maintained exception in Louisiana

1977The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, basing its decision largely on McKey, supra .

1977The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, basing its decision largely on McKey, supra. And, in Parker v. St.

2007The court reasoned that their claims were covered by a class that was previously certified in another suit, Albach v. Kennedy, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/6/01), 801 So.2d 476 , writ denied, 2001-2499 (La.10/12/01), 799 So.2d 1138 . [1] In Albach , the class was defined by the trial court, as follows: owners of property which was surrendered to the State prior to July 10, 1986 if the property was interest bearing to the owner on the date of surrender by the holder to the administrator of unclaimed property.

2007The court reasoned that their claims were covered by a class that was previously certified in another suit, Albach v. Kennedy, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/6/01), 801 So.2d 476 , writ denied, 2001-2499 (La.10/12/01), 799 So.2d 1138 . [1] In Albach , the class was defined by the trial court, as follows: owners of property which was surrendered to the State prior to July 10, 1986 if the property was interest bearing to the owner on the date of surrender by the holder to the administrator of unclaimed property.

2004An earlier decision of this Court, Cook v. Hibernia National Bank, 2001-0455, pp. 1-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/10/02), 816 So.2d 901, 902-903 , sets forth the facts and procedural history of this case as follows: This case involves the consolidation of eight nursing homes into a single enterprise to be listed on a public stock exchange.

2001In re Exxon Coker Fire, 108 F.Supp.2d 628 (M.D.La.2000). [1] After determining that a chandelier was not expressly included in paragraph one as an example of a component part and that it was relatively easy to remove it without substantial damage, the court in Equibank embraced the concept of "societal expectations" to broadly include chandeliers as "electrical installations." [2] In Coulter , the drilling derrick was welded to the platform.

1997On the City’s appeal, the court of appeal reversed. 672 So.2d 1116 .

1996In Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453 , 49 So.2d 852 (1950), without any discussion of the absence in Section 1061 or 1032 of any grant of tort immunity to a principal, or of a principal's apparent ability to avoid any compensation liability, or of the question whether immunity should be conferred only if a principal actually pays compensation, this court maintained an exception of no cause of action which limited an injured employee's remedy against a principal to workers' compensation.

1996In Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453 , 49 So.2d 852 (1950), without any discussion of the absence in Section 1061 or 1032 of any grant of tort immunity to a principal, or of a principal's apparent ability to avoid any compensation liability, or of the question whether immunity should be conferred only if a principal actually pays compensation, this court maintained an exception of no cause of action which limited an injured employee's remedy against a principal to workers' compensation.

1993The engineers then filed motions to dismiss and exceptions of no right of action directed against all plaintiffs except Maurin-Ogden, Inc. The trial court maintained the exception and dismissed the action by the original plaintiff. [4] The court of appeal affirmed, reiterating its holding in Teachers' Retirement System of La. v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System, 444 So.2d 193 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds, 456 So.2d 594 (La.1984), that an undisclosed principal has no right of action to bring suit in its own name against the party who contracted with the principal's

1993The engineers then filed motions to dismiss and exceptions of no right of action directed against all plaintiffs except Maurin-Ogden, Inc. The trial court maintained the exception and dismissed the action by the original plaintiff. [4] The court of appeal affirmed, reiterating its holding in Teachers' Retirement System of La. v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System, 444 So.2d 193 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds, 456 So.2d 594 (La.1984), that an undisclosed principal has no right of action to bring suit in its own name against the party who contracted with the principal's

1993The court of appeal affirmed. 593 So.2d 460 .

1993The engineers then filed motions to dismiss and exceptions of no right of action directed against all plaintiffs except Maurin-Ogden, Inc. The trial court maintained the exception and dismissed the action by the original plaintiff. [4] The court of appeal affirmed, reiterating its holding in Teachers' Retirement System of La. v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System, 444 So.2d 193 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds, 456 So.2d 594 (La.1984), that an undisclosed principal has no right of action to bring suit in its own name against the party who contracted with the principal's

1993This court affirmed the trial court's judgment in Burdis v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 542 So.2d 117 (La.

1989However, in Lowe v. Rivers, 445 So.2d 105 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1984) the court maintained an exception of res judicata where the prior action was dismissed on a plea of prescription.

1988It is from this judgment that plaintiff now appeals, raising the following issue for review: "Was the trial court in error for rendering judgment on the exception in favor of the defendant, Mr. Bumgardner?" Plaintiff contends that in the case of Gowins v. Gowins, 466 So.2d 32 (La.1985), the Supreme Court determined that Louisiana had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Mr. Gowins, on the basis of his consent to the jurisdiction of the court and that an identical finding in the instant case is warranted.

1988In Barkman v. Zoning Appeals Board of Jefferson Parish, 442 So.2d 1237 (La.App. 5th Cir.1983), a panel of this court maintained an exception of no right of action as to a party who had sold his property which adjoined another lot for which a contested use variance had been granted.

1987The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that La.R.S. 9:5628 barred an action filed more than three years after the effective date of the statute, even though the act or omission occurred before the effective date. 489 So.2d 396 (1986).

1987The court of appeal affirmed ( 499 So.2d 454 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986)) and this court granted writs.

1987Citing Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521 (La.1979), the court of appeal reversed. 459 So.2d 602 .

1987Citing Lott v. Haley, 370 So.2d 521 (La.1979), the court of appeal reversed. 459 So.2d 602 .

1986On appeal, the intermediate court affirmed. 455 So.2d 1279 .

1982Appellants particularly rely on the .case of Audubon Insurance Co. v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 366 So.2d 972 (La.App. 1st Cir, 1978).

1980The trial court maintained the exception of pre-emption, citing this court’s decision in OPSB v. Pittman Construction Company, 372 So.2d 717 (App. 4th, 1979), (hereinafter “Pittman II”).

1977In other words, a forced heir may attack by parol a transfer made by his ancestor, for the purpose of showing that it was a simulation, in order to bring the property back into his ancestor’s succession or to recover it for himself, but he cannot use parol evidence to bring into the succession or to recover property, which under no form of title recognized by law ever belonged to his ancestor or to his ancestor’s succession. * * * ” Similarly, in Succession of Hogh, 193 La. 260 , 190 So. 399 (1939), a case also involving an attack by a forced heir, the court maintained an exception of no cause

1977In other words, a forced heir may attack by parol a transfer made by his ancestor, for the purpose of showing that it was a simulation, in order to bring the property back into his ancestor’s succession or to recover it for himself, but he cannot use parol evidence to bring into the succession or to recover property, which under no form of title recognized by law ever belonged to his ancestor or to his ancestor’s succession. * * * ” Similarly, in Succession of Hogh, 193 La. 260 , 190 So. 399 (1939), a case also involving an attack by a forced heir, the court maintained an exception of no cause

1975On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. 300 So.2d 848 .

1971That judgment was reversed on appeal to this court (Succession of Walters, La.App., 202 So.2d 410 ) and the matter was remanded for further proceedings.

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .

1968The trial court maintained the defense of estoppel by warranty, relying on the decisions in Boyet v. Perryman, 240 La. 339 , 123 So.2d 79 ; Louisiana Canal Company v. Leger, 237 La. 936 , 112 So.2d 667 ; Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., supra; Arnett v. Marshall, 210 La. 932 ; 28 So.2d 665 ; and Giffing v. Taft (on rehearing), 151 La. 442, 451 , 91 So. 832, 835 .