Rebecca Pepper v. Carolyn W. Colvin (2013)
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· 1,188 citation events
across 14 courts.
Showing the 50 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 2013 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
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Siddiqui v. Colvin (2015)
But see Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 365-67 (7th Cir.2013) (under some circumstances, failure to use explicitly special technique may be harmless error); Robbers v. Comm’r Soc.
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Mark Schloesser v. Nancy A. Berryhill (2017)
In other words, he does not argue that pay‐ ing for coverage or the provider availability was akin to not having insur‐ ance. 4 Even if the Appeals Council had failed to consider his singular state‐ ment regarding his insurance status, this error would harmless, as the Ap‐ peals Council decision is overwhelmingly supported by the record as dis‐ cussed infra. See Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir.2010); Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The [agen…
“The [agency’s] application … is not a model for compliance, but we will not remand a case for further specification when we are convinced that [it] will reach the same result.”
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Gotoimoana Summers v. Nancy A. Berryhill (2017)
See also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ’s adequate discussion of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation of every piece. of evidence.”) (internal marks omitted).
“[A]n ALJ’s adequate discussion of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation of every piece. of evidence.”
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Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security (2022)
SSR 16-3p (superseding SSR 96-7p); see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”).
“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
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Charles v. Commissioner of Social Security (2023)
Ill. 2018) (“the Court reads the ALJ’s decision as a whole and the ALJ is not required to create “tidy packaging” throughout his decision”); Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”) A representative example: when discussing whether A.L.L. had a limitation…
“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Vaughn v. Saul (2022)
See, e.g., Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We will not, however, reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ’s.”).
“We will not, however, reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ’s.”
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Wegmann v. Saul (2021)
See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 355 (“The critical inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] became disabled at any time prior to . . . the date [the plaintiff] was last insured.”).
“The critical inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] became disabled at any time prior to . . . the date [the plaintiff] was last insured.”
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Sims v. Kijakazi (2021)
See, e.g., Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”).
“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Sims v. Kijakazi (2021)
See, e.g., Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”).
“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Jenkins v. Saul (2020)
Mot. at 5-6 (citing Sawyer v. Colvin, 512 F. App'x 603, 611 (7th Cir. 2013).) Nonetheless, "[i]n determining an individual's RFC, the ALJ must evaluate all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 366 (7th Cir. 2013) ("After a 'not severe' finding at step two," the ALJ must "assess the mental impairment in conjunction w…
"After a 'not severe' finding at step two," the ALJ must "assess the mental impairment in conjunction with the individual's RFC at step four"
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Fudge v. Saul (2020)
See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 355 (“The critical inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] became disabled at any time prior to . . . the date [the plaintiff] was last insured.”).
“The critical inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] became disabled at any time prior to . . . the date [the plaintiff] was last insured.”
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Williams v. Saul (2020)
See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The use of boilerplate is innocuous when . . . the language is followed by an explanation for rejecting the claimant’s testimony.”); Pepper, 712 F.3d at 367-68 (“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”).
“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Johsnon v. Saul (2020)
See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The use of boilerplate is innocuous when . . . the language is followed by an explanation for rejecting the claimant’s testimony.”); Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”).
“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Daniel L. R. v. Commissioner of Social Security (2026)
When making the credibility determination, “an ALJ must adequately explain Page 5 of 11 Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016) (superseding SSR 96-7p).3 Additionally, while an ALJ is not required to provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence, reversal and remand is required where the ALJ “provides nothing more than a superficial analysis[.]” Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Michael O. Joseph, Jr. v. Frank J. Bisignano, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (2026)
In rendering a decision, the ALJ “must build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005)).
quoting Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005)
SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1; Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 2014) (“the ALJ’s RFC assessment must incorporate all of the claimant’s limitations supported by the medical report.”).
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ’s adequate discussion of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation of every piece of evidence.”) (internal marks omitted).
“[A]n ALJ’s adequate discussion of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation of every piece of evidence.”
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Bender v. O'Malley (2024)
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 366 (7th Cir. 2013) (“After a ‘not severe’ finding at step two,” the ALJ must “assess the mental impairment in conjunction with the individual's RFC at step four.”); Judy D. v. Saul, 2019 WL 3805592 , at *4 (N.D.
“After a ‘not severe’ finding at step two,” the ALJ must “assess the mental impairment in conjunction with the individual's RFC at step four.”
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Smith v. Kijakazi (2023)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“ALJ must build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence”) (quoting Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir. 2005)).
“ALJ must build a logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence”
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Donnellon v. O'Malley (2023)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence”).
“ALJ must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion, but he need not provide a complete written evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence”
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Van Ness v. Kijakazi (2022)
See, e.g., Kaplarevic v. Saul, 3 F.4th 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2021)( “It was [plaintiff’s] burden to show disability, and if he wanted to do so, he should have . . . identif[ied] the portions of the medical records that he believed supported various of [his] allegations.”); Fanta v. Saul, 848 F. App'x 655 , 659 (7th Cir. 2021)(“[Plaintiff] does not point to any objective evidence or medical opinions in the record that support stricter limitations.”); Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 3…
“. . . the burden was on [plaintiff] to explain why she was disabled as a result of her depression.”
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RAMOS v. KIJAKAZI (2022)
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 363 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to discuss every snippet of information from the medical records that might be inconsistent with the rest of the objective medical evidence.”).
“[A]n ALJ is not required to discuss every snippet of information from the medical records that might be inconsistent with the rest of the objective medical evidence.”
The decision to discount Neal’s testimony cannot be deemed “patently wrong.” See Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that the court will overturn an ALJ’s credibility determination only if it is patently wrong); see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We will not. . . reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ’s.”).
“We will not. . . reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ’s.”
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MARTIN v. KIJAKAZI (2022)
"If the ALJ has otherwise explained [her] conclusion adequately, the inclusion of this language can be harmless." Id.; see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if [s]he otherwise points to information that justified h[er] credibility determination.").
"[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if [s]he otherwise points to information that justified h[er] credibility determination."
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Green v. Saul (2022)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We will not . . . reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ[].”).
“We will not . . . reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ[].”
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Holbrook v. Commissioner of Social Security (2021)
It is clear to us, given the context, that the ALJ merely used a polite 10 way to say the weight of the evidence did not support all her claims.”); see also Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[t]he use of boilerplate is innocuous when, as here, the language is followed by an explanation for rejecting the claimant’s testimony”); Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“ [T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not autom…
“ [T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Gross v. Commissioner of Social Security (2021)
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *10; see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”).
“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
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Bumgardner v. Saul (2021)
It is well settled that when determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must “consider the combination of all limitations on the ability to work, including those that do not individually rise to the level of a severe impairment.” Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 2010); Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 366 (7th Cir. 2013) (“After a ‘not severe’ finding at step two,” the ALJ must “assess the mental impairment in conjunction with the individual’s RFC at step four.”).
“After a ‘not severe’ finding at step two,” the ALJ must “assess the mental impairment in conjunction with the individual’s RFC at step four.”
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Wilder v. Commissioner of Social Security (2021)
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We will not remand a case to the ALJ for further specification where we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result.”) (citing McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011)).
“We will not remand a case to the ALJ for further specification where we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result.”
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Ballard v. Commissioner of Social Security (2020)
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *10; see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”).
“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
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Sandmon, Georgiann v. Saul, Andrew (2020)
See, e.g., Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (2013) (“simple fact that ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination”).
“simple fact that ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination”
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Tolve v. Saul (2020)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”).
“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Salvino, Sonja v. Berryhill, Nancy (2020)
See also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The burden was on [the claimant] to explain why she was disabled as a result of her depression.”).
“The burden was on [the claimant] to explain why she was disabled as a result of her depression.”
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Enfelt v. Saul (2019)
R. 27; Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will not remand a case for further specification when we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result.”); Lee v. Sullivan, 988 F.3d 789 , 794 (7th Cir. 1993).
“[W]e will not remand a case for further specification when we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result.”
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Gauer v. Saul (2019)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will not remand a case for further specification when we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result.”).
“[W]e will not remand a case for further specification when we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result.”
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Campbell v. Commissioner of Social Security (2019)
SSR 16-3p; see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”).
“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
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Maksutoski v. Berryhill (2019)
See Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Commissioner is responsible for weighing the evidence, resolving conflicts and making independent findings of fact[.]”); see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 363 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The ALJ has the responsibility of resolving any conflicts between the medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony.”).
“The ALJ has the responsibility of resolving any conflicts between the medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony.”
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Keiper v. Berryhill (2019)
SSR 16-3p; see also Pepper v. Colvin , 712 F.3d 351 , 367 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.").
"[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record."
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Ashley v. Berryhill (2019)
See also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”).
“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
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Ephrain S. v. Berryhill (2019)
Thus, in Murphy v. Colvin , 759 F.3d 811 , 816 (7th Cir. 2014), the court stressed that the use of boilerplate language "does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if [she] otherwise points to information that justifies [the] credibility determination." See also Pepper v. Colvin , 712 F.3d 351 , 367-68 (7th Cir. 2013) ("the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate concl…
"the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination."
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Santiago v. Berryhill (2019)
Thus, in Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014), the court stressed that the use of boilerplate language “does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if [she] otherwise 14 points to information that justifies [the] credibility determination.”See also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013)(“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclus…
“the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ's ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Warner v. Berryhill (2019)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[A] claimant represented by counsel is presumed to have made his best case before the ALJ.") (quoting Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007)).
"[A] claimant represented by counsel is presumed to have made his best case before the ALJ."
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Evertsen v. Berryhill (2019)
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e will not remand a case for further specification when we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result”).
“[W]e will not remand a case for further specification when we are convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result”
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Falls v. Berryhill (2018)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”).
“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
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Falls v. Berryhill (2018)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”).
“[A]n ALJ must adequately explain his credibility finding by discussing specific reasons supported by the record.”
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Phillips v. Berryhill (2018)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351 , 367–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“However, the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if [she] otherwise points to information that justifies [her] credibility determination.”).
“However, the simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if [she] otherwise points to information that justifies [her] credibility determination.”
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Carlson v. Colvin (2018)
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The critical inquiry is whether [claimant] became disabled at any time prior to…the date [claimant] was last insured.”).
“The critical inquiry is whether [claimant] became disabled at any time prior to…the date [claimant] was last insured.”
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Peters v. Colvin (2018)
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367-68 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”) In the same vein, the ALJ did not rely solely on the lack of objective medical evidence supporting Claimant’s allegations, though that certainly did play into his consideration (and properly so given the …
“[T]he simple fact that an ALJ used boilerplate language does not automatically undermine or discredit the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion if he otherwise points to information that justifies his credibility determination.”
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Gade v. Berryhill (2018)
Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The critical inquiry is whether [claimant] became disabled at any time prior to…the date [claimant] was last insured.”).
“The critical inquiry is whether [claimant] became disabled at any time prior to…the date [claimant] was last insured.”
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Derry v. Saul (2018)
See Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 363 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to discuss every snippet of information from the medical records that might be inconsistent with the rest of the objective medical evidence” where “the ALJ’s discussion . . . was supported by substantial evidence on the record”).
“[A]n ALJ is not required to discuss every snippet of information from the medical records that might be inconsistent with the rest of the objective medical evidence” where “the ALJ’s discussion . . . was supported by substantial evidence on the record”