187 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2026Rather, prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.” State v. White, 2013-1525, p. 2 (La. 11/8/13), 130 So.3d 298, 300 (upholding a multiple offender adjudication where the State provided “sufficient competent evidence” to prove the convictions and the defendant’s identity as the individual who committed the prior felonies) (internal citations omitted). 2016Thus, the prosecution is not required to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at a habitual offender hearing; rather, “prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.” White , 13-1525, p. 2, 130 So.3d at 300 (emphasis in original). | 4 | 6 |
State v. Townsendgreen2 sentences2019Acts 896 , which provides that a defendant who has alleged a constitutional deficiency in one or more of his prior convictions “shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by [his] response [to the state’s habitual offender bill.].” 4 reveals a Boykin defect in the proceedings.” State v. Clesi, 07-0564, p. 1 (La. 11/2/07), 967 So.2d 488, 489 (per curiam), citing State v. Townsend, 04-0005, p. 1 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So.2d 152, 153 (“We assume for present purposes that the court of appeal correctly found that the documentary evidence introduced b 2014See State v. Townsend, 04-0005, p. 1 (La.4/23/04), 874 So.2d 152, 153 (“We assume for | ¡¡present purposes that the court of appeal correctly found that the documentary evidence introduced by the state at the habitual offender hearing to carry its initial burden under [Shelton ] also carried the defendant’s burden to make an ‘affirmative showing’ of a procedural defect in his guilty plea in Texas because the documents omitted any mention of advice with respect to the privilege against self-incrimination.”). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Paynegreen2 sentences2018See State v. Payne, 94-1628 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/96) , 677 So.2d 527 . 2018See State v. Payne, 94-1628 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/96) , 677 So.2d 527 . | 4 | 4 |
State v. Dortheygreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, the State avers that the trial court 22-KH-300 4 abused its discretion in granting defendant’s request for a downward departure from the mandatory minimum under Dorthey, supra. In opposition, defendant contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the “unique” mitigating factors that were discussed during the habitual offender hearing. 2018At the habitual offender hearing, Defendant argued for a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence pursuant to State v. Dorthey , 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993). | 3 | 7 |
State ex rel. Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2020At the commencement of the colloquy regarding the 11 See State v. Moore, 12-102 (La. 5/25/12), 90 So.3d 384 (per curium), where the Louisiana Supreme Court suggested that “a habitual offender hearing should not be considered part of the record for purposes of error patent review and that a defendant must assign as error any perceived defect in the proceedings to preserve appellate review of the claimed error.” 20-KA-97 11 multiple bill, defendant indicated that he reviewed the waiver of rights form with his attorney and that he signed the form. 2017However, it is noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “a habitual offender hearing should not be considered part of the record for purposes of error patent review and that a defendant must assign as error any perceived defect in the proceedings to preserve appellate review of the claimed error.” State v. Moore, 12-0102 (La. 5/25/12), 90 So.3d 384, 385 (per curiam ). | 3 | 7 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2012State v. Jones, 332 So.2d 461, 462 (La.1976) (A trial judge may take judicial notice during habitual offender proceedings “of any prior proceeding which was a part of the same case he had previously tried.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Gordon, 582 So.2d 285, 293, n. 2 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991) (“[T]he trial court could take judicial notice of the ^defendant’s trial testimony (admitting his prior simple robbery conviction) because the ... trial was a prior proceeding in the same case as the habitual offender hearing.”). 1991Therefore, at the habitual offender hearing, the trial court properly took judicial notice of the prior proceedings connected with the defendant's prosecution for aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery (including the trial and the defendant's testimony therein.) See State v. Jones, 332 So.2d 461, 463 (La.1976) (In an habitual offender hearing, the trial court could take judicial notice of any prior proceeding which was a part of the same case he had previously tried.) To summarize, we find that the trial court could not take judicial notice of the defendant's prior felony co | 3 | 4 |
State v. Blackwellgreen2 sentences2010See State v. Blackwell, 377 So.2d 110, 112 (La.1979); State v. Curtis, 338 So.2d 662 (La.1976). 2010See State v. Blackwell, 377 So.2d 110, 112 (La.1979); State v. Curtis, 338 So.2d 662 (La.1976). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Sheltongreen2 sentences2022McMillan, 43 So. 3d at 302 - 303. 6 Pursuant to State v. Shelton, 621 So. 2d 769 ( La. 1993), once the State carries its initial burden at an habitual offender hearing of proving the existence of a defendant' s prior guilty pleas and his representation by counsel or waiver of counsel, the burden shifts to the defendant " to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea." Shelton, 621 So. 2d at 779 . 2022McMillan, 43 So. 3d at 302 - 303. 6 Pursuant to State v. Shelton, 621 So. 2d 769 ( La. 1993), once the State carries its initial burden at an habitual offender hearing of proving the existence of a defendant' s prior guilty pleas and his representation by counsel or waiver of counsel, the burden shifts to the defendant " to produce some affirmative evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the plea." Shelton, 621 So. 2d at 779 . | 2 | 16 |
State v. Curtisgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Curtis, 338 So.2d 662 (La.1976). 2010See State v. Blackwell, 377 So.2d 110, 112 (La.1979); State v. Curtis, 338 So.2d 662 (La.1976). | 2 | 5 |
State v. Clesigreen2 sentences2019Acts 896 , which provides that a defendant who has alleged a constitutional deficiency in one or more of his prior convictions “shall have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on any issue of fact raised by [his] response [to the state’s habitual offender bill.].” 4 reveals a Boykin defect in the proceedings.” State v. Clesi, 07-0564, p. 1 (La. 11/2/07), 967 So.2d 488, 489 (per curiam), citing State v. Townsend, 04-0005, p. 1 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So.2d 152, 153 (“We assume for present purposes that the court of appeal correctly found that the documentary evidence introduced b 2017See State v. Clesi, 07-0564 (La. 11/2/07), 967 So.2d 488, 489-90 (per curiam). | 2 | 2 |
Melvin McKenzie v. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary of the Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2019United States v. Hernandez , 234 F.3d 252 , 255 (5th Cir. 2000) ; McKenzie v. Wainwright , 632 F.2d 649 , 651 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty on the basis of a promise by his defense attorney or the prosecutor, whether or not such promise is fulfillable, breach of that promise taints the voluntariness of his plea.") In this case, defendant has not specifically claimed that his stipulation as a second-felony offender was induced by the trial court's statement that he was "always parole eligible." At the time of the stipulation, defendant signed the habitual offender waiver of 2019United States v. Hernandez , 234 F.3d 252 , 255 (5th Cir. 2000) ; McKenzie v. Wainwright , 632 F.2d 649 , 651 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty on the basis of a promise by his defense attorney or the prosecutor, whether or not such promise is fulfillable, breach of that promise taints the voluntariness of his plea.") In this case, defendant has not specifically claimed that his stipulation as a second-felony offender was induced by the trial court's statement that he was "always parole eligible." At the time of the stipulation, defendant signed the habitual offender waiver of | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Cottongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Spellmangreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Alexandergreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Spellmangreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Hillgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Bolesgreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Alexisgreen2 sentences2010The Louisiana Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that [the Habitual Offender Act] does not require the State to use a specific | utyye of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.” Payton , 00-2899 at p. 8, 810 So.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Lindsey, 99-3302, p. 7 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 339, 344 )(emphasis in original). 2007The Louisiana Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Habitual Offender Act "does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence." State v. Payton, 00-2899 (La.3/15/02), 810 So.2d 1127 , quoting State v. Lindsey, 99-3202 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 339 . | 1 | 10 |
State v. Paytongreen2 sentences2010The Louisiana Supreme Court “has repeatedly held that [the Habitual Offender Act] does not require the State to use a specific | utyye of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.” Payton , 00-2899 at p. 8, 810 So.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Lindsey, 99-3302, p. 7 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 339, 344 )(emphasis in original). 2007The Louisiana Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Habitual Offender Act "does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at an habitual offender hearing and that prior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence." State v. Payton, 00-2899 (La.3/15/02), 810 So.2d 1127 , quoting State v. Lindsey, 99-3202 (La.10/17/00), 770 So.2d 339 . | 1 | 9 |
State v. Gautreauxgreen2 sentences1998This court has held "where a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent before admitting his prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing, defendant's acknowledgment is insufficient where the acknowledgment is the only proof of prior convictions offered by the state." State v. Payne, 94-1628, p.4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/95); 665 So.2d 158 , citing State v. Norris, 94-1064 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95) ; 651 So.2d 490 and State v. Gautreaux, 607 So.2d 1086 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992). 1996La.R.S. 1315:529.1; State v. Norris, 94-1064 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95) ; 651 So.2d 490 ; State v. Gautreaux, 607 So.2d 1086 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Muhammadgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Muhammad , 03-2991 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 45 , 49 n.9 (wherein the supreme court explained within the habitual offender context that "the trial judge has the right to take judicial cognizance of any prior proceeding which is part of the same case he has previously tried."); State v.Brown , 11-1656 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So.3d 1232 ; State v. Timmons , 44,702 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So.3d 1074 , writ denied , 09-2251 (La. 4/16/10), 31 So.3d 1053 . 2012Id. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Martingreen2 sentences2011The court in Johnson , relying on State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983), further stated La.R.S. 15:529.1(D) specifically provides defendant shall be advised of his right to a formal hearing and to demand that the state prove its case. 2005The State also cites State v. Martin, 427 So.2d 1182 (La.1983), in which the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant was required to object at the habitual offender hearing to the failure of the record of a predicate offense to reflect the presence of counsel in order to raise the issue on appeal. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Robersongreen2 sentences2010In concluding the hearing was fundamentally fair, this court noted that the defendant was represented by capable counsel who explained the habitual offender charges to him and the defendant admitted his prior offense in the presence of his attorney “after being extensively informed of his right to a hearing where the State would have to prove his identity as a habitual offender beyond reasonable doubt.” Id. at 636. (emphasis added). 1 In State v. Roberson, 94-1570 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95) , 664 So.2d 687 , this court reversed a habitual offender adjudication, concluding that the proceeding was 1998Harris was distinguished in a decision rendered by this court in State v. Roberson, 94-1570 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95) ; 664 So.2d 687 . | 1 | 3 |
| Ryan v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Lindsey v. Louisianagreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Wisegreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Milbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Turnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Picotgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Petersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State ex rel. Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2020At the commencement of the colloquy regarding the 11 See State v. Moore, 12-102 (La. 5/25/12), 90 So.3d 384 (per curium), where the Louisiana Supreme Court suggested that “a habitual offender hearing should not be considered part of the record for purposes of error patent review and that a defendant must assign as error any perceived defect in the proceedings to preserve appellate review of the claimed error.” 20-KA-97 11 multiple bill, defendant indicated that he reviewed the waiver of rights form with his attorney and that he signed the form. 2017However, it is noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “a habitual offender hearing should not be considered part of the record for purposes of error patent review and that a defendant must assign as error any perceived defect in the proceedings to preserve appellate review of the claimed error.” State v. Moore, 12-0102 (La. 5/25/12), 90 So.3d 384, 385 (per curiam ). | 1 | 7 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2011A panel of this court previously addressed the requirement that a defendant be informed of his rights at a habitual offender hearing, stating: Although the right to remain silent is not specifically set forth in La.R.S. 15:529.1, in State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 (La.1983), writ granted on other grounds, 438 So.2d 1113 (La.1983); appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984), appeal after remand, 471 So.2d 1041 (La.App. 1 Cir.1985), the Louisiana Supreme Court held this statute clearly recognizes the defendant has the right to remain silent, and the statute implicitly provided defe 1999In Johnson, 432 So.2d 815 , the defendant was required to testify at a habitual offender hearing about an earlier out-of-state conviction, without having been cautioned about his rights. | 6 | 1988–2011 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2010He specifically argues that his two predicate convictions were infirm because the trial court in both cases failed to properly advise him of his constitutional right of confrontation in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), 2 and La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1. 3 I/The State responds that the evidence produced at the habitual offender hearing was sufficient to show that the two predicate guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made, and the language used in the guilty plea forms adhered to the dictates of Boykin . 2010He specifically argues that his two predicate convictions were infirm because the trial court in both cases failed to properly advise him of his constitutional right of confrontation in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), 2 and La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1. 3 I/The State responds that the evidence produced at the habitual offender hearing was sufficient to show that the two predicate guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made, and the language used in the guilty plea forms adhered to the dictates of Boykin . | 5 | 1993–2018 |
State v. Schaefer
green
2 sentences2017State v. Schaefer, 97-465 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/97) , 704 So.2d 300, 304 . 2017State v. Schaefer, 97-465 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/25/97) , 704 So.2d 300, 304 . | 5 | 2011–2017 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2011In State v. Harris, 95-0900 (La.5/19/95), 654 So.2d 680 (per curiam), on application for post-conviction relief, the court of appeal reversed the petitioner’s adjudication and sentence as a multiple offender on the grounds that the trial court failed to advise him of his rights at the habitual offender hearing before defense counsel stipulated to petitioner’s identity. 2002In State v. Harris, 95-900 (La.5/19/95); 654 So.2d 680 , the supreme court found the habitual offender hearing at issue was fundamentally fair even though the defendant was not informed of his rights. | 4 | 1997–2011 |
State v. Norris
neutral
2 sentences1998This court has held "where a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent before admitting his prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing, defendant's acknowledgment is insufficient where the acknowledgment is the only proof of prior convictions offered by the state." State v. Payne, 94-1628, p.4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/95); 665 So.2d 158 , citing State v. Norris, 94-1064 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95) ; 651 So.2d 490 and State v. Gautreaux, 607 So.2d 1086 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992). 1996La.R.S. 1315:529.1; State v. Norris, 94-1064 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95) ; 651 So.2d 490 ; State v. Gautreaux, 607 So.2d 1086 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992). | 4 | 1995–1998 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2025Id. 2013The case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether this Defendant has shown that “because of unusual circumstances [he] is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.” Johnson, 709 So.2d at 676 (quoting State v. Young). | 3 | 2012–2025 |
State v. Crosby
green
2 sentences2019Prior to the habitual offender hearing, defendant filed objections, contending that in district court case number 12-0652, he pled guilty under Crosby , supra , to three counts, 20 and because the trial court never ruled on his pre-trial motion to suppress, he did not receive the benefit for which he entered the plea bargain. 21 *416 He contended that as a result, his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered under Boykin , 22 and thus the two guilty pleas the State intended to use as predicates from district court case number 12-0652 were deficient. 2019Prior to the habitual offender hearing, defendant filed objections, contending that in district court case number 12-0652, he pled guilty under Crosby , supra , to three counts, 20 and because the trial court never ruled on his pre-trial motion to suppress, he did not receive the benefit for which he entered the plea bargain. 21 *416 He contended that as a result, his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered under Boykin , 22 and thus the two guilty pleas the State intended to use as predicates from district court case number 12-0652 were deficient. | 3 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Martin
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Muhammad , 03-2991 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 45 , 49 n.9 (wherein the supreme court explained within the habitual offender context that "the trial judge has the right to take judicial cognizance of any prior proceeding which is part of the same case he has previously tried."); State v.Brown , 11-1656 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So.3d 1232 ; State v. Timmons , 44,702 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So.3d 1074 , writ denied , 09-2251 (La. 4/16/10), 31 So.3d 1053 . 2016State v. Brown, 2011-1656, p. 2 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So.3d 1232, 1234 . “[T]he Habitual Offender Act does not require the State to use a specific type of evidence to carry its burden at a habitual offender hearing. | 3 | 2013–2018 |
State v. Alexander
neutral
2 sentences2003In State v. Alexander, 98-1377 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/16/00) , 753 So.2d 933 this court stated: LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(b) states that the district attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt any issue of fact and that the presumption of regularity of judgment shall be sufficient to meet the original burden of proof. 2001If the State introduces anything less than the “perfect” transcript, for example, a guilty plea form, a minute entry, an “imperfect” transcript, or any combination thereof, the judge then must weigh the evidence submitted by the defendant and by the State to determine whether the State has met its burden of proving that the defendant’s prior guilty plea was informed and voluntary, and made with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights, (footnotes omitted). 98-1377 at pp. 5-6, 753 So.2d at 937 . |flDefense counsel objected at the habitual offender hearing that the evidence presented by | 3 | 2001–2003 |
Parke v. Raley
green
2 sentences2001In State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (1993), our supreme court, in light of Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), revised the previous scheme allocating burdens of proof in habitual offender proceedings to properly reflect the "presumption of regularity of judgments." The court wrote: In light of the fact that Parke holds Boykin does not require that the entire burden be placed on the prosecution in a recidivism proceeding and because our present system of placing the entire burden on the State fails to give any presumption of regularity to a final conviction used 2001In State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (1993), our supreme court, in light of Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 , 113 S.Ct. 517 , 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), revised the previous scheme allocating burdens of proof in habitual offender proceedings to properly reflect the "presumption of regularity of judgments." The court wrote: In light of the fact that Parke holds Boykin does not require that the entire burden be placed on the prosecution in a recidivism proceeding and because our present system of placing the entire burden on the State fails to give any presumption of regularity to a final conviction used | 3 | 1996–2001 |
cluster 22502
green
2 sentences2019United States v. Hernandez , 234 F.3d 252 , 255 (5th Cir. 2000) ; McKenzie v. Wainwright , 632 F.2d 649 , 651 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty on the basis of a promise by his defense attorney or the prosecutor, whether or not such promise is fulfillable, breach of that promise taints the voluntariness of his plea.") In this case, defendant has not specifically claimed that his stipulation as a second-felony offender was induced by the trial court's statement that he was "always parole eligible." At the time of the stipulation, defendant signed the habitual offender waiver of 2019United States v. Hernandez , 234 F.3d 252 , 255 (5th Cir. 2000) ; McKenzie v. Wainwright , 632 F.2d 649 , 651 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty on the basis of a promise by his defense attorney or the prosecutor, whether or not such promise is fulfillable, breach of that promise taints the voluntariness of his plea.") In this case, defendant has not specifically claimed that his stipulation as a second-felony offender was induced by the trial court's statement that he was "always parole eligible." At the time of the stipulation, defendant signed the habitual offender waiver of | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2019Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2019Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Roberts
neutral
2 sentences2019While the Habitual Offender Law does not specify a time within which the state must file a multiple bill, the state must do so "within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior felony record." State v. Roberts , 588 So.2d 759 , 762 (La. 2019While the Habitual Offender Law does not specify a time within which the state must file a multiple bill, the state must do so "within a reasonable time after the prosecution knows that a defendant has a prior felony record." State v. Roberts , 588 So.2d 759 , 762 (La. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Fredericks green | 2 | 2015–2018 |
| State v. Timmons neutral | 2 | 2015–2018 |
| State v. Cottonham neutral | 2 | 2011–2015 |
| State v. Odom green | 2 | 2009–2015 |
| State v. Cottonham neutral | 2 | 2011–2015 |
| State v. Tucker green | 2 | 1993–2013 |
| State v. Winslow neutral | 2 | 2011–2012 |
| State v. Triche green | 2 | 2008–2012 |
| State v. Mays green | 2 | 2010–2011 |
| State v. Toney green | 2 | 2009–2009 |
| Jackson v. Virginia red | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| Dugar v. Whitley green | 2 | 1996–2008 |
| State v. Gremillion neutral | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Hardy green | 2 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Holden green | 2 | 1993–1997 |
| State v. Rubbicco green | 2 | 1993–1994 |
| State v. Mallett green | 2 | 1993–1994 |
| State v. Mallett green | 2 | 1993–1994 |
| State v. McFarland green | 2 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. McMillan green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. SWANZY neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Seals green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Carter neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Kornahrens neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Seals v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Sims v. Florida green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Delaney neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.