Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc. (2013)

Aske’s contract with CSD did not create an entitlement to continued employment under Oregon law. “[I]n Oregon, the general rule is that an employer may discharge an employee at any time and for any reason, absent a contractual, statutory, or constitutional requirement to the contrary.” Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 297 P.3d 1277, 1282 (Or. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court properly dismissed the Goshas’ claim for promissory estoppel because the Goshas failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Bank of America, N.A. made a representation reasonably expected to “induce action or forebearance on the part of [the Goshas].” Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 353 Or. 282 , 297 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2013).

Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 353 Or. 282 , 297 P.3d 1277, 1286 (2013) (en banc); Crawford v. Standard Ins.

The Oregon Supreme Court has identified the standard for reasonable reliance as follows: “If [the plaintiff] is a person of normal intelligence, experience and education, he may not put faith in representations which any such normal person would recognize at once as preposterous . . . or which are shown by facts within his observation to be so patently and obviously false that he must have closed his eyes to avoid discovery of the truth, and still compel the defendant to be …

Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 353 Or. 282, 291 (2013) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981)).

Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 353 Or. 282 , 296–97, 297 P.3d 1277, 1286 (2013).

Claims Although the caption of the lead-action’s second-amended complaint does not include Welch’s name as a defendant, the body of the complaint includes 80 297 P.3d 1277, 1283 (Or. 2013). 81 ECF No. 215 at 2 ¶ 1. claims against him, and the parties have proceeded as though he were named in the caption.

Promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy that applies where the promiser makés a promise that is' reasonably expeeted to induce action or forbearance from the other party, thev other party does in fact rely on the promise, and “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 353 Or. 282, 291 , 297 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2013) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 90(1) (1981)).

See Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 353 Or 282, 296-97 , 297 P3d 1277 (2013) (noting that two elements of a fraud claim are justifiable reliance on a misrepresentation and resulting damages).

See Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 353 Or 282, 298 , 297 P3d 1277 (2013) (describing the subjective and objective components of reliance and further explaining that “the type of interest protected by the law of deceit is the interest in formulating business judgments without being misled by others — in short, in not being cheated” (citation omitted)).