proportionate penalties clause in Illinois

2026A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005).

2026As noted above, a sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487 .

2026“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 14 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community’ (People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)).” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 . ¶ 31 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666 , has overruled its decision in Holman, 2017 IL 1

2026People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002). ¶ 35 Our supreme court recognizes two types of violations of the proportionate penalties clause: where (1) the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements, or (2) the punishment is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.

2026Further, in People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , the Illinois Supreme Court held that a defendant who was 18 years and 3 months old at the time of the offense could pursue an as-applied challenge to his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause in postconviction proceedings where an adequate factual record could be developed.

2026People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 32 ; People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61 . 20 No. 1-24-0714 ¶ 69 Additionally, even under a mandatory sentencing scheme, Conwell could have made a proportionate penalties claim in his initial postconviction petition by arguing his youth and attendant circumstances made his natural life sentence cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the crime as to shock the moral sense of the community.

2026The State further argues that Dorsey has foreclosed the defendant’s 11 asserted “cause” because Dorsey found that the “announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment” in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), “[did] not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2026VIII) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), by imposing a de facto life sentence without considering defendant’s age of 18 years at the time of the offense, (2) the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause (Ill.

2021A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005) (citing People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003)).

2021A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005) (citing People v. Moss, 206 Ill. 2d 503, 522 (2003)).

2026The court distinguished its decisions in Harris and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 115151 , by stating that they “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 . ¶ 20 Further, our supreme court has concluded that “[a]s Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 .

2026People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 28 (a sentence within the applicable statutory range will not be reversed unless the sentence “greatly varies from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to 13 the nature of the offense”); People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 51 (“A defendant’s sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where, among other circumstances, the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2026While Miller only directly applies to offenders under the age of 18 (see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58 ), the Illinois Supreme Court has held that “ ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old [are not foreclosed] from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 ; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ). ¶ 65 The defendant’s attorney argued that the defendant’s natural life sentence violate

2025Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson, 2018 IL 121636, ¶ 31 (quoting Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37 ); see Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 41 (18-year-old defendant sentenced to a mandatory minimum aggregate term of 76 years’ imprisonment; this court stated that the record needed to be sufficiently developed in the circuit court through an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact to review the defendant’s constitutional claim); House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 5, 31 (19-year-old defendant sentenced to a mandatory natural life term for murder; this court determined that the appellate court erred in holding t

2026To establish a claim under the proportionate penalties clause, “a defendant must show either that the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community; or that it differs from the penalty imposed for an offense containing the same elements.” People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348 (2009). 19 ¶ 51 The eighth amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const., amend.

2025To be meritorious on a claim of a proportionate penalties clause violation, “a defendant must show either that the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community; or that it 18 differs from the penalty imposed for an offense containing the same elements.” People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348 (2009).

2026People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 , ¶¶ 69- 78; People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36 . ¶ 53 At the time Robinson filed his supplemental successive petition in 2021, he relied on new, evolving case law interpreting the proportionate penalties clause as applied to emerging adults to explain why he had not raised these claims in earlier postconviction proceedings.

2026People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 , ¶¶ 69- 78; People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36 . -6- No. 1-23-2206 ¶ 21 At the time Brady filed his successive petition and supplement, he relied on new, evolving case law interpreting the proportionate penalties clause as applied to emerging adults to explain why he had not raised these claims in an earlier postconviction proceeding.

2022In Sharpe, the court eliminated one of the three forms, holding that cross-comparison claims were no longer viable under the Illinois’s proportionate penalties clause. 177 Ill. 2d at 516-21 .

2022Id. at 521 . - 14 - No. 1-20-0317 ¶ 43 In two cases, one involving a direct appeal and the other a section 2-1401 petition, our supreme court has recognized that young adult offenders may rely on the evolving neuroscience regarding brain development in juveniles and its correlation to maturity underpinning the Miller decision to support an as-applied challenge pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2025To support our findings, a summary of defendant’s pleadings after his conviction and sentencing is warranted. ¶ 52 On July 27, 2010, defendant filed an initial pro se petition for relief pursuant to the Post- Conviction Hearing Act on the grounds his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause - 23 - 1-24-0067 of the Illinois constitution under the identical elements test pursuant to People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007).

2025In the “Statement Of Facts” section of defendant’s March 2012 2-1401 petition, defendant stated that, “During the pending appeal the Court held that the [addition] of the ‘15, 20, Lifer [sic]’ law was unconstitutional.” Defendant stated that the court’s - 25 - 1-24-0067 decisions in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (Oct. 6, 2005), and People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (June 7, 2007), “made this law unenforceable as void.” The March 2012 2-1401 petition argued that defendant’s conviction for attempt (first degree murder) is void because the “penalty provision of that statute violates the pro

2026The State further argued that the proportionate penalties clause does not apply to the defendant’s case because the proportionate penalties clause is coextensive with the eighth amendment under People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102 , and because our court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected his 8 eighth amendment claim, his proportionality claim fails as well.

2026The State further argued that the proportionate penalties clause does not apply to the defendant’s case because the proportionate penalties clause is coextensive with the eighth amendment under People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102 , and because our court and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected his 8 eighth amendment claim, his proportionality claim fails as well.

2026Taking into consideration the supreme court’s decisions in Dorsey, Clark, and People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461 , we are compelled to conclude that the defendant is not entitled to relief where he cannot establish the requisite cause for failing to bring his proportionate penalties claim in his direct appeal or in his subsequent postconviction petitions. ¶ 38 In his brief, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he failed to establish “cause” because, as he claimed in his motion for leave to file the successive petition, the proportionate penalties claim arose from new

2026The court distinguished its decisions in Harris and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 115151 , by stating that they “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 . ¶ 20 Further, our supreme court has concluded that “[a]s Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 .

2026In support of that contention, defendant cited an exhibit attached to the motion, which he titled “Science.” ¶9 Defendant argued his sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 , and that a “sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ [Citation.]” Defendant’s motion described defendant’s “personal characteristics” and contained information about his upbringing, and concluded that defendant’s “stunted

2026In support of that contention, defendant cited an exhibit attached to the motion, which he titled “Science.” ¶9 Defendant argued his sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 , and that a “sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ [Citation.]” Defendant’s motion described defendant’s “personal characteristics” and contained information about his upbringing, and concluded that defendant’s “stunted

2026“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 14 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community’ (People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)).” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 . ¶ 31 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666 , has overruled its decision in Holman, 2017 IL 1

2026A sentence “violates the proportionate penalties clause if the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Hillard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 .

2026See House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 18 (to overcome presumption the statute is constitutional, the challenging person must establish the statute is invalid as applied to that person). ¶ 33 Our supreme court has recognized that young adult offenders may raise as-applied challenges under the proportionate penalties clause where a defendant receives a mandatory life sentence and an adequate factual record can be developed.

2026Defendant then fled to Mexico because he feared retaliation from the Latin Kings. ¶ 10 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder of Bankhead and Means while personally discharging a firearm. ¶ 11 Prior to sentencing, defendant’s attorney submitted a memorandum, which was later amended following the submission of an updated presentencing investigation (PSI) report, arguing that a mandatory natural life sentence would violate the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution due to defendant’s status as a 21-ye

2023See Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 51 (“This is because federal cases have generally drawn a line at 18 years of age [citation] and because *** the proportionate penalties clause offers a broader path to the same types of relief.”). ¶ 18 Assuming arguendo Mr. Davis brought his claim under the proportionate penalties clause, his postconviction petition was not sufficient for the court to grant leave for a successive filing.

2022See, e.g., People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 55 (recognizing that “the proportionate penalties clause goes further than the eighth amendment in offering protection against oppressive penalties.”) (citing People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶ 37 ). ¶ 41 In Aikens, we remanded for resentencing after the juvenile defendant’s sentence had been mandatorily enhanced under prior law. 2016 IL App (1st) 133578, ¶ 38 .

2026The State further argues that Dorsey has foreclosed the defendant’s 11 asserted “cause” because Dorsey found that the “announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment” in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), “[did] not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 .

2026Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 “deprived defendant of some helpful support for his state constitutional law claim, which is insufficient to establish cause.” Id. ¶ 19 In Clark, the supreme court concluded that Miller did not provide cause for raising a proportionate penalties claim in successive postconviction petitions as a defendant “had the essential legal tools” to raise the claim in his initial postconviction petition.

2024When reviewing a proportionate penalties claim, “our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (2005).

2024See People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (2005) (“[A] sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is so cruel, degrading, or disproportionate to the offense that the sentence shocks the moral sense of the community. [Citations.]”). - 17 - No. 1-21-1190 ¶ 42 As to the appropriate remedy, we find that there is no need for further postconviction proceedings since there are no disputed issues of fact.

2024In Hilliard, the court cited Dorsey for the proposition that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition” and Moore for the proposition that “Miller applies to neither discretionary sentences nor adults.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 89 Due to the factual similarity of People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541 , we note in particular Hilliard’s abrogation of Minniefield.

2023See Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42 ; People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶¶ 1, 23, 34 ; People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 1-2, 6 ; People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶ 1-2 . ¶ 74 The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74 , found that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” The supreme court reasoned that: “Illinois courts have long recognized the differences between persons of mature age and those wh

2024Apr. 1, 2018). -7- violates the proportionate penalties clause based on the identical elements test is therefore without merit. ¶ 22 Rothe nonetheless cites further cases in support: People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412 (1996), People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007), and People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821 .

2012In People v. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d 412, 418 , 222 Ill.Dec. 296 , 677 N.E.2d 830 (1996), we held that the penalty for armed violence based on robbery with a category I weapon, when compared to the then less severe penalty for armed robbery while armed with a handgun, violates the proportionate penalties clause based on the identical elements test.

2024New research findings do not necessarily alter that traditional line between adults and juveniles.” Id. ¶ 54 This reasoning applies with equal force to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

2022Punishments satisfying this standard have not been -3- 2022 IL App (2d) 191061-U delineated because “as our society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the ‘moral sense’ of the community.” Id. at 339 . ¶7 Defendant points out that in People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 40 , our supreme court stated that the proportionate penalties clause’s “objective of rehabilitation[] went beyond the framers’ understanding of the eighth amendment and is not synonymous with that provision.” Defendant argues that the mandatory sentences imposed on him are morally shoc

2022To determine whether the proportionate penalties clause has been violated, this court has adopted the “identical elements test,” first applied in People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 181 (1990).

2022To determine whether the proportionate penalties clause has been violated, this court has adopted the “identical elements test,” first applied in People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 181 (1990).

2023Ellis, 2017 IL App (1st) 142181-U , ¶¶ 25-27, 30-31. ¶ 39 On direct appeal, this court also acknowledged that “[d]efendant’s 30-year term sits within the lower half” of the 21 to 45 year sentencing range (Id. ¶ 29); his sentence did not violate the proportionate penalties clause (Id. ¶ 18); “[t]his court has held that a prison term in this range does not violate the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause and has declined to extend the rules set out in Miller and Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)] to mandatory minimum sentences applied to juveniles” (Id. ¶ 23); statutory am

2022Punishments satisfying this standard have not been -3- 2022 IL App (2d) 191061-U delineated because “as our society evolves, so too do our concepts of elemental decency and fairness which shape the ‘moral sense’ of the community.” Id. at 339 . ¶7 Defendant points out that in People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 40 , our supreme court stated that the proportionate penalties clause’s “objective of rehabilitation[] went beyond the framers’ understanding of the eighth amendment and is not synonymous with that provision.” Defendant argues that the mandatory sentences imposed on him are morally shoc

2026It pointed out our supreme court’s remarks in People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28 , that this court’s remand of Savage’s sentencing claim (Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 ) had “infirmities.” See Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28 (calling this court’s remand into doubt as “ ‘Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a -7- No. 1-24-0760 claim under the proportionate penalties clause’ ” in a successive postconviction petition and “Miller applies to neither discretionary sentences nor adults” (internal citations o

2026Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 59 (“It is well established that offenders who are 18 years and older cannot raise a facial challenge to their sentences under the eighth amendment and the Miller line of cases.”) As our supreme court held in Hilliard, “ ‘Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause’ ” in a successive postconviction petition and “Miller applies to neither discretionary sentences nor adults.” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 28 . ¶ 39 However, at the heari

2026People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 , ¶¶ 69- 78; People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36 . ¶ 53 At the time Robinson filed his supplemental successive petition in 2021, he relied on new, evolving case law interpreting the proportionate penalties clause as applied to emerging adults to explain why he had not raised these claims in earlier postconviction proceedings.

2026People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 , ¶¶ 69- 78; People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36 . -6- No. 1-23-2206 ¶ 21 At the time Brady filed his successive petition and supplement, he relied on new, evolving case law interpreting the proportionate penalties clause as applied to emerging adults to explain why he had not raised these claims in an earlier postconviction proceeding.

2025The court then concluded that “Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived defendant of ‘some 17 No. 1-24-0463 helpful support’ for his state constitutional law claim, which is insufficient to establish ‘cause.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 59 ). ¶ 56 Later, in People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 94 , the supreme court similarly concluded that Miller did not provide cause for raising a proportionate penalties clause claim in a successive postconviction petition.

2023Setting aside whether a trial court’s failure to consider mitigating evidence at sentencing can support a state constitutional challenge under the proportionate penalties clause (see People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 61 ), the trial court stated in its lengthy findings that it had considered, inter alia, defendant’s PSI, the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, as well as the trial evidence.

2016“In analyzing a proportionate penalties challenge, our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense.” People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 543 (2005); see -3- also People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 473-74 (1998).

2016“In analyzing a proportionate penalties challenge, our ultimate inquiry is whether the legislature has set the sentence in accord with the seriousness of the offense.” Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d at 543 ; see also People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462, 473-74 (1998).

2026“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 14 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community’ (People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)).” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 . ¶ 31 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666 , has overruled its decision in Holman, 2017 IL 1

2026“A statute violates the proportionate penalties clause if either the penalty is harsher than the penalty for a different offense containing identical elements (People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 14 2d 481, 521 (2005)) or ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller)). ¶ 32 As a preliminary matter, we note that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson, 2023 IL 127666 , has overruled its decision in Holman, 2