party opposing challenge in New York

2013Although a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 challenging the procedure used to enact local legislation is governed by a four-month statute of limitations, which runs from the enactment of the legislation (see CPLR 217; Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 NY3d 306 [2006]; P & N Tiffany Props., Inc. v Village of Tuckahoe, 33 AD3d 61, 65-66 [2006]), the statute of limitations is a defense which must be asserted by the party opposing the challenge, and the failure to interpose a cause of action within the applicable limitations period is not a jurisdictional defect (see Wind

2013Although a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 challenging the procedure used to enact local legislation is governed by a four-month statute of limitations, which runs from the enactment of the legislation (see CPLR 217; Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 NY3d 306 [2006]; P & N Tiffany Props., Inc. v Village of Tuckahoe, 33 AD3d 61, 65-66 [2006]), the statute of limitations is a defense which must be asserted by the party opposing the challenge, and the failure to interpose a cause of action within the applicable limitations period is not a jurisdictional defect (see Wind

2013Although a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 challenging the procedure used to enact local legislation is governed by a four-month statute of limitations, which runs from the enactment of the legislation (see CPLR 217; Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 NY3d 306 [2006]; P & N Tiffany Props., Inc. v Village of Tuckahoe, 33 AD3d 61, 65-66 [2006]), the statute of limitations is a defense which must be asserted by the party opposing the challenge, and the failure to interpose a cause of action within the applicable limitations period is not a jurisdictional defect (see Wind

2013Although a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 challenging the procedure used to enact local legislation is governed by a four-month statute of limitations, which runs from the enactment of the legislation (see CPLR 217; Matter of Eadie v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 7 NY3d 306 [2006]; P & N Tiffany Props., Inc. v Village of Tuckahoe, 33 AD3d 61, 65-66 [2006]), the statute of limitations is a defense which must be asserted by the party opposing the challenge, and the failure to interpose a cause of action within the applicable limitations period is not a jurisdictional defect (see Wind

2024"Forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and will not be set aside unless the party opposing the clause demonstrates that the enforcement of such would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause is invalid because of fraud or overreaching, such that a trial in the contractual forum would be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the challenging party would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of his or her day in court" ( Harry Casper, Inc. v Pines Assoc., L.P. , 53 AD3d 764, 764-765 [3d Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2008Bank v Eastern Shipping Worldwide, Inc., 35 AD3d 222, 222 [2006], quoting British W.

2008Forum selection clauses are prima facie valid (see Brooke Group v JCH Syndicate 488, 87 NY2d 530, 534 [1996]) and will not be set aside unless the party opposing the clause demonstrates that the enforcement of such “ ‘would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause is invalid because of fraud or overreaching, such that a trial in the contractual forum would be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the chállenging party would, for all practical purposes, be deprived of his or her day in court’ ” (Sterling Natl.

2006(Batson, 476 US at 95 [when circumstances suggest the need, the trial court must undertake a “factual inquiry” that “takes into account all possible explanatory factors”].) At this third step, trial courts “are authorized to act on outlandish or entirely evanescent assertions, even if they appear race neutral on their face.” (People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172, 183 [1996].) Further, the trial court’s responsibility is to make a sufficient record to allow for meaningful appellate review as well as to “reflect[ ] the basis for their rulings.” (Id. at 184.) In the case at bar, the People made a prima fa

2006(Batson, 476 US at 95 [when circumstances suggest the need, the trial court must undertake a “factual inquiry” that “takes into account all possible explanatory factors”].) At this third step, trial courts “are authorized to act on outlandish or entirely evanescent assertions, even if they appear race neutral on their face.” (People v Payne, 88 NY2d 172, 183 [1996].) Further, the trial court’s responsibility is to make a sufficient record to allow for meaningful appellate review as well as to “reflect[ ] the basis for their rulings.” (Id. at 184.) In the case at bar, the People made a prima fa