Rodriguez v. Shulman (2012)

However, because the defendants “perform[] ‘quasi-judicial functions[,]’” Klayman I, 2019 WL 2396538 , at *11 (citation omitted), they “are entitled to quasi- judicial immunity[,]” Rodriguez, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 12 ; see id. (“[Quasi-judicial] immunity has traditionally been extended to members of boards of law examiners or of boards that have the power to revoke attorneys’ licenses.”).

Oct. 6, 2020); Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2012),; Wiggins v. Philip Morris, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 458, 466 (D.D.C. 1994).

For example, he criticizes the Northern 4 It matters not that the Northern District dismissed the claims against the DOJ defendants without prejudice. “[E]ven a jurisdictional judgment that results in dismissal without prejudice may [] nevertheless have issue preclusive—if not claim preclusive—effect.” Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2012). 5 Having determined that MacKenzie’s claims are precluded and thus cannot proceed, the Court need not address the Go…

Unitronics’ motion thus “provided [Mr. Gharb] with ample notice that he may *159 be enjoined from making future filings in this district,” and Mr. Gharb “had the opportunity to be heard on the matter of whether a prospective pre-filing injunction is appropriate because he was free to address the injunction issue in the context of his briefs in opposition to [Unitronics’] motions.” Id.\ see also Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F.Supp.2d 1, 15 (D.D.C.2012) (finding plaintiffs had op…

Caldwell, 6 F.Supp.3d at 50 (citing Powell, 851 F.2d at 431 ; Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F.Supp.2d 1, 15 (D.D.C.2012)).

Court of Appeals and this Court, is the same. 13 not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged.”) (emphasis in original); Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that new legal theories raised in second proceeding were so related to previously litigated questions that they did not constitute distinct issues).

See Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254, 258-59 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“If a new legal theory or factual assertion put forward in the second action is related to the subject-matter and relevant to the issues that were litigated and adjudicated previously, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged”) (emphasis in original); Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F.Supp.2d 1,…

Courts in this District, for example, have justified their decision to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when: (1) "[a]ll federal claims against Defendants have been dismissed"; (2) "[t]he case has not progressed in federal court past motions for judgment on the pleadings"; (3) "discovery has just commenced"; and (4) "the Court has developed little familiarity with the issues presented." Mpoy v. Fenty , 901 F.Supp.2d 144 , 158-59 (D.D.C. 2012) ; se…

See Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that judicial immunity applied to “the [d]efendants who served on the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board and the D.C.

See Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding plaintiffs had opportunity to be heard regarding injunction when they submitted opposition brief).

See Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding plaintiffs had opportunity to be heard regarding injunction when they submitted opposition brief). 5 Here, there can be little question that Hall has been given appropriate notice.

See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1 , 11–12 (D.D.C. 2012); Richardson v. District of Columbia, 711 F. Supp. 2d 115, 128 (D.D.C. 2010); Nwachukwu, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 192–93; Thomas v. Knight, 257 F. Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D.D.C. 2003).

Courts in this District, for example, have justified their decision to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when: (1) “[a]ll federal claims against Defendants have been dismissed”; (2) “[t]he case has not progressed in federal court past motions for judgment on the pleadings”; (3) “discovery has just commenced”; and (4) “the Court has developed little familiarity with the issues presented.” Mpoy v. Fenty, 901 F. Supp. 2d 144 , 158–59 (D.D.C. 2012); se…

Unitronics’ motion thus “provided [Mr. Gharb] with ample notice that he may be enjoined from making future filings in this district,” and Mr. Gharb “had the opportunity to be heard on the matter of whether a prospective pre-filing injunction is appropriate because he was free to address the injunction issue in the context of his briefs in opposition to [Uni-tronics’] motions.” Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F.Supp.2d 1, 15 (D.D.C.2012) (finding plaintiffs had opport…

Unitronics’ motion thus “provided [Mr. Gharb] with ample notice that he may be enjoined from making future filings in this district,” and Mr. Gharb “had the opportunity to be heard on the matter of whether a prospective pre-filing injunction is appropriate because he was free to address the injunction issue in the context of his briefs in opposition to [Unitronics’] motions.” Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F.Supp.2d 1, 15 (D.D.C.2012) (finding plaintiffs had opportu…

See id.-, see also Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F.Supp.2d 1, 15 (D.D.C.2012) (“Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.”).