38 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wallace v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2021Because “dismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, . . . any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.’” Hoffman v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 752 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (¶11) 4 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Wallace v. Jones, 572 So. 2d 371, 376 (Miss. 1990)). ¶9. 2017We are mindful of the fact that “dismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” Wallace v. Jones, 572 So.2d 371, 376 (Miss. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982)). | 12 | 24 |
Holder v. Orange Grove Medical Specialties, P.A.green2 sentences2025Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Cox v. Cox, 976 So. 2d 869, 874 (¶14) (Miss. 2008)). “[D]ismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” [Id.] (quoting Holder, 54 So. 3d at 197 (¶17)). 2024Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Cox v. Cox, 976 So. 2d 869, 874 (¶14) (Miss. 2008)). ¶9. “[D]ismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant 5 of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” Sullivan, 283 So. 3d at 235 (¶54) (quoting Holder, 54 So. 3d at 197 (¶17)). | 9 | 9 |
Hoffman v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp.green2 sentences2021Because “dismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, . . . any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.’” Hoffman v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 752 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (¶11) 4 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Wallace v. Jones, 572 So. 2d 371, 376 (Miss. 1990)). ¶9. 2019“We also are mindful of the fact that dismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” Holder, 54 So. 3d at 197 (¶17) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hoffman v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 752 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (¶11) (Miss. 1999)). ¶56. | 8 | 9 |
Cox v. Coxgreen2 sentences2025Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Cox v. Cox, 976 So. 2d 869, 874 (¶14) (Miss. 2008)). “[D]ismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” [Id.] (quoting Holder, 54 So. 3d at 197 (¶17)). 2024Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Cox v. Cox, 976 So. 2d 869, 874 (¶14) (Miss. 2008)). ¶9. “[D]ismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant 5 of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” Sullivan, 283 So. 3d at 235 (¶54) (quoting Holder, 54 So. 3d at 197 (¶17)). | 4 | 4 |
Hillman v. Weatherlygreen2 sentences2021While the trial court has the inherent authority to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a dismissal “is ‘reserved for the most egregious cases,’ due to the ‘extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim.’” Id. at 765 (¶11) (quoting Hillman v. Weatherly, 14 So. 3d 721,726 (¶17) (Miss. 2009)). 2011Dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is “reserved for the most egregious cases,” due to the “extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim.” Hillman v. Weatherly, 14 So.3d 721, 726 (Miss.2009) (quoting Wallace v. Jones, 572 So.2d 371, 376 (Miss.1990)). | 3 | 3 |
Hensarling v. Hollygreen2 sentences2025“The supreme court has provided considerations to be weighed in determining whether to affirm a Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice: (1) whether there was a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff; (2) whether lesser sanctions may have better served the interests of justice; and (3) the existence of other aggravating factors.” Id. (quoting Hensarling v. Holly, 972 So. 2d 716, 719 (¶7) (Miss. 2024“The supreme court has provided considerations to be weighed in determining whether to affirm a Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice: (1) whether there was a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff; (2) whether lesser sanctions may have better served the interests of justice; and (3) the existence of other aggravating factors.” Id. (quoting Hensarling v. Holly, 972 So. 2d 716, 719 (¶7) (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Branum v. Stategreen2 sentences2000However, these concerns must be balanced with any prejudice further delay may impose upon the appellee: "The predominant reason for creating time limitations in appellate procedure is to bring an expeditious termination to the dispute and a final resolution to the matter as quickly as possible." Garrett v. Nix, 431 So.2d 137, 139-40 (Miss.1983), overruled on other grounds, Moran v. Necaise, 437 So.2d 1222 (Miss. 1983). ¶ 10. 1998However, these concerns must be balanced with any prejudice further delay may impose upon the appellee: "The predominant reason for creating time limitations in appellate procedure is to bring an expeditious termination to the dispute and a final resolution to the matter as quickly as possible." Garrett v. Nix, 431 So. 2d 137, 139-40 (Miss. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Moran v. Necaise, 437 So. 2d 1222 (Miss. 1983). ¶10. | 2 | 2 |
Sam ROGERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KROGER COMPANY, Defendant-Appelleegreen2 sentences2017We are mindful of the fact that “dismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” Wallace v. Jones, 572 So.2d 371, 376 (Miss. 1990) (citing Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982)). 2007In my opinion, even if dismissal is the appropriate remedy, the dismissal should be without prejudice. "[D]ismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases." Wallace v. Jones, 572 So.2d 371, 376 (Miss.1990) (citing Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.1982)). | 1 | 9 |
Jerami Williams v. State of Mississippigreen1 sentence2022See Williams v. State, 228 So. 3d 949, 952-53 (¶14) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Blackwell v. Howard Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2021We noted in a unanimous decision that “dismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim, and any dismissals with prejudice are reserved for the most egregious cases.” Id. at 467 (¶12) (quoting Holder v. Orange Grove Med. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson Public School District v. Head Ex Rel. Russellgreen1 sentence2021While the trial court has the inherent authority to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a dismissal “is ‘reserved for the most egregious cases,’ due to the ‘extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim.’” Id. at 765 (¶11) (quoting Hillman v. Weatherly, 14 So. 3d 721,726 (¶17) (Miss. 2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Van Meter v. Alfordgreen2 sentences2015Dismissal of an appeal is only appropriate “where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct[,] and lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.” Van Meter v. Alford, 774 So.2d 430, 433 (¶ 9) (Miss.2000). “[DJismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim....” Id. 2015Dismissal of an appeal is only appropriate “where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct[,] and lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.” Van Meter v. Alford, 774 So.2d 430, 433 (¶ 9) (Miss.2000). “[DJismissal with prejudice is an extreme and harsh sanction that deprives a litigant of the opportunity to pursue his claim....” Id. | 1 | 1 |
MISS. DHS v. Guidrygreen1 sentence2012Dep’t of Human Sens. v. Guidry, 830 So.2d 628, 632 (¶ 13) (Miss.2002)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moran v. Necaise
green
2 sentences2000However, these concerns must be balanced with any prejudice further delay may impose upon the appellee: "The predominant reason for creating time limitations in appellate procedure is to bring an expeditious termination to the dispute and a final resolution to the matter as quickly as possible." Garrett v. Nix, 431 So.2d 137, 139-40 (Miss.1983), overruled on other grounds, Moran v. Necaise, 437 So.2d 1222 (Miss. 1983). ¶ 10. 1998However, these concerns must be balanced with any prejudice further delay may impose upon the appellee: "The predominant reason for creating time limitations in appellate procedure is to bring an expeditious termination to the dispute and a final resolution to the matter as quickly as possible." Garrett v. Nix, 431 So. 2d 137, 139-40 (Miss. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Moran v. Necaise, 437 So. 2d 1222 (Miss. 1983). ¶10. | 2 | 1998–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.