violation of some positive rule in Maine

1998Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court’s decision of whether to modify spousal support only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, “so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me.1980), In general, the divorce court may modify an award of alimony upon the showing of a substantial change in either the payor or payee spouse’s financial condition.

1997On the filing of a proper motion by one of the parties, the trial court, pursuant to 19 M.R.S.A. § 721(5) (Supp.1996), “may alter or amend a decree for alimony or specific sum when it appears that justice requires it-” We have previously stated that when the question is one of modification of alimony, “[a]bsent a violation of some positive rule of law, this Court will overturn the trial court’s decision of such a question only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me.1980) (citations

2000“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court’s decision ‘only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.’ ” Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Me.1994) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 591 A.2d 872, 874 (Me.1991)). [¶ 10] Pepper relies on our decision in Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1987), to contend that because Thistle Productions is an Arizona corporation with no connection to Maine, the court had no jurisdiction over the corporation, and accordingly, had no authority t

1994Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court’s decision “only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Anderson v. Anderson, 591 A.2d 872, 874 (Me.1991) (citation omitted).

2000“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court’s decision ‘only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.’ ” Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Me.1994) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 591 A.2d 872, 874 (Me.1991)). [¶ 10] Pepper relies on our decision in Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A.2d 1290 (Me. 1987), to contend that because Thistle Productions is an Arizona corporation with no connection to Maine, the court had no jurisdiction over the corporation, and accordingly, had no authority t

1997“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court’s decision ‘only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Me.1994)). [¶ 18] The divorce court may, in its discretion and when justice requires, leave the divorced parties as co-owners of property with either party free to initiate proceedings for partition when the party wishes.

1998“Where the question is one of the modification of alimony or support ... [a]bsent a violation of some positive rule of law, this Court will overturn the trial court’s decision of such a question only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” See id. at 980 .

1992“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, this Court will overturn the trial court’s decision of such a question only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Finn v. Finn, 517 A.2d 317, 318 (Me.1986) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 444 A.2d 977, 980 (Me.1982)).

2005We will only overturn a court’s distribution of property “ ‘if there is a violation of some positive rule of law or if the division results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.’ ” Libby v. Libby, 2001 ME 130, ¶ 6, 781 A.2d 773, 775 (quoting Doucette v. Washburn, 2001 ME 38, ¶23 , 766 A.2d 578, 586 ). [¶ 16] The court concluded that all of the parties’ property, which consisted of both real and personal property located within and outside of Maine, was marital property.

2005We will only overturn a court’s distribution of property “ ‘if there is a violation of some positive rule of law or if the division results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.’ ” Libby v. Libby, 2001 ME 130, ¶ 6, 781 A.2d 773, 775 (quoting Doucette v. Washburn, 2001 ME 38, ¶23 , 766 A.2d 578, 586 ). [¶ 16] The court concluded that all of the parties’ property, which consisted of both real and personal property located within and outside of Maine, was marital property.

1997Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me.1992).

1994The divorce court’s division of marital property will be overturned if there is a violation of some positive rule of law or if the division results in a “plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058 (Me.1992) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 591 A.2d 872, 874 (Me.1991)). *1047 The evidence in this case discloses that Joan received non-income-producing marital property of the approximate net value of $70,000 with an obligation to pay $1100 in marital debts.

1992“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, this Court will overturn the trial court’s decision of such a question only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Finn v. Finn, 517 A.2d 317, 318 (Me.1986) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 444 A.2d 977, 980 (Me.1982)).

1988“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, this Court will overturn the trial court’s decision of such a question only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Finn v. Finn, 517 A.2d 317, 318 (Me.1986) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me.1980)).

2015We review the denial of a motion to modify spousal support for an abuse of discretion and consider “(1) whether factual findings, if any, are supported by the record pursuant to the clear error standard; (2) whether the court understood the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given the facts and applying the law, whether the court weighed the applicable facts and made choices within the bounds of reasonableness.” McAllister v. McAllister, 2011 ME 69, ¶ 11 , 21 A.3d 1010 (quotation marks omitted); see also Day v. Day, 1998 ME 194, ¶ 5 , 717 A.2d 914 (“Absent a violation of som

2015We review the denial of a motion to modify spousal support for an abuse of discretion and consider “(1) whether factual findings, if any, are supported by the record pursuant to the clear error standard; (2) whether the court understood the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given the facts and applying the law, whether the court weighed the applicable facts and made choices within the bounds of reasonableness.” McAllister v. McAllister, 2011 ME 69, ¶ 11 , 21 A.3d 1010 (quotation marks omitted); see also Day v. Day, 1998 ME 194, ¶ 5 , 717 A.2d 914 (“Absent a violation of som

1997Absent a violation of some positive rule of law we defer to the discretion of the trial court and will overturn its decision as to the disposition of marital property and the amount of an alimony award “only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Arey v. Arey, 651 A.2d at 353-54 (citations omitted).

1997“Absent a violation of some positive rule of law, we will overturn the trial court’s decision ‘only if it results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams v. Williams, 645 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Me.1994)). [¶ 18] The divorce court may, in its discretion and when justice requires, leave the divorced parties as co-owners of property with either party free to initiate proceedings for partition when the party wishes.

1998See Haag v. Haag, 609 A.2d 1164, 1165 (Me.1992). [¶ 6] Although parties to a divorce may fashion a private settlement agreement addressing property division and spousal support, and the divorce court may incorporate this agreement into the divorce decree, only an incorporated agreement’s provision not to increase alimony will survive despite subsequent events.

1997Zillert *1260 v. Zillert, 395 A.2d 1152, 1157 (Me.1978) (footnote omitted).

1997See also 19 M.R.S.A. § 721 (Supp.1996) (setting forth factors to consider when determining an award of alimony that includes “[economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital property or income”); Strater v. Strater, 159 Me. 508, 518 , 196 A.2d 94 (1963) (“There is no universal standard which [the court] may apply in determining the amount of alimony in any given case.”); Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d at 847-48 (incidents of divorce such as property division and alimony addressed to trial court’s sound discretion, and “it is particularly inappropriate ... to undertake

1997See also 19 M.R.S.A. § 721 (Supp.1996) (setting forth factors to consider when determining an award of alimony that includes “[economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital property or income”); Strater v. Strater, 159 Me. 508, 518 , 196 A.2d 94 (1963) (“There is no universal standard which [the court] may apply in determining the amount of alimony in any given case.”); Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d at 847-48 (incidents of divorce such as property division and alimony addressed to trial court’s sound discretion, and “it is particularly inappropriate ... to undertake

1997See also 19 M.R.S.A. § 721 (Supp.1996) (setting forth factors to consider when determining an award of alimony that includes “[economic misconduct by either party resulting in the diminution of marital property or income”); Strater v. Strater, 159 Me. 508, 518 , 196 A.2d 94 (1963) (“There is no universal standard which [the court] may apply in determining the amount of alimony in any given case.”); Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d at 847-48 (incidents of divorce such as property division and alimony addressed to trial court’s sound discretion, and “it is particularly inappropriate ... to undertake

1996Noyes v. Noyes, 662 A.2d 921, 922 (Me.1995) (citations omitted).

1994When dividing the marital property, the court must consider the factors set forth in 19 M.R.S.A § 722-A and may, within its discretion, consider all factors relevant to a particular divorce. § 722-A; Axtell v. Ax-tell, 482 A.2d 1261, 1263 (Me.1984) (“[B]e-cause the relation of marital property to the individual marital partners is unique, the court may consider other matters peculiar to the case under consideration in order to obtain a just result.”).

1980Small v. Small, Me., 413 A.2d 1318, 1321 (1980); Capron v. Capron, Me., 403 A.2d 1217, 1218 (1979). *1039 On this record, the trial justice could have rationally found that Dr. Smith retired for the primary purpose of avoiding alimony.

1980Small v. Small, Me., 413 A.2d 1318, 1321 (1980); Capron v. Capron, Me., 403 A.2d 1217, 1218 (1979). *1039 On this record, the trial justice could have rationally found that Dr. Smith retired for the primary purpose of avoiding alimony.