Bar Counsel exception in Maryland

2023See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Conwell, 462 Md. 437 , 461– 62 (2019) (overruling Bar Counsel’s exception that Respondent did not violate Rule 1.4 because the client did not request invoices regarding escalating fees, and the retainer agreement did not contemplate that the client would receive automatic statements). 12 D.

2023See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Conwell, 462 Md. 437 , 461– 62 (2019) (overruling Bar Counsel’s exception that Respondent did not violate Rule 1.4 because the client did not request invoices regarding escalating fees, and the retainer agreement did not contemplate that the client would receive automatic statements). 12 D.

2021In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patton, 432 Md. 359, 378 , 69 A.3d 11, 22 (2013), citing Ruffalo, we sustained Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions that an attorney’s misrepresentation of facts during his deposition violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) because the matters had not been charged or did not constitution violations of the MLRPC.

2021In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patton, 432 Md. 359, 378 , 69 A.3d 11, 22 (2013), citing Ruffalo, we sustained Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions that an attorney’s misrepresentation of facts during his deposition violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) because the matters had not been charged or did not constitution violations of the MLRPC.

2007See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Seiden, 373 Md. 409, 419 , 818 A.2d 1108, 1113 (2003) (sustaining Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s findings where Petitioner did not charge the Respondent for violations of the MRPC) (citations omitted).

2007See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Seiden, 373 Md. 409, 419 , 818 A.2d 1108, 1113 (2003) (sustaining Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s findings where Petitioner did not charge the Respondent for violations of the MRPC) (citations omitted).

2021Similarly, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 169-70 , 994 A.2d 928, 941-42 (2010), this Court sustained Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that an attorney did not violate MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) where the attorney made no attempt to correct a misstatement in a complaint concerning the date of an automobile accident.

2021Similarly, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 169-70 , 994 A.2d 928, 941-42 (2010), this Court sustained Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that an attorney did not violate MLRPC 3.3(a)(1) where the attorney made no attempt to correct a misstatement in a complaint concerning the date of an automobile accident.

2013Bar Counsel, citing Attorney Grievance v. Usiak, 418 Md. 667 , 18 A.3d 1 (2011) and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland, 345 Md. 383 , 692 A.2d 465 (1997), excepts to the conclusion that Levin did not violate Rule 8.4(d) when he knowingly forwarded the proceeds of the legal malpractice settlement to his client.

2013Bar Counsel, citing Attorney Grievance v. Usiak, 418 Md. 667 , 18 A.3d 1 (2011) and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garland, 345 Md. 383 , 692 A.2d 465 (1997), excepts to the conclusion that Levin did not violate Rule 8.4(d) when he knowingly forwarded the proceeds of the legal malpractice settlement to his client.

2026See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lang, 461 Md. 1, 70 , 191 A.3d 474, 515 (2018) (We sustained Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s failure to find that an attorney - 53 - was likely to repeat his misconduct and stated that, until the attorney reached an awareness of his duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct, “he is likely to repeat his misconduct.”).

2026See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lang, 461 Md. 1, 70 , 191 A.3d 474, 515 (2018) (We sustained Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s failure to find that an attorney - 53 - was likely to repeat his misconduct and stated that, until the attorney reached an awareness of his duties under the Rules of Professional Conduct, “he is likely to repeat his misconduct.”).

2023We overruled Bar Counsel’s exception because the plain language of MARPC 8.5(b) “specifically contemplates that one set of professional rules should apply to a particular act or acts of conduct.” Bonner, 477 Md. at 598 , 271 A.3d at 262-63 (emphasis in original).

2023We overruled Bar Counsel’s exception because the plain language of MARPC 8.5(b) “specifically contemplates that one set of professional rules should apply to a particular act or acts of conduct.” Bonner, 477 Md. at 598 , 271 A.3d at 262-63 (emphasis in original).

2023See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n 9 The dissent in Riely would have sustained “Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney did not engage in a pattern of misconduct” because the attorney “violated the same three” rules of professional conduct “while representing different sets of clients . . . in two different years[,]” which was “sufficient to establish a pattern of misconduct.” Riely, 471 Md. at 509-10 , 242 A.3d at 236-37 (Watts, J., dissenting). - 13 - v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 710 , 202 A.3d 1200, 1238 (2019) (This Court stated that the likelihood of the att

2023See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n 9 The dissent in Riely would have sustained “Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney did not engage in a pattern of misconduct” because the attorney “violated the same three” rules of professional conduct “while representing different sets of clients . . . in two different years[,]” which was “sufficient to establish a pattern of misconduct.” Riely, 471 Md. at 509-10 , 242 A.3d at 236-37 (Watts, J., dissenting). - 13 - v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 710 , 202 A.3d 1200, 1238 (2019) (This Court stated that the likelihood of the att

2023See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n 9 The dissent in Riely would have sustained “Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney did not engage in a pattern of misconduct” because the attorney “violated the same three” rules of professional conduct “while representing different sets of clients . . . in two different years[,]” which was “sufficient to establish a pattern of misconduct.” Riely, 471 Md. at 509-10 , 242 A.3d at 236-37 (Watts, J., dissenting). - 13 - v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 710 , 202 A.3d 1200, 1238 (2019) (This Court stated that the likelihood of the att

2023See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n 9 The dissent in Riely would have sustained “Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that the attorney did not engage in a pattern of misconduct” because the attorney “violated the same three” rules of professional conduct “while representing different sets of clients . . . in two different years[,]” which was “sufficient to establish a pattern of misconduct.” Riely, 471 Md. at 509-10 , 242 A.3d at 236-37 (Watts, J., dissenting). - 13 - v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 710 , 202 A.3d 1200, 1238 (2019) (This Court stated that the likelihood of the att

2022In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 295, 297 , 218 A.3d 757 , 771-72 (2019), we concluded that an attorney’s statements to Bar Counsel and the Immigration Court, which violated MARPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.1(a), “also constitute[d] violations of MARPC []8.4(c), as they [were] misrepresentations.” In this case, the hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Collins made knowing and intentional misrepresentations in the petition for reinstatement by stating that to the best of her knowledge no new disciplinary complaints were pending against her, and in her October 15, 2020 respon

2022See Faith, 127 Md.

2022See id. at 236, 263 , 269 A.3d at 288, 304 . 3 On April 5, 2022, with the approval of the hearing judge and with Malone’s consent, Bar Counsel filed a “Consent Motion for Extension of Time to File Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” in which Bar Counsel requested an extension of time from May 6, 2022, to May 13, 2022, for the hearing judge to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.

2021See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frank, 470 Md. 699, 733 , 236 A.3d 603, 624 (2020).

2021See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frank, 470 Md. 699, 733 , 236 A.3d 603, 624 (2020).

2020See id. at 42 n.21.

2018See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Landeo , 446 Md. 294 , 338, 132 A.3d 196 (2016) (no liability under 5.3(c)(2) when attorney did not directly supervise staff).

2018See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Landeo , 446 Md. 294 , 338, 132 A.3d 196 (2016) (no liability under 5.3(c)(2) when attorney did not directly supervise staff).

2014Indeed, Garcia and Wingerter follow inexorably from this Court’s statement of the rule in 2001, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418 , 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001): “Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597 , 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646 , 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002).

2014Indeed, Garcia and Wingerter follow inexorably from this Court’s statement of the rule in 2001, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418 , 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001): “Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597 , 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646 , 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002).

2014Indeed, Garcia and Wingerter follow inexorably from this Court’s statement of the rule in 2001, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418 , 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001): “Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597 , 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646 , 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002).

2014Indeed, Garcia and Wingerter follow inexorably from this Court’s statement of the rule in 2001, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418 , 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001): “Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597 , 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646 , 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002).

2014Indeed, Garcia and Wingerter follow inexorably from this Court’s statement of the rule in 2001, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418 , 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001): “Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597 , 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646 , 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002).

2014Indeed, Garcia and Wingerter follow inexorably from this Court’s statement of the rule in 2001, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418 , 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001): “Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.” See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597 , 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646 , 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002).

2013Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 375 Md. 110, 126 , 825 A.2d 418, 427 (2003) (“[W]e accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as prima facie correct unless shown to be ‘clearly erroneous,’ and we give due regard to the hearing judge’s opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)) As a result, we overrule Bar Counsel’s exception.

2013Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 375 Md. 110, 126 , 825 A.2d 418, 427 (2003) (“[W]e accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact as prima facie correct unless shown to be ‘clearly erroneous,’ and we give due regard to the hearing judge’s opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)) As a result, we overrule Bar Counsel’s exception.

2012In so doing, we turn to Dual, Incorporated v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 163-64 , 857 A.2d 1095, 1101-02 (2004), in which we reiterated that when a corporation becomes defunct, only transactions involving its winding up can be carried out.

2012In so doing, we turn to Dual, Incorporated v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 163-64 , 857 A.2d 1095, 1101-02 (2004), in which we reiterated that when a corporation becomes defunct, only transactions involving its winding up can be carried out.

2011I am persuaded, however, that this Court should overrule Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s “failure” to find that the Respondent engaged in a “pattern of misconduct,” as that term has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oregon in In re Redden, 842 Or. 393 , 153 P.3d 113, 114-15 (2007), and by the Supreme Court of Arizona in In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118-19 (1993).

2011I am persuaded, however, that this Court should overrule Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s “failure” to find that the Respondent engaged in a “pattern of misconduct,” as that term has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oregon in In re Redden, 842 Or. 393 , 153 P.3d 113, 114-15 (2007), and by the Supreme Court of Arizona in In re Levine, 174 Ariz. 146 , 847 P.2d 1093, 1118-19 (1993).