multiple-victim exception in Minnesota

2015See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 605 ; see also State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn. 1980) (permitting one sentence per victim in multiple-victim cases “so long as the multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct”).

2004See Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d at 851 (applying the multiple-victim exception as long as the sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct); see also Lingwall, 637 N.W.2d at 314 ; Lundberg, 575 N.W.2d at 591-92 .

2016Under the multiple victim exception to this rule, however, a court may impose “multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).

2015“Under the multiple- victim exception, courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 590 (quotation omitted).

1985The supreme court discussed an identical claim in State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. 1982) stating: Under the multiple-victim exception to the rule of Minn.Stat. § 609.035 [1980], which bars multiple sentencing in cases of multiple offenses committed as part of the same behavioral incident, the trial court may impose one sentence per victim in multiple victim cases so long as the multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.

1983As stated in State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn.1982), “Under the multiple-victim exception to the rule of Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (1980), which bars multiple sentencing in cases of multiple offenses committed as part of the same behavioral incident, the trial court may impose one sentence per victim in multiple victim cases so long as the multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” (Citations omitted).

2012For example, in State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn.1983), the defendant argued that the multiple-victim exception should not apply “in any case in which the statute violated does not require a showing of intent.” But we disagreed, saying that “[t]he fact that [the] defendant may not have intended to hurt anyone should not make a difference.” Id.

2012For example, in State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn.1983), the defendant argued that the multiple-victim exception should not apply “in any case in which the statute violated does not require a showing of intent.” But we disagreed, saying that “[t]he fact that [the] defendant may not have intended to hurt anyone should not make a difference.” Id.

2025Under the multiple-victim exception to section 609.035, a district court may impose “multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006).

2017But see State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006) (stating that under-the multiple-victim exception, "courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if: (1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality'of the defendant’s conduct”). .

2013The supreme court observed that “the multiple-victim exception clearly permits three assault convictions if a burglar assaults three different people after entering a house.” Id. at 711 (emphasis added).

2012In Hodges, 386 N.W.2d at 711 , we stated that "the multiple-victim exception clearly permits three assault convictions if a burglar assaults three different people after entering a house.” The same holds true when the person, who recklessly discharges a firearm at an occupied building, assaults eight different building occupants by committing the act with an intent to cause fear of immediate harm.

2004Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 360 , 161 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1968); see also State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn.1979) (quoting Stangvik); see State v. Briggs, 256 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Minn.1977) (same).

1995See, e.g., State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn.1980) (affirming imposition of two sentences for defendant who fired two bullets that struck seven people in a bar); State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn.1979) (upholding sentences for five counts of aggravated assault where defendant planted a firebomb at a house while five residents were at home).

2025Stangvik v. Tahash, 161 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Minn. 1968) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2012Stangvik, 281 Minn. at 361 , 161 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 408 P.2d 124, 128 (1965)).

2016The purpose of the multiple-victim exception is to make sure a “defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability and a defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by means likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person.” Id. (quotations omitted).

2015See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 605 ; see also State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn. 1980) (permitting one sentence per victim in multiple-victim cases “so long as the multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct”).

2024And the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that the multiple-victim rule does not violate the separation of powers, Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 419 (Minn. 2018), and does not violate the bar on double jeopardy, State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1987).

2019See Munt v. State , 920 N.W.2d 410 , 418-419 (Minn. 2018).

2012We have held that courts are not prevented from giving a defendant multiple sentences for multiple crimes arising out of a single behavioral incident if two critex-ia are met: “(1) the crimes affect multiple victims; and (2) multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn.2006); see also State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Minn.2000); State ex rel.

2012See Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d at 878 (“[W]e uphold the imposition of one sentence per victim if this would not result in punishment grossly out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Minn.1997) (“[0]ne sentence may be imposed per victim in multiple-victim cases.... ”).

2006See, e.g., Bangert v. State, 282 N.W.2d 540, 546-47 (Minn.1979) (multiple murders merited multiple sentences); State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn.1977) (an aggravated assault and a sex crime merited multiple sentences); State v. Briggs, 256 N.W.2d 305, 305-06 (Minn.1977) (three sentences merited for defendant who fired 20 bullets at three victims); see also State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 882-83 (Minn.1983) (where multiple deaths were a reasonably foreseeable consequence, a vehicular homicide killing two people merited two sentences).

2004Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 360 , 161 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1968); see also State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn.1979) (quoting Stangvik); see State v. Briggs, 256 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Minn.1977) (same).

2004See State v. Oates, 611 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Minn.App.2000) (affirming separate sentences for multiple assaults on multiple victims because the defendant fired “several shots in a crowded bar, with intent to kill one individual but heedless of the mortal risk posed to countless others”), review denied (Minn. Aug. 22, 2000); see also State v. Wipper, 512 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn.1994) (affirming arson and murder convictions but vacating arson sentence because arson did not involve multiple victims).

1998See State v. Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779, 790 (Minn.1987) (affirming imposition of consecutive sentences for convictions of burglary, kidnapping, and first-degree murder against different persons); State v. Hodges, 386 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Minn.1986) (holding multiple victim exception does not allow three burglary convictions merely because three people were present in house when it was burglarized, but noting burglary is not “purely a property offense,” and sentences for other offenses committed within dwelling against other victims are permissible); see also State v. Wipper, 512 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Min

2025In such cases, the district court has discretion to impose multiple 6 Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1, states: “[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them.” This statute “generally ‘prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.’ ” State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. 2012) (quoti

2024In State v. Rhoades, we stated that a defendant “convicted of multiple counts of possession of child pornography as part of a single behavioral incident that involves images of multiple victims may be sentenced consecutively on each count under the multiple-victim [rule].” 690 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Minn. App. 2004).

2024And the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that the multiple-victim rule does not violate the separation of powers, Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 419 (Minn. 2018), and does not violate the bar on double jeopardy, State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 835 (Minn. 1987).

2015Nunn also argues for the first time on appeal that the multiple-victim exception to Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (2014) violates both the doctrine of separation of powers, see League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 646 (Minn.2012), and the prohibition against double jeopardy, see State v. McKenzie, 542 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn.1996).

2015Nunn also argues for the first time on appeal that the multiple-victim exception to Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (2014) violates both the doctrine of separation of powers, see League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 646 (Minn.2012), and the prohibition against double jeopardy, see State v. McKenzie, 542 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn.1996).

2015When determining whether a sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of an offense, “we are guided by past sentences received by other offenders for similar offenses.” Carpenter v. State, 674 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Minn. 2004).

2012See also State v. DeFoe, 280 N.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Minn.1979) (affirming separate sentences for aggravated assault and aggravated robbery in which only one of the several people in the bar was a victim of aggravated assault).

2012Stangvik, 281 Minn. at 361 , 161 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 408 P.2d 124, 128 (1965)).

2012Stangvik, 281 Minn. at 361 , 161 N.W.2d at 672 (quoting People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671 , 47 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 408 P.2d 124, 128 (1965)).

2012See Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d at 878 (“[W]e uphold the imposition of one sentence per victim if this would not result in punishment grossly out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Minn.1997) (“[0]ne sentence may be imposed per victim in multiple-victim cases.... ”).

2006See Jones, 678 N.W.2d at 24 (rejecting a similarly broad definition of the term “victims,” noting that such a broad definition would lead to “absurd” results).

2006See, e.g., Bangert v. State, 282 N.W.2d 540, 546-47 (Minn.1979) (multiple murders merited multiple sentences); State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn.1977) (an aggravated assault and a sex crime merited multiple sentences); State v. Briggs, 256 N.W.2d 305, 305-06 (Minn.1977) (three sentences merited for defendant who fired 20 bullets at three victims); see also State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 882-83 (Minn.1983) (where multiple deaths were a reasonably foreseeable consequence, a vehicular homicide killing two people merited two sentences).

2006See, e.g., Bangert v. State, 282 N.W.2d 540, 546-47 (Minn.1979) (multiple murders merited multiple sentences); State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn.1977) (an aggravated assault and a sex crime merited multiple sentences); State v. Briggs, 256 N.W.2d 305, 305-06 (Minn.1977) (three sentences merited for defendant who fired 20 bullets at three victims); see also State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 882-83 (Minn.1983) (where multiple deaths were a reasonably foreseeable consequence, a vehicular homicide killing two people merited two sentences).

2005See State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 358 (Minn.App.2002) (when criminal conduct arises from a single behavioral incident, multiple convictions are permissible but multiple sentences are not).

2004“Consecutive sentencing of multiple felonies with multiple victims is permissive and within the broad discretion of the [district] court.” State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 284 (Minn.2003); see also Minn. Sent.

2004See, e.g., State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 850-51 (Minn.1980); State v. Lingwall, 637 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Minn.App.2001); State v. Lundberg, 575 N.W.2d 589, 591-92 (Minn.App.1998), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1998).

2004See Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d at 851 (applying the multiple-victim exception as long as the sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct); see also Lingwall, 637 N.W.2d at 314 ; Lundberg, 575 N.W.2d at 591-92 .