5 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2025See Owens, 310 Kan. at 874 (discussing State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 [2004], as an example of improper conflation of the first and second Barker factors). 2025See Owens, 310 Kan. at 874 (discussing State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 [2004], as an example of improper conflation of the first and second Barker factors). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Owensgreen1 sentence2020This was a simple and straightforward case, and the nature of the evidence involved does not justify a 19-month delay between Owens' arrest and trial. [Citations omitted.]" 310 Kan. at 875, 451 P.3d at 474-75. 18 The State's argument here conflates the first and second Barker factors in exactly the way that Owens warned against. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bloom
green
2 sentences2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). 2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Smallwood
green
2 sentences2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). 2019The State in this case largely blurs the distinction between the first and second Barker factors, suggesting this court did so in 11 State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 309 , 85 P.3d 1164 (2004), State v. Bloom, 273 Kan. 291 , 44 P.3d 305 (2002), and State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Bussart-Savaloja
green
1 sentence2015Although three of the four factors suggest that Delacruz’ due process rights were violated, his failure to show substantial prejudice negates any violation. “[T]he necessity of showing substantial prejudice dominates the Barker test once a defendant has been convicted, and the first and second Barker factors do not compensate for a failure to timely assert the right or allege substantial prejudice. [Citation omitted.]” Bussart-Savaloja, 40 Kan. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. William John Yehling
green
1 sentence2008Yehling, 456 F.3d at 1245-46 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.