post-sentence hearing in Pennsylvania

2020Furthermore, we disagree with the Commonwealth’s argument that the post-sentence standard applied pursuant to Commonwealth v. Muntz, 630 A.2d 51 (Pa. Super. 1995).

2020On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s application of the post-sentence standard to the motion to withdraw, concluding “the vacating of sentence by this Court does not magically transform [the defendant’s] post-sentence request to withdraw his guilty plea into a pre-sentence request.” Id. at 54 n.6.

2022The trial court, citing Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337 (Pa. Super. 2014), believed that the post-sentence standard applied here because the defendant’s plea bargain included a negotiated sentence, thus giving the defendant foreknowledge of what his sentence would be.

2022The trial court, citing Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337 (Pa. Super. 2014), believed that the post-sentence standard applied here because the defendant’s plea bargain included a negotiated sentence, thus giving the defendant foreknowledge of what his sentence would be.

2025This Court has held that “a claim of excessiveness of sentence does not raise a substantial question so as to permit appellate review where the sentence is within the statutory limits.” Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2025Accordingly, the trial court conducted a colloquy pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988) (requiring trial court to make determination that defendant's waiver of right to counsel is knowing, intelligent and voluntary), and, afterward, permitted Appellant to proceed with the post-sentence hearing pro se.

2025Accordingly, the trial court conducted a colloquy pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988) (requiring trial court to make determination that defendant's waiver of right to counsel is knowing, intelligent and voluntary), and, afterward, permitted Appellant to proceed with the post-sentence hearing pro se.

2025Appellant then compares his sentence to the term of 18 to 90 years’ incarceration that this Court found to be an abuse of discretion in Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011).

2023Finally, we agree with the trial court that Commonwealth v. Mola, 838 A.2d 791 (Pa. Super. 2003) — on which Appellant relied in his post-sentence motion and on appeal — is distinguishable.

2017In doing so, we noted that Townsend’s counsel testified, at the post-sentence hearing, 9 that (1) she did not believe there was enough medical evidence to support a guilty but mentally ill finding; and (2) she discussed the option of pleading guilty but mentally ill with Townsend more than once. 747 A.2d at 383 .

2016The Commonwealth notes that Prendes applied the rationale outlined in Commonwealth v. Lesko, 467 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1983), in holding that because the defendant’s “plea agreement included a negotiated sentence[, t]he trial court accepted the guilty plea with the negotiated sentence[, and thus the defendant] was fully aware of the sentence he would receive, the ‘manifest injustice’ standard applied.” Prendes, 97 A.3d at 354 .

2016J-S64008-16 Because our Supreme Court did not overrule Lesko or Prendes in Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 2015) or in any subsequent decision, Prendes remains good law upon which the Commonwealth may properly rely for the proposition that the higher post- sentence standard of “manifest injustice” is applicable herein, in light of the fact Appellant had entered into a negotiated guilty plea. -2- J-S64008-16 -3-

2014She was dragged through her own blood making it look to all as if her love and care was never of any value ...” .Although a post-sentence hearing was held, I do not believe that permitting Appellant to raise the same ineffectiveness claims in a PCRA petition will improperly "afford [him] the right to two collateral attacks.” Holmes , -Pa. at-, 79 A.3d at 575 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 320 n. 22, 961 A.2d 119 , 148 n. 22 (2008)).

2014She was dragged through her own blood making it look to all as if her love and care was never of any value ...” .Although a post-sentence hearing was held, I do not believe that permitting Appellant to raise the same ineffectiveness claims in a PCRA petition will improperly "afford [him] the right to two collateral attacks.” Holmes , -Pa. at-, 79 A.3d at 575 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 320 n. 22, 961 A.2d 119 , 148 n. 22 (2008)).

2014She was dragged through her own blood making it look to all as if her love and care was never of any value ...” .Although a post-sentence hearing was held, I do not believe that permitting Appellant to raise the same ineffectiveness claims in a PCRA petition will improperly "afford [him] the right to two collateral attacks.” Holmes , -Pa. at-, 79 A.3d at 575 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 320 n. 22, 961 A.2d 119 , 148 n. 22 (2008)).

2010“Counsel is not ineffective where counsel’s decision to not call defendant was reasonable, e.g., where defendant could be impeached with his prior record of offenses crimen falsi.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 17 Here, the record reflects that, at the post-sentence hearing, trial counsel testified that he advised Appellant of his right to testify but explained that the Commonwealth would then seek to admit evidence of Appellant’s prior crimen falsi.

2003NOTES [1] 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501. [2] 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301. [3] 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123. [4] 18 Pa.C.S. § 5510. [5] All appeals in cases where the death penalty has been imposed are reviewed directly by this court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(1). [6] As examples of the other evidence of mitigation, the verdict slip stated that Appellant was an abused child, Appellant used alcohol prior to the offense, and that Appellant was diagnosed as a pedophile. [7] As noted infra at 69 and 71, we will not address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were not preserved below, presented at the evidentiary hearing an

2003NOTES [1] 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501. [2] 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301. [3] 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123. [4] 18 Pa.C.S. § 5510. [5] All appeals in cases where the death penalty has been imposed are reviewed directly by this court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(1). [6] As examples of the other evidence of mitigation, the verdict slip stated that Appellant was an abused child, Appellant used alcohol prior to the offense, and that Appellant was diagnosed as a pedophile. [7] As noted infra at 69 and 71, we will not address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that were not preserved below, presented at the evidentiary hearing an

2003Id. at 424 , 106 A.2d at 826-27 . ¶20 At the post-sentence hearing on this ineffectiveness claim, trial counsel testified that he did not believe a Kloiber instruction was warranted in this case.

2003Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 759 A.2d 932, 934 (Pa.Super.2000) (relying on Commonwealth v. Valderrama, 479 Pa. 500 , 388 A.2d 1042 (1978)). ¶ 11 The evidence offered by Rivers would be useful only as impeachment evidence and, on that basis, does not constitute after discovered evidence warranting the grant of a new trial.

2003Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 759 A.2d 932, 934 (Pa.Super.2000) (relying on Commonwealth v. Valderrama, 479 Pa. 500 , 388 A.2d 1042 (1978)). ¶ 11 The evidence offered by Rivers would be useful only as impeachment evidence and, on that basis, does not constitute after discovered evidence warranting the grant of a new trial.

2003Id. at 424 , 106 A.2d at 826-27 . ¶20 At the post-sentence hearing on this ineffectiveness claim, trial counsel testified that he did not believe a Kloiber instruction was warranted in this case.

1999Id. ¶ 20 Trial counsel testified at the post sentence hearing .that he had a number of phone conversations with Mrs. Barger.

1990Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551 , 475 A.2d 1303 (1984).

1990Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551 , 475 A.2d 1303 (1984).