Louisiana rule in Louisiana

2007C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2) brought "Louisiana's standard for summary judgment closely in line with the federal standard under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c)." Hayes, 96-287 at ___, 685 So. 2d at 694 .

1998In 1997, the legislature again amended the provisions of Art. 966 for the purpose of clarifying the 1996 changes and legislatively overruling all cases inconsistent with Hayes v. Autin, 96-287 (La.App. 3d Cir. 12/26/96), 685 So.2d 691, 694 , writ denied, 97-0281 (La.3/14/97), 690 So.2d 41 , which had declared that the 1996 amendment brought Louisiana's standard for summary judgment closely in line with the federal courts' "more liberal standard." Whether or not the 1996 and 1997 amendments actually changed the standard for summary judgment is debatable, but there can be no doubt that the legis

2004Hayes v. Autin, 96-287 (La.App.3 Cir. 12/26/96); 685 So.2d 691, 694 , writ denied, 97-0281 (La.3/14/97), 690 So.2d 41 .

1998In 1997, the legislature again amended the provisions of Art. 966 for the purpose of clarifying the 1996 changes and legislatively overruling all cases inconsistent with Hayes v. Autin, 96-287 (La.App. 3d Cir. 12/26/96), 685 So.2d 691, 694 , writ denied, 97-0281 (La.3/14/97), 690 So.2d 41 , which had declared that the 1996 amendment brought Louisiana's standard for summary judgment closely in line with the federal courts' "more liberal standard." Whether or not the 1996 and 1997 amendments actually changed the standard for summary judgment is debatable, but there can be no doubt that the legis

2018Shaffer , 77 So.3d 939 .

2018Shaffer , 77 So.3d 939 .

2004The court further noted that dismissal is a “draconian” penalty which should only be applied in “extreme circumstances.” Id. |4Comparing the Louisiana rule for sanctioning a party who fails to comply with discovery with the Federal rule, the Horton court identified four factors appellate courts should consider when determining whether a trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiffs claims is an abuse of discretion: (1) whether the violation was willful or resulted from inability to comply; (2) whether less drastic sanctions would be effective; (3) whether the violations prejudiced the opposing party

2004The court further noted that dismissal is a “draconian” penalty which should only be applied in “extreme circumstances.” Id. |4Comparing the Louisiana rule for sanctioning a party who fails to comply with discovery with the Federal rule, the Horton court identified four factors appellate courts should consider when determining whether a trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiffs claims is an abuse of discretion: (1) whether the violation was willful or resulted from inability to comply; (2) whether less drastic sanctions would be effective; (3) whether the violations prejudiced the opposing party

1984As later stated in Allen v. Smith, 390 So.2d 1300 (La.1980): The Louisiana rule empowering a court to impose these sanctions is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), (d).

1984As later stated in Allen v. Smith, 390 So.2d 1300 (La.1980): The Louisiana rule empowering a court to impose these sanctions is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), (d).

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1994In State v. Wade, 375 So.2d 97 (La.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971 , 100 S.Ct. 1665 , 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980), the sole issue was the defendant's right to introduce psychiatric testimony concerning his ability or lack of ability to formulate specific intent. "[W]e do not find that due process is offended by the Louisiana rule that a defendant cannot rebut evidence of specific intent by presentation of psychiatric testimony, without pleading not guilty by reason of insanity.

1967Application of the rule in this state was the subject of comment in Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329 , 59 So.2d 409 (1952) wherein the court stated: “The Louisiana rule is that while mutual, equal fault operates as a bar to relief being given to either litigant, the courts consider in each case the degree of guilt, and only where there is a finding of fact that the degree of guilt has been equal is the suit dismissed.

1967Application of the rule in this state was the subject of comment in Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329 , 59 So.2d 409 (1952) wherein the court stated: “The Louisiana rule is that while mutual, equal fault operates as a bar to relief being given to either litigant, the courts consider in each case the degree of guilt, and only where there is a finding of fact that the degree of guilt has been equal is the suit dismissed.

1962The views expressed by us in Randall v. Ridgley, La.App., 185 So. 632 and in Bacas v. Laswell, La.App., 22 So.2d 591 , are consistent with this conclusion.” * * * * ‡ “If this reasoning is sound then, in an effort to determine who is responsible as the aggressor in an affray which is • commenced by words, it becomes necessary to determine whether the words were such as to justify the conclusion that it should have been anticipated that physical retaliation would be attempted.

1962The views expressed by us in Randall v. Ridgley, La.App., 185 So. 632 and in Bacas v. Laswell, La.App., 22 So.2d 591 , are consistent with this conclusion.” * * * * ‡ “If this reasoning is sound then, in an effort to determine who is responsible as the aggressor in an affray which is • commenced by words, it becomes necessary to determine whether the words were such as to justify the conclusion that it should have been anticipated that physical retaliation would be attempted.

1962The views expressed by us in Randall v. Ridgley, La.App., 185 So. 632 and in Bacas v. Laswell, La.App., 22 So.2d 591 , are consistent with this conclusion.” * * * * ‡ “If this reasoning is sound then, in an effort to determine who is responsible as the aggressor in an affray which is • commenced by words, it becomes necessary to determine whether the words were such as to justify the conclusion that it should have been anticipated that physical retaliation would be attempted.

1962The views expressed by us in Randall v. Ridgley, La.App., 185 So. 632 and in Bacas v. Laswell, La.App., 22 So.2d 591 , are consistent with this conclusion.” * * * * ‡ “If this reasoning is sound then, in an effort to determine who is responsible as the aggressor in an affray which is • commenced by words, it becomes necessary to determine whether the words were such as to justify the conclusion that it should have been anticipated that physical retaliation would be attempted.

2010This court has observed “Although the wording of the federal rule differs from the Louisiana rule, as observed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Williams, [ 830 So.2d 984 ,] a review of federal jurisprudence reveals the two rules are virtually identical in application.” State v. Willis, 05-218, p. 27 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 915 So.2d 365, 386 , writ denied, 06-186 (La.6/23/06), 930 So.2d 973 .

2010This court has observed “Although the wording of the federal rule differs from the Louisiana rule, as observed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Williams, [ 830 So.2d 984 ,] a review of federal jurisprudence reveals the two rules are virtually identical in application.” State v. Willis, 05-218, p. 27 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 915 So.2d 365, 386 , writ denied, 06-186 (La.6/23/06), 930 So.2d 973 .

2007Leon v. Moore, 98-1792, p. 4 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 4/1/99), 731 So.2d 502, 504 , writ denied, 99-1294 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 20 .

2007Leon v. Moore, 98-1792, p. 4 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 4/1/99), 731 So.2d 502, 504 , writ denied, 99-1294 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 20 .

2007Leon v. Moore, 98-1792, p. 4 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 4/1/99), 731 So.2d 502, 504 , writ denied, 99-1294 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 20 .

2007Leon v. Moore, 98-1792, p. 4 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 4/1/99), 731 So.2d 502, 504 , writ denied, 99-1294 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 20 .

2006Additionally, in King v. Stranco, Inc., 00-2003, 00-2004, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/01), 818 So.2d 48, 50-51 , the first circuit explained: The amended LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 brings Louisiana’s standard for summary judgment closely in line with the federal standard under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

2004Additionally, in King v. Stranco, Inc., 00-2003, 00-2004, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/01), 818 So.2d 48, 50-51 , the first circuit explained: The amended LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 brings Louisiana's standard for summary judgment closely in line with the federal standard under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

1995Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d at 550 ; Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 904, 907 (5th Cir.1985); Triplette v. Exxon Corporation, 554 So.2d at 1362 .

1995Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d at 550 ; Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 904, 907 (5th Cir.1985); Triplette v. Exxon Corporation, 554 So.2d at 1362 .

1995Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d at 550 ; Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 904, 907 (5th Cir.1985); Triplette v. Exxon Corporation, 554 So.2d at 1362 .

1995Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d at 550 ; Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 904, 907 (5th Cir.1985); Triplette v. Exxon Corporation, 554 So.2d at 1362 .

1991State v. Smith, 415 So.2d 930 (La. 1982); State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La. 1979).

1982In State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La. 1979), we held that when the state intends to use a federal or non-Louisiana plea of guilty as a prior conviction in order to enhance punishment under La.R.S. 15:529.1 (Habitual Offender Law): the state is required only to prove the conviction by a plea of guilty with representation by counsel.

1990Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 359 So.2d 154 (La.1978).

1985Gremillion v. Town of Cottonport, 420 So.2d 1302 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982); Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So.2d 154 (La.1978).