Lamp rule in Pennsylvania

2023Our Supreme Court refined the Lamp rule in Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, 510 Pa. 589 , 511 A.2d 757, 759 (1986), holding that “Lamp requires of plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” In addition, Farinacci clarified that: (1) the plaintiff carries an evidentiary burden of proving that she made a good-faith effort to ensure that notice of the commencement of an action was served on the defendant, McCreesh, supra, 888 A.2d at 672 ; and (2) “[i]n each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court must

2023Our Supreme Court refined the Lamp rule in Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, 510 Pa. 589 , 511 A.2d 757, 759 (1986), holding that “Lamp requires of plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” In addition, Farinacci clarified that: (1) the plaintiff carries an evidentiary burden of proving that she made a good-faith effort to ensure that notice of the commencement of an action was served on the defendant, McCreesh, supra, 888 A.2d at 672 ; and (2) “[i]n each case, where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court must

2023Moreover, the Commonwealth Court determined that the plaintiff’s attempt at service “did not constitute a good faith effort to serve the defendant with process under the Lamp rule because [the plaintiff]’s attempt at service did not comply with relevant rules relating to service of process in Philadelphia County.” Id. (citation omitted).

2023Moreover, the Commonwealth Court determined that the plaintiff’s attempt at service “did not constitute a good faith effort to serve the defendant with process under the Lamp rule because [the plaintiff]’s attempt at service did not comply with relevant rules relating to service of process in Philadelphia County.” Id. (citation omitted).

2021In announcing the Lamp rule, we declared that its “purpose” was to “avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but, by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” Lamp, 366 A.2d at 889 .

2021In announcing the Lamp rule, we declared that its “purpose” was to “avoid the situation in which a plaintiff can bring an action, but, by not making a good-faith effort to notify a defendant, retain exclusive control over it for a period in excess of that permitted by the statute of limitations.” Lamp, 366 A.2d at 889 .

2005We revisited the Lamp rule in Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, 510 Pa. 589 , 511 A.2d 757, 759 (1986), wherein we stated that “Lamp requires of plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” Most recently, we reconsidered the necessary requirements of a “good faith effort to effectuate notice” in our plurality opinion in Witherspoon v. City of Philadelphia, 564 Pa. 388 , 768 A.2d 1079 (2001), wherein the opinion announcing the judgment of the court favored requiring plaintiffs to have process immediately and continually reissued

2005We revisited the Lamp rule in Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, 510 Pa. 589 , 511 A.2d 757, 759 (1986), wherein we stated that “Lamp requires of plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” Most recently, we reconsidered the necessary requirements of a “good faith effort to effectuate notice” in our plurality opinion in Witherspoon v. City of Philadelphia, 564 Pa. 388 , 768 A.2d 1079 (2001), wherein the opinion announcing the judgment of the court favored requiring plaintiffs to have process immediately and continually reissued

2017See McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 672 n.17 (observing that claims could be dismissed where the defendant “had notice of the potential for litigation, [but] it did not have actual notice of the commencement of the litigation within the statute of limitations period.”); see also Englert, 932 A.2d at 127 (stating that “[a]ppellants did not provide [a]ppellees with actual notice of the commencement of the action within the applicable statute of limitations.

2017See McCreesh, 888 A.2d at 672 n.17 (observing that claims could be dismissed where the defendant “had notice of the potential for litigation, [but] it did not have actual notice of the commencement of the litigation within the statute of limitations period.”); see also Englert, 932 A.2d at 127 (stating that “[a]ppellants did not provide [a]ppellees with actual notice of the commencement of the action within the applicable statute of limitations.

2015Co. of N. Am. v. Carnahan, 284 A.2d 728, 729 (Pa. 1971)).

2015Co. of N. Am. v. Carnahan, 284 A.2d 728, 729 (Pa. 1971)).

2005Cf. [Zarlinsky v. Laudenslager, 402 Pa. 290 , 167 A.2d 317, 319 (1961)] ("The [statute of limitations] is without direct bearing on the issue here involved since the plaintiffs filed their praecipe for writ of summons ... within two years of the happening of the accident.

2005Cf. [Zarlinsky v. Laudenslager, 402 Pa. 290 , 167 A.2d 317, 319 (1961)] ("The [statute of limitations] is without direct bearing on the issue here involved since the plaintiffs filed their praecipe for writ of summons ... within two years of the happening of the accident.

2017The McCreesh court rejected the strict approach of cases such as Teamann v. Zafris, 811 A.2d 52 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002), appeal denied, 830 A.2d 976 (Pa. 2003), which required rigid compliance with the Rules in order to satisfy the Lamp test.

2017The McCreesh court rejected the strict approach of cases such as Teamann v. Zafris, 811 A.2d 52 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002), appeal denied, 830 A.2d 976 (Pa. 2003), which required rigid compliance with the Rules in order to satisfy the Lamp test.

2025See nn. 2 & 3, supra. -7- J-A07035-25 the substance of the appeal due to (1) the plaintiff’s failure to file preliminary objections to new matter objecting to the untimeliness of the Lamp objection and (2) the plaintiff’s failure to raise this objection in his response to the defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings: This case is infected with multiple procedural irregularities.

2025See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943 , 972 n.10 (Pa. 2013) (where Commonwealth, as appellee, failed to argue that defendant waived arguments by failing to raise them in trial court in timely manner, Commonwealth “waived the waiver”); Commonwealth v. Dabney, 274 A.3d 1283 , 1292 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2022) (addressing argument raised for first time on appeal because Commonwealth, as appellee, did not argue that defendant waived issue). -9- J-A07035-25 I am constrained to disagree with the rationales advanced by the Majority for finding that Defendants did not waive their Lamp objection.

2019Simple neglect or mistake is an example of failing to fulfill the responsibility of plaintiff or his counsel to see to it that the requirements for service are carried out. 5 Nagy v. Upper Yoder Twp., 652 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (citation and internal quoations omitted) (emphasis added).

2019Simple neglect or mistake is an example of failing to fulfill the responsibility of plaintiff or his counsel to see to it that the requirements for service are carried out. 5 Nagy v. Upper Yoder Twp., 652 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (citation and internal quoations omitted) (emphasis added).

2005McCreesh, 839 A.2d at 1213.

2005McCreesh, 839 A.2d at 1213.

2001As long as the plaintiff files a praecipe for reissuance of the writ within the ‘equivalent period,’ we do not believe that Lamp dictates an additional affirmative duty to pursue service of process if the initial good-faith service attempt is unsuccessful.” Id. at 391.

2001As long as the plaintiff files a praecipe for reissuance of the writ within the ‘equivalent period,’ we do not believe that Lamp dictates an additional affirmative duty to pursue service of process if the initial good-faith service attempt is unsuccessful.” Id. at 391.

1995However, it is not necessary that plaintiff’s conduct constitute some bad faith or overt attempt to delay before the Lamp rule applies; “[s]imple neglect or mistake is an example of failing to fulfill the responsibility on plaintiff or his counsel to see to it that the requirements for service are carried out.” Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa. Super. 446, 454-55 , 460 A.2d 271,275 (1983); Rosenberg v. Nicholson, 408 Pa. Super. 502 , 597 A.2d 145 (1991), allocatur denied, 530 Pa. 633 , 606 A.2d 903 (1992).

1995However, it is not necessary that plaintiff’s conduct constitute some bad faith or overt attempt to delay before the Lamp rule applies; “[s]imple neglect or mistake is an example of failing to fulfill the responsibility on plaintiff or his counsel to see to it that the requirements for service are carried out.” Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa. Super. 446, 454-55 , 460 A.2d 271,275 (1983); Rosenberg v. Nicholson, 408 Pa. Super. 502 , 597 A.2d 145 (1991), allocatur denied, 530 Pa. 633 , 606 A.2d 903 (1992).

1994See Sanders v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 424 Pa.Super. 372 , 622 A.2d 966 (1993); Pannill v. Seahorne, 278 Pa.Super. 562 , 420 A.2d 684 (1980). 5 .

1994See Sanders v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 424 Pa.Super. 372 , 622 A.2d 966 (1993); Pannill v. Seahorne, 278 Pa.Super. 562 , 420 A.2d 684 (1980). 5 .

1980In Delphus v. Kastanek, 267 Pa.Super. 26 , 405 A.2d 1285 (1979), we noted that “in Allegheny County it has long been the established practice that after a writ is issued by the prothonotary, a plaintiff must physically pick it up and cause it to be carried across the street to the Sheriffs office and delivered with written instructions for service together with the statutory fees.” Id., 267 Pa.Super. at 28 , 405 A.2d at 1286 (quotations omitted).

1980In Delphus v. Kastanek, 267 Pa.Super. 26 , 405 A.2d 1285 (1979), we noted that “in Allegheny County it has long been the established practice that after a writ is issued by the prothonotary, a plaintiff must physically pick it up and cause it to be carried across the street to the Sheriffs office and delivered with written instructions for service together with the statutory fees.” Id., 267 Pa.Super. at 28 , 405 A.2d at 1286 (quotations omitted).