United States v. Stephen Graham-Wright (2013)

Information “need only relate to one of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 735 (6th Cir. 2012). “[E]videntiary inclusiveness is the order of the day at sentencing, a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it.” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013).

A sentencing court’s “inquiry is ‘broad in scope[]’ and . . . ‘largely unlimited . . . as to the kind of information [it] may consider . . . .’” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).

But “a sentencing judge’s inquiry is ‘broad in scope,’ and [] is ‘largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.’” United States v. Graham- Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).

Further, “[d]istrict courts enjoy ‘broad’ and ‘largely unlimited’ flexibility in the information they can consider at sentencing.” United States v. Dentmond, No. 23-1558, 2024 WL 2186324 , at *3 (6th Cir. May 15, 2024) (quoting United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013)).

United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).

After all, a district court may consider any reliable information in making its sentencing decision, see United States v. Graham- Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013), including information that reflects the existence of uncharged crimes by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399 , 4 Case Nos. 20-5281/5282, United States v. Richardson 407 (6th Cir. 2019).

It is well settled that “a sentencing judge’s inquiry is ‘broad in scope,’ and it is ‘largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.’” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)).

Id. at *2–4 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Federal Rules of Evidence “do not apply at sentencing hearings”).

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”— “a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013) — explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

“When all is said and done, a sentencing judge’s inquiry is ‘broad in scope’ and it is ‘largely unlimited as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.’ ” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013) *535 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 , 92 S.Ct. 589 , 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972)).

The district court could have relied on this evidence, see United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013), but its choice not to does not rise to the level of clear error.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

Id. at 968 (citing United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Nichols, 438 F.3d 437, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Del Vecchio v. Ill.

An imperative of “evidentiary inclusiveness”—“a frame of reference as likely to facilitate leniency as to impede it,” United States v. Graham–Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013)—explains why the Evidence Rules, the Confrontation Clause, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof do not apply at sentencing.

See United States v. Nichols, 438 F.3d 437 , 439–45 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013); Del Vecchio v. Ill.

See United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Rankin, 929 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2019).

See United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that “Miranda generally does not apply at sentencing.

See United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013).

Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1388 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (concluding in the context of a federal habeas corpus petition that, even assuming a confession was obtained in violation of Miranda, it did not require exclusion from a state sentencing proceeding because “[t]he exclusionary rule is generally inapplicable during sentencing”); see also United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]hat is why Miranda generally does not apply at sentencing.

See United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir.2013) (“Sentencing hearings may include evidence otherwise inadmissible at trial so long as the evidence is reliable.”).

See Shalash, 759 F. App’x at 394 (“In sentencing, after all, reliability is the central question, and the report was ‘real information from a real psychiatrist after a voluntary examination.’” (quoting Graham- Wright, 715 F.3d at 604 )).

See Shalash, 759 F. App’x at 394 (“In sentencing, after all, reliability is the central question, and the report was ‘real information from a real psychiatrist after a voluntary examination.’” (quoting Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d at 604 )).