29 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1993–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gophergreen2 sentences2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in 2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in | 9 | 12 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. 2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Thomas, 2008 MT 206, ¶ 10 , 344 Mont. 150 , 186 P.3d 864 ; State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 12 , 291 Mont. 77 , 966 P.2d 137 ; Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192 , 631 P.2d at 295 ; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 , 101 S. Ct. at 695 .3 Whether an officer had sufficient 2 See also §§ 46-5-401(1) and -403, MCA (authorizing temporary investigative stops based on particularized suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Bar-Jonah, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 42 , 324 Mont. 278 , 102 P.3d 1229 (noting Montana codification of constitutional principles). 3 Based on additional information developed incident to a lawf 2020See State v. Thomas, 2008 MT 206, ¶ 10 , 344 Mont. 150 , 186 P.3d 864 ; State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 12 , 291 Mont. 77 , 966 P.2d 137 ; Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192 , 631 P.2d at 295 ; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 , 101 S. Ct. at 695 .3 Whether an officer had sufficient 2 See also §§ 46-5-401(1) and -403, MCA (authorizing temporary investigative stops based on particularized suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Bar-Jonah, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 42 , 324 Mont. 278 , 102 P.3d 1229 (noting Montana codification of constitutional principles). 3 Based on additional information developed incident to a lawf | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The State must satisfy the particularized suspicion requirement by showing that the police officer had “(1) objective data and articulable facts from which an experienced officer can make certain inferences, and (2) a resulting suspicion that the occupant of [the] vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing . . . .” State v. Larson, 2010 MT 236, ¶ 19 , 358 Mont. 156 , 243 P.3d 1130 (citing Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, ¶ 20 , 349 Mont. 408 , 203 P.3d 842 ). 2017The State must satisfy the particularized suspicion requirement by showing that the police officer had “(1) objective data and articulable facts from which an experienced officer can make certain inferences, and (2) a resulting suspicion that the occupant of [the] vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing . . . .” State v. Larson, 2010 MT 236, ¶ 19 , 358 Mont. 156 , 243 P.3d 1130 (citing Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, ¶ 20 , 349 Mont. 408 , 203 P.3d 842 ). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in 2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in | 1 | 2 |
State v. Reynoldsgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in 2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. | 1 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. 2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gravesgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in 2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in | 1 | 1 |
Harbour Village Apts. v. City of Mukilteogreen1 sentence2024See State v. Anderson, 258 Mont. 510, 514-15 , 853 P.2d 1245, 1247-48 (1993) (noting 1991 amendment of § 46-5-401, MCA, “to reflect the particularized suspicion standard set forth in [State v.] Gopher”); Reynolds, 272 Mont. at 49 , 989 P.2d at 542 (noting 1991 amendment to § 46-5-401, MCA, “to be consistent with United States Supreme Court and Montana case law”); Commission Comments to § 46-5-401(1), MCA (1991) (noting that the 1991 amendments more closely “reflect” our holding in Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192-94 , 631 P.2d at 295-96 (recognizing temporary investigative stop exception enunciated in | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murraygreen2 sentences2017Section 61-8-341(1), MCA, mandates that vehicles entering highways “shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles that are approaching close enough on the through highway to constitute an immediate hazard.” “Observation of a traffic offense is sufficient to establish a particularized suspicion.” State v. Loney, 2004 MT 204, ¶ 16 , 322 Mont. 305 , 95 P.3d 691 ; accord State v. Murray, 2011 MT 10, ¶ 14 , 359 Mont. 123 , 247 P.3d 721 (“[O]bservation of a traffic offense more than satisfies the particularized suspicion requirement.”). ¶5 “A court’s determination that particularized suspicion exis 2017Section 61-8-341(1), MCA, mandates that vehicles entering highways “shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles that are approaching close enough on the through highway to constitute an immediate hazard.” “Observation of a traffic offense is sufficient to establish a particularized suspicion.” State v. Loney, 2004 MT 204, ¶ 16 , 322 Mont. 305 , 95 P.3d 691 ; accord State v. Murray, 2011 MT 10, ¶ 14 , 359 Mont. 123 , 247 P.3d 721 (“[O]bservation of a traffic offense more than satisfies the particularized suspicion requirement.”). ¶5 “A court’s determination that particularized suspicion exis | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wagnergreen2 sentences2017Section 61-8-341(1), MCA, mandates that vehicles entering highways “shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles that are approaching close enough on the through highway to constitute an immediate hazard.” “Observation of a traffic offense is sufficient to establish a particularized suspicion.” State v. Loney, 2004 MT 204, ¶ 16 , 322 Mont. 305 , 95 P.3d 691 ; accord State v. Murray, 2011 MT 10, ¶ 14 , 359 Mont. 123 , 247 P.3d 721 (“[O]bservation of a traffic offense more than satisfies the particularized suspicion requirement.”). ¶5 “A court’s determination that particularized suspicion exis 2017Section 61-8-341(1), MCA, mandates that vehicles entering highways “shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles that are approaching close enough on the through highway to constitute an immediate hazard.” “Observation of a traffic offense is sufficient to establish a particularized suspicion.” State v. Loney, 2004 MT 204, ¶ 16 , 322 Mont. 305 , 95 P.3d 691 ; accord State v. Murray, 2011 MT 10, ¶ 14 , 359 Mont. 123 , 247 P.3d 721 (“[O]bservation of a traffic offense more than satisfies the particularized suspicion requirement.”). ¶5 “A court’s determination that particularized suspicion exis | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schatzgreen2 sentences2009Gopher, 193 Mont. at 194 , 631 P.2d at 296 (emphasis added). *414 ¶17 Shortly after Gopher was decided, this Court decided State v. Schatz, 194 Mont. 59 , 634 P.2d 1193 (1981), wherein we acknowledged that Gopher adopted the two-part particularized suspicion test from Cortez . 2009Gopher, 193 Mont. at 194 , 631 P.2d at 296 (emphasis added). *414 ¶17 Shortly after Gopher was decided, this Court decided State v. Schatz, 194 Mont. 59 , 634 P.2d 1193 (1981), wherein we acknowledged that Gopher adopted the two-part particularized suspicion test from Cortez . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Morsettegreen2 sentences2009In applying the facts in Schatz to that test, we pointed out that the officer involved in Schatz was “a veteran of 9 years of experience,” and we concluded that “[u]nder the test adopted in [Gopher], this experienced law enforcement officer had a ‘particularized suspicion’ sufficient to effectuate a lawful arrest.” Schatz, 194 Mont. at 62 , 634 P.2d at 1195 (emphasis added). ¶18 The following year, this Court stretched the use of the term “experienced” officer even further in State v. Morsette, 201 Mont. 233, 240 , 654 P.2d 503, 507 (1982). 2009In applying the facts in Schatz to that test, we pointed out that the officer involved in Schatz was “a veteran of 9 years of experience,” and we concluded that “[u]nder the test adopted in [Gopher], this experienced law enforcement officer had a ‘particularized suspicion’ sufficient to effectuate a lawful arrest.” Schatz, 194 Mont. at 62 , 634 P.2d at 1195 (emphasis added). ¶18 The following year, this Court stretched the use of the term “experienced” officer even further in State v. Morsette, 201 Mont. 233, 240 , 654 P.2d 503, 507 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Hulse v. State, Department of Justicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rutherford
green
2 sentences2011Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, ¶ 20 , 349 Mont. 408 , 203 P.3d 842 . ‘Whether particularized suspicion exists is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances and requires consideration of the quantity or content of the information available to the officer and the quality or degree of *187 reliability of that information.” City of Missoula v. Moore, 2011 MT 61, ¶ 16 , 360 Mont. 22 , 251 P.3d 679 (citing State v. Rutherford, 2009 MT 154, ¶ 12 , 350 Mont. 403 , 208 P.3d 389 ). ¶63 We pointed out in Flynn that when we first adopted the particularized suspicion standard for vehicular stops, we re 2011Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, ¶ 20 , 349 Mont. 408 , 203 P.3d 842 . ‘Whether particularized suspicion exists is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances and requires consideration of the quantity or content of the information available to the officer and the quality or degree of *187 reliability of that information.” City of Missoula v. Moore, 2011 MT 61, ¶ 16 , 360 Mont. 22 , 251 P.3d 679 (citing State v. Rutherford, 2009 MT 154, ¶ 12 , 350 Mont. 403 , 208 P.3d 389 ). ¶63 We pointed out in Flynn that when we first adopted the particularized suspicion standard for vehicular stops, we re | 3 | 2011–2011 |
City of Missoula v. Moore
neutral
2 sentences2011Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, ¶ 20 , 349 Mont. 408 , 203 P.3d 842 . ‘Whether particularized suspicion exists is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances and requires consideration of the quantity or content of the information available to the officer and the quality or degree of *187 reliability of that information.” City of Missoula v. Moore, 2011 MT 61, ¶ 16 , 360 Mont. 22 , 251 P.3d 679 (citing State v. Rutherford, 2009 MT 154, ¶ 12 , 350 Mont. 403 , 208 P.3d 389 ). ¶63 We pointed out in Flynn that when we first adopted the particularized suspicion standard for vehicular stops, we re 2011Brown v. State, 2009 MT 64, ¶ 20 , 349 Mont. 408 , 203 P.3d 842 . ‘Whether particularized suspicion exists is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances and requires consideration of the quantity or content of the information available to the officer and the quality or degree of *187 reliability of that information.” City of Missoula v. Moore, 2011 MT 61, ¶ 16 , 360 Mont. 22 , 251 P.3d 679 (citing State v. Rutherford, 2009 MT 154, ¶ 12 , 350 Mont. 403 , 208 P.3d 389 ). ¶63 We pointed out in Flynn that when we first adopted the particularized suspicion standard for vehicular stops, we re | 3 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Thomas, 2008 MT 206, ¶ 10 , 344 Mont. 150 , 186 P.3d 864 ; State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 12 , 291 Mont. 77 , 966 P.2d 137 ; Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192 , 631 P.2d at 295 ; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 , 101 S. Ct. at 695 .3 Whether an officer had sufficient 2 See also §§ 46-5-401(1) and -403, MCA (authorizing temporary investigative stops based on particularized suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Bar-Jonah, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 42 , 324 Mont. 278 , 102 P.3d 1229 (noting Montana codification of constitutional principles). 3 Based on additional information developed incident to a lawf 2020See State v. Thomas, 2008 MT 206, ¶ 10 , 344 Mont. 150 , 186 P.3d 864 ; State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 12 , 291 Mont. 77 , 966 P.2d 137 ; Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192 , 631 P.2d at 295 ; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 , 101 S. Ct. at 695 .3 Whether an officer had sufficient 2 See also §§ 46-5-401(1) and -403, MCA (authorizing temporary investigative stops based on particularized suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Bar-Jonah, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 42 , 324 Mont. 278 , 102 P.3d 1229 (noting Montana codification of constitutional principles). 3 Based on additional information developed incident to a lawf | 2 | 2017–2020 |
State v. Larson
green
2 sentences2018The State must satisfy the particularized suspicion requirement by showing that the police officer had “(1) objective data and articulable facts from which an experienced officer can make certain inferences, and (2) a resulting suspicion that the occupant of [the] vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing . . . .” State v. Larson, 2010 MT 236, ¶ 19 , 358 Mont. 156 , 243 P.3d 1130 . 2018The State must satisfy the particularized suspicion requirement by showing that the police officer had “(1) objective data and articulable facts from which an experienced officer can make certain inferences, and (2) a resulting suspicion that the occupant of [the] vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing . . . .” State v. Larson, 2010 MT 236, ¶ 19 , 358 Mont. 156 , 243 P.3d 1130 . | 2 | 2017–2018 |
State v. Flynn
green
2 sentences2017However, “a defendant’s subsequent, valid explanation for conduct that objectively appeared suspicious ... cannot affect the validity of a stop properly based on particularized suspicion.” State v. Flynn, 2011 MT 48, ¶ 11 , 359 Mont. 376 , 251 P.3d 143 . ¶20 The District Court properly applied a particularized suspicion standard to conduct a canine search. 2017However, “a defendant’s subsequent, valid explanation for conduct that objectively appeared suspicious ... cannot affect the validity of a stop properly based on particularized suspicion.” State v. Flynn, 2011 MT 48, ¶ 11 , 359 Mont. 376 , 251 P.3d 143 . ¶20 The District Court properly applied a particularized suspicion standard to conduct a canine search. | 2 | 2015–2017 |
State v. Coates
green
2 sentences2008“In Bullock and Siegal, we validated the long-standing notion throughout this country, but especially in Montana, that a person’s residence and his homestead are secure from unwarranted government intrusion, be it by physical or technological means.” Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 48 , 950 P.2d at 726 . 2008“In Bullock and Siegal , we validated the long-standing notion throughout this country, but especially in Montana, that a person’s residence and his homestead are secure from unwarranted government intrusion, be it by physical or technological means.” Scheetz, 286 Mont, at 48 , 950 P.2d at 726 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Scheetz
green
2 sentences2008“In Bullock and Siegal, we validated the long-standing notion throughout this country, but especially in Montana, that a person’s residence and his homestead are secure from unwarranted government intrusion, be it by physical or technological means.” Scheetz, 286 Mont. at 48 , 950 P.2d at 726 . 2008“In Bullock and Siegal , we validated the long-standing notion throughout this country, but especially in Montana, that a person’s residence and his homestead are secure from unwarranted government intrusion, be it by physical or technological means.” Scheetz, 286 Mont, at 48 , 950 P.2d at 726 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Hart
green
2 sentences2008In essence, the argument is that the State’s intrusion into the Defendants’ privacy expectations by the electronic monitoring and recording of their conversations was minimal and, therefore, did not rise to a level of requiring probable cause. ¶48 We observe at the outset that the State relies on 1993 Chevrolet Pickup and State v. Hart, 2004 MT 51 , 320 Mont. 154 , 85 P.3d 1275 , in support of applying a particularized suspicion standard to justify the searches of the conversations in the present cases. 2008In essence, the argument is that the State’s intrusion into the Defendants’ privacy expectations by the electronic monitoring and recording of their conversations was minimal and, therefore, did not rise to a level of requiring probable cause. ¶48 We observe at the outset that the State relies on 1993 Chevrolet Pickup and State v. Hart, 2004 MT 51 , 320 Mont. 154 , 85 P.3d 1275 , in support of applying a particularized suspicion standard to justify the searches of the conversations in the present cases. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Florida v. Royer
green
2 sentences2024Section 46-5-403, MCA (1991-2019) (investigative “stop authorized by” § 46-5-401, MCA, “may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop”), is similarly an essential codification of the related Terry stop scope and duration 27 Comments of Commission on Criminal Procedure §§ 20.01-.03 (Jan. 10, 1989), File No. 88-559, Montana Supreme Court. 30 limitations recognized in Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-20 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ; and progeny. 2024Section 46-5-403, MCA (1991-2019) (investigative “stop authorized by” § 46-5-401, MCA, “may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop”), is similarly an essential codification of the related Terry stop scope and duration 27 Comments of Commission on Criminal Procedure §§ 20.01-.03 (Jan. 10, 1989), File No. 88-559, Montana Supreme Court. 30 limitations recognized in Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S. Ct. at 1325-26 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-20 , 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79 ; and progeny. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Roberts
green
2 sentences2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. 2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Elison
green
2 sentences2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. 2020State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 15 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 ; State v. Roberts, 1999 MT 59, ¶ 12 , 293 Mont. 476 , 977 P.2d 974 ; State v. Reynolds, 272 Mont. 46, 49-50 , 899 P.2d 540, 542 (1995); State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 193-94 , 631 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S. Ct. 690, 694-95 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877-79 (1968).2 The particularized suspicion standard does not require that an officer be certain, or even ultimately correct, that a person was in fact engaged in the suspected crirninal activity. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Bar-Jonah
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Thomas, 2008 MT 206, ¶ 10 , 344 Mont. 150 , 186 P.3d 864 ; State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 12 , 291 Mont. 77 , 966 P.2d 137 ; Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192 , 631 P.2d at 295 ; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 , 101 S. Ct. at 695 .3 Whether an officer had sufficient 2 See also §§ 46-5-401(1) and -403, MCA (authorizing temporary investigative stops based on particularized suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Bar-Jonah, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 42 , 324 Mont. 278 , 102 P.3d 1229 (noting Montana codification of constitutional principles). 3 Based on additional information developed incident to a lawf 2020See State v. Thomas, 2008 MT 206, ¶ 10 , 344 Mont. 150 , 186 P.3d 864 ; State v. Henderson, 1998 MT 233, ¶ 12 , 291 Mont. 77 , 966 P.2d 137 ; Gopher, 193 Mont. at 192 , 631 P.2d at 295 ; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 , 101 S. Ct. at 695 .3 Whether an officer had sufficient 2 See also §§ 46-5-401(1) and -403, MCA (authorizing temporary investigative stops based on particularized suspicion of criminal activity); State v. Bar-Jonah, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 42 , 324 Mont. 278 , 102 P.3d 1229 (noting Montana codification of constitutional principles). 3 Based on additional information developed incident to a lawf | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Loney
green
2 sentences2017Section 61-8-341(1), MCA, mandates that vehicles entering highways “shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles that are approaching close enough on the through highway to constitute an immediate hazard.” “Observation of a traffic offense is sufficient to establish a particularized suspicion.” State v. Loney, 2004 MT 204, ¶ 16 , 322 Mont. 305 , 95 P.3d 691 ; accord State v. Murray, 2011 MT 10, ¶ 14 , 359 Mont. 123 , 247 P.3d 721 (“[O]bservation of a traffic offense more than satisfies the particularized suspicion requirement.”). ¶5 “A court’s determination that particularized suspicion exis 2017Section 61-8-341(1), MCA, mandates that vehicles entering highways “shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles that are approaching close enough on the through highway to constitute an immediate hazard.” “Observation of a traffic offense is sufficient to establish a particularized suspicion.” State v. Loney, 2004 MT 204, ¶ 16 , 322 Mont. 305 , 95 P.3d 691 ; accord State v. Murray, 2011 MT 10, ¶ 14 , 359 Mont. 123 , 247 P.3d 721 (“[O]bservation of a traffic offense more than satisfies the particularized suspicion requirement.”). ¶5 “A court’s determination that particularized suspicion exis | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Case
green
2 sentences2017The District Court properly concluded that the “observations made by Trooper Fetterhoff gave rise to reasonable and articulable facts regarding his particularized suspicion that Estes was engaged in criminal activity.” The District Court did not err or abuse its discretion. ¶21 Next, Estes argues that Trooper Fetterhoff unconstitutionally extended the stop by detaining Estes after he told Estes he was “good to go.” “A person has been seized for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment only if a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.” State v. Case, 2007 MT 161, 2017The District Court properly concluded that the “observations made by Trooper Fetterhoff gave rise to reasonable and articulable facts regarding his particularized suspicion that Estes was engaged in criminal activity.” The District Court did not err or abuse its discretion. ¶21 Next, Estes argues that Trooper Fetterhoff unconstitutionally extended the stop by detaining Estes after he told Estes he was “good to go.” “A person has been seized for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment only if a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.” State v. Case, 2007 MT 161, | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re the License Suspension of Cybulski
green
2 sentences2011Loney , ¶ 16; In re License Suspension of Cybulski, 2008 MT 128, ¶ 26 , 343 Mont. 56 , 183 P.3d 39 . 2011Loney , ¶ 16; In re License Suspension of Cybulski, 2008 MT 128, ¶ 26 , 343 Mont. 56 , 183 P.3d 39 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Clark
neutral
2 sentences2011State v. Clark, 2009 MT 327, ¶ 13 , 353 Mont. 1 , 218 P.3d 483 . ¶12 When this Court first adopted the particularized suspicion standard for vehicular stops, it properly recognized that the inquiry turned on what the officer knew, observed, inferred and ultimately suspected. 2011State v. Clark, 2009 MT 327, ¶ 13 , 353 Mont. 1 , 218 P.3d 483 . ¶12 When this Court first adopted the particularized suspicion standard for vehicular stops, it properly recognized that the inquiry turned on what the officer knew, observed, inferred and ultimately suspected. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Richard Clawson
green
2 sentences2011The particularized suspicion inquiry is a fact based assessment of the objective quantity, content and reliability of information “available to the officer.” State v. Clawson, 2009 MT 228, ¶ 11 , 351 Mont. 354 , 212 P.3d 1056 (emphasis added). 2011The particularized suspicion inquiry is a fact based assessment of the objective quantity, content and reliability of information “available to the officer.” State v. Clawson, 2009 MT 228, ¶ 11 , 351 Mont. 354 , 212 P.3d 1056 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Rader neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Fisher green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Jarman green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Farabee green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Gilder green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Broken Rope green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Lee green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Grinde v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.