alter ego doctrine in Georgia

1994"To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the stockholders' disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud." (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Farmers Warehouse of Pelham v. Collins, 220 Ga. 141, 150 (2) (d) ( 137 SE2d 619 ) (1964); Marett v. Professional Ins.

1994"To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the stockholders' disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud." (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Farmers Warehouse of Pelham v. Collins, 220 Ga. 141, 150 (2) (d) ( 137 SE2d 619 ) (1964); Marett v. Professional Ins.

2025Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 279 Ga. 288, 290 (1) ( 612 SE2d 296 ) (2005); Dan J.

2025Baillie Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 279 Ga. 288, 290 (1) ( 612 SE2d 296 ) (2005); Dan J.

2009“The concept of piercing the corporate veil is applied in Georgia to remedy injustices which arise where a party has over extended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat justice, perpetuate fraud or to evade contractual or tort responsibility.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 321 ( 367 SE2d 107 ) (1988).

2009“The concept of piercing the corporate veil is applied in Georgia to remedy injustices which arise where a party has over extended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat justice, perpetuate fraud or to evade contractual or tort responsibility.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 321 ( 367 SE2d 107 ) (1988).

2016See Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 301 Ga. App. 254, 260 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 233 ) (2009) (where there was some evidence that would support a finding that the *707 shareholders used the corporate entities as their alter egos, it was for the jury to decide whether the alter ego doctrine should apply and allow the entities and the shareholders to be treated as one); Soerries v. Dancause, 248 Ga. App. 374, 375 ( 546 SE2d 356 ) (2001) (when litigated, the question of whether the alter ego doctrine applies “is for the jury, unless there is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding th

2016See Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 301 Ga. App. 254, 260 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 233 ) (2009) (where there was some evidence that would support a finding that the *707 shareholders used the corporate entities as their alter egos, it was for the jury to decide whether the alter ego doctrine should apply and allow the entities and the shareholders to be treated as one); Soerries v. Dancause, 248 Ga. App. 374, 375 ( 546 SE2d 356 ) (2001) (when litigated, the question of whether the alter ego doctrine applies “is for the jury, unless there is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding th

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2019As a consequence, it is appropriately granted only in the absence of adequate remedies at law.” (Citations omitted.) Acree v. McMahan, 276 Ga. 880, 882 ( 585 SE2d 873 ) (2003).

2019As a consequence, it is appropriately granted only in the absence of adequate remedies at law.” (Citations omitted.) Acree v. McMahan, 276 Ga. 880, 882 ( 585 SE2d 873 ) (2003).

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Southern Environmental Group v. Rosebud Landscape Gardeners, 196 Ga. App. 392, 394 (1) ( 395 SE2d 913 ) (1990).

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Southern Environmental Group v. Rosebud Landscape Gardeners, 196 Ga. App. 392, 394 (1) ( 395 SE2d 913 ) (1990).

1992“To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the *296 stockholders’ disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.” ’ [Cit.]” Sheppard v. Tribble Heating & Air Conditioning, 163 Ga. App. 732, 733 (1) ( 294 SE2d 572 ) (1982).

1992“To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the *296 stockholders’ disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.” ’ [Cit.]” Sheppard v. Tribble Heating & Air Conditioning, 163 Ga. App. 732, 733 (1) ( 294 SE2d 572 ) (1982).

2016Georgia law recognizes the alter ego doctrine, which allows the application of equitable principles “to disregard the separate and distinct legal existence possessed by a corporation where it is established that the corporation served as a mere alter ego or business conduit of another.” Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 267 Ga. 419 -420 ( 479 SE2d 751 ) (1997) (citations omitted).

2016Georgia law recognizes the alter ego doctrine, which allows the application of equitable principles “to disregard the separate and distinct legal existence possessed by a corporation where it is established that the corporation served as a mere alter ego or business conduit of another.” Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 267 Ga. 419 -420 ( 479 SE2d 751 ) (1997) (citations omitted).

2026In Cobra 4 Enters. v. Powell-Newman, 336 Ga. App. 609 ( 785 SE2d 556 ) (2016) (physical precedent only), this court rejected an attempt to impose liability horizontally between a company and its sibling corporation, stating that “Georgia courts have never applied the alter ego doctrine to impose liability in this manner.” Id. at 614 (2).

2026In Cobra 4 Enters. v. Powell-Newman, 336 Ga. App. 609 ( 785 SE2d 556 ) (2016) (physical precedent only), this court rejected an attempt to impose liability horizontally between a company and its sibling corporation, stating that “Georgia courts have never applied the alter ego doctrine to impose liability in this manner.” Id. at 614 (2).

2026See, e. g., NEC Techs. v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390, 397 (5) ( 478 SE2d 769 ) (1996) (reversing this court’s finding of genuine issues of material fact as to whether one company was the alter ego of another company because there was “an absence of any evidence establishing the existence of fact questions regarding the alter ego issue”); TMX Fin. v. Goldsmith, 352 Ga. App. 190 , 209-210 (6)( 833 SE2d 317 ) (2019) (under alter ego doctrine, the corporate veil may be pierced to hold a family of corporations liable for the debts of each other) (punctuation omitted); Renee Unlimited v. City of Atlanta, 3

2026See, e. g., NEC Techs. v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390, 397 (5) ( 478 SE2d 769 ) (1996) (reversing this court’s finding of genuine issues of material fact as to whether one company was the alter ego of another company because there was “an absence of any evidence establishing the existence of fact questions regarding the alter ego issue”); TMX Fin. v. Goldsmith, 352 Ga. App. 190 , 209-210 (6)( 833 SE2d 317 ) (2019) (under alter ego doctrine, the corporate veil may be pierced to hold a family of corporations liable for the debts of each other) (punctuation omitted); Renee Unlimited v. City of Atlanta, 3

2019Lawson, 261 Ga. at 150 (2).

2016See Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 301 Ga. App. 254, 260 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 233 ) (2009) (where there was some evidence that would support a finding that the *707 shareholders used the corporate entities as their alter egos, it was for the jury to decide whether the alter ego doctrine should apply and allow the entities and the shareholders to be treated as one); Soerries v. Dancause, 248 Ga. App. 374, 375 ( 546 SE2d 356 ) (2001) (when litigated, the question of whether the alter ego doctrine applies “is for the jury, unless there is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding th

2016See Renee Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 301 Ga. App. 254, 260 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 233 ) (2009) (where there was some evidence that would support a finding that the *707 shareholders used the corporate entities as their alter egos, it was for the jury to decide whether the alter ego doctrine should apply and allow the entities and the shareholders to be treated as one); Soerries v. Dancause, 248 Ga. App. 374, 375 ( 546 SE2d 356 ) (2001) (when litigated, the question of whether the alter ego doctrine applies “is for the jury, unless there is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding th

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2006D., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 727, 730 (3) ( 368 SE2d 329 ) (1988), adhered to on reconsideration, 188 Ga. App. 431, 434 (2) ( 373 SE2d 383 ) (1988). 26 Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584, 592 (5) (c) ( 533 SE2d 136 ) (2000). 27 See id. at 593 (describing elements that must be shown to prove a de facto merger). 28 See NEC Technologies v. Nelson, 267 Ga. 390,397 (5) (478SE2d769) (1996) (“To establish the alter ego doctrine a plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or by confusing otherwise *

2005Acree v. McMahan, 276 Ga. 880, 882 ( 585 SE2d 873 ) (2003); Kissun, supra; Hester Enterprises v. Narvais, 198 Ga. App. 580, 581 ( 402 SE2d 333 ) (1991).

2005Acree v. McMahan, 276 Ga. 880, 882 ( 585 SE2d 873 ) (2003); Kissun, supra; Hester Enterprises v. Narvais, 198 Ga. App. 580, 581 ( 402 SE2d 333 ) (1991).

2002That decision does not require us to ignore Barber’s trial testimony in this case. 10 See Carver v. Jones, 166 Ga. App. 197, 198 (1) ( 303 SE2d 529 ) (1983) (“Where a defendant admits the essential facts of a plaintiff’s petition but sets up other facts in justification or avoidance, an affirmative defense is presented and the defendant ordinarily has the burden of proving it”). 11 See id. (“The burden of proof is determined by the pleadings, and a defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s allegations is notice to the plaintiff that he has the burden to prove them.”); OCGA § 24-4-1; see also Fuda,

2002That decision does not require us to ignore Barber’s trial testimony in this case. 10 See Carver v. Jones, 166 Ga. App. 197, 198 (1) ( 303 SE2d 529 ) (1983) (“Where a defendant admits the essential facts of a plaintiff’s petition but sets up other facts in justification or avoidance, an affirmative defense is presented and the defendant ordinarily has the burden of proving it”). 11 See id. (“The burden of proof is determined by the pleadings, and a defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s allegations is notice to the plaintiff that he has the burden to prove them.”); OCGA § 24-4-1; see also Fuda,

2002That decision does not require us to ignore Barber’s trial testimony in this case. 10 See Carver v. Jones, 166 Ga. App. 197, 198 (1) ( 303 SE2d 529 ) (1983) (“Where a defendant admits the essential facts of a plaintiff’s petition but sets up other facts in justification or avoidance, an affirmative defense is presented and the defendant ordinarily has the burden of proving it”). 11 See id. (“The burden of proof is determined by the pleadings, and a defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s allegations is notice to the plaintiff that he has the burden to prove them.”); OCGA § 24-4-1; see also Fuda,

1997In discussing the alter ego doctrine, the courts frequently invoke the term “agency” in the context of the subsidiary corporation having been “ ‘so organized and controlled and its business conducted in such a manner as to make it merely an agency, instrumentality, adjunct, or alter ego of another corporation.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Triple “C” Recreation Assn. v. Cash, 124 Ga. App. 754, 756 ( 186 SE2d 145 ) (1971).

1997In discussing the alter ego doctrine, the courts frequently invoke the term “agency” in the context of the subsidiary corporation having been “ ‘so organized and controlled and its business conducted in such a manner as to make it merely an agency, instrumentality, adjunct, or alter ego of another corporation.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Triple “C” Recreation Assn. v. Cash, 124 Ga. App. 754, 756 ( 186 SE2d 145 ) (1971).

1997Midland Properties Co. v. Farmer, 100 Ga. App. 8, 29 (18) ( 110 SE2d 100 ) (1959).

1997Midland Properties Co. v. Farmer, 100 Ga. App. 8, 29 (18) ( 110 SE2d 100 ) (1959).

1994Careers, 201 Ga. App. 178, 180 (1) (b) ( 410 SE2d 373 ) (1991).

1994Careers, 201 Ga. App. 178, 180 (1) (b) ( 410 SE2d 373 ) (1991).

1994“To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the stockholders’ disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.” *360 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Custom Lighting &c. v. Hampshire Co., 204 Ga. App. 293, 295-296 (2) ( 418 SE2d 811 ) (1992).

1994“To establish the alter ego doctrine it must be shown that the stockholders’ disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.” *360 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Custom Lighting &c. v. Hampshire Co., 204 Ga. App. 293, 295-296 (2) ( 418 SE2d 811 ) (1992).

1992See also Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39 (1) ( 401 SE2d 738 ) (1991), citing Kaplan. “ ‘Courts permit “piercing the corporate veil” “in situations where the parties involved have themselves disregarded the separateness of legal entities. . . .” It is obvious that if the individual who is the principal shareholder or owner of the corporation conducts his private and corporate business on an interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one, then he is without standing to complain when an injured party does the same.

1992See also Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39 (1) ( 401 SE2d 738 ) (1991), citing Kaplan. “ ‘Courts permit “piercing the corporate veil” “in situations where the parties involved have themselves disregarded the separateness of legal entities. . . .” It is obvious that if the individual who is the principal shareholder or owner of the corporation conducts his private and corporate business on an interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one, then he is without standing to complain when an injured party does the same.

1990See, e.g., Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 844 (2a) ( 392 SE2d 37 ); Stewart Brothers v. Allen, 189 Ga. App. 816 (1) ( 377 SE2d 724 ) (1989); Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 321 ( 367 SE2d 107 ) (1988); Stillman v. Tempo Carpets, 174 Ga. App. 66 (1) ( 329 SE2d 197 ) (1985).

1990See, e.g., Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 844 (2a) ( 392 SE2d 37 ); Stewart Brothers v. Allen, 189 Ga. App. 816 (1) ( 377 SE2d 724 ) (1989); Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 321 ( 367 SE2d 107 ) (1988); Stillman v. Tempo Carpets, 174 Ga. App. 66 (1) ( 329 SE2d 197 ) (1985).