Winters instruction in District of Columbia

2022A Winters instruction is one of three anti- deadlock charges listed in the Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia which a trial court may issue at its discretion “when jurors cannot agree,” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Comment to No. 2.601 (5th ed. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), but the Winters instruction represents “the highwater mark for an anti-deadlock charge.” 317 A.2d at 534 .

2022A Winters instruction is one of three anti- deadlock charges listed in the Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia which a trial court may issue at its discretion “when jurors cannot agree,” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Comment to No. 2.601 (5th ed. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), but the Winters instruction represents “the highwater mark for an anti-deadlock charge.” 317 A.2d at 534 .

2016Specifically, the trial court told jurors that “[i]t is desirable that the case be decided”; that “it [was their] duty to decide the case”; that they should “be open to being convinced”; that they should question their position if other jurors were not persuaded; and that they should “try a little bit more to see if [they could] reach a unanimous decision.” We have previously stated that “if the trial court uses language from the Winters anti-deadlock instruction for a poll breakdown, it will 29 increase the risk of coercion unacceptably.” (Marcus) Brown, 59 A.3d at 974 ; see also Smith v. Uni

2016Specifically, the trial court told jurors that “[i]t is desirable that the case be decided”; that “it [was their] duty to decide the case”; that they should “be open to being convinced”; that they should question their position if other jurors were not persuaded; and that they should “try a little bit more to see if [they could] reach a unanimous decision.” We have previously stated that “if the trial court uses language from the Winters anti-deadlock instruction for a poll breakdown, it will 29 increase the risk of coercion unacceptably.” (Marcus) Brown, 59 A.3d at 974 ; see also Smith v. Uni

2012This is error of a significant magnitude as we have repeatedly stated that anti-deadlock instructions “should not be given routinely,” Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 , 703 n. 9 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “is not a course to be taken precipitously and automatically when a jury announces an inability to reach a verdict.” Thompson, 354 A.2d at 851 n. 8; see also Harris, 622 A.2d at 703 n. 9 (“[A]n ‘anti-deadlock’ instruction ... ‘should not be given routinely, but only after careful consideration by the trial judge of the nature of the case and length of the deliber

2012This is error of a significant magnitude as we have repeatedly stated that anti-deadlock instructions “should not be given routinely,” Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 , 703 n. 9 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “is not a course to be taken precipitously and automatically when a jury announces an inability to reach a verdict.” Thompson, 354 A.2d at 851 n. 8; see also Harris, 622 A.2d at 703 n. 9 (“[A]n ‘anti-deadlock’ instruction ... ‘should not be given routinely, but only after careful consideration by the trial judge of the nature of the case and length of the deliber

2023There was nothing irrational or inconsistent in that outcome. 64 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 363 (holding that coercion was not shown where the jury reached a verdict an hour after the judge’s anti-deadlock instruction); see also Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 154-55 (D.C. 1999) (no coercion where jury reached its verdict about one hour after receiving the Winters instruction). 65 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 364 .

2023There was nothing irrational or inconsistent in that outcome. 64 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 363 (holding that coercion was not shown where the jury reached a verdict an hour after the judge’s anti-deadlock instruction); see also Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 154-55 (D.C. 1999) (no coercion where jury reached its verdict about one hour after receiving the Winters instruction). 65 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 364 .

2022Compare Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56, 61 (D.C. 1994) (finding no substantial risk of a coerced verdict where jury deliberated for several hours before returning a unanimous verdict after receiving the Winters instruction), with United States v. Berroa, 46 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C.

2022Compare Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56, 61 (D.C. 1994) (finding no substantial risk of a coerced verdict where jury deliberated for several hours before returning a unanimous verdict after receiving the Winters instruction), with United States v. Berroa, 46 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C.

2012This is error of a significant magnitude as we have repeatedly stated that anti-deadlock instructions “should not be given routinely,” Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 , 703 n. 9 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “is not a course to be taken precipitously and automatically when a jury announces an inability to reach a verdict.” Thompson, 354 A.2d at 851 n. 8; see also Harris, 622 A.2d at 703 n. 9 (“[A]n ‘anti-deadlock’ instruction ... ‘should not be given routinely, but only after careful consideration by the trial judge of the nature of the case and length of the deliber

1978Compare Thompson v. United States, D.C.App., 354 A.2d 848 (1976), in which even after a Winters instruction, the jury reported that it was still deadlocked; but, nevertheless, requiring further deliberation was found not to have coerced the verdict.

2023We do not see that the judge’s actions in giving the Winters instruction can be said to have contributed to a coercive atmosphere or to have caused any juror to “abandon his honest conviction as a pure accommodation to the majority of jurors or the court.” 63 See, e.g., Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1172 ; Reed v. United States, 383 A.2d 316, 322 (D.C. 1978).

2023We do not see that the judge’s actions in giving the Winters instruction can be said to have contributed to a coercive atmosphere or to have caused any juror to “abandon his honest conviction as a pure accommodation to the majority of jurors or the court.” 63 See, e.g., Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1172 ; Reed v. United States, 383 A.2d 316, 322 (D.C. 1978).

2022See Benlamine v. United States, 692 A.2d 1359 , 1364–65 (D.C. 1997) (reversing where trial court gave Crowder instruction and then Winters instruction after ninth juror dissented in jury poll); see also Davis, 669 A.2d at 685 (reversing where trial court gave Winters instruction after third juror dissented in jury poll).

2012See Benlamine v. United States, 692 A.2d 1359, 1362 (D.C.1997) (after taking a partial verdict and later receiving a note that the jury was deadlocked, the court asked the jury if they were "hopelessly deadlocked” before issuing a Winters instruction). .

2008Jones further contends that the predeli-beration charge formed a critical part of *977 the “surrounding circumstances,” Coleman v. United States, 515 A.2d 439, 453 (D.C.1986), that made it error for the judge to give the Winters instruction when the jury announced that it was deadlocked.

2008Jones further contends that the predeli-beration charge formed a critical part of *977 the “surrounding circumstances,” Coleman v. United States, 515 A.2d 439, 453 (D.C.1986), that made it error for the judge to give the Winters instruction when the jury announced that it was deadlocked.

2013See, e.g., Hankins, supra, 3 A.3d at 362 (stating that it is generally not coercive to give standard anti-deadlock instructions when the jury has deliberated for considerable time and declared itself unable to reach agreement); Davis, supra, 700 A.2d at 230-31 (concluding there was no abuse of discretion where the trial court gave the Winters instruction, which is more forceful than the Gallagher instruction, after the jury stated “that we are not going to reach a verdict no [matter] how long we sit here”).

2013See, e.g., Hankins, supra, 3 A.3d at 362 (stating that it is generally not coercive to give standard anti-deadlock instructions when the jury has deliberated for considerable time and declared itself unable to reach agreement); Davis, supra, 700 A.2d at 230-31 (concluding there was no abuse of discretion where the trial court gave the Winters instruction, which is more forceful than the Gallagher instruction, after the jury stated “that we are not going to reach a verdict no [matter] how long we sit here”).

2012This is error of a significant magnitude as we have repeatedly stated that anti-deadlock instructions “should not be given routinely,” Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 , 703 n. 9 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “is not a course to be taken precipitously and automatically when a jury announces an inability to reach a verdict.” Thompson, 354 A.2d at 851 n. 8; see also Harris, 622 A.2d at 703 n. 9 (“[A]n ‘anti-deadlock’ instruction ... ‘should not be given routinely, but only after careful consideration by the trial judge of the nature of the case and length of the deliber

1986In assessing such a claim of error, this court “must look to the total circumstances to determine whether [the verdict] was coerced,” keeping in mind that the giving of a Winters instruction is left to “the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Wilson v. United States, 419 A.2d 353, 356 (D.C.1980).

2011We determined that there was “a substantial risk of a coerced verdict” because of the juror’s response to the court’s questions, including her statement that “she was under emotional strain,”; we said that “[t]his already potentially coercive situation was compounded by permitting hours of further deliberation and the giving of the Winters instruction.” Id.

2011We determined that there was “a substantial risk of a coerced verdict” because of the juror’s response to the court’s questions, including her statement that “she was under emotional strain,”; we said that “[t]his already potentially coercive situation was compounded by permitting hours of further deliberation and the giving of the Winters instruction.” Id.

2022He asserts the subsequent delivery of a Crowder instruction—including its reiteration of the “[jury’s] duty to deliberate and reach agreement” language from the Winters instruction—coerced the jury’s verdict. “[O]ur evaluation of jury coercion focuses on probabilities, not certainties.” Davis v. United States, 669 A.2d 680, 685 (D.C. 1995).

2022He asserts the subsequent delivery of a Crowder instruction—including its reiteration of the “[jury’s] duty to deliberate and reach agreement” language from the Winters instruction—coerced the jury’s verdict. “[O]ur evaluation of jury coercion focuses on probabilities, not certainties.” Davis v. United States, 669 A.2d 680, 685 (D.C. 1995).

2000This court has also made clear that if a jury reveals its numerical split and the trial court then gives a Winters instruction, there is “great potential for coercing a verdict.” Benlamine, 692 A.2d at 1363 (citing Davis, 669 A.2d at 684 ); see Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823, 825 (D.C.1988) (citing Blango v. United States, 335 A.2d 230, 233 (D.C.1975)).

2000This court has also made clear that if a jury reveals its numerical split and the trial court then gives a Winters instruction, there is “great potential for coercing a verdict.” Benlamine, 692 A.2d at 1363 (citing Davis, 669 A.2d at 684 ); see Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823, 825 (D.C.1988) (citing Blango v. United States, 335 A.2d 230, 233 (D.C.1975)).

2012Cf. Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56, 61 (D.C.1994) (stating that “nothing in the record ... indicated] that the verdict was coerced” as a result of giving the Winters instruction and pointing to the fact that the jurors “deliberated for several hours after receiving the ... instruction”); Nelson v. United States, 378 A.2d 657, 661 (D.C.1977) (concluding that the effect of the anti-deadlock charge was attenuated because the jury was discharged for the balance of the day and then deliberated for the rest of the next day before returning a verdict); (Tommie) Johnson v. United States, 360 A.2d

2012Cf. Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56, 61 (D.C.1994) (stating that “nothing in the record ... indicated] that the verdict was coerced” as a result of giving the Winters instruction and pointing to the fact that the jurors “deliberated for several hours after receiving the ... instruction”); Nelson v. United States, 378 A.2d 657, 661 (D.C.1977) (concluding that the effect of the anti-deadlock charge was attenuated because the jury was discharged for the balance of the day and then deliberated for the rest of the next day before returning a verdict); (Tommie) Johnson v. United States, 360 A.2d

1991Arguing before us prior to the Wright decision, the government distinguished Jones from the present case on the grounds that the trial court in Jones had created a "coercive atmosphere” by giving a Winters instruction and by informing the jury that it had "a duty to reach a verdict.” Jones, supra, 544 A.2d at 1254.

1991Arguing before us prior to the Wright decision, the government distinguished Jones from the present case on the grounds that the trial court in Jones had created a "coercive atmosphere” by giving a Winters instruction and by informing the jury that it had "a duty to reach a verdict.” Jones, supra, 544 A.2d at 1254.

2022But the fact that the court could have reasonably chosen to give the Winters instruction does not mean that choice was a “neutral” action, nor does it preclude us from concluding based on subsequent events that the instruction had a coercive effect. 19 jury poll breakdown signifies the presence of coercion, see id. at 26 , but based on the facts detailed above and the absence of any alternative explanation—e.g., there is no indication that this jury, which sent the court multiple notes with sophisticated questions, was confused or simply impatient with the collaborative process—the inference o

2022But the fact that the court could have reasonably chosen to give the Winters instruction does not mean that choice was a “neutral” action, nor does it preclude us from concluding based on subsequent events that the instruction had a coercive effect. 19 jury poll breakdown signifies the presence of coercion, see id. at 26 , but based on the facts detailed above and the absence of any alternative explanation—e.g., there is no indication that this jury, which sent the court multiple notes with sophisticated questions, was confused or simply impatient with the collaborative process—the inference o

2012(James) Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365 .

2012This is error of a significant magnitude as we have repeatedly stated that anti-deadlock instructions “should not be given routinely,” Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 , 703 n. 9 (D.C.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “is not a course to be taken precipitously and automatically when a jury announces an inability to reach a verdict.” Thompson, 354 A.2d at 851 n. 8; see also Harris, 622 A.2d at 703 n. 9 (“[A]n ‘anti-deadlock’ instruction ... ‘should not be given routinely, but only after careful consideration by the trial judge of the nature of the case and length of the deliber

2023“The purpose of the jury poll . . . ‘is to ascertain for a certainty that each of the jurors approves of the verdict as returned; that no one has been coerced or induced to sign a verdict to which he does not fully assent.’” Green v. United States, 740 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194 (1899)). 47 V.

2023“The purpose of the jury poll . . . ‘is to ascertain for a certainty that each of the jurors approves of the verdict as returned; that no one has been coerced or induced to sign a verdict to which he does not fully assent.’” Green v. United States, 740 A.2d 21, 25 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194 (1899)). 47 V.

2023There was nothing irrational or inconsistent in that outcome. 64 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 363 (holding that coercion was not shown where the jury reached a verdict an hour after the judge’s anti-deadlock instruction); see also Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 154-55 (D.C. 1999) (no coercion where jury reached its verdict about one hour after receiving the Winters instruction). 65 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 364 .

2023There was nothing irrational or inconsistent in that outcome. 64 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 363 (holding that coercion was not shown where the jury reached a verdict an hour after the judge’s anti-deadlock instruction); see also Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 154-55 (D.C. 1999) (no coercion where jury reached its verdict about one hour after receiving the Winters instruction). 65 Hankins, 3 A.3d at 364 .

2023We do not see that the judge’s actions in giving the Winters instruction can be said to have contributed to a coercive atmosphere or to have caused any juror to “abandon his honest conviction as a pure accommodation to the majority of jurors or the court.” 63 See, e.g., Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1172 ; Reed v. United States, 383 A.2d 316, 322 (D.C. 1978).

2023We do not see that the judge’s actions in giving the Winters instruction can be said to have contributed to a coercive atmosphere or to have caused any juror to “abandon his honest conviction as a pure accommodation to the majority of jurors or the court.” 63 See, e.g., Epperson, 495 A.2d at 1172 ; Reed v. United States, 383 A.2d 316, 322 (D.C. 1978).

2022Compare Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56, 61 (D.C. 1994) (finding no substantial risk of a coerced verdict where jury deliberated for several hours before returning a unanimous verdict after receiving the Winters instruction), with United States v. Berroa, 46 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C.

2022Compare Carey v. United States, 647 A.2d 56, 61 (D.C. 1994) (finding no substantial risk of a coerced verdict where jury deliberated for several hours before returning a unanimous verdict after receiving the Winters instruction), with United States v. Berroa, 46 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C.

2022Thus our task is not to determine whether the jury’s verdict finding Mr. Callaham guilty of robbery was in fact coerced, but only whether the record “reveals a substantial risk of a coerced verdict.” Coley v. United States, 196 A.3d 414, 420 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2022Thus our task is not to determine whether the jury’s verdict finding Mr. Callaham guilty of robbery was in fact coerced, but only whether the record “reveals a substantial risk of a coerced verdict.” Coley v. United States, 196 A.3d 414, 420 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2013If it is made clear, in substance, that a verdict is not being demanded, and the jurors are being asked to return to the jury room and "try again” without sacrificing conscientiously held convictions, ... this encouragement from the trial judge "may be the only way to persuade any stubborn jurors ... to rethink their positions.” Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530, 538-39 (D.C.1974) (en banc) (Gallagher, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Epperson v. United States, 471 A.2d 1016, 1017 (D.C.1984) (quoting Winters, supra, 317 A.2d at 532-34 ) (reaffirming tha

2013If it is made clear, in substance, that a verdict is not being demanded, and the jurors are being asked to return to the jury room and "try again” without sacrificing conscientiously held convictions, ... this encouragement from the trial judge "may be the only way to persuade any stubborn jurors ... to rethink their positions.” Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530, 538-39 (D.C.1974) (en banc) (Gallagher, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Epperson v. United States, 471 A.2d 1016, 1017 (D.C.1984) (quoting Winters, supra, 317 A.2d at 532-34 ) (reaffirming tha

2013Cf. Barbett v. United States, 54 A.3d 1241, 1248 (D.C.2012) (reversing the verdict where the trial court issued a Winters instruction as a routine matter even though the jury re-deliberated for nearly an hour).

2013Cf. Barbett v. United States, 54 A.3d 1241, 1248 (D.C.2012) (reversing the verdict where the trial court issued a Winters instruction as a routine matter even though the jury re-deliberated for nearly an hour).

2012See also Houston v. United States, 592 A.2d 1066, 1067 (D.C.1991) (“We will ... reverse a trial court’s ruling on a matter within its discretion when the trial court, while recognizing its right to exercise discretion, declines to do so, preferring instead to adhere to a uniform policy”) (internal quotation marks omitted).