State-agent immunity in Alabama

2025We have held that State-agent immunity may bar an action against a state agent or employee under the principles announced in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000).

2025If the defendant presented evidence demonstrating that he or she was engaged in conduct that would entitle the defendant to immunity, we then consider whether the plaintiff met his or her burden of demonstrating by substantial evidence the applicability one of the exceptions to State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000)(plurality opinion)(setting forth a restatement of State-agent immunity that was adopted by a majority of the Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).

2025If the defendant presented evidence demonstrating that he or she was engaged in conduct that would entitle the defendant to immunity, we then consider whether the plaintiff met his or her burden of demonstrating by substantial evidence the applicability one of the exceptions to State-agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000)(plurality opinion)(setting forth a restatement of State-agent immunity that was adopted by a majority of the Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).

2025See Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000) (adopting, by majority, the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity).

2025Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052 ; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709 ; Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998)." Riche argues that he is entitled to State-agent immunity under § 36-1-12(c)(5), which, as noted, provides that an "education employee" such as Riche is immune from civil liability in his individual capacity for 13 SC-2025-0064 acts that involve "[e]xercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in … educating students."4 Although § 36-1-12(c)(5) uses the phrase "educating students," that phrase is not limited to teachers and administrators or to con

2023"A State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he or she 'fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist.' " Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).' "Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). 'State-agent immunity protects agents of the State in their exercise of discretion in educating students.

2025Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052 ; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709 ; Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998)." Riche argues that he is entitled to State-agent immunity under § 36-1-12(c)(5), which, as noted, provides that an "education employee" such as Riche is immune from civil liability in his individual capacity for 13 SC-2025-0064 acts that involve "[e]xercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in … educating students."4 Although § 36-1-12(c)(5) uses the phrase "educating students," that phrase is not limited to teachers and administrators or to con

2018The Court concluded that "Wood's affidavit simply recite[d] the rule of State-agent immunity restated in Cranman ." 852 So.2d at 710 .

2025However, under the test for State-agent immunity, "not all discretionary acts by an agent of the State should be labeled as ' "immune." ' " Id. at 456 (quoting Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405 ).

2024Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, 257 So. 3d 850, 855-58 (Ala. 2018) (reviewing whether the plaintiff presented substantial evidence of an exception to immunity), and Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence that an exception to State-agent immunity existed; thus, a writ of mandamus was issued to direct the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendant).

2018See , e.g. , Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Forensic Sci. , 709 So.2d 455 (Ala. 1997) (granting a petitioner mandamus relief from the denial of his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, the pre- Cranman term for State-agent immunity, see Ryan v. Hayes , 831 So.2d 21 , 27 (Ala. 2002) ); and Nance v. Matthews , 622 So.2d 297 (Ala. 1993) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint based on qualified immunity).

2018See , e.g. , Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Forensic Sci. , 709 So.2d 455 (Ala. 1997) (granting a petitioner mandamus relief from the denial of his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, the pre- Cranman term for State-agent immunity, see Ryan v. Hayes , 831 So.2d 21 , 27 (Ala. 2002) ); and Nance v. Matthews , 622 So.2d 297 (Ala. 1993) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint based on qualified immunity).

2025Should the State agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable.' "Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala. 2008); see also Wilson[ v. Manning], 880 So. 2d [1101] at 1111 [(Ala. 2003)] (noting that, when the burden at summary-judgment stage has shifted to the nonmovant, the nonmovant must present 'substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer' the existence of the fact at issue). 13 SC-2024-0547 "In order to establish that [Shuford's] cla

2024Should the State agent make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is applicable.' "Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala. 2008); see also Wilson[ v. Manning], 880 So. 2d [1101,] 1111 [(Ala. 2003)] (noting that, when the burden at summary-judgment stage has shifted to the nonmovant, the nonmovant must present 'substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer' the existence of the fact at issue)." (Footnote omitted.) 8 SC-2023-0735 To establish that the pla

2025Specifically, " 'peace officers are afforded immunity by Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a), and the test for State- agent immunity set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), as modified in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2006) (incorporating the peace-officer-immunity standard provided in § 6-5-338(a) into the State- agent-immunity analysis found in Cranman)....

2024The detectives and the City moved for a summary judgment based on peace-officer immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975, and State-agent immunity pursuant to Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion), as modified in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2006).1 The trial court denied the motion, and this petition followed. _________________________ 1Although Cranman was a plurality decision, the restatement of law pertaining to State-agent immunity set forth in Cranman was subsequently adopted by this Court in Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911 (Ala. 2000

2007Cranman , 792 So.2d at 405 ("We therefore restate the rule governing State-agent immunity."). 8 I believe that the result in this case is consistent with the Alabama caselaw interpreting the doctrine of State-agent immunity. *Page 669 See, e.g., Ex parte Sawyer , 876 So.2d 433 (Ala. 2003) (relying on Cranman to issue writ of mandamus dismissing claims against the commissioner of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation in her individual capacity for failing to establish policies that would have prevented an attack on a nursing-home resident by a fellow nursing-home resident); Ex

2007In Ex parte Blankenship, supra, this Court held that a band director and a high school principal were entitled to State-agent immunity because they were exercising their discretion in educating students when they allowed a 19-year-old male, who was not a student at the school, to participate in the band.

2023See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808, 813-14 (Ala. 2002)("[A] motion to dismiss is typically not the appropriate vehicle by which to assert … State-agent immunity[,] and … normally the determination as to the existence of such a defense should be reserved until the summary-judgment stage, following appropriate discovery.").

2023See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808, 813-14 (Ala. 2002)("[A] motion to dismiss is typically not the appropriate vehicle by which to assert … State-agent immunity[,] and … normally the determination as to the existence of such a defense should be reserved until the summary-judgment stage, following appropriate discovery.").

2025See Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 914 (Ala. 2000) (holding 17 SC-2025-0064 that the defendant was not entitled to State-agent immunity because his conduct "d[id] not fit within any of the categories of immune State-agent conduct contained in … Cranman").

2025To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, the petitioner must demonstrate: " '(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' " Id. (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)). 8 SC-2024-0419 In reviewing the denial of a summary-judgment motion based on peace-officer and State-agent immunity, this Court first considers the evidence surrounding the activities of the defen

2025Giambrone, 874 So. 2d at 1052 ; Wood, 852 So. 2d at 709 ; Ex parte Davis, 721 So. 2d 685, 689 (Ala. 1998)." Riche argues that he is entitled to State-agent immunity under § 36-1-12(c)(5), which, as noted, provides that an "education employee" such as Riche is immune from civil liability in his individual capacity for 13 SC-2025-0064 acts that involve "[e]xercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in … educating students."4 Although § 36-1-12(c)(5) uses the phrase "educating students," that phrase is not limited to teachers and administrators or to con

2016“Prior decisions of this Court state that ‘ “ ‘[t]he applicability of the doctrine of discretionary function [now called State-agent immunity] must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and it is a question of law to be decided by the trial court.”” Ex parte Sawyer, 984 So.2d 1100, 1106-07 (Ala.2007) (quoting Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So.2d 21, 28 (Ala.2002), quoting in turn Ex parte Davis, 721 So.2d 685, 689 (Ala.1998)).” Suttles v. Roy, 75 So.3d 90, 99 (Ala.2010).

2013"Since [Ex parte] Cranman [, 792 So.2d 392, 405 (Ala.2000) ], we analyze immunity issues in terms of 'State-agent' immunity, rather than 'under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions.' Ex parte Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.2003).” Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala.2003).

2011"Since Cranman, we analyze immunity issues in terms of 'State-agent' immunity, rather than ‘under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions.’ Ex parte Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.2003).” Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala.2003).

2025See Downing v. City of Dothan, 59 So. 3d 16, 20 (Ala. 2010)(holding that police officers met initial burden of showing application of immunity to their actions because, in deciding whether to arrest someone, they "were engaged in a law-enforcement function for which State-agent immunity would be available"); Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d at 906 (holding that officers were "entitled to immunity because they were engaged in an 'arrest or attempted arrest,' which is a discretionary function requiring the exercise of judgment"); Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So. 2d 1075, 1079 (Ala. 2005) (

2025"The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this Court in Ex parte Cranman, supra, governs the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a)." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 292 (Ala. 2012)(citing Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005)).

2023Accordingly, this Court now 7 SC-2022-0525 recognizes that the restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this Court in Cranman, and as modified by Hollis, "governs the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a)." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 292 (Ala. 2012); see also Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 204 (Ala. 2003) and Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1281-82 (Ala. 2008).

2013"Since [Ex parte] Cranman [, 792 So.2d 392, 405 (Ala.2000) ], we analyze immunity issues in terms of 'State-agent' immunity, rather than 'under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions.' Ex parte Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.2003).” Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala.2003).

2024Although this Court initially created this exception to apply to claims of sovereign (or State) immunity, see Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795 , we have since expanded the applicability of the exception to claims of State-agent immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000), qualified immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte Sawyer, 876 So. 2d 433, 439 (Ala. 2003), municipal substantive immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, [Ms. SC- 2022-0524, Mar. 31, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023), and statutory immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 18

2011As this Court also has explained: “This State immunity afforded sheriffs and deputies is not affected by this Court’s decision on State-agent immunity in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000): ‘We do not deal here with the absolute immunity of witnesses, judges, prosecutors and legislators, nor do we overrule Ex parte Purvis, 689 So.2d 794 (Ala.1996).’ 792 So.2d at 396 n. 2; see also Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d [928,] 930 n. 1 [(Ala.2003)] (‘In Cranman, although we restated the rule governing State-agent immunity, we did not address the State immunity afforded to sheriffs and deputy sher

2025In certain circumstances, a peace officer is not entitled to such immunity from an action seeking liability in his or her individual capacity: 12 SC-2024-0547 " ' "(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or " ' "(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law." " 'Cranman, 792 So. 2

2024In certain circumstances, a peace officer is not entitled to such immunity from an action seeking liability in his or her individual capacity: " ' "(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the Constitution of this State, or laws, 7 SC-2023-0735 rules, or regulations of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the activities of a governmental agency require otherwise; or " ' "(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law." " 'Cranman, 792 So. 2d

2012Accord Cook v. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc., 825 So.2d 83, 89 (Ala.2001), and C.B. v. Bobo, 659 So.2d 98, 104 (Ala.1995). ‘We construe all doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff.’ Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 (Ala.2003). ‘[A] motion to dismiss is typically not the appropriate vehicle by which to assert ... qualified immunity or State-agent immunity and ... normally the determination as to the existence of such a defense should be reserved until the summary-judgment stage, following appropriate discovery.’ Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Mental Health & Ment

2011See Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928 , 931 n. 2 (Ala.2003) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment generally is not reviewable by a petition for writ of mandamus, subject to certain narrow exceptions, such as the issue of immunity.”); compare, e.g., Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 176 (Ala.2000) (reviewing the denial of motion to dismiss grounded on State immunity and State-agent immunity and stating generally that “a petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate means for seeking review of an order denying a claim of immunity”); and Ex parte Wood, supra (revi

2018See Ex parte Watson , 37 So.3d 752 , 762 (Ala. 2009) (holding that a State agent acted beyond her authority when she failed to comply with certain requirements, thus "defeat[ing] her claim of State-agent immunity").

2018See Ex parte Watson , 37 So.3d 752 , 762 (Ala. 2009) (holding that a State agent acted beyond her authority when she failed to comply with certain requirements, thus "defeat[ing] her claim of State-agent immunity").

2018State-agent Immunity "State-agent immunity protects state employees, as agents of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in executing their work responsibilities." Ex parte Hayles , 852 So.2d 117 , 122 (Ala. 2002).

2018State-agent Immunity "State-agent immunity protects state employees, as agents of the State, in the exercise of their judgment in executing their work responsibilities." Ex parte Hayles , 852 So.2d 117 , 122 (Ala. 2002).

2023However, '[o]nce it is determined that State-agent immunity applies, State-agent immunity is withheld upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority. [Ex parte ] Cranman, 792 So. 2d [392,] at 405 [(Ala. 2000)].' Ex parte Bitel, 45 So. 3d 1252, 1257-58 (Ala. 2010)." N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561, 566 (Ala. 2011) (emphasis added).

2016However, ‘[ojnce it is determined that State-agent immunity applies, State-agent immunity is withheld upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority. [Ex parte] Cranman, 792 So.2d [392,] at 405 [(Ala.2000)].’ Ex parte Bitel, 45 So.3d 1252, 1257-58 (Ala.2010).” N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So.3d 561, 566 (Ala.2011).

2013Even those actions against State officials in their individual capacities, however, may still be barred by § 14, Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala.1989) (‘State officers and employees, in their [individual capacities,] ... are absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in effect, one against the State.’), or by State-agent immunity under Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000).” Ex parte Thomas, 110 So.3d at 371 .

2012Even those actions against State officials in their individual capacities, however, may still be barred by § 14, Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala.1989) (“State officers and employees, in their [individual capacities,] ... are absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in effect, one against the State.”), or by State-agent immunity under Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000).

2025"The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this Court in Ex parte Cranman, supra, governs the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a)." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 292 (Ala. 2012)(citing Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala. 2005)).

2023Accordingly, this Court now 7 SC-2022-0525 recognizes that the restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by this Court in Cranman, and as modified by Hollis, "governs the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a)." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 292 (Ala. 2012); see also Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 204 (Ala. 2003) and Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1281-82 (Ala. 2008).

2018Assuming that he acted with limited quasi-judicial immunity, there is a broad spectrum of conduct for which a prosecutor like [R.E.L.] would not act with any immunity. [D.A.R.] submits that [R.E.L.'s] conduct was such that it was outside of the scope of any quasi-judicial immunity." In his brief on appeal, D.A.R. does not cite or discuss Mooneyham , Phelps , Carden , or Lewis v. Brautigam , 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955). 11 Instead, D.A.R. first discusses principles of State-agent immunity, *1043 citing Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 , 405 (Ala. 2000), and Ex parte Alabama Department of Transp

2018Assuming that he acted with limited quasi-judicial immunity, there is a broad spectrum of conduct for which a prosecutor like [R.E.L.] would not act with any immunity. [D.A.R.] submits that [R.E.L.'s] conduct was such that it was outside of the scope of any quasi-judicial immunity." In his brief on appeal, D.A.R. does not cite or discuss Mooneyham , Phelps , Carden , or Lewis v. Brautigam , 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955). 11 Instead, D.A.R. first discusses principles of State-agent immunity, *1043 citing Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 , 405 (Ala. 2000), and Ex parte Alabama Department of Transp

2016See Ex parte Spivey, 846 So.2d 322, 331-32 (Ala.2002) (noting that “[a] State agent is also immune from civil liability for exercising judgment in supervising personnel” and that a supe rior’s supervision of personnel is a category “specifically included within the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity”); and Gowens v. Tys.

2003In determining whether Coach Nall and Coach Faulk’s decisions regarding the safety of the practice drill are protected by State-agent immunity, we are guided by our recent decision in Ex parte Spivey, 846 So.2d 322 (Ala.2002).

2005NOTES [1] Article I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901, provides that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." [2] As our supreme court stated in Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 855 So.2d 1016, 1020 (Ala.2003): "` Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000), recounts the evolution of State-agent immunity. . .,' Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d [911,] 913 [(Ala.2000)], and restates the law on that topic: "`We therefore restate the rule governing State-agent immunity: "`A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduc

2004Therefore, I must, as I did in Harris , determine whether Jones was entitled to state-agent immunity in order to decide whether the summary judgment in Jones's favor on Quinlan's assault-and-battery and deprivation-of-property claims should be affirmed. "` Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), recounts the evolution of State-agent immunity ...,' Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d [911,] 913 [(Ala.2000)], and restates the law on that topic: "`We therefore restate the rule governing State-agent immunity: "`A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the co

2025However, this Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a constitutional officer in the officer's individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of the officer's employment." Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Ala. 2005) (emphasis added).

2011However, this Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a constitutional officer in the officer’s individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of the officer’s employment.’ “Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 500-01 (Ala.2005) (emphasis added).” Shelley, 53 So.3d at 887 .

2023However, '[o]nce it is determined that State-agent immunity applies, State-agent immunity is withheld upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority. [Ex parte ] Cranman, 792 So. 2d [392,] at 405 [(Ala. 2000)].' Ex parte Bitel, 45 So. 3d 1252, 1257-58 (Ala. 2010)." N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So. 3d 561, 566 (Ala. 2011) (emphasis added).

2016However, ‘[ojnce it is determined that State-agent immunity applies, State-agent immunity is withheld upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority. [Ex parte] Cranman, 792 So.2d [392,] at 405 [(Ala.2000)].’ Ex parte Bitel, 45 So.3d 1252, 1257-58 (Ala.2010).” N.C. v. Caldwell, 77 So.3d 561, 566 (Ala.2011).

2018See Giambrone [v. Douglas] , 874 So.2d [1046,] 1057 [ (Ala. 2003) ] (holding that State-agent immunity 'is not abrogated for negligent and wanton behavior; instead, immunity is withheld only upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority')." Ex parte Randall , 971 So.2d 652 , 664 (Ala. 2007). 5 " ' "Reasonableness" is not the standard by which discretionary immunity [now called State-agent immunity] is reviewed.

2018See Giambrone [v. Douglas] , 874 So.2d [1046,] 1057 [ (Ala. 2003) ] (holding that State-agent immunity 'is not abrogated for negligent and wanton behavior; instead, immunity is withheld only upon a showing that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority')." Ex parte Randall , 971 So.2d 652 , 664 (Ala. 2007). 5 " ' "Reasonableness" is not the standard by which discretionary immunity [now called State-agent immunity] is reviewed.

2025See Downing v. City of Dothan, 59 So. 3d 16, 20 (Ala. 2010)(holding that police officers met initial burden of showing application of immunity to their actions because, in deciding whether to arrest someone, they "were engaged in a law-enforcement function for which State-agent immunity would be available"); Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d at 906 (holding that officers were "entitled to immunity because they were engaged in an 'arrest or attempted arrest,' which is a discretionary function requiring the exercise of judgment"); Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So. 2d 1075, 1079 (Ala. 2005) (

2005Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So.2d 1075 , 1078 (Ala. 2005); Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So.2d 135 , 143 (Ala. 2004) ("Whether a qualified peace officer is due § 6-5-338 (a) immunity is now judged by the restatement of State-agent immunity articulated by Ex parte Cranman. . . ."); and Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201 , 203 (Ala. 2003) ("Thus, we will address the applicability of peace-officer immunity under the principles set forth in Cranman. ").