5 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1892–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoosac Valley Farmers Exchange, Inc. v. AG Assets, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Farmers Exch. v AG Assets, 168 AD2d 822 ). 1998Farmers Exch. v AG Assets, 168 AD2d 822 ). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Gaddy v. Eyler
green
1 sentence2000(See, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 ; Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 238 , supra; Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79 ; Echeverri v Happe, 256 AD2d 304 .) Logic thus dictates that in the absence of defendants’ failure to proffer competent evidence with regard to the threshold question, summary judgment must be denied, regardless of whether plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is clearly deficient, or nonexistent. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Fernandez v. Shields
neutral
1 sentence2000(See, Grasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 ; Williams v Hughes, 256 AD2d 461 ; Fernandez v Shields, 223 AD2d 666 .) Once defendant has proffered competent evidence that meets the sufficiency standard, the burden is shifted to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption that there is no issue of fact as to the threshold question. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Echeverri v. Happe
neutral
1 sentence2000(See, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 ; Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 238 , supra; Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79 ; Echeverri v Happe, 256 AD2d 304 .) Logic thus dictates that in the absence of defendants’ failure to proffer competent evidence with regard to the threshold question, summary judgment must be denied, regardless of whether plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is clearly deficient, or nonexistent. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Williams v. Hughes
neutral
1 sentence2000(See, Grasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 ; Williams v Hughes, 256 AD2d 461 ; Fernandez v Shields, 223 AD2d 666 .) Once defendant has proffered competent evidence that meets the sufficiency standard, the burden is shifted to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption that there is no issue of fact as to the threshold question. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Grossman v. Wright
green
1 sentence2000(See, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 ; Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 238 , supra; Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79 ; Echeverri v Happe, 256 AD2d 304 .) Logic thus dictates that in the absence of defendants’ failure to proffer competent evidence with regard to the threshold question, summary judgment must be denied, regardless of whether plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is clearly deficient, or nonexistent. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Licari v. Elliott
green
1 sentence2000(See, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 ; Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230, 238 , supra; Grossman v Wright, 268 AD2d 79 ; Echeverri v Happe, 256 AD2d 304 .) Logic thus dictates that in the absence of defendants’ failure to proffer competent evidence with regard to the threshold question, summary judgment must be denied, regardless of whether plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is clearly deficient, or nonexistent. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Grasso v. Angerami
green
1 sentence2000(See, Grasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 ; Williams v Hughes, 256 AD2d 461 ; Fernandez v Shields, 223 AD2d 666 .) Once defendant has proffered competent evidence that meets the sufficiency standard, the burden is shifted to the plaintiff to rebut the presumption that there is no issue of fact as to the threshold question. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Zumbo v. Town of Farmington
green
1 sentence1978(Zumbo v Town of Farmington, 60 AD2d 350 ; People v Judiz, 38 NY2d 529 .) Plaintiff’s burden is perhaps best summarized by the Court of Appeals in Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip ( 41 NY2d 7 , 11-12) where it states: "The exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality applies not only to enactments of the Legislature but to ordinances of municipalities as well. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Robin v. Village of Hempstead
neutral
1 sentence1978(Wiggins v Town of Somers, 4 NY2d 215 ; Robin v Village of Hempstead, 66 Misc 2d 482 .) It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of constitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Wiggins v. Town of Somers
green
1 sentence1978(Wiggins v Town of Somers, 4 NY2d 215 ; Robin v Village of Hempstead, 66 Misc 2d 482 .) It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of constitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Judiz
green
1 sentence1978(Zumbo v Town of Farmington, 60 AD2d 350 ; People v Judiz, 38 NY2d 529 .) Plaintiff’s burden is perhaps best summarized by the Court of Appeals in Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip ( 41 NY2d 7 , 11-12) where it states: "The exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality applies not only to enactments of the Legislature but to ordinances of municipalities as well. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hendrie v. Berkowitz
neutral
1 sentence1892Involved in this principle is the further proposition that where the fact that the firm name is indorsed or signed by a partner for accommodation, or by way of surety or guaranty, is apparent upon the face of the paper, or implied in the circumstances of the transaction, or actually known to him who would avail himself of such guaranty, surety, or indorsement, the contract cannot, ■without more, be enforced against the firm, (Bank v. Saffarrans, 3 Humph. 597 ;) and in such case it devolves upon the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of want of authority, by showing the express or implied assen | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.