prima facie CEPA claim in New Jersey

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2025The inquiry does not end once the employer satisfies this burden, however, as "plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the employer's proffered reasons were a pretext for the discriminatory action taken by the employer." Id. 1 Whether plaintiff established a prima facie CEPA claim was argued only at the trial level, as the parties' appellate briefs exclusively addressed the burden - shifting stage of the litigation because this was the premise of the trial court's reconsideration decision on appeal.

2024Where a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence establishing a prima facie CEPA claim under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c), "the burden of persuasion is shifted to the employer to rebut the presumption of [unlawful retaliation] by articulating some legitimate non[-retaliatory] reason for the adverse employment action." Id. at 290-91 (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J.

2026A plaintiff "need not show that his or her employer or another employee actually violated the law or a clear mandate of public policy" id. at 462, or that the conduct is "an actual violation of a law or regulation," Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000).

2026A plaintiff "need not show that his or her employer or another employee actually violated the law or a clear mandate of public policy" id. at 462 , or that the conduct is "an actual violation of a law or regulation," Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000).

2019To demonstrate a prima facie CEPA violation, a plaintiff must establish: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462

2019A-2249-17T2 11 [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462 ); accord Puglia v. Elk Pipel)ine, Inc., 226 N.J. 258, 280 (2016).] "[T]he court decides, as a matter of law, whether or not a plaintiff has carried his or her burden of demonstrating the elements of [a] prima facie case[.]" Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 125 (2008).

2019To demonstrate a prima facie CEPA violation, a plaintiff must establish: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462

2019A-2249-17T2 11 [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462 ); accord Puglia v. Elk Pipel)ine, Inc., 226 N.J. 258, 280 (2016).] "[T]he court decides, as a matter of law, whether or not a plaintiff has carried his or her burden of demonstrating the elements of [a] prima facie case[.]" Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 197 N.J. 81, 125 (2008).

2025Super. at 587 (quoting Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 418 (1999)).

2025Grp., 385 N.J.

2025See Chiofalo, 238 N.J. at 541 ("[E]ither 'the court or the plaintiff' must identify the statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that closely relates to the complained-of conduct" to establish a prima facie CEPA claim (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J at 464)).

2025A-1532-23 15 sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions." Ibid.

2024To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, plaintiff is required to demonstrate: (1) [they] reasonably believed that [their] employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) [they] performed a "whistle-blowing" activity . . . ; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against [them]; and (4) a causal connection exists A-0774-22 12 between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Allen, 246 N.J. at 290 (quoting Dzwonzar, 177 N.J. at 462 ).] "The 'burden shifting analysis under the Law A

2024Super. 474, 492 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Zappasodi v. New Jersey, Dept. of Corrections, 335 N.J.

2022To meet this prong, Gathman was required to demonstrate "evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive." Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J.

2019"Where the employer produces such evidence, the presumption of discrimination disappears." Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 211 (1999) (citing St.

2019Accordingly, even if plaintiff had established a prima facie CEPA claim, Bally's "articulate[d] some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 550 (1990) (citations omitted).

2018Turning to the termination claim and the facts leading up to it, after recounting the elements of a prima facie CEPA claim, the judge concluded there was "nothing in the case to show any type of causal connection between the whistleblowing activity" and the termination, no specifics "as to what specific whistleblowing activity was 16 A-0190-16T3 related to this specific adverse employment action," and "nothing to show . . . that [plaintiff's] supervisors at the time of the termination were aware of any of these whistleblowing activities." The judge explained that, as a result, "a jury would be

2018Qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. . . ." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

2018Qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. . . ." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 387 (2000) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

2018See, e.g., Hitesman v. Bridgeway, Inc., 218 N.J. 8, 29 (2014) (citations omitted).

2018Turning to the termination claim and the facts leading up to it, after recounting the elements of a prima facie CEPA claim, the judge concluded there was "nothing in the case to show any type of causal connection between the whistleblowing activity" and the termination, no specifics "as to what specific whistleblowing activity was 16 A-0190-16T3 related to this specific adverse employment action," and "nothing to show . . . that [plaintiff's] supervisors at the time of the termination were aware of any of these whistleblowing activities." The judge explained that, as a result, "a jury would be

2017Thus, by the time the trial concluded, approximately seven years had passed. 3 The panel also held that, “[a]lthough plaintiff established a prima facie CEPA claim, the CEPA verdict is so fatally flawed that the judgment must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial on all issues related to plaintiff’s CEPA claim.” 9 Police, 439 N.J.

2017State Police, 439 N.J.Super. 554, 577 , 110 A.3d 934 (App. Div. 2015).