Pichler v. UNITE (2005)

The finding that this alleged a violation of the DPPA rested on the district court's interpretation of § 2724(a), which provides that: "A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains[.]" The district court relied on Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 241-42 (E.D.Pa.2005), aff'd on other grounds, 542 F.3d 380 (3…

Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 242 (E.D.Pa.2005). *367 B.

Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 241 (E.D.Pa.2005).

Even after such a ruling, a defendant could manufacture a slightly different purpose for his conduct and then claim ignorance of whether the DPPA prohibited the new purpose.” Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 242 (E.D.

Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 250 (E.D.

See, e.g., Rios v. Direct Mail Express, Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1205 (S.D.Fla.2006) (“[T]he term ‘knowingly’ only modifies the phrase ‘obtains, discloses, or uses personal information’ ... not ... ‘for a purpose not permitted.’ ”); Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 242 (E.D.Pa.2005).

(D.I. 291, at 6.) A proposed class definition should not “inextricably intertwine[ ] identification of class members with liability determinations.” See Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 247 (E.D.Pa.2005).

A court must reject a proposed class or subclass definition that “inextricably intertwines identification of class members with liability determinations.” Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 247 (E.D.Pa.2005), aff'd, 542 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 2008).

We reasoned that, although our Court of Appeals has not adopted the Allison standard, it has ruled that a district court does not err by applying it, see Barabin v. Aramark Corp., 2003 WL 355417 (3d Cir. Jan.24 2003) (unpublished), and eases in lower courts have surmised that “the Court of Appeals will join the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits [in adopting Allison] when an appropriate case reaches it.” Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 256 (E.D.Pa.2005); see also Thomps…

Thus, under the express language of the DPPA the term “knowingly” only modifies the phrase “obtains, discloses, or uses personal information.” It does not modify the phrase “for a purpose not permitted under this Chapter.” See Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 241-42 (E.D.Pa.2005) (thoroughly analyzing the DPPA and finding that the term “knowingly” did not modify the phrase “for a purpose not permitted under this Chapter.”).

See Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230 (E.D.Pa.2005) ( Pichler I ).

See Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 240 (E.D.

Accord Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 245 (E.D.Pa.2005) (holding that pursuant to § 2724(b)(1), a plaintiff need not prove actual damages to be awarded liquidated damages). 3 There is no language in subsection (b)(1) that confines liquidated damages to people who suffered actual damages.

See Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230 (E.D.Pa.2005). 6 .

See, e.g., Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 253-54 (E.D.Pa.2005) (finding certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) appropriate where “there is a ‘risk’ that another court could interpret [the statute] differently” and that “[i]f that were to occur, the inconsistent adjudications would establish incompatible standards of conduct for [defendant]”).

Id.; see also Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230, 259 (E.D.Pa.2005) (declining to hold that the possibility that the defendant could face up to seventy million in damages is sufficient to deny class certification).