second compensable injury rule in Wyoming

2005Medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits awarded at a later date pursuant to the second compensable injury rule are not among the benefits the statute controls." Yenne-Tully I, 12 P.8d at 178 (quoting Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo.1995)). [T18] The Division does not directly dispute the potential applicability of the second compensable injury rule to Mr. Carabajal's claim.

2000In Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224-25 (Wyo.1995), we said: The basic rationale behind the second compensable injury rule is well stated in Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 530-31 , 62 P.2d 531, at 539 (1936): [I]t seems to us palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has tried to keep his place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and then has found that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which medical science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, have gradually and ultimately produced a

2024This principle, referred to as the second compensable injury rule, applies when ‘an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention.’” In re Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 9 , 215 P.3d 277, 281 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Baldwin v. Scullion, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1936), and quoting Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel.

2000In Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224-25 (Wyo.1995), we said: The basic rationale behind the second compensable injury rule is well stated in Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 530-31 , 62 P.2d 531, at 539 (1936): [I]t seems to us palpably unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has tried to keep his place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and then has found that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which medical science could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, have gradually and ultimately produced a

2007Id. [¶ 19] A review of the cases in which we have applied the second compensable injury rule is instructive.

2007Id. [119] A review of the cases in which we have applied the second compensable injury rule is instructive.

2022We held that, “[u]nder the[se] circumstances, the failure to [invoke the second compensable injury rule] constitute[d] a decision ‘not in accordance with law.’” Id. (quoting Pino, 996 P.2d at 687 ). [¶46] In this case, however, no medical expert testified that Ms. Reichenberg’s carpal tunnel syndrome “ripened” into a second compensable injury or that her initial injury materially contributed to the precipitation, aggravation, or acceleration of the injury.

2011Div., 996 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo.2000) and Kaczmarek, ¶ 11, 215 P.3d at 282-83 , indicate that the second compensable injury rule imposes a more lenient burden of proof, i.e., the claimant must demonstrate it is "more probable than not" that the first and second injury are causally related. [¶ 22] As the OAH recognized, a claimant generally has the burden of proving each of the essential elements of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

2022Div., 2005 WY 119 , ¶¶ 19–21, 119 P.3d 947 , 953–54 (Wyo. 2005) we held that this argument is not foreclosed on appeal so long as the hearing examiner heard sufficient evidence of the claimant’s theory of the case to be on alert she should apply the second compensable injury rule.

2022Div., 2005 WY 119 , ¶¶ 19–21, 119 P.3d 947 , 953–54 (Wyo. 2005) we held that this argument is not foreclosed on appeal so long as the hearing examiner heard sufficient evidence of the claimant’s theory of the case to be on alert she should apply the second compensable injury rule.

2024This principle, referred to as the second compensable injury rule, applies when ‘an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention.’” In re Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 9 , 215 P.3d 277, 281 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Baldwin v. Scullion, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1936), and quoting Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel.

2024This principle, referred to as the second compensable injury rule, applies when ‘an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention.’” In re Kaczmarek, 2009 WY 110, ¶ 9 , 215 P.3d 277, 281 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Baldwin v. Scullion, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1936), and quoting Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel.

2015As with claims for benefits arising from an initial injury, an employee claiming entitlement to benefits under the second compensable injury rule has the burden of proving "a causal connection exists between a work-related injury and the injury for which worker's compensation benefits are being sought." Hoffman, ¶ 9, 291 P.3d at 301 , quoting Davenport v. State ex rel.

2015As with claims for benefits arising from an initial injury, an employee claiming entitlement to benefits under the second compensable injury rule has the burden of proving “a causal connection exists between a work-related injury and the injury for which worker’s compensation benefits are being sought.” Hoffman, ¶ 9, 291 P.3d at 301 , quoting Davenport v. State ex rel.

2015Div. v. Hartmann, 2015 WY 1 , ¶ 20, 342 P.3d 377, 382-83 (Wyo.2015). [130] The OAH has the responsibility to invoke and apply the correct rules of law, including the second compensable injury rule, to workers' compensation claims.

2015Div. v. Hartmann, 2015 WY 1 , ¶ 20, 342 P.3d 377, 382-83 (Wyo. 2015). [¶30] The OAH has the responsibility to invoke and apply the correct rules of law, including the second compensable injury rule, to workers’ compensation claims.

2011Dale, ¶ 35, 188 P.3d at 563 ; Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo.2000).

2011Dale, ¶ 35, 188 P.3d at 563 ; Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 963 (Wyo.2000).

2010In its brief, the Division has pointed out that where a common law remedy conflicts with a statutory remedy, the statutory remedy is controlling, citing Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 961-62 (Wyo.1973).

2010In its brief, the Division has pointed out that where a common law remedy conflicts with a statutory remedy, the statutory remedy is controlling, citing Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 961-62 (Wyo.1973).

2003Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Colvin, 681 P.2d 269, 273 (Wyo.1984), we held that double recovery was prohibited (claimant could not be compensated for the partial loss of his entire arm and also be compensated for the individual injuries to the same member). [¶ 12] It is true that this Court has recognized the second compensable injury rule, under which an employee who has incurred a compensable injury and received benefits for that injury, may receive more benefits for a compensable injury caused by the first injury, regardless of the passage of time.

2003Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. Colvin, 681 P.2d 269, 273 (Wyo.1984), we held that double recovery was prohibited (claimant could not be compensated for the partial loss of his entire arm and also be compensated for the individual injuries to the same member). [112] It is true that this Court has recognized the second compensable injury rule, under which an employee who has incurred a compensable injury and received benefits for that injury, may receive more benefits for a compensable injury caused by the first injury, regardless of the passage of time.

2015"Under the second compensable injury rule, a subsequent injury or condition is compensable if it is causally related to the initial compensable injury." Id.

2015“Under the second compensable injury rule, a subsequent injury or condition is compensable if it is causally related to the initial compensable injury.” Id.

2009Walsh v. Holly Sugar Corp., 931 P.2d 241, 243 (Wyo.1997). [¶ 10] To define the burden of proof applicable to the second compensable injury rule, we have contrasted it with the burden articulated in Wyo.

2007Id., ¶ 24, 119 P.3d at 955 . [¶ 23] In contrast to these cases, in Walsh v. Holly Sugar Corp., 931 P.2d 241 (Wyo.1997), we upheld a denial of benefits to an employee who sought to establish that he had suffered a second compensable injury.

2013The second compensable injury rule applies when "an initial compensable injury ripens into a condition requiring addi *944 tional medical intervention." Id., ¶ 21, 268 P.3d at 1044 .

2012As with claims for benefits arising from an initial injury, an employee claiming entitlement to benefits under the second compensable injury rule has the burden of proving "a causal connection exists between a work-related injury and the injury for which worker's compensation benefits are being sought." Davenport, ¶ 21, 268 P.3d at 1044 (citation omitted).

2019Compare Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2012 WY 163 , ¶ 14 n.2, 292 P.3d 855 , 860 n.2 (Wyo. 2012) (order remanding the case to the Teton County Board of Commissioners for a minor correction did not render the order non-appealable). [¶13] The district court concluded its written order with, “This final order constitutes the Judgment of the Court.” Focusing on the words “final” and “judgment,” Dr. Painter argues the order is final and appealable because the district court said so.

2019Compare Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2012 WY 163 , ¶ 14 n.2, 292 P.3d 855 , 860 n.2 (Wyo. 2012) (order remanding the case to the Teton County Board of Commissioners for a minor correction did not render the order non-appealable). [¶13] The district court concluded its written order with, “This final order constitutes the Judgment of the Court.” Focusing on the words “final” and “judgment,” Dr. Painter argues the order is final and appealable because the district court said so.

2019Labor Standards, 2017 WY 143 , ¶ 14 n.3, 406 P.3d 312 , 315 n.3 (Wyo. 2017). 3 matter to the agency for reconsideration of all of the issues under the second compensable injury rule was a substantive remand and therefore the order was not a final appealable order); Schwab, ¶ 13, 312 P.3d at 794 (order was not an appealable order because it remanded the matter to the agency for a contested case hearing, which was not a mere ministerial matter); Martin, ¶¶ 7, 16, 60 P.3d at 1275, 1277 (order remanding the matter to the agency to allow the employee to provide additional evidence to defend against

2019Labor Standards, 2017 WY 143 , ¶ 14 n.3, 406 P.3d 312 , 315 n.3 (Wyo. 2017). 3 matter to the agency for reconsideration of all of the issues under the second compensable injury rule was a substantive remand and therefore the order was not a final appealable order); Schwab, ¶ 13, 312 P.3d at 794 (order was not an appealable order because it remanded the matter to the agency for a contested case hearing, which was not a mere ministerial matter); Martin, ¶¶ 7, 16, 60 P.3d at 1275, 1277 (order remanding the matter to the agency to allow the employee to provide additional evidence to defend against

2018See Hardy , 2017 WY 42 , ¶ 12, 394 P.3d at 458 .

2018See Hardy , 2017 WY 42 , ¶ 12, 394 P.3d at 458 .