30 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Heweygreen2 sentences2026During sentencing, at step two of the Hewey analysis, see State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993), the sentencing court stated: The defendant, too, is plainly sad for what happened to his child, but he has never taken responsibility for his actions. 2026During sentencing, at step two of the Hewey analysis, see State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993), the sentencing court stated: The defendant, too, is plainly sad for what happened to his child, but he has never taken responsibility for his actions. | 18 | 20 |
State of Maine v. Theodore S. Stanislawgreen2 sentences2026Id.; see also Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 . 5 Merchant argues that the court erred when it failed to consider whether to impose consecutive sentences before moving on to the third step in the Hewey analysis on Count 1, contrary to our guidance in State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43 , 65 A.3d 1242 . 2026Id.; see also Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 . 5 Merchant argues that the court erred when it failed to consider whether to impose consecutive sentences before moving on to the third step in the Hewey analysis on Count 1, contrary to our guidance in State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43 , 65 A.3d 1242 . | 2 | 5 |
State v. Shortsleevesgreen2 sentences2009L.J. 612 , 611-12, 616 (1991); see Short-sleeves, 580 A.2d at 149-50 . [¶ 37] In accordance with the Hewey analysis, “[t]he first step a court must take in determining a sentence is to consider the particular nature and seriousness of the offense.” State v. Bates, 2003 ME 67, ¶ 25 , 822 A.2d 1129, 1135 (quotation marks omitted). 2009L.J. 612 , 611-12, 616 (1991); see Short-sleeves, 580 A.2d at 149-50 . [¶ 37] In accordance with the Hewey analysis, “[t]he first step a court must take in determining a sentence is to consider the particular nature and seriousness of the offense.” State v. Bates, 2003 ME 67, ¶ 25 , 822 A.2d 1129, 1135 (quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Downsgreen2 sentences2026In crafting an aggregate sentence with primary counts, the sentencing court must perform a separate Hewey analysis, going through each of the three steps, for each primary count that it determines will run consecutively to another count. 3 A consecutive sentence is one “involving imprisonment that immediately follows in time another sentence involving imprisonment.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(5-D) (2025). 8 Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 14 , 962 A.2d 950 ; see State v. Chase, 2025 ME 90, ¶ 29 , 345 A.3d 183 . [¶13] The procedure followed by the sentencing court in State v. Chase provides a model of the proper way 2026In crafting an aggregate sentence with primary counts, the sentencing court must perform a separate Hewey analysis, going through each of the three steps, for each primary count that it determines will run consecutively to another count. 3 A consecutive sentence is one “involving imprisonment that immediately follows in time another sentence involving imprisonment.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(5-D) (2025). 8 Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 14 , 962 A.2d 950 ; see State v. Chase, 2025 ME 90, ¶ 29 , 345 A.3d 183 . [¶13] The procedure followed by the sentencing court in State v. Chase provides a model of the proper way | 1 | 3 |
State v. Gilmangreen2 sentences2026See State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35 , ¶ 11 n.4, 993 A.2d 14 (stating that when the sentencing judge imposed less than the statutory mandatory minimum, Rule 35 was the correct vehicle to correct the illegal sentence). [¶31] At the sentencing proceeding, the court discussed registration within the third step of the three-step Hewey analysis. 2026See State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35 , ¶ 11 n.4, 993 A.2d 14 (stating that when the sentencing judge imposed less than the statutory mandatory minimum, Rule 35 was the correct vehicle to correct the illegal sentence). [¶31] At the sentencing proceeding, the court discussed registration within the third step of the three-step Hewey analysis. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Batesgreen2 sentences2025“We review the trial court’s application of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the maximum sentence for abuse of discretion.” State v. Bates, 2003 ME 67, ¶ 25 , 822 A.2d 1129 . [¶22] In the second step of the Hewey analysis, the court considered Woodard’s age, stating, “the defendant’s age at the time of the incident is significant to the Court. 2025“We review the trial court’s application of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the maximum sentence for abuse of discretion.” State v. Bates, 2003 ME 67, ¶ 25 , 822 A.2d 1129 . [¶22] In the second step of the Hewey analysis, the court considered Woodard’s age, stating, “the defendant’s age at the time of the incident is significant to the Court. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pfeilgreen2 sentences2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St 2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sweetgreen2 sentences2009State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 15 , 745 A.2d 368, 373 . [¶ 23] Before it began its Hewey analysis of each count, the court summarized the aggravating and mitigating factors. 2009State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 15 , 745 A.2d 368, 373 . [¶ 23] Before it began its Hewey analysis of each count, the court summarized the aggravating and mitigating factors. | 1 | 2 |
State of Maine v. Kenneth M. Chase Jr.green2 sentences2026In crafting an aggregate sentence with primary counts, the sentencing court must perform a separate Hewey analysis, going through each of the three steps, for each primary count that it determines will run consecutively to another count. 3 A consecutive sentence is one “involving imprisonment that immediately follows in time another sentence involving imprisonment.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(5-D) (2025). 8 Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 14 , 962 A.2d 950 ; see State v. Chase, 2025 ME 90, ¶ 29 , 345 A.3d 183 . [¶13] The procedure followed by the sentencing court in State v. Chase provides a model of the proper way 2026In crafting an aggregate sentence with primary counts, the sentencing court must perform a separate Hewey analysis, going through each of the three steps, for each primary count that it determines will run consecutively to another count. 3 A consecutive sentence is one “involving imprisonment that immediately follows in time another sentence involving imprisonment.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(5-D) (2025). 8 Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 14 , 962 A.2d 950 ; see State v. Chase, 2025 ME 90, ¶ 29 , 345 A.3d 183 . [¶13] The procedure followed by the sentencing court in State v. Chase provides a model of the proper way | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Raymond Ellis Jr.green2 sentences2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St 2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984); Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Violettegreen2 sentences2023In addition, “[i]f the court decides to impose consecutive sentences, the court shall state its reasons for doing so on the record or in the sentences.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1608(3); see Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 16 , 65 A.3d 1242 (“If the court decides to impose consecutive sentences for various convictions, it must perform a separate Hewey analysis for each conviction.”). 15 [¶20] Here, as the parties have pointed out, the court imposed consecutive sentences without making the required findings, providing the required explanation, or performing a separate Hewey analysis for each conviction.10 We the 2023In addition, “[i]f the court decides to impose consecutive sentences, the court shall state its reasons for doing so on the record or in the sentences.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1608(3); see Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 16 , 65 A.3d 1242 (“If the court decides to impose consecutive sentences for various convictions, it must perform a separate Hewey analysis for each conviction.”). 15 [¶20] Here, as the parties have pointed out, the court imposed consecutive sentences without making the required findings, providing the required explanation, or performing a separate Hewey analysis for each conviction.10 We the | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Gabriel J. Hansengreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the 2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reesegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Laferriere v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Calderongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Berubegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Corbettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cloutiergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lilleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Maine v. Jahneiro Plummer
green
2 sentences2026The court erred when it adopted the exact same Hewey analysis for Count 3 as was articulated for Count 1 but then imposed a sentence on Count 3 different from the sentence that it imposed on Count 1. [¶11] “[W]e review the sentencing court’s determination of the basic sentence de novo for misapplication of legal principles and its determination of the maximum sentence for abuse of discretion.” State v. Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 10 , 243 A.3d 1184 (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e review the sentencing court’s analysis at each step to determine whether it disregarded the relevant sentencing factor 2026The court erred when it adopted the exact same Hewey analysis for Count 3 as was articulated for Count 1 but then imposed a sentence on Count 3 different from the sentence that it imposed on Count 1. [¶11] “[W]e review the sentencing court’s determination of the basic sentence de novo for misapplication of legal principles and its determination of the maximum sentence for abuse of discretion.” State v. Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 10 , 243 A.3d 1184 (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e review the sentencing court’s analysis at each step to determine whether it disregarded the relevant sentencing factor | 2 | 2025–2026 |
State v. Cookson
green
2 sentences2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the 2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the | 2 | 2010–2020 |
State v. Seamon
green
2 sentences2026State v. Seamon, 2017 ME 123, ¶ 23 , 165 A.3d 342 . 2026State v. Seamon, 2017 ME 123, ¶ 23 , 165 A.3d 342 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State of Maine v. Andrew L. Seamon
green
2 sentences2026State v. Seamon, 2017 ME 123, ¶ 23 , 165 A.3d 342 . 2026State v. Seamon, 2017 ME 123, ¶ 23 , 165 A.3d 342 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State of Maine v. Bethany Ringuette
neutral
2 sentences2025Id. (ellipsis and quotation marks omitted). [¶14] In cases of gross sexual assault involving a victim who has not yet attained twelve years of age, the Legislature has mandated a basic term of imprisonment of at least twenty years in step one of the Hewey analysis. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4-E) (2018); 17-A M.R.S. § 253-A(2) (2025).1 In State v. 1 Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4-E) (2018) provided: If the State pleads and proves that a crime under section 253 was committed against a person who had not yet attained 12 years of age, the court, notwithstanding subsection 2, shall impose a definite term of i 2025Id. (ellipsis and quotation marks omitted). [¶14] In cases of gross sexual assault involving a victim who has not yet attained twelve years of age, the Legislature has mandated a basic term of imprisonment of at least twenty years in step one of the Hewey analysis. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4-E) (2018); 17-A M.R.S. § 253-A(2) (2025).1 In State v. 1 Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4-E) (2018) provided: If the State pleads and proves that a crime under section 253 was committed against a person who had not yet attained 12 years of age, the court, notwithstanding subsection 2, shall impose a definite term of i | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Shulikov
green
2 sentences2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St 2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Gray
green
2 sentences2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St 2025A sentencing court may consider the same facts at steps one and two of its sentencing analysis, provided that it does so for different purposes.” Plummer, 2020 ME 143, ¶ 14 , 243 A.3d 1184 ; see also Ellis, 2025 ME 56, ¶ 19 , --- A.3d --- (“[T]he same fact considered at step one may also be considered at step two provided it is for a distinct purpose.”); State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13 , 893 A.2d 611 (“[A] court [may] refer to the 16 same facts in the various steps of the sentencing analysis so long as the court is weighing different considerations at each step.” (quotation marks omitted)); St | 1 | 2025–2025 |
James A. Philbrook v. State of Maine
green
1 sentence2024The advice that Gordon should proceed with the twelve-year-cap option was a strategic decision that was not “manifestly unreasonable,” Pineo, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 , and it did not “fall[] below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶18] That the court ultimately imposed a twelve-year unsuspended sentence (after reading the parties’ “exhaustive” sentencing memoranda, listening to their arguments, and conducting a detailed Hewey analysis that involved the weighing of significant aggravating | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Philbrook v. State
green
1 sentence2024The advice that Gordon should proceed with the twelve-year-cap option was a strategic decision that was not “manifestly unreasonable,” Pineo, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 , and it did not “fall[] below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶18] That the court ultimately imposed a twelve-year unsuspended sentence (after reading the parties’ “exhaustive” sentencing memoranda, listening to their arguments, and conducting a detailed Hewey analysis that involved the weighing of significant aggravating | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Pineo v. State
green
2 sentences2024The advice that Gordon should proceed with the twelve-year-cap option was a strategic decision that was not “manifestly unreasonable,” Pineo, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 , and it did not “fall[] below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶18] That the court ultimately imposed a twelve-year unsuspended sentence (after reading the parties’ “exhaustive” sentencing memoranda, listening to their arguments, and conducting a detailed Hewey analysis that involved the weighing of significant aggravating 2024The advice that Gordon should proceed with the twelve-year-cap option was a strategic decision that was not “manifestly unreasonable,” Pineo, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 , and it did not “fall[] below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶18] That the court ultimately imposed a twelve-year unsuspended sentence (after reading the parties’ “exhaustive” sentencing memoranda, listening to their arguments, and conducting a detailed Hewey analysis that involved the weighing of significant aggravating | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ford v. State
green
1 sentence2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984); Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Burdick
green
2 sentences2024See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B); Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 19 , 852 A.2d 70 ; Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13 , 782 A.2d 319 . 12 court, we review for obvious error. 2024See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B); Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 19 , 852 A.2d 70 ; Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13 , 782 A.2d 319 . 12 court, we review for obvious error. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
James M. Manley v. State of Maine
green
2 sentences2024The advice that Gordon should proceed with the twelve-year-cap option was a strategic decision that was not “manifestly unreasonable,” Pineo, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 , and it did not “fall[] below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶18] That the court ultimately imposed a twelve-year unsuspended sentence (after reading the parties’ “exhaustive” sentencing memoranda, listening to their arguments, and conducting a detailed Hewey analysis that involved the weighing of significant aggravating 2024The advice that Gordon should proceed with the twelve-year-cap option was a strategic decision that was not “manifestly unreasonable,” Pineo, 2006 ME 119, ¶ 13 , 908 A.2d 632 , and it did not “fall[] below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney,” Philbrook, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 7 , 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). [¶18] That the court ultimately imposed a twelve-year unsuspended sentence (after reading the parties’ “exhaustive” sentencing memoranda, listening to their arguments, and conducting a detailed Hewey analysis that involved the weighing of significant aggravating | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bartolo P. Ford v. State of Maine
green
1 sentence2024Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693 (1984); Ford v. State, 2019 ME 47, ¶ 11 , 205 A.3d 896 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Commeau
green
2 sentences2024See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B); Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 19 , 852 A.2d 70 ; Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13 , 782 A.2d 319 . 12 court, we review for obvious error. 2024See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B); Commeau, 2004 ME 78, ¶ 19 , 852 A.2d 70 ; Burdick, 2001 ME 143, ¶ 13 , 782 A.2d 319 . 12 court, we review for obvious error. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Burns
green
2 sentences2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the 2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Basu green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State of Maine v. Brian Nichols
green
2 sentences2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the 2020See, e.g., Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶ 31 , 228 A.3d 1082 (considering “motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct” at the second step); 7 State v. Nichols, 2013 ME 71, ¶ 27 , 72 A.3d 503 (holding that the court may consider “the defendant’s motive” in deciding the continuum of the seriousness of murder at the first step (quoting State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 38 , 837 A.2d 101 )); State v. Burns, 2011 ME 92, ¶ 13 , 26 A.3d 817 (addressing the motive of greed at the first step); State v. Downs, 2009 ME 3, ¶ 20 , 962 A.2d 950 (discussing at step one the motive to reoffend against the | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State of Maine v. Andrew J. Freeman green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Stanislaw green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Downs green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.