harmful effect error in Tennessee

2020App. P. 36(b) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim.

2018App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim.

2020App. 1988) (waiver applies when the defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection); State v. Jenkins, 733 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Crim.

2010P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988) (waiver applies when the defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection); see also State v. Jenkins, 733 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn.Crim.

2026App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party . . . who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error”); Gilley, 297 S.W.3d at 762 (“The failure to make a contemporaneous objection constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal.”).

2024Rule 36(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure states that “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” “The failure to make a contemporaneous objection constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal.” State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 762 (Tenn. Crim.

2022App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief to be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action -5- was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 277 (Tenn. 2016) (“[A] defendant may not advocate a different or novel position on appeal.”); see also State v. Maddin, 192 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. Crim.

2022App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief to be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action -5- was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 277 (Tenn. 2016) (“[A] defendant may not advocate a different or novel position on appeal.”); see also State v. Maddin, 192 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. Crim.

2022“When a party does not object to the admissibility of evidence, . . . the evidence becomes admissible notwithstanding any other Rule of Evidence to the contrary, and the jury may consider that evidence for its ‘natural probative effects as if it were in law admissible.’” State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 274, 280 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Harrington, 627 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1981)); see T.R.A.P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error who failed to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”).

2022App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that when a defendant fails to object to the admissibility of evidence, “the evidence becomes admissible notwithstanding any other Rule of Evidence to the contrary, and the jury may consider that evidence for its ‘natural probative effects as if it were in law admissible’”) (quoting State v. Harring

2021App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Jones, 733 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Tenn. Crim.

2020App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Jones, 733 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Tenn. Crim.

2014App. P. 36(a) (stating that “Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tenn. 1989).

2014P. 36(a) (stating that “Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tenn.1989).

2005App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party . . . who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error”); see State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a defendant relinquishes the right to argue on appeal any issues that should have been presented in a motion for new trial).

2005Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) instructs this Court that it is not required to grant relief “to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Additionally, Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e) states in relevant part: “in all cases tried by a jury, no issue presented for review shall be predicated upon error in the admission or exclusion of evidence . . . or other ground upon which a new trial is sought, unless the same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial;

2026App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 277 (Tenn. 2016) (“It is well-settled that a defendant may not advocate a different or novel position on appeal.”); State v. Johnson, No. M2023-01477-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 2795847 , at * 2 (Tenn. Crim.

2022App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief to be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action -5- was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 277 (Tenn. 2016) (“[A] defendant may not advocate a different or novel position on appeal.”); see also State v. Maddin, 192 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. Crim.

2021App. P. 36(a) (providing that appellate courts need not grant relief when the objecting party “failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error”); State v. Johnson, 970 S.W.2d 500, 508 (Tenn. Crim.

2021App. P. 36(a) (providing that appellate courts need not grant relief when the objecting party “failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error”); State v. Johnson, 970 S.W.2d 500, 508 (Tenn. Crim.

2015App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 918 (Tenn. 2009) (“One cardinal principle of appellate practice is that a party who fails to raise an issue in the trial court waives its right to raise that issue on appeal.”).5 VIII.

2015App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 918 (Tenn. 2009) (“One cardinal principle of appellate practice is that a party who fails to raise an issue in the trial court waives its right to raise that issue on appeal.”).

2016App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Alder, 71 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tenn. Crim.

2013See State v. Alder, 71 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tenn. Crim.

2014App. P. 36(a) (nothing in the rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error); see also State v. Thompson, 36 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tenn. Crim.

2013P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party ... who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of the error.”); State v. Thompson, 36 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000).

2014Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) states that “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” “It is well-settled that a litigant ‘will not be permitted to take advantage of errors which he himself committed, or invited, or induced the trial court to commit, or which were the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.’” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Norris v. Richar

2013The State’s response was not adequate to effectively notify the Defendant of the dates, times and locations of the offenses alleged in the indictment.” Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b) states, “Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Furthermore, “it is well-settled that a litigant ‘will not be permitted to take advantage of errors which he himself committed, or invited, or induced the trial court to

2025App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim.

2016App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 356-57 (Tenn. Crim.

2025App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also Bristol, 654 S.W.3d at 925 (“[i]t has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained on appeal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983)).

2019See Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W. 2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) (“It has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained on appeal.”) Further, Rule 36 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure states that we are not required to grant relief to a party responsible for an error or who “failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” However, there is an exception to this general rule as noted in Heatherly v. Merrimack Mut.

2022App. P 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that when a defendant fails to object to the admissibility of evidence, “‘the evidence becomes admissible notwithstanding any other Rule of Evidence to the contrary, - 50 - and the jury may consider that evidence for its ‘natural probative effects as if it were in law admissible’”) (quoting

2022“When a party does not object to the admissibility of evidence, . . . the evidence becomes admissible notwithstanding any other Rule of Evidence to the contrary, and the jury may consider that evidence for its ‘natural probative effects as if it were in law admissible.’” State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 274, 280 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Harrington, 627 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1981)); see T.R.A.P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error who failed to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”).

2010App. 1994), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. June 20, 1994); State v. Gregory, 862 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tenn. Crim.

2004App. P. 36(a); see State v. Gregory, 862 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tenn. Crim.

2009State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Tenn. 1995).

2007State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Tenn. 1995).

2026App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 170 (Tenn. 2008) (appendix) (“[A] party who invites or waives error, or who fails to take reasonable steps to cure an error, is not entitled to relief on appeal.”).

2025App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 170 (Tenn. 2008) (“[A] party who invites or waives error, or who fails to take reasonable steps to cure an error, is not entitled to relief on appeal.”).

2021Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 634 - 635. “[A] defendant is not entitled to relief when he or she ‘failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.’” State v. Debiasi Sirnard King, No. E2002-00634-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21261775 , at *4 (Tenn. Crim.

2018However, we may consider an issue as plain error when all five of the following factors are met: (a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim.

2021App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d at 153 (“Ordinarily, issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived.”); State v. Maddin, 192 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. Crim.

2007See T.R.A.P. 3(e) (stating that issues regarding the admissibility of evidence are waived if they were not raised in the motion for a new trial); T.R.A.P. 36(a) (stating that relief is not available to a party “who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of the error”); see also State v. Alvarado, 961 S.W.2d 136, 153 (Tenn. Crim.

2015App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); Simpson v. Frontier Community Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991) (“[I]ssues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citations omitted); Charles A. Kennedy, 2014 WL 4953586 , at *10 (“Because the State failed to present this argument in the trial court, the trial court did not have the opportunity to pass

2014App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); Simpson v. Frontier Community Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991) (“[I]ssues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citations omitted); Charles A. Kennedy, 2014 WL 4953586 , at *10 (“Because the State failed to present this argument in the trial court, the trial court did not have the opportunity to pass

2014Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) states that “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” “It is well-settled that a litigant ‘will not be permitted to take advantage of errors which he himself committed, or invited, or induced the trial court to commit, or which were the natural consequence of his own neglect or misconduct.’” State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting Norris v. Richar

2013The State’s response was not adequate to effectively notify the Defendant of the dates, times and locations of the offenses alleged in the indictment.” Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b) states, “Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Furthermore, “it is well-settled that a litigant ‘will not be permitted to take advantage of errors which he himself committed, or invited, or induced the trial court to

2013App. P. 36(a); see also Alexander v. Armentrout, 24 S.W.3d 267 , 273 n. 9 (Tenn. 2000).

2011App. P. 36(a); see also Alexander v. Armentrout, 24 S.W.3d 267 , 273 n. 9 (Tenn. 2000).

2010Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a) states that appellate relief is generally not available when a party has “failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” See, e.g., State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2001).

2010App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief to be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tenn. 2001).

2018The rationale for this holding is supported by Rule 36(a) T.R.A.P. which it was not charging negligence per se to the jury. - 10 - provides that “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party . . . who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Mires v. Clay, 3 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

1999The rationale for this holding is supported by Rule 36(a) [of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure] which provides that “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party . . . who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” Mires v. Clay, ____ S.W.2d ____, 1999 WL 632823, at *5 (Tenn. App. 1999) (quoting T.R.A.P. 36(a)); see also Shedd v. Hines, 1989 WL 71049 , at *2 (Tenn. App. June 28, 1989) (no perm. app. filed) (holding that appellant waived objection to trial court’s refusal to cons

2010App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to -10- prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 373 (Tenn. Crim.

1999In a case involving similar circumstances, this Court noted that, while the decision not to request a curative instruction may be understandable as a tactical matter, “an accused is not entitled to relief when he fails ‘to take whatever action . . . reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.’” McPherson, 882 S.W.2d at 371 (quoting Tenn. R.

2026This rule of issue preservation “ensure[s] that the defense and the prosecution are afforded an opportunity to develop fully their opposing positions on an issue.” State v. Minor, 546 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tenn. 2018) (citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009)).

2019Because the Defendant failed to comply with appellate review preservations requirements, we “must utilize the plain error doctrine rather than plenary appellate review when applying a new rule.” Minor, 546 S.W.3d at 70 .