proportionate penalties clause in Illinois

2026“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 14 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community’ (People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)).” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 . ¶ 31 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666 , has overruled its decision in Holman, 2017 IL 1

2024See People v. Griffin, 368 Ill. App. 3d 369, 378-79 (2006) (rejecting 17-year-old’s proportionate penalties challenge to mandatory natural life sentence for multiple first degree murder convictions); People v. McCoy, 337 Ill. App. 3d 518, 521-25 (2003) (same for a 19-year-old defendant); People v. Winters, 349 Ill. App. 3d 747 , 750- 51 (2004) (same for 18-year-old defendant); but see Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 338-343 (holding that mandatory life sentence for 15-year-old for multiple first degree murders violated the proportionate penalties clause). ¶ 57 The State, on the other hand, encoura

2026As noted above, a sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487 .

2026A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005).

2026The State further argues that Dorsey has foreclosed the defendant’s 11 asserted “cause” because Dorsey found that the “announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment” in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), “[did] not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2026The State further argues that Dorsey has foreclosed the defendant’s 11 asserted “cause” because Dorsey found that the “announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment” in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), “[did] not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2026People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 28 (a sentence within the applicable statutory range will not be reversed unless the sentence “greatly varies from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to 13 the nature of the offense”); People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51 (“A defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where, among other circumstances, the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2026In Moore, our supreme court held that “Miller’s announcement of new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a juvenile offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 , quoting People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61 .

2005Prior to October 6, 2005, there were three separate tests which could be used in determining whether the legislature set a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense: “First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. [Citations.] Second, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. [Citations.] Fina

2005Prior to October 6, 2005, there were three separate tests which could be used in determining whether the legislature set a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense: “First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. [Citations.] Second, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. [Citations.] Fina

2026To establish a claim under the proportionate penalties clause, “a defendant must show either that the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community; or that it differs from the penalty imposed for an offense containing the same elements.” People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348 (2009). 19 ¶ 51 The eighth amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const., amend.

2026A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002); see also People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348 (2009).

2026People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 , ¶¶ 69- 78; People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36 . ¶ 53 At the time Robinson filed his supplemental successive petition in 2021, he relied on new, evolving case law interpreting the proportionate penalties clause as applied to emerging adults to explain why he had not raised these claims in earlier postconviction proceedings.

2026People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 , ¶¶ 69- 78; People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36 . -6- ¶ 21 At the time Brady filed his successive petition and supplement, he relied on new, evolving case law interpreting the proportionate penalties clause as applied to emerging adults to explain why he had not raised these claims in an earlier postconviction proceeding.

2022Id. at 521 . - 14 - ¶ 43 In two cases, one involving a direct appeal and the other a section 2-1401 petition, our supreme court has recognized that young adult offenders may rely on the evolving neuroscience regarding brain development in juveniles and its correlation to maturity underpinning the Miller decision to support an as-applied challenge pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2022In Sharpe, the court eliminated one of the three forms, holding that cross-comparison claims were no longer viable under the Illinois’s proportionate penalties clause. 177 Ill. 2d at 516-21 .

2025In the “Statement Of Facts” section of defendant’s March 2012 2-1401 petition, defendant stated that, “During the pending appeal the Court held that the [addition] of the ‘15, 20, Lifer [sic]’ law was unconstitutional.” Defendant stated that the court’s - 25 - 1-24-0067 decisions in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (Oct. 6, 2005), and People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (June 7, 2007), “made this law unenforceable as void.” The March 2012 2-1401 petition argued that defendant’s conviction for attempt (first degree murder) is void because the “penalty provision of that statute violates the pro

2025To support our findings, a summary of defendant’s pleadings after his conviction and sentencing is warranted. ¶ 52 On July 27, 2010, defendant filed an initial pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Post- Conviction Hearing Act on the grounds his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause - 23 - 1-24-0067 of the Illinois constitution under the identical elements test pursuant to People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007).

2026Taking into consideration the supreme court’s decisions in Dorsey, Clark, and People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461 , we are compelled to conclude that the defendant is not entitled to relief where he cannot establish the requisite cause for failing to bring his proportionate penalties claim in his direct appeal or in his subsequent postconviction petitions. ¶ 39 In his brief, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he failed to establish “cause” because, as he claimed in his motion for leave to file the successive petition, the proportionate penalties claim arose from new

2026Taking into consideration the supreme court’s decisions in Dorsey, Clark, and People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461 , we are compelled to conclude that the defendant is not entitled to relief where he cannot establish the requisite cause for failing to bring his proportionate penalties claim in his direct appeal or in his subsequent postconviction petitions. ¶ 38 In his brief, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he failed to establish “cause” because, as he claimed in his motion for leave to file the successive petition, the proportionate penalties claim arose from new

2026“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 14 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)). ¶ 32 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666 , has overruled its decision in Holman, 2

2026“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 14 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community’ (People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)).” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 . ¶ 31 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666 , has overruled its decision in Holman, 2017 IL 1

2026Additionally, in House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 5, 31 , a 19-year-old defendant was sentenced to a mandatory natural life term for murder, and the supreme court determined that the appellate court erred in holding that his natural life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause as applied to him without a developed evidentiary record or factual findings on the issue. ¶ 55 Thus, the Spencer court ultimately determined that “as-applied constitutional claims cannot ultimately succeed absent a sufficiently developed evidentiary record” and that the defendant’s as- applied challenge was better

2026People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 18 ; People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22 . ¶ 45 Following briefing and oral argument in this matter, in People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015 , the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a 20-year-old offender’s 100-year sentence violated 15 the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.

2026While Miller only directly applies to offenders under the age of 18 (see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 ), the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “ ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old [are not foreclosed] from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ). ¶ 65 The defendant’s attorney argued that the defendant’s natural life sentence violate

2026While Miller only directly applies to offenders under the age of 18 (see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 ), the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “ ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old [are not foreclosed] from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ). ¶ 65 The defendant’s attorney argued that the defendant’s natural life sentence violate

2023See Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51 (“This is because federal cases have generally drawn a line at 18 years of age [citation] and because *** the proportionate penalties clause offers a broader path to the same types of relief.”). ¶ 18 Assuming arguendo Mr. Davis brought his claim under the proportionate penalties clause, his postconviction petition was not sufficient for the court to grant leave for a successive filing.

2022E.g., Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶ 37-38 (considering a 19-year-old defendant’s as-applied sentencing claim under the proportionate penalties clause rather than the eighth amendment); People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51 (18-year-old defendant); People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 13-31 (19-year-old defendant); People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 61 (22-year-old defendant); People v. Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202, ¶ 20 (19-year-old defendant). ¶ 26 The proportionate penalties clause provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both accord

2026He also contended that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

2024New research findings do not necessarily alter that traditional line between adults and juveniles.” Id. ¶ 54 This reasoning applies with equal force to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2024Gipson already addressed and rejected a similar argument, concluding, “it appears the court meant only that like the eighth amendment, the proportionate penalties clause does not apply unless a penalty has been imposed.” Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 70 ; see also Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d at 521 (determining that the petition for adjudication of wardship was not a direct action by the state to inflict punishment, foreclosing application of the proportionate penalties clause and the eighth amendment). 21 Nos. 1-22-0807 & 1-22-1122 (cons.) “Punishments satisfying this standard have not been

2024To succeed on a proportionate penalties claim in this instance, defendant had to demonstrate that “the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 ; Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 , ¶ 69. 9 The State references In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 518 (2006), in support of its argument that Jones also forecloses defendant’s proportionate penalties claim.

2026There, the court found, “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2026The State further argues that Dorsey has foreclosed the defendant’s 11 asserted “cause” because Dorsey found that the “announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment” in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), “[did] not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2024When reviewing a proportionate penalties claim, “our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (2005).

2024People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 503 (2010), - 14 - 1-19-1374 People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 542 (2005) (“If this [sentencing] provision violates the proportionate penalties clause, then it is void ab initio.”). ¶ 54 Defendant has raised an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause for the first time on appeal; therefore, the proper forum for his claim ordinarily should be in a successive postconviction petition.

2024In Hilliard, the court cited Dorsey for the proposition that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition” and Moore for the proposition that “Miller applies to neither discretionary sentences nor adults.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 89 Due to the factual similarity of People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541 , we note in particular Hilliard’s abrogation of Minniefield.

2021People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, ¶¶ 39-41 ; People v. Carrion, 2020 IL App (1st) 171274 , ¶ 38; People v. White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, ¶ 24 ; see also People v. Glinsey, 2021 IL App (1st) 191145, ¶ 60 (Martin, J., dissenting); but see People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 44 ; People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 109 .

2024Apr. 1, 2018). -7- violates the proportionate penalties clause based on the identical elements test is therefore without merit. ¶ 22 Rothe nonetheless cites further cases in support: People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996), People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007), and People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821 .

2012In People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 418 (1996), we held that the penalty for armed violence based on robbery with a category I weapon, when compared to the then less severe penalty for armed robbery while armed with a handgun, violates the proportionate penalties clause based on the identical elements test.

2025Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 503-04 (tracing the identical elements analysis to People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d. 172 (1990)); see, e.g., Christy, 139 Ill. 2d. at 181 (comparing the offenses of aggravated kidnapping and armed violence predicated on kidnapping with a Category I weapon); People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267 , -4- ¶¶ 15-16 (explaining that “a violation of the proportionate penalties clause arises out of the relationship between two statutes,” referring to the armed robbery statute and the armed violence statute (Emphasis added.)); Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 20 (comparing the offense of aggrava

2025Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 503-04 (tracing the identical elements analysis to People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d. 172 (1990)); see, e.g., Christy, 139 Ill. 2d. at 181 (comparing the offenses of aggravated kidnapping and armed violence predicated on kidnapping with a Category I weapon); People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267 , -4- ¶¶ 15-16 (explaining that “a violation of the proportionate penalties clause arises out of the relationship between two statutes,” referring to the armed robbery statute and the armed violence statute (Emphasis added.)); Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 20 (comparing the offense of aggrava

2026He also contended that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).

2023Ellis, 2017 IL App (1st) 142181-U , ¶¶ 25-27, 30-31. ¶ 39 On direct appeal, this court also acknowledged that “[d]efendant’s 30-year term sits within the lower half” of the 21 to 45 year sentencing range (Id. ¶ 29); his sentence did not violate the proportionate penalties clause (Id. ¶ 18); “[t]his court has held that a prison term in this range does not violate the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause and has declined to extend the rules set out in Miller and Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)] to mandatory minimum sentences applied to juveniles” (Id. ¶ 23); statutory am

2026It pointed out our supreme court’s remarks in People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28 , that this court’s remand of Savage’s sentencing claim (Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 ) had “infirmities.” See Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28 (calling this court’s remand into doubt as “ ‘Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a -7- claim under the proportionate penalties clause’ ” in a successive postconviction petition and “Miller applies to neither discretionary sentences nor adults” (internal citations omitted)). ¶ 27

2024The difference is illustrated by People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 , abrogated by Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28 , where the 22-year-old defendant alleged that his discretionary 85-year sentence was unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause as the sentencing statute applied to him.

2016“In analyzing a proportionate penalties challenge, our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense.” Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d at 543 ; see also People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 473-74 (1998).

2016“In analyzing a proportionate penalties challenge, our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense.” Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d at 543 ; see also People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 473-74 (1998).

2026Ease of argument is not the standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶¶ 44-45 . - 12 - 1-25-0240 ¶ 30 In Haines, the court found that “[t]he young-adult brain research to which Miller and Harris gave their imprimatur provides some helpful support for [the] defendant’s claim under the proportionate-penalties clause.

2026The court found that the defendant “‘had the essential legal tools to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause’ when he filed his previous postconviction petitions.” Id. (quoting Haines, 2021 IL App (4th) 190612, ¶ 49 ).

2018But see People v. Patterson , 2014 IL 115102 , ¶ 106, 388 Ill.Dec. 834 , 25 N.E.3d 526 .

2018But see People v. Patterson , 2014 IL 115102 , ¶ 106, 388 Ill.Dec. 834 , 25 N.E.3d 526 .

2026While Miller only directly applies to offenders under the age of 18 (see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 ), the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “ ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old [are not foreclosed] from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ). ¶ 65 The defendant’s attorney argued that the defendant’s natural life sentence violate

2025Specifically, defendant argues that Moore is distinguishable from this case because the defendants in Moore received discretionary life sentences whereas defendant received a mandatory life sentence; and, according to defendant, “Moore specifically held that because Miller did not change the law applicable to discretionary sentences imposed on young adult offenders, it [did] not provide cause for [those defendants] to file their proposed successive postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that Miller did change the law with respect to mandatory life sentences, and defendan

2025The cross-comparison analysis involves two steps: (1) “whether the purposes of the compared offenses are distinct such that comparative proportionality review is not appropriate,” and (2) “if the purposes are deemed related, we consider whether the offense with the harsher penalty is more serious than the offense with the less severe penalty.” People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (2005).

2006Third, there is a violation of the proportionate penalties clause when identical offenses are given different sentences.” People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 452 (2002).

2013Thus, we held the 15-year enhancement for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause and was “unenforceable.” Id. at 397 . ¶ 15 A few years later, in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 (2005), we abandoned cross- comparison proportionate penalties analysis, and expressly overruled “[t]hose cases that used such an analysis to invalidate a penalty.” Walden was no longer good law. ¶ 16 Following Sharpe, the next opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the sentencing enhancement for armed robbery presented itself in Hauschild.

2007However, in People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 397 , 264 Ill.Dec. 91 , 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), overruled by People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), this court held that pursuant to the cross-comparison test, the statutory 15-year mandatory enhancement for armed robbery while armed with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and was "unenforceable." Consequently, the trial courts in the instant case and in Harvey found that they lacked the authority, pursuant to Walden , to impose the 15-year "add on penalty" to the