28 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fowler v. Stategreen2 sentences1992Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are ‘clearly erroneous,’ the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.]” Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 257 (3), 258 ( 271 SE2d 168 ). 1992Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are ‘clearly erroneous,’ the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal. [Cit.]” Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 257 (3), 258 ( 271 SE2d 168 ). | 2 | 2 |
Cofield v. Stategreen2 sentences1986See Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 106 (4), 109 ( 274 SE2d 530 ); Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 405 (1), 406 ( 330 SE2d 686 ). 1986See Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 106 (4), 109 ( 274 SE2d 530 ); Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 405 (1), 406 ( 330 SE2d 686 ). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are “clearly erroneous,” the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal. [Cits.] Jones v. State, 285 Ga. 328, 329 (2) ( 676 SE2d 225 ) (2009). 2013Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are “clearly erroneous,” the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal. [Cits.] Jones v. State, 285 Ga. 328, 329 (2) ( 676 SE2d 225 ) (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Mungin, supra. See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements affirmed where defendant’s testimony at Jackson-Denno hearing that he had confessed because the police threatened to arrest his wife and to have DFCS take his daughter was contradicted by two police detectives who testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them). 2012See Mungin, supra. See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements affirmed where defendant’s testimony at Jackson-Denno hearing that he had confessed because the police threatened to arrest his wife and to have DFCS take his daughter was contradicted by two police detectives who testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them). | 1 | 1 |
Hester v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 437 (2) ( 651 SE2d 538 ) (2007) (trial court authorized to find that defendant freely and voluntarily gave statement after having knowingly waived Miranda rights, where no evidence of alleged threats to defendant was offered at JacksonDenno hearing). 2012Hester v. State, 287 Ga. App. 434, 437 (2) ( 651 SE2d 538 ) (2007) (trial court authorized to find that defendant freely and voluntarily gave statement after having knowingly waived Miranda rights, where no evidence of alleged threats to defendant was offered at JacksonDenno hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Mungin v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Mungin, supra. See generally Hester, supra; cf. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 43-44 (2) ( 625 SE2d 411 ) (2005) (trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress his custodial statements affirmed where defendant’s testimony at Jackson-Denno hearing that he had confessed because the police threatened to arrest his wife and to have DFCS take his daughter was contradicted by two police detectives who testified that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and waived them). | 1 | 1 |
SOSNIAK v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 280 ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010). 2011See Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 280 ( 695 SE2d 604 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Jack v. Stategreen2 sentences2007“Atrial court’s findings of fact and credibility following a JacksonDenno hearing must be accepted by an appellate court unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) Jack v. State, 245 Ga. App. 216, 219 (5) ( 536 SE2d 235 ) (2000). 2007“Atrial court’s findings of fact and credibility following a JacksonDenno hearing must be accepted by an appellate court unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted.) Jack v. State, 245 Ga. App. 216, 219 (5) ( 536 SE2d 235 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Underwood v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Underwood v. State, 218 Ga. App. 530, 533 (2) ( 462 SE2d 434 ) (1995). 1999See Underwood v. State, 218 Ga. App. 530, 533 (2) ( 462 SE2d 434 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Norman v. Stategreen2 sentences1998In order to preserve an objection upon a specific ground for appeal, “the objection must be made at trial upon the specific ground.” (Punctuation omitted.) Norman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 333, 334 (2) ( 398 SE2d 395 ) (1990). 1998In order to preserve an objection upon a specific ground for appeal, “the objection must be made at trial upon the specific ground.” (Punctuation omitted.) Norman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 333, 334 (2) ( 398 SE2d 395 ) (1990). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walkergreen2 sentences1998Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous, the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Walker, 204 Ga. App. 1, 2 ( 418 SE2d 384 ) (1992). 1998Unless the factual and credibility findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous, the trial court’s decision on admissibility will be upheld on appeal.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Walker, 204 Ga. App. 1, 2 ( 418 SE2d 384 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Thus, even assuming trial counsel’s performance was deficient (which we do not find), appellant has failed to show that a reasonable probability exists that such a deficient performance would have prejudiced his defense, as required by the second prong of Strickland, supra. Additionally, the trial court found that “the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving that [his trial counsel] was ineffective and but for [counsel’s] alleged deficiencies the defendant would have been acquitted.” These findings must be upheld unless erroneous (Harris v. State, 268 Ga. 412, 413 ( 490 SE2d 96 )), whi 1998Thus, even assuming trial counsel’s performance was deficient (which we do not find), appellant has failed to show that a reasonable probability exists that such a deficient performance would have prejudiced his defense, as required by the second prong of Strickland, supra. Additionally, the trial court found that “the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving that [his trial counsel] was ineffective and but for [counsel’s] alleged deficiencies the defendant would have been acquitted.” These findings must be upheld unless erroneous (Harris v. State, 268 Ga. 412, 413 ( 490 SE2d 96 )), whi | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1993Smith v. State, 258 Ga. 676, 678-679 ( 373 SE2d 200 ) (1988). 3. 1993Smith v. State, 258 Ga. 676, 678-679 ( 373 SE2d 200 ) (1988). 3. | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Following a JacksonDenno hearing, the trial court ruled that only those portions of the second statement testified to during the preliminary hearing (and *848 hence reflected in the transcript) might be admitted into evidence. (b) In White v. State, 253 Ga. 106, 109 (2) ( 317 SE2d 196 ) (1984), we held: The purpose of the statute is to inform the defendant “in writing of all relevant and material portions of his own statement that the state may rely upon to his disadvantage.” [Cits.] . . . [W]e find that the purpose of the statute was satisfied, as the appellant was clearly notified by the sta 1990Following a JacksonDenno hearing, the trial court ruled that only those portions of the second statement testified to during the preliminary hearing (and *848 hence reflected in the transcript) might be admitted into evidence. (b) In White v. State, 253 Ga. 106, 109 (2) ( 317 SE2d 196 ) (1984), we held: The purpose of the statute is to inform the defendant “in writing of all relevant and material portions of his own statement that the state may rely upon to his disadvantage.” [Cits.] . . . [W]e find that the purpose of the statute was satisfied, as the appellant was clearly notified by the sta | 1 | 1 |
Page v. Stategreen2 sentences1988See Page v. State, 249 Ga. 648 (2a) ( 292 SE2d 850 ) (1982) and cits. 2. 1988See Page v. State, 249 Ga. 648 (2a) ( 292 SE2d 850 ) (1982) and cits. 2. | 1 | 1 |
Farley v. Stategreen2 sentences1988“We view the purpose of a JacksonDenno hearing and the requirement for the giving of Miranda warnings, as one allowing the trial court in the first instance, as a matter of law, and the jury, ultimately, as a matter of fact, to assure themselves of the voluntariness of a statement made by an individual and offered as a truthful but inculpatory admission against interest, and thus not violative of the constitutional prohibition of involuntary self-incrimination.” (Emphasis supplied.) Farley v. State, 145 Ga. App. 98, 100 (1) ( 243 SE2d 322 ) (1978). 1988“We view the purpose of a JacksonDenno hearing and the requirement for the giving of Miranda warnings, as one allowing the trial court in the first instance, as a matter of law, and the jury, ultimately, as a matter of fact, to assure themselves of the voluntariness of a statement made by an individual and offered as a truthful but inculpatory admission against interest, and thus not violative of the constitutional prohibition of involuntary self-incrimination.” (Emphasis supplied.) Farley v. State, 145 Ga. App. 98, 100 (1) ( 243 SE2d 322 ) (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Parks v. Stategreen2 sentences1986See Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 106 (4), 109 ( 274 SE2d 530 ); Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 405 (1), 406 ( 330 SE2d 686 ). 1986See Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 106 (4), 109 ( 274 SE2d 530 ); Parks v. State, 254 Ga. 403, 405 (1), 406 ( 330 SE2d 686 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. State
green
1 sentence2013As Lake has failed to allege that any involuntary statements were even involved at his trial, “we cannot conclude that it was likely that the . . . jury instruction [given here regarding the use of involuntary statements] affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences2013Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 2013Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 ( 84 SCt 1774 , 12 LE2d 908) (1964). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Durham v. State
neutral
2 sentences2004However, a review of the transcript of the JacksonDenno hearing “supports the trial court’s finding that [he] was *492 advised of his rights, understood and waived them, and gave his statement^] voluntarily.” Durham v. State, 273 Ga. 142 ( 539 SE2d 137 ) (2000). 3. 2004However, a review of the transcript of the JacksonDenno hearing “supports the trial court’s finding that [he] was *492 advised of his rights, understood and waived them, and gave his statement^] voluntarily.” Durham v. State, 273 Ga. 142 ( 539 SE2d 137 ) (2000). 3. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences1998Thus, even assuming trial counsel’s performance was deficient (which we do not find), appellant has failed to show that a reasonable probability exists that such a deficient performance would have prejudiced his defense, as required by the second prong of Strickland, supra. Additionally, the trial court found that “the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving that [his trial counsel] was ineffective and but for [counsel’s] alleged deficiencies the defendant would have been acquitted.” These findings must be upheld unless erroneous (Harris v. State, 268 Ga. 412, 413 ( 490 SE2d 96 )), whi 1998Thus, even assuming trial counsel’s performance was deficient (which we do not find), appellant has failed to show that a reasonable probability exists that such a deficient performance would have prejudiced his defense, as required by the second prong of Strickland, supra. Additionally, the trial court found that “the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving that [his trial counsel] was ineffective and but for [counsel’s] alleged deficiencies the defendant would have been acquitted.” These findings must be upheld unless erroneous (Harris v. State, 268 Ga. 412, 413 ( 490 SE2d 96 )), whi | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Christenson v. State
green
2 sentences1998This Court affirmed Christen-son’s convictions in Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80 ( 402 SE2d 41 ) (1991) (“Christenson F), but remanded to the trial court to determine if the State had a good faith basis for some of its cross-examination questions during the sentencing phase and to conduct a JacksonDenno hearing on the admissibility of a custodial statement introduced in the sentencing phase. 1998This Court affirmed Christen-son’s convictions in Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80 ( 402 SE2d 41 ) (1991) (“Christenson F), but remanded to the trial court to determine if the State had a good faith basis for some of its cross-examination questions during the sentencing phase and to conduct a JacksonDenno hearing on the admissibility of a custodial statement introduced in the sentencing phase. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Payne v. State
green
2 sentences1993As noted in Payne, supra at 360 , this was authorized in Jackson v. Denno, and has been done a number of times in Georgia. 1993As noted in Payne, supra at 360 , this was authorized in Jackson v. Denno, and has been done a number of times in Georgia. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Thompson v. State
green
1 sentence1992“Moreover, the court conducted a JacksonDenno hearing, which produced evidence which . . . authorized the finding that, considering the nine factors enumerated in Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227 (3) ( 282 SE2d 301 ) (1981), the statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Thompson, supra. Decided September 8, 1992 Reconsideration denied September 23, 1992 Michelle C. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Marshall v. State
green
2 sentences1992“Moreover, the court conducted a JacksonDenno hearing, which produced evidence which . . . authorized the finding that, considering the nine factors enumerated in Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227 (3) ( 282 SE2d 301 ) (1981), the statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Thompson, supra. Decided September 8, 1992 Reconsideration denied September 23, 1992 Michelle C. 1992“Moreover, the court conducted a JacksonDenno hearing, which produced evidence which . . . authorized the finding that, considering the nine factors enumerated in Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227 (3) ( 282 SE2d 301 ) (1981), the statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Thompson, supra. Decided September 8, 1992 Reconsideration denied September 23, 1992 Michelle C. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Strickland v. State
green
2 sentences1990He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 Strickland’s first conviction was reversed in Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230 ( 357 SE2d 85 ) (1987), and the evidence presented at the first trial, except some additional material contained in the JacksonDenno hearing, was substantially the same as the evidence at the second trial. 1. 1990He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 Strickland’s first conviction was reversed in Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230 ( 357 SE2d 85 ) (1987), and the evidence presented at the first trial, except some additional material contained in the JacksonDenno hearing, was substantially the same as the evidence at the second trial. 1. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Howard v. State
green
2 sentences1988Howard v. State, 180 Ga. App. 817 (1) ( 350 SE2d 825 ) (1986). 1988Howard v. State, 180 Ga. App. 817 (1) ( 350 SE2d 825 ) (1986). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Hance v. State
green
2 sentences1986Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856 ( 268 SE2d 339 ) (1980). 1986Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856 ( 268 SE2d 339 ) (1980). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences1985Cf. Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820 ( 256 SE2d 907 ), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 957 (1979); Scott v. State, 243 Ga. 233 ( 253 SE2d 698 ) (1979). 1985Cf. Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820 ( 256 SE2d 907 ), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 957 (1979); Scott v. State, 243 Ga. 233 ( 253 SE2d 698 ) (1979). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Shaw v. South Carolina green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Scott v. State
green
2 sentences1985Cf. Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820 ( 256 SE2d 907 ), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 957 (1979); Scott v. State, 243 Ga. 233 ( 253 SE2d 698 ) (1979). 1985Cf. Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 820 ( 256 SE2d 907 ), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 957 (1979); Scott v. State, 243 Ga. 233 ( 253 SE2d 698 ) (1979). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Peek v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Gates v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Hulsey v. Arkansas green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.