United States v. James and Mallay (2013)

See James, 712 F.3d at 99 (finding autopsy report not testimonial in part because it was completed “substantially before any criminal investigation into [victim’s] death had begun”); id. at 101 (finding toxicology report not testimonial in part because there was “no indication . . . that a criminal investigation was contemplated during the inquiry”); cf. State v. Bass, 132 A.3d 1207, 1225 (N.J. 2016) (finding autopsy report testimonial in part because autopsy took place duri…

“We review the denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).

“We review the denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).

We have previously concluded that “Williams does not … yield a single, useful holding relevant to the case before us.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013).

“A district court is accorded broad discretion in controlling the scope and extent of cross-examination.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed.

United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).

“We review the denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for abuse 19 of discretion.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).

Upon review of the District Court’s denial of Seabrook’s Rule 33 motion 7 for a new trial for abuse of discretion, United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013), we reject Seabrook’s challenge.

Therefore, “the Confrontation Clause gives a 7 defendant the right not only to cross-examination, but to effective cross-examination.” United 8 States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2013). 9 We conclude that Walker was given “a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose” the 10 alleged weaknesses in Donaldson’s cell-site testimony through cross-examination.

Watts identifies no erroneous findings in the district court’s 38-page opinion, nor any basis in the record to suggest that the district court should have “harbor[ed] a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that such concern is prerequisite to granting a Rule 33 motion) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Because we have identified no errors in Carter’s trial, “we must reject [his] claim of cumulative error.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013). 10

Finally, when the redacted statements were admitted, the 8 district court emphatically instructed the jury that one defendant’s self- 9 inculpatory statements were not to be considered by the jury as evidence 10 against any co-defendant, further mitigating any prejudicial effect from the 11 properly redacted statements. 12 Nor has Laurent carried his “heavy burden” to show that any prejudice 13 he suffered from a joint trial with Merritt was “so severe that his conviction 14…

“In deciding a Rule 33 motion, [t]he test is whether it would be a manifest injustice to let the guilty verdict stand.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

The Confrontation Clause under the Sixth Amendment “gives a defendant the right not only to cross-examination, but to effective cross- examination.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2013).

United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013). 6 U.S. CONST. amend.

A trial court "is accorded broad discretion in controlling the scope and extent of cross-examination." United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A district court should afford wide latitude to a defendant in a criminal case to cross-examine government witnesses, . . . [b]ut it does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry in cross-examining a prosecution witness.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2013). 1 Federal Rule of Evidence 611 provides that “[c]ross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of t…

The Supreme Court has “explained that the Confrontation Clause was designed to protect against the ‘principal evil’ of using ex parte statements against the accused.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004)).

And while some judges have suggested that the broader formulation should apply to business records, see James, 712 F.3d at 108 (Eaton, J., concurring), such a view is far from clearly established. 3 Because we uphold the state postconviction court’s reasoning under § 2254(d)(1), we needn’t address the parties’ additional dispute over whether the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing trials such as Owens’s, in which the jury is invited to find additional aggravat…

We have explained that “[i]n deciding a Rule 33 motion, [t]he test is 14 whether it would be a manifest injustice to let the guilty verdict stand.” United 15 States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). 16 Choudhry pointed the District Court principally to two sources of 17 evidence that he argued warranted a new trial: (1) “information disclosed at 3 1 trials conducted in Pakistan . . . after Mr. Choudhry’s U.S. trial had concluded”; 2 and (2)…

We reverse 24 restrictions on cross-examination only when the district court has abused its “broad discretion.” 25 United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30 , 26 42 (2d Cir. 2010)). 27 On appeal, Mack argues that the district court erred when it did not permit his counsel to re- 28 cross-examine witnesses or to cross-examine witnesses on additional topics.

The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 53–54 (2004). “[T]he proper Confrontation Clause inquiry should focus not on reliability as contemplated by the law of evidence, but on the ‘witnesses against the accused—in other words, those who bear testimony.’” United Sta…

When deciding a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, “the test is whether it would be a manifest injustice to let the guilty verdict stand.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013).

Because of the factual nature of the inquiry, "we will reverse a decision to admit co-conspirator statements only if it is clearly erroneous." James , 712 F.3d at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted).

See Williams, 567 U.S. at 141 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that “[w]hat comes out of” the Court’s fractured decision “is—to be frank—who knows what”); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013).

United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 96 (2d Cir. 2013).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides that “‘[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.’” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 107 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed.

In this Circuit, we consider whether such a document was “made with the primary purpose of creating a record for use at a later criminal trial.” United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 96 (2d Cir. 2013).

Those decisions made clear that Ganthier’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the introduction of Dr. Kanfer’s autopsy report — 10 The Second Circuit in Garlick further noted that John’s apparent reliance on a Second Circuit case — United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) — as support for the view that redacted autopsy reports are non-testimonial was misplaced.

“In this Circuit, [courts] consider whether such a document was ‘made with the primary purpose of creating a record for use at a later criminal trial.’” United States v. Grecco, 728 F. App’x 32 , 34 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 96 (2d Cir. 2013)).

Ordinarily, ‘‘[w]hen a fragmented [c]ourt decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five [j]ustices, the holding of the [c]ourt may be viewed as the position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1134 , 134 S. Ct. 2660 , 189 L.

App'x 819 , 829-31 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding that a toxicology report ordered by the medical examiner as part of an autopsy was not testimonial because medical examiners routinely conduct autopsies that do not lead to criminal investigations or prosecutions and the primary purpose of an autopsy is to determine the cause of death); James , 712 F.3d at 99 ("In short, the autopsy report was not testimonial because it was not prepared *448 primarily to create a record for use at…

See Williams v. Illinois , supra, 567 U.S. at 106 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 126-27 , 132 S.Ct. 2221 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also United States v. James , 712 F.3d 79 , 95 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[t]he Williams plurality's first rationale-that the laboratory report *1257 there was offered as basis evidence, and not for its truth-was roundly rejected by five [j]ustices"), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1134 , 134 S. Ct. 2660 , 189 L.

Ed. 2d 132 (2007), with United States v. James , supra, 712 F.3d at 99, 101-102 (concluding that court must consider circumstances of death to determine whether primary purpose of autopsy was for use in criminal prosecution).

See United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 87-102 (2d Cir. 2013) ("autopsy report was not testimonial because it was not prepared primarily to create a record for use at a criminal trial"); People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶¶76-138 , 980 N.E.2d 570 (autopsy report not testimonial because it was not "prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual" or for "providing evidence in a criminal case" (citations omitted)); State v. Maxwell, 2014-Ohio-1019, ¶¶54-65 ,…

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 2013). 4 Should the Court grant Plaintiff this limited leave to amend, Plaintiff is encouraged to contact the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal Assistance Project for free legal assistance.

See United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Rule 803(8)(A)-(B), which defines public records, excludes documents prepared in anticipation of litigation[.]”); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 237 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Rule 803(8) excludes documents prepared for the ultimate purpose of litigation.”); see also In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2012 WL 4511308 , at *2 (“Rule 803(8) allows the admission of public records that would otherwise constitute hearsay be…

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 2013).

Indeed, at the time of trial, several federal and state courts had concluded that Williams did not establish any controlling rule (see United States v James, 712 F3d 79, 95-96 [2d Cir 2013] [concluding that, as “five Justices disagreed with” the Williams plurality’s “narrowed definition of testimonial” “and it would appear to conflict directly with Melendez-Diaz,” Williams did not “yield a single, useful holding”]; United States v Duron-Caldera, 737 F3d 988, 994-995 [5th Cir…

A statement is testimonial and triggers the protections of the Confrontation Clause if it was "made with the primary purpose of creating a record for use at a later criminal trial." United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 96 (2d Cir. 2013).

United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2013).

It reasoned that Wis. Stat. §908.01 (4)(b)5 “requires only that the declarant (Welch) and the party against whom the statement was offered ([the petitioner]), not the person to whom the statement was made (Smith), be members of the conspiracy.” Id. (citing United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 106 (2d Cir. 2013)).

United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 105 (2d Cir.2013), cert. denied, ——- U.S. ——, 134 S.Ct. 2660 , 189 L.Ed.2d 208 (2014). ?

Washington, 876 F.3d at 406 (quoting United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79 at 91 (2d Cir. 2013)).

Compare United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 134 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2013); Mitchell v. Kelly, 520 F. App ' x 329 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); McNeiece v. Lattimore, 501 F. App'x 634,636 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 831-32 (10th Cir. 2013), with United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1232 (11th Cir. 2012); Bostick, 791 F.3d at 127 . 33 ECF No. 712.

See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 97-98 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Autopsies are typically conducted soon after death . . . . when it is not yet clear whether there is a particular suspect or whether the facts found in the autopsy will ultimately prove relevant in a criminal trial.”); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 97-99 (2nd Cir. 2013) (explaining that routine autopsy report was not testimonial because it was completed substantially before criminal investi…

See, e.g., United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 988 , 994 n.4 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Watson, 185 A.3d 845, 855-56 (N.H. 2018); State v. Stanfield, 347 P.3d 175 , 184 15 (Idaho 2015); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 665-66 (N.J. 2014); State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 919-20 (W.Va. 2012).

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A .e> 126 Nev. at 339 , 236 P.3d at 637 , the toxicology analysis here was not performed in contemplation of criminal proceedings, but rather for the routine purpose of determining cause of death in a suspected accidental overdose from prescription drugs, compare United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 97-99 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that toxicology report was nontestimonial where produced for coroner's routine duty of determining cause of death, s…

See Washington , 876 F.3d at 406-07 ; see also United States v. James , 712 F.3d 79 , 91 (2d Cir. 2013) ("The [ Williams ] Court came to no clear consensus as to what constituted a testimonial statement in this context ....").

See, e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Williams does not, as far as we can determine, using the Marks analytic approach, yield a single, useful holding relevant to the case before us.