Tedder standard in Florida

2018Although not necessary, further supporting our conclusion is the fact that the trial court gave a Tedder instruction, stating that it could reverse the jury recommendation "only if the facts [were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." See Tedder , 322 So.2d at 910 .

2018Although not necessary, further supporting our conclusion is the fact that the trial court gave a Tedder instruction, stating that it could reverse the jury recommendation "only if the facts [were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." See Tedder , 322 So.2d at 910 .

2012In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” “The singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is ‘a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s recommendation of life,’ rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation.” Washington v. State, 907 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla.2005) (quoting Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 283 (Fla.2000)). “[T]he jury’s life recommendation changes the analytical d

2012In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” “The singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is ‘a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s recommendation of life,’ rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation.” Washington v. State, 907 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla.2005) (quoting Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 283 (Fla.2000)). “[T]he jury’s life recommendation changes the analytical d

2005Second, the Court already has addressed the applicability of Keen on collateral review and has held that Keen was “[nothing] more than an application of our long-standing Tedder analysis.” Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 540 (Fla.2001) (“Keen is not a major constitutional change or jurisprudential upheaval of the law as it was espoused in Tedder.

2005Second, the Court already has addressed the applicability of Keen on collateral review and has held that Keen was "[nothing] more than an application of our long-standing Tedder analysis." Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 540 (Fla.2001) (" Keen is not a major constitutional change or jurisprudential upheaval of the law as it was espoused in Tedder.

1996See Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla.1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). [10] In Craig I, we extensively considered and rejected Craig's claim that the Tedder standard had not been met.

1996See Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508, 511 (Fla.1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447 , 104 S.Ct. 3154 , 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). [10] In Craig I, we extensively considered and rejected Craig's claim that the Tedder standard had not been met.

2017See Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So. 2d 1010, 1012-1013 (Fla. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 692 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1997); Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996). -5- The majority has not considered the facts in a light most favorable to the recommendation of the jury, as we are required to do, or acknowledged the unchallenged reasonable basis in the record supporting the jury’s vote as to Anna’s death.

2017See Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So. 2d 1010, 1012-1013 (Fla. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 692 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1997); Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996). -5- The majority has not considered the facts in a light most favorable to the recommendation of the jury, as we are required to do, or acknowledged the unchallenged reasonable basis in the record supporting the jury’s vote as to Anna’s death.

2017See Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So. 2d 1010, 1012-1013 (Fla. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 692 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1997); Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996). -5- The majority has not considered the facts in a light most favorable to the recommendation of the jury, as we are required to do, or acknowledged the unchallenged reasonable basis in the record supporting the jury’s vote as to Anna’s death.

2017See Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So. 2d 1010, 1012-1013 (Fla. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 692 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1997); Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996). -5- The majority has not considered the facts in a light most favorable to the recommendation of the jury, as we are required to do, or acknowledged the unchallenged reasonable basis in the record supporting the jury’s vote as to Anna’s death.

2017See Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So. 2d 1010, 1012-1013 (Fla. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 692 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1997); Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996). -5- The majority has not considered the facts in a light most favorable to the recommendation of the jury, as we are required to do, or acknowledged the unchallenged reasonable basis in the record supporting the jury’s vote as to Anna’s death.

2017See Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 699 So. 2d 1010, 1012-1013 (Fla. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 692 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1997); Boyett v. State, 688 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1996). -5- The majority has not considered the facts in a light most favorable to the recommendation of the jury, as we are required to do, or acknowledged the unchallenged reasonable basis in the record supporting the jury’s vote as to Anna’s death.

2017Similarly, in Strausser v. State, 682 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996), we found that the trial court’s override failed the Tedder standard because “there was vast mitigation to support the jury’s recommendation.” Likewise, we have just recently again reaffirmed this enduring standard in reversing the trial court’s override of the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence in Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997), the latest of a series of recent cases wherein we have consistently reaffirmed Tedder.

2017Similarly, in Strausser v. State, 682 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996), we found that the trial court’s override failed the Tedder standard because “there was vast mitigation to support the jury’s recommendation.” Likewise, we have just recently again reaffirmed this enduring standard in reversing the trial court’s override of the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence in Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997), the latest of a series of recent cases wherein we have consistently reaffirmed Tedder.

2017Similarly, in Strausser v. State, 682 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996), we found that the trial court’s override failed the Tedder standard because “there was vast mitigation to support the jury’s recommendation.” Likewise, we have just recently again reaffirmed this enduring standard in reversing the trial court’s override of the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence in Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997), the latest of a series of recent cases wherein we have consistently reaffirmed Tedder.

2017Similarly, in Strausser v. State, 682 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1996), we found that the trial court’s override failed the Tedder standard because “there was vast mitigation to support the jury’s recommendation.” Likewise, we have just recently again reaffirmed this enduring standard in reversing the trial court’s override of the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence in Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465, 471 (Fla. 1997), the latest of a series of recent cases wherein we have consistently reaffirmed Tedder.

2005Contrary to Justice Harding's assertion in his concurrence, a proper and consistent application of Tedder does not result in our making "new law on a case-by-case basis in order to reach a desired result." Rather, a proper and consistent application of our long-standing Tedder analysis mandates that we reduce Mills' sentence to life in order to fulfill "our responsibility to apply the law uniformly in all cases, regardless of the status of the players or the stakes of the game." It is precisely because this Court has openly acknowledged in Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928, 933 (Fla.1989), that

2001It is precisely because this Court has openly acknowledged in Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928, 933 (Fla.1989), that it did not properly and "uniformly" apply Tedder to Mills and other defendants, that we are urged to correct our mistake now before a life is taken based on that mistake.

2004As we recently emphasized, "[t]he singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is `a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation." Id. (quoting San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 471 (Fla.1998)); see also Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1990) (reiterating that under Tedder , "the trial court's role is solely to determine whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to form a basis upon which reasonable jurors could rely in recommending life imprisonment

2004As we recently emphasized, "[t]he singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is `a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation." Id. (quoting San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 471 (Fla.1998)); see also Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1990) (reiterating that under Tedder , "the trial court's role is solely to determine whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to form a basis upon which reasonable jurors could rely in recommending life imprisonment

2004Cf. Holsworth v. State, 522 So.2d 348, 354 (Fla.1988) (agreeing with the defendant that in overriding the jury's recommendation, the trial judge could not substitute his view of the evidence and the weight to be given it for that of the jury); Parker v. State, 643 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Fla.1994) (rejecting the State's argument that in the context of a Tedder analysis this Court should defer to a trial judge's discretionary decision regarding the weight of mitigation evidence regardless of the jury's recommendation and noting that "[w]hile some persons may disagree with the weight [of the mitigatio

2004Cf. Holsworth v. State, 522 So.2d 348, 354 (Fla.1988) (agreeing with the defendant that in overriding the jury's recommendation, the trial judge could not substitute his view of the evidence and the weight to be given it for that of the jury); Parker v. State, 643 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Fla.1994) (rejecting the State's argument that in the context of a Tedder analysis this Court should defer to a trial judge's discretionary decision regarding the weight of mitigation evidence regardless of the jury's recommendation and noting that "[w]hile some persons may disagree with the weight [of the mitigatio

1990As we elaborated in Ferry v. State, 507 So.2d 1373, 1376 (Fla. 1987), the Tedder standard has been consistently interpreted by this Court to mean that when there is a reasonable basis in the record to support a jury's recommendation of life, an override is improper.

1990As we elaborated in Ferry v. State, 507 So.2d 1373, 1376 (Fla. 1987), the Tedder standard has been consistently interpreted by this Court to mean that when there is a reasonable basis in the record to support a jury's recommendation of life, an override is improper.

2004As we recently emphasized, "[t]he singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is `a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation." Id. (quoting San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 471 (Fla.1998)); see also Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1990) (reiterating that under Tedder , "the trial court's role is solely to determine whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to form a basis upon which reasonable jurors could rely in recommending life imprisonment

2004As we recently emphasized, "[t]he singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is `a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation." Id. (quoting San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 471 (Fla.1998)); see also Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1990) (reiterating that under Tedder , "the trial court's role is solely to determine whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to form a basis upon which reasonable jurors could rely in recommending life imprisonment

1987We have found the Tedder standard was met where "[t]he recommendation of life was not based on any valid mitigating factor discernible from the record." Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d at 1065 .

1987We have found the Tedder standard was met where "[t]he recommendation of life was not based on any valid mitigating factor discernible from the record." Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d at 1065 .

2012In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” “The singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is ‘a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s recommendation of life,’ rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation.” Washington v. State, 907 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla.2005) (quoting Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 283 (Fla.2000)). “[T]he jury’s life recommendation changes the analytical d

2012In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” “The singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is ‘a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury’s recommendation of life,’ rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation.” Washington v. State, 907 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla.2005) (quoting Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 283 (Fla.2000)). “[T]he jury’s life recommendation changes the analytical d

2004Cf. Holsworth v. State, 522 So.2d 348, 354 (Fla.1988) (agreeing with the defendant that in overriding the jury's recommendation, the trial judge could not substitute his view of the evidence and the weight to be given it for that of the jury); Parker v. State, 643 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Fla.1994) (rejecting the State's argument that in the context of a Tedder analysis this Court should defer to a trial judge's discretionary decision regarding the weight of mitigation evidence regardless of the jury's recommendation and noting that "[w]hile some persons may disagree with the weight [of the mitigatio

2004Cf. Holsworth v. State, 522 So.2d 348, 354 (Fla.1988) (agreeing with the defendant that in overriding the jury's recommendation, the trial judge could not substitute his view of the evidence and the weight to be given it for that of the jury); Parker v. State, 643 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Fla.1994) (rejecting the State's argument that in the context of a Tedder analysis this Court should defer to a trial judge's discretionary decision regarding the weight of mitigation evidence regardless of the jury's recommendation and noting that "[w]hile some persons may disagree with the weight [of the mitigatio

2000This was error, because just as a Tedder inquiry has no place in a death recommendation case, see Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1327 (Fla.1997) (rejecting reliance on jury override cases in death recommendation case because such *285 cases "entail[ ] a wholly different legal principle and analysis"); Watts v. State, 593 So.2d 198, 204 (Fla.1992) (same), the reciprocal holds true when a jury life recommendation is independently analyzed by the trial court and independently reviewed by this Court. [21] In other words, the jury's life recommendation changes the analytical dynamic and magnifie

2000This was error, because just as a Tedder inquiry has no place in a death recommendation case, see Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1327 (Fla.1997) (rejecting reliance on jury override cases in death recommendation case because such *285 cases "entail[ ] a wholly different legal principle and analysis"); Watts v. State, 593 So.2d 198, 204 (Fla.1992) (same), the reciprocal holds true when a jury life recommendation is independently analyzed by the trial court and independently reviewed by this Court. [21] In other words, the jury's life recommendation changes the analytical dynamic and magnifie

2000Stevens v. State, 613 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1992); see also Parker, 643 So.2d at 1035 (repeating the admonition that "[a]lthough we have made it clear many times before, we wish to leave no doubt that Tedder is indeed the law of this State, law that this Court has applied scores of times since 1975 `and consistently reaffirmed since then'"). [22] Indeed, Shapiro testified that Keen told him to meet Keen and his wife at Tug Boat Annie's, so he could join them on their sea voyage and serve as a witness to Anita's "accident" for double indemnity purposes.

2000Stevens v. State, 613 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1992); see also Parker, 643 So.2d at 1035 (repeating the admonition that "[a]lthough we have made it clear many times before, we wish to leave no doubt that Tedder is indeed the law of this State, law that this Court has applied scores of times since 1975 `and consistently reaffirmed since then'"). [22] Indeed, Shapiro testified that Keen told him to meet Keen and his wife at Tug Boat Annie's, so he could join them on their sea voyage and serve as a witness to Anita's "accident" for double indemnity purposes.

2000This was error, because just as a Tedder inquiry has no place in a death recommendation case, see Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1327 (Fla.1997) (rejecting reliance on jury override cases in death recommendation case because such *285 cases "entail[ ] a wholly different legal principle and analysis"); Watts v. State, 593 So.2d 198, 204 (Fla.1992) (same), the reciprocal holds true when a jury life recommendation is independently analyzed by the trial court and independently reviewed by this Court. [21] In other words, the jury's life recommendation changes the analytical dynamic and magnifie

2000This was error, because just as a Tedder inquiry has no place in a death recommendation case, see Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1327 (Fla.1997) (rejecting reliance on jury override cases in death recommendation case because such *285 cases "entail[ ] a wholly different legal principle and analysis"); Watts v. State, 593 So.2d 198, 204 (Fla.1992) (same), the reciprocal holds true when a jury life recommendation is independently analyzed by the trial court and independently reviewed by this Court. [21] In other words, the jury's life recommendation changes the analytical dynamic and magnifie

2000Keen also accurately interprets our reasoning in Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 143 (Fla.1986), as applying to a co-actor "guilty of the same offense rather than having the exact same degree of participation in the crime." Appellant's Initial Brief at 84.

2000Keen also accurately interprets our reasoning in Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 143 (Fla.1986), as applying to a co-actor "guilty of the same offense rather than having the exact same degree of participation in the crime." Appellant's Initial Brief at 84.