Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Erie Lackawanna Inc. (1987)
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· 108 citation events
across 36 courts.
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(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
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Byrd v. Delo (1990)
But see, McDonald v. Blackburn, 806 F.2d 613 , 622 n. 9 (5th Cir.1986) (following plurality in Kuhlman ), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2465 , 95 L.Ed.2d 874 (1987); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir.1988) (petitioner must make "colorable showing"), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1645 , 104 L.Ed.2d 160 (1989).
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United States v. Catherine Papajohn (2000)
See United States v. Adams, 799 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2464 , 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987) (distinguishing between “I believe that the defendant is guilty,” which is an impermissible voucher, and “I believe [that] the evidence has shown the defendant’s guilt,” which is a permitted argument).
distinguishing between “I believe that the defendant is guilty,” which is an impermissible voucher, and “I believe [that] the evidence has shown the defendant’s guilt,” which is a permitted argument
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United States v. Catherine Papajohn (2000)
See United States v. Adams, 799 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987) (distinguishing between "I believe that the defendant is guilty," which is an impermissible voucher, and "I believe [that] the evidence has shown the defendant's guilt," which is a permitted argument).
distinguishing between "I believe that the defendant is guilty," which is an impermissible voucher, and "I believe [that] the evidence has shown the defendant's guilt," which is a permitted argument
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Dannenberg v. Software Toolworks Inc. (1994)
See also Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir.1986) (using a pragmatic approach similar to Horn and exercising jurisdiction only after concluding “that the dismissal, which was nominally without prejudice, was for our purposes a final dismissal” because the statute of limitations would prevent the plaintiffs from refiling any dismissed claims), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987).
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Dannenberg v. The Software Toolworks Inc. (1994)
See also Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir.1986) (using a pragmatic approach similar to Horn and exercising jurisdiction only after concluding "that the dismissal, which was nominally without prejudice, was for our purposes a final dismissal" because the statute of limitations would prevent the plaintiffs from refiling any dismissed claims), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987).
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Hohe v. Casey (1992)
See plaintiffs’ brief at 15 (citing Robinson v. New Jersey, 806 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987) and acknowledging that the escrow “regime” established by the union is constitutional).
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Mary A. Hohe Timothy L. Cassel Joseph F. Clover, III Vickie M. Clover Steven A. Ebersole Linda R. Garman Arle… (1992)
See plaintiffs' brief at 15 (citing Robinson v. New Jersey, 806 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987) and acknowledging that the escrow "regime" established by the union is constitutional). 36 Because of this concession and the plaintiffs' failure to raise on appeal a facial constitutional challenge to Act 84's escrow provisions, we need not address that issue. 2.
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United States v. James Owens (1992)
See also United States v. Adams, 799 F.2d 665, 671 (11th Cir.1986) (when district court withdraws evidence from the jury with an instruction to disregard it, “ ‘the error is cured unless the evidence is so highly prejudicial as to render the error incurable’ ”) (quoting United States v. Benz, 740 F.2d 903, 916 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 , 106 S.Ct. 62 , 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2464 , 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987).
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Hughes v. Lipscher (1990)
See Robinson v. New Jersey, 806 F.2d 442, 449 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F.2d 513, 517 (3d Cir.1978).
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Hughes v. Lipscher (1990)
See Robinson v. New Jersey, 806 F.2d 442, 449 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F.2d 513, 517 (3d Cir.1978).
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United States v. Johnie M. Owens (1990)
More than one court has recognized the sensible principle that “[a] defendant cannot take his chances with a judge and then, if he thinks that the sentence is too severe, secure a disqualification and a hearing before another judge.” Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 642 (9th Cir.1950); see also United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 , 1173 n. 3 (3d Cir.) (“Disqualification motion filed after trial and judgment is usually considered untimely ... for otherwise a party…
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Catherine M. Jones v. Pittsburgh National Corporation T/d/b/a Pittsburgh National Bank, a Federally-Chartered… (1990)
See United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1173, n. 3 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2465 , 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir.1978).
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Jones v. Pittsburgh National Corp. (1990)
See United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1173, n. 3 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2465 , 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir.1978).
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United States v. Jimmie Calvin Caves, United States of America v. Chloe Kathleen Gorman (1989)
See generally United States v. Adams, 799 F.2d 665, 672-73 (11th Cir.1986) (upholding conviction for possession of marijuana when female defendant’s presence in motor home containing marijuana “was essential to the success of the ruse — to give the appearance of a couple vacationing in a motor home”), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2464 , 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987).
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Charles Anderson Miller v. Daniel B. Vasquez, Warden (1989)
In reviewing whether this challenge implicates Miller’s due process rights, we consider “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); see Newton v. Superior Court of California, 803 F.2d 1051, 1058-59 (9th Cir.1986) (applyi…
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Martin E. O'BOyle v. Jiffy Lube International, Inc (1989)
See Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1156 (3d Cir.1986), (except in a few specific situations not applicable here, a notice of appeal from a non-final order will take effect when, due to subsequent events, the previous non-final order is rendered final), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1987).
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Walker v. Government of the Virgin Islands (2000)
See United States v, Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2465 , 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987).
See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3rd Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2465 , 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987).
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Ahls v. Sherwood/Division of Harsco Corp. (1991)
Id. at 308-09 , 82 S.Ct. at 1514-15 , 8 L.Ed.2d at 525-26 ; see also Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1155-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 , 107 S.Ct. 2463 , 95 L.Ed.2d 872 (1986).
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Government of the Virgin Islands v. Britton (1990)
See United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987).