27 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2024 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thomas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023“If all three [mentioned] conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243 , 1258 n.17 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 2006)). 2023“If all three [mentioned] conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243 , 1258 n.17 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 2006)). | 5 | 5 |
United States v. Olanogreen2 sentences2010See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (describing the plain-error review applicable to "questions which had not previously been specifically urged,” i.e., that there "must be an 'error' that is 'plain' and that ‘affect[s] substantial rights' ” and "the court should not exercise [its] discretion [to correct the forfeited error] unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336 (D.C.1979) ("[A]p- 2010If these three conditions are satisfied, the court may exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). | 2 | 8 |
Puckett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 , -, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1432-33 , 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (holding that a forfeited claim of governmental failure to fulfill its obligations under a plea agreement is subject to the requirements of plain error review). 12 .Id. at 1429 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 2011Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 , -, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1432-33 , 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (holding that a forfeited claim of governmental failure to fulfill its obligations under a plea agreement is subject to the requirements of plain error review). 12 .Id. at 1429 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). | 2 | 3 |
In re Taylorgreen2 sentences2022“To be ‘plain,’ an error should be ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.’” In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85, 99 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 2021To show either a constructive amendment or a variance, appellant must demonstrate that the prosecution deviated from the facts on which Count 5 is based when it relied at trial on the evidence of a fabricated alibi to prove obstruction of 28 Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243, 1258 (D.C. 2013); (Alexander) Smith v. United States, 801 A.2d 958 , 961–62 (D.C. 2002). 29 Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1258 n.17 (quoting Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1100 (D.C. 2010)). 30 In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85, 99 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 31 Portillo, 62 A.3d | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021If all three of those conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to grant relief from a forfeited error, “but only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 ). 9 Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999). 10 held that a claim is not forfeited where, despite defense counsel’s failure to object, the trial judge demonstrably was aware of the potential error and broached it sua sponte.10 When that is so, we have explained, the purpose of requiring a timely ob 2021If all three of those conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to grant relief from a forfeited error, “but only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 ). 9 Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999). 10 held that a claim is not forfeited where, despite defense counsel’s failure to object, the trial judge demonstrably was aware of the potential error and broached it sua sponte.10 When that is so, we have explained, the purpose of requiring a timely ob | 1 | 13 |
Portillo v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023“If all three [mentioned] conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243 , 1258 n.17 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 2006)). 2023“If all three [mentioned] conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243 , 1258 n.17 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 2006)). | 1 | 4 |
United States v. Younggreen2 sentences2010If these three conditions are satisfied, the court may exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). 2010If these three conditions are satisfied, the court may exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). | 1 | 3 |
Newby v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002See Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C(1992) (“If the point was not preserved ..., we review for plain error.”); Newby, supra, 797 A.2d at 1237 n. 1 (If an appellant demonstrates trial court error that is “ ‘plain’ ” and “ ‘affects substantial rights ... an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if [] the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). 2002See Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C(1992) (“If the point was not preserved ..., we review for plain error.”); Newby, supra, 797 A.2d at 1237 n. 1 (If an appellant demonstrates trial court error that is “ ‘plain’ ” and “ ‘affects substantial rights ... an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if [] the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). | 1 | 2 |
Greer v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2024Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 508 (2021) (internal quotation omitted); see Grogan v. United States, 271 A.3d 196 , 212-13 (D.C. 2022) (“If [the requirements of plain-error review] are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error . . . .”); D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Little v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021To show either a constructive amendment or a variance, appellant must demonstrate that the prosecution deviated from the facts on which Count 5 is based when it relied at trial on the evidence of a fabricated alibi to prove obstruction of 28 Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243, 1258 (D.C. 2013); (Alexander) Smith v. United States, 801 A.2d 958 , 961–62 (D.C. 2002). 29 Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1258 n.17 (quoting Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1100 (D.C. 2010)). 30 In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85, 99 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 31 Portillo, 62 A.3d | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2021If all three of those conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to grant relief from a forfeited error, “but only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 ). 9 Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999). 10 held that a claim is not forfeited where, despite defense counsel’s failure to object, the trial judge demonstrably was aware of the potential error and broached it sua sponte.10 When that is so, we have explained, the purpose of requiring a timely ob | 1 | 1 |
Khaalis v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2010See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770 , 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (describing the plain-error review applicable to "questions which had not previously been specifically urged,” i.e., that there "must be an 'error' that is 'plain' and that ‘affect[s] substantial rights' ” and "the court should not exercise [its] discretion [to correct the forfeited error] unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 336 (D.C.1979) ("[A]p- | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Atkinsongreen2 sentences2007See id. at 735-36 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . “[Reversal for plain error ... should be confined to ‘particularly egregious’ situations,” Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 75 (D.C.1989) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)), and is limited to where the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391 , 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)); see (Joyce) Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 (“When the first 2007See id. at 735-36 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . “[Reversal for plain error ... should be confined to ‘particularly egregious’ situations,” Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 75 (D.C.1989) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)), and is limited to where the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391 , 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)); see (Joyce) Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 (“When the first | 1 | 1 |
Dixon v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007See id. at 735-36 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 . “[Reversal for plain error ... should be confined to ‘particularly egregious’ situations,” Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 75 (D.C.1989) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 , 105 S.Ct. 1038 , 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)), and is limited to where the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 , 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 , 56 S.Ct. 391 , 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)); see (Joyce) Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 (“When the first | 1 | 1 |
Green v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006We now apply the applicable legal principles to the specific factual context of this case, considering the factual context from the perspective of the jurors, see Green, supra, 740 A.2d at 26 (citation omitted), and focusing on two factors: “the inherent coercive potential of the situation before the court,” Harris, supra, 622 A.2d at 701 ; and “the actions of the trial judge in order to determine whether these actions exacerbated, alleviated or were neutral with respect to coercive potential,” Id. 2006We now apply the applicable legal principles to the specific factual context of this case, considering the factual context from the perspective of the jurors, see Green, supra, 740 A.2d at 26 (citation omitted), and focusing on two factors: “the inherent coercive potential of the situation before the court,” Harris, supra, 622 A.2d at 701 ; and “the actions of the trial judge in order to determine whether these actions exacerbated, alleviated or were neutral with respect to coercive potential,” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233 , 1237 n. 1 (D.C.2002) (citations omitted). 3 . "[V]oir dire ... is a necessary part of trial by jury.” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), oyerruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 4 .Appellant not surprisingly cites no legislative history suggesting that the D.C. 2004See, e.g., Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233 , 1237 n. 1 (D.C.2002) (citations omitted). 3 . "[V]oir dire ... is a necessary part of trial by jury.” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), oyerruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 4 .Appellant not surprisingly cites no legislative history suggesting that the D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Swain v. Alabamared2 sentences2004See, e.g., Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233 , 1237 n. 1 (D.C.2002) (citations omitted). 3 . "[V]oir dire ... is a necessary part of trial by jury.” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), oyerruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 4 .Appellant not surprisingly cites no legislative history suggesting that the D.C. 2004See, e.g., Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233 , 1237 n. 1 (D.C.2002) (citations omitted). 3 . "[V]oir dire ... is a necessary part of trial by jury.” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), oyerruled on other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 4 .Appellant not surprisingly cites no legislative history suggesting that the D.C. | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2002See Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C(1992) (“If the point was not preserved ..., we review for plain error.”); Newby, supra, 797 A.2d at 1237 n. 1 (If an appellant demonstrates trial court error that is “ ‘plain’ ” and “ ‘affects substantial rights ... an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if [] the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ”) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Marciano Vasquez
green
2 sentences2024Rather, the amended text of the rule “clarif[ies] that Rule 12 recognizes the traditional distinction between forfeiture and waiver” and a defendant’s forfeited challenge should be reviewed “for plain error.” Id. at 373 . 2024Rather, the amended text of the rule “clarif[ies] that Rule 12 recognizes the traditional distinction between forfeiture and waiver” and a defendant’s forfeited challenge should be reviewed “for plain error.” Id. at 373 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Manuel Soto
green
2 sentences2024And in Soto, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the rule’s revised text and drafting history made clear that “appellate courts are not to presume that a defendant’s failure to file a timely pretrial motion is a waiver,” that “Rule 12 is generally directed at the district 42 courts, not the appellate courts,” and that, accordingly, “plain-error review applies to claims [governed by Rule 12] raised for the first time on appeal.” 794 F.3d at 652-55 .9 * * * 9 I acknowledge that the federal circuits are split on this issue and that several circuits have held that, even under Rule 12 as amended, unpr 2024And in Soto, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the rule’s revised text and drafting history made clear that “appellate courts are not to presume that a defendant’s failure to file a timely pretrial motion is a waiver,” that “Rule 12 is generally directed at the district 42 courts, not the appellate courts,” and that, accordingly, “plain-error review applies to claims [governed by Rule 12] raised for the first time on appeal.” 794 F.3d at 652-55 .9 * * * 9 I acknowledge that the federal circuits are split on this issue and that several circuits have held that, even under Rule 12 as amended, unpr | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Smith v. United States
green
1 sentence2021To show either a constructive amendment or a variance, appellant must demonstrate that the prosecution deviated from the facts on which Count 5 is based when it relied at trial on the evidence of a fabricated alibi to prove obstruction of 28 Portillo v. United States, 62 A.3d 1243, 1258 (D.C. 2013); (Alexander) Smith v. United States, 801 A.2d 958 , 961–62 (D.C. 2002). 29 Portillo, 62 A.3d at 1258 n.17 (quoting Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1100 (D.C. 2010)). 30 In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85, 99 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 31 Portillo, 62 A.3d | 1 | 2021–2021 |
White v. United States
green
1 sentence2011When the defendant has preserved his claim that the government breached its agreement, we have deemed it "irrelevant that the government's remarks may not have influenced the sentencing judge.” White, 425 A.2d at 618 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2007Thus, while our discussion considers whether appellant has forfeited review of this issue by failing to lodge an objection below, it is clear that he did not waive — ie., he did not make an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)—his right to have his guilt adjudicated by a jury, without interference by the trial judge into matters entrusted solely to that jury’s prerogative. 2007Thus, while our discussion considers whether appellant has forfeited review of this issue by failing to lodge an objection below, it is clear that he did not waive — ie., he did not make an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)—his right to have his guilt adjudicated by a jury, without interference by the trial judge into matters entrusted solely to that jury’s prerogative. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2007Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Subsequent to sentencing, appellant filed a motion for relief from his conviction *787 pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110, contending that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) failing to raise an objection under the Confrontation Clause to the introduction of the DEA-7 chemist reports when the declar-ant chemist did not testify at trial; and (2) failing to move the trial court to revisit its pretrial ruling regarding the admissibility of his statement “there’s nothing in there” under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S 2007Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Subsequent to sentencing, appellant filed a motion for relief from his conviction *787 pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110, contending that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) failing to raise an objection under the Confrontation Clause to the introduction of the DEA-7 chemist reports when the declar-ant chemist did not testify at trial; and (2) failing to move the trial court to revisit its pretrial ruling regarding the admissibility of his statement “there’s nothing in there” under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Dominguez Benitez
green
2 sentences2006"The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 , 124 S.Ct. 2333 (citation omitted). 28 . 2006"The reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 , 124 S.Ct. 2333 (citation omitted). 28 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Harris v. United States
green
2 sentences2006We now apply the applicable legal principles to the specific factual context of this case, considering the factual context from the perspective of the jurors, see Green, supra, 740 A.2d at 26 (citation omitted), and focusing on two factors: “the inherent coercive potential of the situation before the court,” Harris, supra, 622 A.2d at 701 ; and “the actions of the trial judge in order to determine whether these actions exacerbated, alleviated or were neutral with respect to coercive potential,” Id. 2006We now apply the applicable legal principles to the specific factual context of this case, considering the factual context from the perspective of the jurors, see Green, supra, 740 A.2d at 26 (citation omitted), and focusing on two factors: “the inherent coercive potential of the situation before the court,” Harris, supra, 622 A.2d at 701 ; and “the actions of the trial judge in order to determine whether these actions exacerbated, alleviated or were neutral with respect to coercive potential,” Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.