Merrill factors in Alaska

2025In total 7 See Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962) (principal factors to be considered by trial court are “respective ages of the parties; their earning ability; the duration and conduct of each during the marriage; their station in life; the circumstances and necessities of each; their health and physical condition; [and] their financial circumstances”); AS 25.24.160(4) (codifying Merrill factors). -8- 7787 Julie was awarded $109,000 of the marital estate, plus an equalization payment of $65,000, and Steve received $117,000.8 The proceeds from the sale of the parties’ sha

2024He asserts that the court’s decision to use the steel company’s going- concern value rather than its liquidation value “essentially prohibits [B.M.] from retiring or forces him to absorb an economic loss of $959,897 — the difference between the court’s value of $1,245,897 and the liquidation value of $286,000.” The essence of B.M.’s argument is that the superior court weighed the Merrill factors incorrectly by assigning too much weight to his conduct and R.C.’s income capacity and not enough to his age and “imminent need for retirement,” resulting in a property division that was “ ‘clearly unj

2015AS 25.24.160(a)(4); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962). 18 Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 652 (Alaska 1987). 19 Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Alaska 1995) (citing Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Alaska 1984)). 20 Id. (quoting Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Alaska 1987)); see also Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42, 53-54 (Alaska 1996) (holding there was no error where trial court divided property 50-50 but did not make explicit findings on Merrill factors because “the court’s findings, when read in their entirety, demonstrate that the court considered

1997The trial court's memorandum of decision does not indicate that this factor was taken into consideration. [5] We have ruled that a factor listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) should be adverted to by the trial court in dividing the property of the parties where the factor is relevant. [6] See Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027 , *145 1032 (Alaska 1995) ("[T]he trial court need not make findings as to every factor, nor do these findings need to be exhaustive, but where the parties raise significant issues regarding particular factors, the trial court must address these issues...."); Cox, 882 P.2d at 918-1

2015AS 25.24.160(a)(4); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962). 18 Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 652 (Alaska 1987). 19 Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Alaska 1995) (citing Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Alaska 1984)). 20 Id. (quoting Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Alaska 1987)); see also Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42, 53-54 (Alaska 1996) (holding there was no error where trial court divided property 50-50 but did not make explicit findings on Merrill factors because “the court’s findings, when read in their entirety, demonstrate that the court considered

2015AS 25.24.160(a)(4); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962). 18 Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 652 (Alaska 1987). 19 Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Alaska 1995) (citing Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Alaska 1984)). 20 Id. (quoting Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Alaska 1987)); see also Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42, 53-54 (Alaska 1996) (holding there was no error where trial court divided property 50-50 but did not make explicit findings on Merrill factors because “the court’s findings, when read in their entirety, demonstrate that the court considered

2023STANDARD OF REVIEW The first step of an equitable property division, characterizing property as either marital or separate, may involve both legal and factual questions.5 “[F]indings as to the parties’ intent, actions, and contributions to the marital estate are factual questions.”6 “Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error . . . .”7 “To reverse for clear 5 Grove v. Grove, 400 P.3d 109, 112 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Beals v. Beals, 303 P.3d 453, 458-59 (Alaska 2013)). 6 Id. (quoting Beals, 303 P.3d at 459 ). 7 Id. (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 125 P.3d 299, 304 (Alaska 2005)). -8- 7665 error, w

2006These factors are commonly known as the "Merrill factors,” as listed in Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 547-48 n. 4 (Alaska 1962). 9 .Brown v. Brown, 947 P.2d 307, 313 (Alaska 1997) (citation omitted); Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 574-75 (Alaska 1983). 10 .

2015Equitable distribution of assets is reviewed for abuse of discretion and is overturned only if clearly unjust.15 “In determining an equitable division of property, a 15 Sandberg v. Sandberg, 322 P.3d 879, 886 (Alaska 2014) (“We review a trial court’s equitable division of marital property under the abuse of discretion standard; (continued...) -12- 1551 court’s starting point is the presumption that an equal division is the most just.”16 The court then applies the Merrill factors to determine whether a different allocation is called for.17 15 (...continued) we will not disturb it unless the res

2015Equitable distribution of assets is reviewed for abuse of discretion and is overturned only if clearly unjust.15 “In determining an equitable division of property, a 15 Sandberg v. Sandberg, 322 P.3d 879, 886 (Alaska 2014) (“We review a trial court’s equitable division of marital property under the abuse of discretion standard; (continued...) -12- 1551 court’s starting point is the presumption that an equal division is the most just.”16 The court then applies the Merrill factors to determine whether a different allocation is called for.17 15 (...continued) we will not disturb it unless the res

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2023He contends, “Mr. Haynes obviously did not intend that Ms. Haynes should be awarded 90% of any marital estate.” 4 The equitable allocation of marital property upon divorce requires consideration of the statutory “Merrill factors”: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and health of the parties; (C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage; (D) the fi

2023He contends, “Mr. Haynes obviously did not intend that Ms. Haynes should be awarded 90% of any marital estate.” 4 The equitable allocation of marital property upon divorce requires consideration of the statutory “Merrill factors”: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and health of the parties; (C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage; (D) the fi

2022The court’s division left Loreta with $991,298.42 and Brian with $630,181.63 in marital assets. 27 See Grove, 400 P.3d at 112 (“We review . . . the equitable allocation of property[] for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if it is ‘clearly unjust.’ ”). -14- 1891 Alaska law requires property divisions to be made “in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault.”28 A superior court generally has broad discretion when dividing property in a divorce proceeding.29 It must, however, consider the so-called Merrill factors in its division: (1) “the length of the marriage an

2022Notably, the statute codifying the Merrill factors, AS 25.24.160(a)(4), mandates distribution of marital assets “without regard to which of the parties is in fault.” In Oberhansly v. Oberhansly we observed that the “fault” referenced in the statute is fault for the failure of the marriage, not fault for the dissipation of marital assets; we held that the latter type of fault could fairly be considered.18 We therefore upheld the unequal property division in Oberhansly in part because “the superior court properly considered [one party’s] fault in allowing most of the household debts to fall in d

2023He contends, “Mr. Haynes obviously did not intend that Ms. Haynes should be awarded 90% of any marital estate.” 4 The equitable allocation of marital property upon divorce requires consideration of the statutory “Merrill factors”: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and health of the parties; (C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage; (D) the fi

2022Notably, the statute codifying the Merrill factors, AS 25.24.160(a)(4), mandates distribution of marital assets “without regard to which of the parties is in fault.” In Oberhansly v. Oberhansly we observed that the “fault” referenced in the statute is fault for the failure of the marriage, not fault for the dissipation of marital assets; we held that the latter type of fault could fairly be considered.18 We therefore upheld the unequal property division in Oberhansly in part because “the superior court properly considered [one party’s] fault in allowing most of the household debts to fall in d

2023The third and final step in a superior court’s equitable division of marital assets is dividing the marital estate.28 An equal division of property is presumptively a just distribution.29 The court must consider and make findings about the factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4), also known as the Merrill factors, in reaching its final property distribution.30 Veronica argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that the factor related to the conduct of the parties favored Dan,31 and that the factor concerning the relative financial condition of the parties was neutral.32 We conclude that th

2023The third and final step in a superior court’s equitable division of marital assets is dividing the marital estate.28 An equal division of property is presumptively a just distribution.29 The court must consider and make findings about the factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4), also known as the Merrill factors, in reaching its final property distribution.30 Veronica argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that the factor related to the conduct of the parties favored Dan,31 and that the factor concerning the relative financial condition of the parties was neutral.32 We conclude that th

2015AS 25.24.160(a)(4); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962). 18 Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 652 (Alaska 1987). 19 Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Alaska 1995) (citing Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Alaska 1984)). 20 Id. (quoting Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Alaska 1987)); see also Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42, 53-54 (Alaska 1996) (holding there was no error where trial court divided property 50-50 but did not make explicit findings on Merrill factors because “the court’s findings, when read in their entirety, demonstrate that the court considered

2009Nicholson v. Wolfe, 974 P.2d 417, 422 (Alaska 1999) (citing Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Alaska 1984) and Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 548 n. 10 (Alaska 1962)). 37 . 741 P.2d at 1196 (vacating and remanding where trial court "gave no indication of which, if any, of the Merrill factors [codified and expanded in AS 25.24.160(a)(4)] it weighed in deciding that its allocation was 'fair and equitable'"). 38 .

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2024He asserts that the court’s decision to use the steel company’s going- concern value rather than its liquidation value “essentially prohibits [B.M.] from retiring or forces him to absorb an economic loss of $959,897 — the difference between the court’s value of $1,245,897 and the liquidation value of $286,000.” The essence of B.M.’s argument is that the superior court weighed the Merrill factors incorrectly by assigning too much weight to his conduct and R.C.’s income capacity and not enough to his age and “imminent need for retirement,” resulting in a property division that was “ ‘clearly unj

2024He asserts that the court’s decision to use the steel company’s going- concern value rather than its liquidation value “essentially prohibits [B.M.] from retiring or forces him to absorb an economic loss of $959,897 — the difference between the court’s value of $1,245,897 and the liquidation value of $286,000.” The essence of B.M.’s argument is that the superior court weighed the Merrill factors incorrectly by assigning too much weight to his conduct and R.C.’s income capacity and not enough to his age and “imminent need for retirement,” resulting in a property division that was “ ‘clearly unj

2023The third and final step in a superior court’s equitable division of marital assets is dividing the marital estate.28 An equal division of property is presumptively a just distribution.29 The court must consider and make findings about the factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4), also known as the Merrill factors, in reaching its final property distribution.30 Veronica argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that the factor related to the conduct of the parties favored Dan,31 and that the factor concerning the relative financial condition of the parties was neutral.32 We conclude that th

2023The third and final step in a superior court’s equitable division of marital assets is dividing the marital estate.28 An equal division of property is presumptively a just distribution.29 The court must consider and make findings about the factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4), also known as the Merrill factors, in reaching its final property distribution.30 Veronica argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that the factor related to the conduct of the parties favored Dan,31 and that the factor concerning the relative financial condition of the parties was neutral.32 We conclude that th

2023The third and final step in a superior court’s equitable division of marital assets is dividing the marital estate.28 An equal division of property is presumptively a just distribution.29 The court must consider and make findings about the factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4), also known as the Merrill factors, in reaching its final property distribution.30 Veronica argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that the factor related to the conduct of the parties favored Dan,31 and that the factor concerning the relative financial condition of the parties was neutral.32 We conclude that th

2023The third and final step in a superior court’s equitable division of marital assets is dividing the marital estate.28 An equal division of property is presumptively a just distribution.29 The court must consider and make findings about the factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4), also known as the Merrill factors, in reaching its final property distribution.30 Veronica argues on appeal that the court erred in finding that the factor related to the conduct of the parties favored Dan,31 and that the factor concerning the relative financial condition of the parties was neutral.32 We conclude that th

2023He contends, “Mr. Haynes obviously did not intend that Ms. Haynes should be awarded 90% of any marital estate.” 4 The equitable allocation of marital property upon divorce requires consideration of the statutory “Merrill factors”: (A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage; (B) the age and health of the parties; (C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage; (D) the fi

2020DISCUSSION “Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) governs the division of property in divorce.”6 The statute provides that property “acquired only during marriage” must be divided “in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault.”7 It states that “the division of property must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce”8 based on the consideration of the Merrill factors,9 codified as AS 25.24.160(a)(4).10 In 6 Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080, 1088 (Alaska 2017). 7 AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 8 Id. 9 See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 2018) (citing Merrill v. M

2022Teresa relies on our Day v. Williams decision that a superior court’s property division was not supported by sufficient findings to permit meaningful appellate review.25 Factors in Day, including the difference in income between the parties and the availability of health insurance, seemed to weigh in favor of an uneven distribution, yet the court made no findings about how these factors affected the distribution of marital property before equally dividing the property.26 Dominic relies on our Downs v. Downs decision that once a superior court makes findings guided by the Merrill factors, “we g

2022Teresa relies on our Day v. Williams decision that a superior court’s property division was not supported by sufficient findings to permit meaningful appellate review.25 Factors in Day, including the difference in income between the parties and the availability of health insurance, seemed to weigh in favor of an uneven distribution, yet the court made no findings about how these factors affected the distribution of marital property before equally dividing the property.26 Dominic relies on our Downs v. Downs decision that once a superior court makes findings guided by the Merrill factors, “we g

2022The court’s division left Loreta with $991,298.42 and Brian with $630,181.63 in marital assets. 27 See Grove, 400 P.3d at 112 (“We review . . . the equitable allocation of property[] for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if it is ‘clearly unjust.’ ”). -14- 1891 Alaska law requires property divisions to be made “in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault.”28 A superior court generally has broad discretion when dividing property in a divorce proceeding.29 It must, however, consider the so-called Merrill factors in its division: (1) “the length of the marriage an

2022The court’s division left Loreta with $991,298.42 and Brian with $630,181.63 in marital assets. 27 See Grove, 400 P.3d at 112 (“We review . . . the equitable allocation of property[] for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if it is ‘clearly unjust.’ ”). -14- 1891 Alaska law requires property divisions to be made “in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault.”28 A superior court generally has broad discretion when dividing property in a divorce proceeding.29 It must, however, consider the so-called Merrill factors in its division: (1) “the length of the marriage an

2020DISCUSSION “Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) governs the division of property in divorce.”6 The statute provides that property “acquired only during marriage” must be divided “in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault.”7 It states that “the division of property must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce”8 based on the consideration of the Merrill factors,9 codified as AS 25.24.160(a)(4).10 In 6 Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080, 1088 (Alaska 2017). 7 AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 8 Id. 9 See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 2018) (citing Merrill v. M

2015Equitable distribution of assets is reviewed for abuse of discretion and is overturned only if clearly unjust.15 “In determining an equitable division of property, a 15 Sandberg v. Sandberg, 322 P.3d 879, 886 (Alaska 2014) (“We review a trial court’s equitable division of marital property under the abuse of discretion standard; (continued...) -12- 1551 court’s starting point is the presumption that an equal division is the most just.”16 The court then applies the Merrill factors to determine whether a different allocation is called for.17 15 (...continued) we will not disturb it unless the res

2015AS 25.24.160(a)(4); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546 , 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962). 18 Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 652 (Alaska 1987). 19 Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Alaska 1995) (citing Brooks v. Brooks, 677 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Alaska 1984)). 20 Id. (quoting Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Alaska 1987)); see also Lundquist v. Lundquist, 923 P.2d 42, 53-54 (Alaska 1996) (holding there was no error where trial court divided property 50-50 but did not make explicit findings on Merrill factors because “the court’s findings, when read in their entirety, demonstrate that the court considered

1997The trial court's memorandum of decision does not indicate that this factor was taken into consideration. [5] We have ruled that a factor listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) should be adverted to by the trial court in dividing the property of the parties where the factor is relevant. [6] See Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027 , *145 1032 (Alaska 1995) ("[T]he trial court need not make findings as to every factor, nor do these findings need to be exhaustive, but where the parties raise significant issues regarding particular factors, the trial court must address these issues...."); Cox, 882 P.2d at 918-1

1997The trial court's memorandum of decision does not indicate that this factor was taken into consideration. [5] We have ruled that a factor listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) should be adverted to by the trial court in dividing the property of the parties where the factor is relevant. [6] See Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027 , *145 1032 (Alaska 1995) ("[T]he trial court need not make findings as to every factor, nor do these findings need to be exhaustive, but where the parties raise significant issues regarding particular factors, the trial court must address these issues...."); Cox, 882 P.2d at 918-1

1997The trial court's memorandum of decision does not indicate that this factor was taken into consideration. [5] We have ruled that a factor listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) should be adverted to by the trial court in dividing the property of the parties where the factor is relevant. [6] See Davila v. Davila, 908 P.2d 1027 , *145 1032 (Alaska 1995) ("[T]he trial court need not make findings as to every factor, nor do these findings need to be exhaustive, but where the parties raise significant issues regarding particular factors, the trial court must address these issues...."); Cox, 882 P.2d at 918-1

1992Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a) provides that spousal support may be awarded to the extent it is “just and necessary." In Messina v. Messina, 583 P.2d 804, 805 (Alaska 1978), we held that the standards provided in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 6 together with the Merrill factors, supra note 4, must be considered in determining whether an alimony award is just and necessary.

1992Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a) provides that spousal support may be awarded to the extent it is “just and necessary." In Messina v. Messina, 583 P.2d 804, 805 (Alaska 1978), we held that the standards provided in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 6 together with the Merrill factors, supra note 4, must be considered in determining whether an alimony award is just and necessary.

2020DISCUSSION “Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) governs the division of property in divorce.”6 The statute provides that property “acquired only during marriage” must be divided “in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault.”7 It states that “the division of property must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce”8 based on the consideration of the Merrill factors,9 codified as AS 25.24.160(a)(4).10 In 6 Hockema v. Hockema, 403 P.3d 1080, 1088 (Alaska 2017). 7 AS 25.24.160(a)(4). 8 Id. 9 See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 433 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 2018) (citing Merrill v. M

1990The court explained that it awarded the stock to Steve because the “stock is important, necessary and instrumental in [Steve’s] continued employment with Petro.” The court’s equitable allocation of the marital property is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard and “will not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust.” Moffitt, 749 P.2d at 346 .

1988Indeed, we have required the application of the Merrill analysis in cases where the parties' marriage was of the same or even shorter duration than that of the Roses'. *1126 See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 225 (Alaska 1986) (eighteen months); Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802 (Alaska 1986) (eleven months).

1988Indeed, we have required the application of the Merrill analysis in cases where the parties' marriage was of the same or even shorter duration than that of the Roses'. *1126 See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 225 (Alaska 1986) (eighteen months); Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802 (Alaska 1986) (eleven months).

2025In balancing the equities, we have interpreted AS 25.24.160(a)(4) to allow “a premarital asset to be treated as marital property only when necessary for a just and equitable property division.” Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Alaska 1987).

2025In balancing the equities, we have interpreted AS 25.24.160(a)(4) to allow “a premarital asset to be treated as marital property only when necessary for a just and equitable property division.” Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Alaska 1987).

2024He asserts that the court’s decision to use the steel company’s going- concern value rather than its liquidation value “essentially prohibits [B.M.] from retiring or forces him to absorb an economic loss of $959,897 — the difference between the court’s value of $1,245,897 and the liquidation value of $286,000.” The essence of B.M.’s argument is that the superior court weighed the Merrill factors incorrectly by assigning too much weight to his conduct and R.C.’s income capacity and not enough to his age and “imminent need for retirement,” resulting in a property division that was “ ‘clearly unj

2024He asserts that the court’s decision to use the steel company’s going- concern value rather than its liquidation value “essentially prohibits [B.M.] from retiring or forces him to absorb an economic loss of $959,897 — the difference between the court’s value of $1,245,897 and the liquidation value of $286,000.” The essence of B.M.’s argument is that the superior court weighed the Merrill factors incorrectly by assigning too much weight to his conduct and R.C.’s income capacity and not enough to his age and “imminent need for retirement,” resulting in a property division that was “ ‘clearly unj

2024He asserts that the court’s decision to use the steel company’s going- concern value rather than its liquidation value “essentially prohibits [B.M.] from retiring or forces him to absorb an economic loss of $959,897 — the difference between the court’s value of $1,245,897 and the liquidation value of $286,000.” The essence of B.M.’s argument is that the superior court weighed the Merrill factors incorrectly by assigning too much weight to his conduct and R.C.’s income capacity and not enough to his age and “imminent need for retirement,” resulting in a property division that was “ ‘clearly unj

2024He asserts that the court’s decision to use the steel company’s going- concern value rather than its liquidation value “essentially prohibits [B.M.] from retiring or forces him to absorb an economic loss of $959,897 — the difference between the court’s value of $1,245,897 and the liquidation value of $286,000.” The essence of B.M.’s argument is that the superior court weighed the Merrill factors incorrectly by assigning too much weight to his conduct and R.C.’s income capacity and not enough to his age and “imminent need for retirement,” resulting in a property division that was “ ‘clearly unj

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2024Ass’n v. Rewire the Bd., 36 P.3d 685 , 690 & n.4 (Alaska 2001) (“This court will reverse a trial judge’s decision regarding contempt only if it is without evidentiary support or is an abuse of discretion.” (quoting Dale v. Dale, 534 S.E.2d 705, 707 (S.C.

2024Ass’n v. Rewire the Bd., 36 P.3d 685 , 690 & n.4 (Alaska 2001) (“This court will reverse a trial judge’s decision regarding contempt only if it is without evidentiary support or is an abuse of discretion.” (quoting Dale v. Dale, 534 S.E.2d 705, 707 (S.C.

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision

2024We will not disturb the trial court’s allocation unless it is clearly unjust.”3 “The court abuses its discretion if it ‘considers improper factors, fails to 3 Partridge v. Partridge, 239 P.3d 680, 685 (Alaska 2010) (citations omitted). -7- 2017 consider statutorily mandated factors, or gives too much weight to some factors.’ ” 4 We review the superior court’s findings of fact under the Merrill factors for clear error.5 “Trial courts’ . . . awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse of discretion; we reverse such awards only if they are clearly unjust.”6 We review a trial court’s decision