40 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hricus v. Aurora Contractors, Inc.green2 sentences2022However, Industrial Code § 23-9.2(b)(1) is "merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute" ( Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2d Dept 2009], citing Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc. , 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [3d Dept 2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]), and § 23-9.2(b)(2) is inapplicable to the accident that occurred, because an operator was at the controls. 2022However, Industrial Code § 23-9.2(b)(1) is "merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute" ( Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2d Dept 2009], citing Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc. , 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [3d Dept 2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]), and § 23-9.2(b)(2) is inapplicable to the accident that occurred, because an operator was at the controls. | 4 | 6 |
Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co.green2 sentences2009Co., 81 NY2d 494, 503 [1993]). 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (b) (1) is merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute (see e.g. 1996As applied here, the Industrial Code provision (§ 23-3.3 [c]), which mandates "continuing inspections * * * made by designated persons as the work progresses to detect any hazards to any person resulting from * * * loosened material”, is, within the standard expressed in Ross (supra) a specific safety regulation — "a concrete specification” — in contrast to a general safety standard. | 3 | 14 |
Vernieri v. Empire Realty Co.green2 sentences2010The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), based upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5, since that provision is not a regulation sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under the statute, but merely establishes a general safety standard (see Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir v 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]; Mancini v Pedra Constr., 293 AD2d 453 [2002] 2004The Supreme Court correctly determined that the Industrial Code provisions the plaintiff alleged were violated did not furnish a basis for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6). 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 merely establishes a general safety standard that does not give rise to the nondelegable duty imposed by Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Mancini v Pedra Constr., 293 AD2d 453, 454 [2002]; Vernieri v Empire Realty Co., 219 AD2d 593, 598 [1995]). 12 NYCRR 23-3.3 was not applicable here, as that provision concerns demolition work, which is distinct from the type of renovation work in which the plaintiff was involve | 3 | 4 |
Scott v. Westmore Fuel Co.green2 sentences2016First, 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (b) (1) is merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Abelleira v City of New York, 120 AD3d 1163, 1165 [2014]; Gonzalez v Perkan Concrete Corp., 110 AD3d 955, 958 [2013]; Scott v Westmore Fuel Co., Inc., 96 AD3d 520, 521 [2012]; Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc., 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2009]; Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc., 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]). 2013Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the provision is “merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute” (Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc., 63 AD3d at 1005 ; see Scott v Westmore Fuel Co., Inc., 96 AD3d 520, 521 [2012]; Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc., 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]). | 2 | 2 |
McCormick v. 257 W. Genesee, LLCgreen2 sentences2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wilson v Niagara Univ., 43 AD3d 1292, 1293 ). 2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wilson v Niagara Univ., 43 AD3d 1292, 1293 [2007]). | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Niagara Universitygreen2 sentences2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wilson v Niagara Univ., 43 AD3d 1292, 1293 ). 2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wilson v Niagara Univ., 43 AD3d 1292, 1293 [2007]). | 2 | 2 |
Sparkes v. Bergergreen2 sentences2010Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (1) is a general safety standard and, thus, is an insufficient predicate for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Gasques v State of New York, 59 AD3d 666, 668 [2009]; Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601, 602 [2004]). 2010The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), based upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5, since that provision is not a regulation sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under the statute, but merely establishes a general safety standard (see Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir v 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]; Mancini v Pedra Constr., 293 AD2d 453 [2002] | 1 | 3 |
Misicki v. Caradonnagreen2 sentences2019The United Veterans defendants established, prima facie, that 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a) was inapplicable to the facts of this case, as the hammer drill that injured the plaintiff was not "heavy equipment or machinery" (12 NYCRR 23-9.1; see Misicki v Caradonna , 12 NY3d 511, 518 ; Cabrera v Revere Condominium , 91 AD3d 695, 697 ). 2015Corp., 44 NY2d 290 , 297 [1978]), and not merely a declaration of a general safety standard (see Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d at 515 ; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. | 1 | 2 |
Gonzalez v. Perkan Concrete Corp.green2 sentences2019The Supreme Court should have awarded summary judgment dismissing so much of the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action as was premised upon alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5(c)(3), 23-3.3(c), and 23-9.2(a) and (b)(1) insofar as asserted against the United Veterans defendants. 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(b)(1) is " merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under [Labor Law § 241(6)]'" ( Gonzalez v Perkan Concrete Corp. , 110 AD3d 955, 958 , quoting Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 ; see Guallpa v Canarsie Plaza, LLC , 144 AD3d 1088, 1091 ). 2016First, 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (b) (1) is merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Abelleira v City of New York, 120 AD3d 1163, 1165 [2014]; Gonzalez v Perkan Concrete Corp., 110 AD3d 955, 958 [2013]; Scott v Westmore Fuel Co., Inc., 96 AD3d 520, 521 [2012]; Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc., 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2009]; Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc., 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]). | 1 | 2 |
Mancini v. Pedra Constructiongreen2 sentences2010The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), based upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5, since that provision is not a regulation sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under the statute, but merely establishes a general safety standard (see Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir v 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]; Mancini v Pedra Constr., 293 AD2d 453 [2002] 2004The Supreme Court correctly determined that the Industrial Code provisions the plaintiff alleged were violated did not furnish a basis for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6). 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 merely establishes a general safety standard that does not give rise to the nondelegable duty imposed by Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Mancini v Pedra Constr., 293 AD2d 453, 454 [2002]; Vernieri v Empire Realty Co., 219 AD2d 593, 598 [1995]). 12 NYCRR 23-3.3 was not applicable here, as that provision concerns demolition work, which is distinct from the type of renovation work in which the plaintiff was involve | 1 | 2 |
Ferreira v. Unico Service Corp.green2 sentences2005Corp., 262 AD2d 524, 525 [1999]; Vernieri v Empire Realty Co., 219 AD2d 593, 598 [1995]). 2002Corp., 262 AD2d 524 ; Vernieri v Empire Realty Co., 219 AD2d 593 ). | 1 | 2 |
Guallpa v. Canarsie Plaza, LLCgreen1 sentence2019The Supreme Court should have awarded summary judgment dismissing so much of the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action as was premised upon alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5(c)(3), 23-3.3(c), and 23-9.2(a) and (b)(1) insofar as asserted against the United Veterans defendants. 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(b)(1) is " merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under [Labor Law § 241(6)]'" ( Gonzalez v Perkan Concrete Corp. , 110 AD3d 955, 958 , quoting Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 ; see Guallpa v Canarsie Plaza, LLC , 144 AD3d 1088, 1091 ). | 1 | 1 |
Abelleira v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2016First, 12 NYCRR 23-9.2 (b) (1) is merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Abelleira v City of New York, 120 AD3d 1163, 1165 [2014]; Gonzalez v Perkan Concrete Corp., 110 AD3d 955, 958 [2013]; Scott v Westmore Fuel Co., Inc., 96 AD3d 520, 521 [2012]; Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc., 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2009]; Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc., 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]). | 1 | 1 |
Gasques v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (1) is a general safety standard and, thus, is an insufficient predicate for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Gasques v State of New York, 59 AD3d 666, 668 [2009]; Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601, 602 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Mammoet Western, Inc.green1 sentence2010Contrary to plaintiffs’ further contention, 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 “ ‘sets forth only a general safety standard’ and is thus incapable of supporting a Labor Law § 241 (6) claim” (Boyd v Mammoet W., Inc., 32 AD3d 1257, 1258 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
Peay v. New York City School Construction Authoritygreen1 sentence2009Auth., 35 AD3d 566, 567 [2006]; Warnitz v Liro Group, 254 AD2d 411 [1998]), the defendant, on the record before us, failed to make a prima facie showing that it did not have the authority to control the manner in which the claimant’s work was performed (see Hurtado v Interstate Materials Corp., 56 AD3d 722 [2008]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (1) is a general safety standard, which is an insufficient predicate for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Maday v Gábe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir u 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]). | 1 | 1 |
Armer v. General Electric Co.green1 sentence2007Co., 241 AD2d 581, 583 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 812 [1997]; see also Fairchild v Servidone Constr. | 1 | 1 |
| Murray v. Lancaster Motorsports, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hasty v. Solvay Mill Limited Partnershipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jacome v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zuniga v. Stam Realtygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Balthazar v. Full Circle Construction Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Crespo v. Triad, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| DePalma v. Metropolitan Transportation Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fishgold v. Fishgoldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Danchick v. Contegra Services, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Ludovicogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Berg v. ALBANY LADDER COMPANY, INC.
green
2 sentences2022However, Industrial Code § 23-9.2(b)(1) is "merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute" ( Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2d Dept 2009], citing Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc. , 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [3d Dept 2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]), and § 23-9.2(b)(2) is inapplicable to the accident that occurred, because an operator was at the controls. 2022However, Industrial Code § 23-9.2(b)(1) is "merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute" ( Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2d Dept 2009], citing Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc. , 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [3d Dept 2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]), and § 23-9.2(b)(2) is inapplicable to the accident that occurred, because an operator was at the controls. | 5 | 2009–2022 |
Berg v. Albany Ladder Co.
green
2 sentences2022However, Industrial Code § 23-9.2(b)(1) is "merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute" ( Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2d Dept 2009], citing Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc. , 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [3d Dept 2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]), and § 23-9.2(b)(2) is inapplicable to the accident that occurred, because an operator was at the controls. 2022However, Industrial Code § 23-9.2(b)(1) is "merely a general safety standard that does not give rise to a nondelegable duty under the statute" ( Hricus v Aurora Contrs., Inc. , 63 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2d Dept 2009], citing Berg v Albany Ladder Co., Inc. , 40 AD3d 1282 , 1285 [3d Dept 2007], affd 10 NY3d 902 [2008]), and § 23-9.2(b)(2) is inapplicable to the accident that occurred, because an operator was at the controls. | 5 | 2009–2022 |
Maday v. Gabe's Contracting, LLC
green
2 sentences2010Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (1) is a general safety standard and, thus, is an insufficient predicate for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Gasques v State of New York, 59 AD3d 666, 668 [2009]; Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601, 602 [2004]). 2010The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), based upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5, since that provision is not a regulation sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under the statute, but merely establishes a general safety standard (see Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir v 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]; Mancini v Pedra Constr., 293 AD2d 453 [2002] | 3 | 2009–2010 |
Madir v. 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC
green
2 sentences2010The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), based upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.5, since that provision is not a regulation sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under the statute, but merely establishes a general safety standard (see Maday v Gabe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir v 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]; Mancini v Pedra Constr., 293 AD2d 453 [2002] 2009Auth., 35 AD3d 566, 567 [2006]; Warnitz v Liro Group, 254 AD2d 411 [1998]), the defendant, on the record before us, failed to make a prima facie showing that it did not have the authority to control the manner in which the claimant’s work was performed (see Hurtado v Interstate Materials Corp., 56 AD3d 722 [2008]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (1) is a general safety standard, which is an insufficient predicate for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Maday v Gábe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir u 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]). | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Adams v. Glass Fab, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997To establish defendants’ liability under that statute, plaintiffs had to show that defendants violated a regulation setting forth "a specific standard of conduct as opposed to a general reiteration of common-law principles” (Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972, 973 ). 12 NYCRR 23-1.33 is a general safety standard that does not "mandat[e] compliance with concrete specifications” (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. 1996Moreover, plaintiffs allegations that defendant violated the specific safety standards set forth in 12 NYCRR 23-4.2, 23-4.3, 23-4.4 and 23-4.5 are also insufficient because those regulations involve the shoring and stabilization of trenches and other excavation work and, therefore, are not applicable to this case (see, Klien v County of Monroe, 219 AD2d 846 , lv denied 87 NY2d 804 ; Adams v Glass Fab, 212 AD2d 972). | 2 | 1996–1997 |
Cabrera v. Revere Condominium
green
1 sentence2019The United Veterans defendants established, prima facie, that 12 NYCRR 23-9.2(a) was inapplicable to the facts of this case, as the hammer drill that injured the plaintiff was not "heavy equipment or machinery" (12 NYCRR 23-9.1; see Misicki v Caradonna , 12 NY3d 511, 518 ; Cabrera v Revere Condominium , 91 AD3d 695, 697 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Spence v. Island Estates at Mt. Sinai II, LLC
green
2 sentences2018Sinai II, LLC ( 79 AD3d 936 ), which was decided in 2010, this Court concluded that 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 was not sufficiently specific to support a cause of action under Labor Law § 241(6), but merely established a general safety standard ( see Spence v Island Estates at Mt. 2018Sinai II, LLC , 79 AD3d at 937 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gielow v. Rosa Coplon Home
green
1 sentence2010In addition, 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 does not apply because “plaintiffs injury was not caused by an unstable form, shore or bracing during the placing of concrete” (Gielow, 251 AD2d at 972 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bridgham v. Fairview Plaza, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Additionally, since the interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation and the determination as to whether a particular condition is within the scope of the regulation generally present questions of law for the court (see Messina v City of New York, 300 AD2d 121 [2002]; Penta v Related Cos., 286 AD2d 674 [2001]; Millard v City of Ogdensburg, 274 AD2d 953 [2000]; Stasierowski v Conbow Corp., 258 AD2d 914 [1999]), and the plaintiff did not testify at his deposition that his accident was caused by a slippery hazard or condition, or any other hazard specified in 12 NYCRR 23-1.7, the Supreme Court | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Millard v. City of Ogdensburg
green
1 sentence2010Additionally, since the interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation and the determination as to whether a particular condition is within the scope of the regulation generally present questions of law for the court (see Messina v City of New York, 300 AD2d 121 [2002]; Penta v Related Cos., 286 AD2d 674 [2001]; Millard v City of Ogdensburg, 274 AD2d 953 [2000]; Stasierowski v Conbow Corp., 258 AD2d 914 [1999]), and the plaintiff did not testify at his deposition that his accident was caused by a slippery hazard or condition, or any other hazard specified in 12 NYCRR 23-1.7, the Supreme Court | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Penta v. Related Companies
green
1 sentence2010Additionally, since the interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation and the determination as to whether a particular condition is within the scope of the regulation generally present questions of law for the court (see Messina v City of New York, 300 AD2d 121 [2002]; Penta v Related Cos., 286 AD2d 674 [2001]; Millard v City of Ogdensburg, 274 AD2d 953 [2000]; Stasierowski v Conbow Corp., 258 AD2d 914 [1999]), and the plaintiff did not testify at his deposition that his accident was caused by a slippery hazard or condition, or any other hazard specified in 12 NYCRR 23-1.7, the Supreme Court | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Messina v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2010Additionally, since the interpretation of an Industrial Code regulation and the determination as to whether a particular condition is within the scope of the regulation generally present questions of law for the court (see Messina v City of New York, 300 AD2d 121 [2002]; Penta v Related Cos., 286 AD2d 674 [2001]; Millard v City of Ogdensburg, 274 AD2d 953 [2000]; Stasierowski v Conbow Corp., 258 AD2d 914 [1999]), and the plaintiff did not testify at his deposition that his accident was caused by a slippery hazard or condition, or any other hazard specified in 12 NYCRR 23-1.7, the Supreme Court | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Warnitz v. Liro Group, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2009Auth., 35 AD3d 566, 567 [2006]; Warnitz v Liro Group, 254 AD2d 411 [1998]), the defendant, on the record before us, failed to make a prima facie showing that it did not have the authority to control the manner in which the claimant’s work was performed (see Hurtado v Interstate Materials Corp., 56 AD3d 722 [2008]). 12 NYCRR 23-1.5 (c) (1) is a general safety standard, which is an insufficient predicate for liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Maday v Gábe’s Contr., LLC, 20 AD3d 513 [2005]; Sparkes v Berger, 11 AD3d 601 [2004]; Madir u 21-23 Maiden Lane Realty, LLC, 9 AD3d 450 [2004]). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Puckett v. County of Erie green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Brown v. Schulman neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Powers v. Lino Del Zotto & Son Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Sanango v. 200 East 16th Street Housing Corp. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Quinlan v. City of New York green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Olszewski v. Park Terrace Gardens, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| McGrath v. Lake Tree Village Associates green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Sihly v. New York City Transit Authority green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Schwab v. A.J. Martini, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Augello v. 20166 Tenants Corp. neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Durfee v. Eastman Kodak Co. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Ramski v. Zappia Enterprises, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| 2609 Bailey, Inc. v. City of Buffalo green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| In re Jessie R. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Pellescki v. City of Rochester green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Narrow v. Crane-Hogan Structural Systems, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Greene v. City of New York green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Dombrowski v. Schwartz green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Klien v. County of Monroe green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| International Ass'n of Firefighters of Newburgh, Local 589 v. Helsby green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Burke v. Bowen green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.