fundamental-rights exception in Mississippi

2024Howell “overrule[d] [Rowland v. State (Rowland I)], 42 So. 3d 503 (Miss. 2010), [Rowland v. State (Rowland II)], 98 So. 3d 1032 (Miss. 2012), and any other case in which, and to the extent that, we ha[d] held that the fundamental-rights exception can apply to the substantive, constitutional bars codified by the Legislature in the [UPCCRA].” Howell, 358 So. 3d at 616.

2024We valued the ideal that “[t]o deny relief for a fundamental-rights violation brought to our attention in a successive PCR would ignore the serious due-process concerns underlying the fundamental-rights exception.” Smith v. State, 149 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Rowland, 42 So. 3d at 507 ), 53 overruled by Pitchford v. State, 240 So. 3d 1061 (Miss. 2017).

2024We valued the ideal that “[t]o deny relief for a fundamental-rights violation brought to our attention in a successive PCR would ignore the serious due-process concerns underlying the fundamental-rights exception.” Smith v. State, 149 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Rowland, 42 So. 3d at 507 ), 53 overruled by Pitchford v. State, 240 So. 3d 1061 (Miss. 2017).

2024We valued the ideal that “[t]o deny relief for a fundamental-rights violation brought to our attention in a successive PCR would ignore the serious due-process concerns underlying the fundamental-rights exception.” Smith v. State, 149 So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Rowland, 42 So. 3d at 507 ), 53 overruled by Pitchford v. State, 240 So. 3d 1061 (Miss. 2017).

2023Elsewhere in Howell, the Court explained that “the judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception” cannot apply “to 8 Well, not quite “all.” The Court later held that ex post facto claims and claims alleging a denial of the “fundamental right not to be convicted while incompetent” are also excepted from the “procedural bars.” Bell v. State, 123 So. 3d 924, 924-25 (Miss. 2013) (en banc order) (ex post facto claims); Boyd v. State, 155 So. 3d 914, 918 (¶13) (Miss.

2016Walton’s, argument regarding ineffective assistance of counsel relates to his claim that his counsel should have filed *452 a motion to dismiss the case for the State’s alleged failure to provide Walton with a speedy trial.- However, we have clearly stated that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims do not meet the fundamental-rights exception to the three-year time-bar for PCR motions unless they concern “(1) the right against double jeopardy; (2) the right to be free from an illegal sentence; (3) the right to due process at sentencing; and (4) the right not to be subject to ex post facto l

2020“The supreme court has held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . are indeed subject to the procedural bars.” Salter v. State, 64 So. 3d 514, 518 (¶14) (Miss.

2015“The supreme court has held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ... are indeed subject to the procedural bars.” Salter v. State, 64 So.3d 514, 518 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (citing Kirk v. State, 798 So.2d 345, 346 (¶6) (Miss.2000)). “[M]erely raising the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is insufficient to surmount the procedural bar, and this Court must review [the defendant’s] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to determine whether it is sufficient to invoke the fundamental-rights exception.” Lafoon v. State, 164 So.3d 494, 496-97 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (citatio

2020To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that “a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights, among them . . . the right to confront and cross-examine the State’s witnesses[.]” Williams v. State, 222 So. 3d 265, 268 (¶40) (Miss. 2017).

2020For the reasons given in my concurring opinion in Williams v. State, 222 So. 3d 265, 268-71 (¶¶ 8-15) (Miss. 2017) (Coleman, J., concurring), I would overrule Rowland and any other case in which, and to the extent that, we have held that the fundamental-rights exception to the procedural bars can apply to the substantive bars codified by the Legislature in the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act.

2016We recognize that “[t]he burden is on the PCR movant to show he ... is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Smith v. State, 129 So.3d 243, 245 (¶ 5) (Miss.

2016As previously stated, “[t]he burden is on the PCR movant to show he ... is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Smith v. State, 129 So.3d 243, 245 (¶ 5) (Miss.

2015“The supreme court has held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ... are indeed subject to the procedural bars.” Salter v. State, 64 So.3d 514, 518 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (citing Kirk v. State, 798 So.2d 345, 346 (¶6) (Miss.2000)). “[M]erely raising the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is insufficient to surmount the procedural bar, and this Court must review [the defendant’s] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to determine whether it is sufficient to invoke the fundamental-rights exception.” Lafoon v. State, 164 So.3d 494, 496-97 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (citatio

2014App.2010) (citing Kirk v. State, 798 So.2d 345, 346 (¶ 6) (Miss.2000)). “[M]erely raising the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is insufficient to surmount the procedural bar,” and this Court must review Lafoon’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to determine whether it is sufficient to invoke the fundamental-rights exception.

2024Howell “overrule[d] [Rowland v. State (Rowland I)], 42 So. 3d 503 (Miss. 2010), [Rowland v. State (Rowland II)], 98 So. 3d 1032 (Miss. 2012), and any other case in which, and to the extent that, we ha[d] held that the fundamental-rights exception can apply to the substantive, constitutional bars codified by the Legislature in the [UPCCRA].” Howell, 358 So. 3d at 616.

2024See Rowland v. State, 42 So. 3d 503 (Miss. 2010), overruled by Howell, 358 So. 3d 613 ; Rowland v. State, 98 So. 3d 1032 (Miss. 2012), overruled by Howell, 358 So. 3d 613 .

2023Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 78 (Miss. 1975). ¶16.

2017Nine years prior to the passage of the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975), in which the Court held that rules of procedure are the sole province of the courts.

2024It should be noted that even when the Supreme Court overruled Luckett’s substantive holding concerning sentencing in Bester, 188 So. 3d at 529-30 (¶10), the Supreme Court still affirmed the application of the successive-motions bar, stating: 8 In Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613 , 616 (¶12) (Miss. 2023), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the three-year statute of limitation of the UPCCRA was no longer subject to a judicially-created exception for “fundamental rights.” The Court reiterated this in Ronk, 2024 WL 131639 , at *2 (¶16), stating that Howell overruled any case “that has held tha

2024Before Howell, “[e]rrors affecting fundamental constitutional rights” were excepted from the UPCCRA’s bars. 358 So. 3d at 615 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Jones v. State, 119 So. 3d 323, 326 (Miss. 2013)).

2024See Gibson v. Bell, 312 So. 3d 318 , 324 (Miss. 2020) (“Generally, ‘all judicial decisions apply retroactively unless the Court has specifically stated the ruling is prospective.’” (quoting Mid-S. Retina, LLC v. Conner, 72 So. 3d 1048, 1052 (Miss. 2011))). ¶17.

2023Comm’n, 964 So. 2d 1100 (Miss. 2007)); 39 (3) the fundamental-rights exception, see Johnson, 476 So. 2d at 1209 (“The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is fundamental and essential to our form of government.”); (4) the federal district court’s entering a Rhines stay to allow the Court to review his impartial-jury claims; and (5) the State’s conceding that the Court should address juror bias. ¶99.

2023Elsewhere in Howell, the Court explained that “the judicially crafted fundamental-rights exception” cannot apply “to 8 Well, not quite “all.” The Court later held that ex post facto claims and claims alleging a denial of the “fundamental right not to be convicted while incompetent” are also excepted from the “procedural bars.” Bell v. State, 123 So. 3d 924, 924-25 (Miss. 2013) (en banc order) (ex post facto claims); Boyd v. State, 155 So. 3d 914, 918 (¶13) (Miss.

2023See Brown, 306 So. 3d at 748 (citing Grayson, 118 So. 3d at 126 ). ¶104.

2022“When a subsequent PCR motion [has been] filed, the burden falls on the movant to show he has met a statutory exception.” Williams v. State, 110 So. 3d 840, 843 (¶15) (Miss.

2020While the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “an accused criminal has a fundamental right to confront witnesses testifying against him[,]” Johnson v. State, 204 So. 3d 763, 770 (¶22) (Miss. 2016), the right to confrontation is not expressly included as a fundamental-rights exception to the PCR procedural bars.

2019Gunn, 248 So. 3d at 942 (¶19).

2017See Rowland v. State ( Rowland II ), 98 So.3d 1032 , 1036 (Miss. 2012) ("In addition to the statutory exceptions afforded by the Act, we have provided that an exception to the procedural bars exists for errors affecting certain constitutional rights.") (citing Smith v. State , 477 So.2d 191 , 195 (Miss. 1985) ("errors affecting fundamental rights are exceptions to the rule that questions not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal")). ¶ 6.

2016Smith v. State, 118 So.3d 180, 184 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2013).

2016In Fluker, 170 So.3d at 475 (¶11), the supreme court explained: “Although errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA, merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.” (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2016In Fluker, 170 So.3d at 475 (¶11), the supreme court explained: “Although errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA, merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.” (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted).