collective bargaining clause in Michigan

2017In Pearl v Detroit, 126 Mich App 228 , 238 n 4; 336 NW2d 899 (1983), this Court explained that “[a]n incorrect interpretation by the union of a collective bargaining clause, in the absence of bad faith, does not impose liability upon the union.” In Goolsby, 419 Mich at 680 , our Supreme Court explained that, “[a]bsent a reasoned, good-faith, non-discriminatory decision not to process a grievance,” if a union fails to comply with the grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, “the union has acted arbitrarily and breached its duty of fair representation.” However, a reasoned, good

2017In Pearl v Detroit, 126 Mich App 228 , 238 n 4; 336 NW2d 899 (1983), this Court explained that “[a]n incorrect interpretation by the union of a collective bargaining clause, in the absence of bad faith, does not impose liability upon the union.” In Goolsby, 419 Mich at 680 , our Supreme Court explained that, “[a]bsent a reasoned, good-faith, non-discriminatory decision not to process a grievance,” if a union fails to comply with the grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, “the union has acted arbitrarily and breached its duty of fair representation.” However, a reasoned, good

2017In Pearl v Detroit, 126 Mich App 228 , 238 n 4; 336 NW2d 899 (1983), this Court explained that “[a]n incorrect interpretation by the union of a collective bargaining clause, in the absence of bad faith, does not impose liability upon the union.” In Goolsby, 419 Mich at 680 , our Supreme Court explained that, “[a]bsent a reasoned, good-faith, non-discriminatory decision not to process a grievance,” if a union fails to comply with the grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, “the union has acted arbitrarily and breached its duty of fair representation.” However, a reasoned, good

2017In Pearl v Detroit, 126 Mich App 228 , 238 n 4; 336 NW2d 899 (1983), this Court explained that “[a]n incorrect interpretation by the union of a collective bargaining clause, in the absence of bad faith, does not impose liability upon the union.” In Goolsby, 419 Mich at 680 , our Supreme Court explained that, “[a]bsent a reasoned, good-faith, non-discriminatory decision not to process a grievance,” if a union fails to comply with the grievance procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, “the union has acted arbitrarily and breached its duty of fair representation.” However, a reasoned, good

1987In the third type of decision, the Court recognized the employer’s need for relatively unfettered business judgment as well as the policies of the nlra, holding that bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business. [Id., p 679.] The Court construed the Fibreboard decision as, in effect, utilizing this test, underlining the Fibreboard Court’s conclusion that reducti

1987In the third type of decision, the Court recognized the employer's need for relatively unfettered business judgment as well as the policies of the NLRA, holding that bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business. [ Id., p 679.] The Court construed the Fibreboard decision as, in effect, utilizing this test, underlining the Fibreboard Court's conclusion that reduct

1990It is well within the province of parties to a commercial arbitration to allow the arbitrator to decide questions of law as well as of fact, and agreements to arbitrate have generally been construed as contracts for deciding questions of law as well as of fact. [ DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 446-447 ; 331 NW2d 418 (1982) (LEVIN, J., concurring).] [9] To the extent that the reasoning in Waldrop v Rodery, 34 Mich App 1 ; 190 NW2d 691 (1971), is inconsistent with the reasoning in this opinion, I would no longer follow Waldrop. [10] See Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, Local 317 v Lorillard Corp, 448

1990It is well within the province of parties to a commercial arbitration to allow the arbitrator to decide questions of law as well as of fact, and agreements to arbitrate have generally been construed as contracts for deciding questions of law as well as of fact. [ DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 446-447 ; 331 NW2d 418 (1982) (LEVIN, J., concurring).] [9] To the extent that the reasoning in Waldrop v Rodery, 34 Mich App 1 ; 190 NW2d 691 (1971), is inconsistent with the reasoning in this opinion, I would no longer follow Waldrop. [10] See Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, Local 317 v Lorillard Corp, 448

1990It is well within the province of parties to a commercial arbitration to allow the arbitrator to decide questions of law as well as of fact, and agreements to arbitrate have generally been construed as contracts for deciding questions of law as well as of fact. [ DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 446-447 ; 331 NW2d 418 (1982) (LEVIN, J., concurring).] [9] To the extent that the reasoning in Waldrop v Rodery, 34 Mich App 1 ; 190 NW2d 691 (1971), is inconsistent with the reasoning in this opinion, I would no longer follow Waldrop. [10] See Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, Local 317 v Lorillard Corp, 448

1990It is well within the province of parties to a commercial arbitration to allow the arbitrator to decide questions of law as well as of fact, and agreements to arbitrate have generally been construed as contracts for deciding questions of law as well as of fact. [ DAIIE v Gavin, 416 Mich 407, 446-447 ; 331 NW2d 418 (1982) (LEVIN, J., concurring).] [9] To the extent that the reasoning in Waldrop v Rodery, 34 Mich App 1 ; 190 NW2d 691 (1971), is inconsistent with the reasoning in this opinion, I would no longer follow Waldrop. [10] See Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, Local 317 v Lorillard Corp, 448