restricted line inquiry in District of Columbia

2012To find harmless error, “it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witnesses] testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witnesses] testimony.” Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 533 (D.C. 1992).

2005To be considered harmless, "[u]nder Chapman , it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witness’ testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness’ testimony." Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 533 (quoting Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C.1989)) (other citation and quotation marks omitted). 11 .

2001“Under our harmless error test, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witness’ testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness’ testimony.” Scull, supra, 564 A.2d at 1166 (internal quotations omitted) (citing *754 Springer, supra, 388 A.2d at 856 ).

1997Under Chapman , before harmless error may be found, “it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt ‘(1) that the defendant' would have been convicted without the witness’ testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness’ testimony.’” Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 856 (D.C.1978) (citation omitted).

2012Because we cannot say “(1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witness’ testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness’ testimony,” Jenkins, 617 A.2d at 533 , we reverse all of Mr. Coles’ convictions which rested on Officer Hopper’s testimony. 19 III.

2012To find harmless error, “it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witnesses] testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witnesses] testimony.” Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 533 (D.C. 1992).

2001From a purely commonsensical viewpoint, I would think that the “outcome of trial” test of Tabron II, 444 A.2d at 944 , for harmless error would be impossible to apply here where previous trials involving the same key witness had ended in mistrials. 2 Turning, therefore, to the second test for harmless error under Tabron II, 444 A.2d at 944 , it is clear that the restricted line of inquiry concerning Bryan’s adjudication for murder would have weakened the impact of his testimony.

2001From a purely commonsensical viewpoint, I would think that the “outcome of trial” test of Tabron II, 444 A.2d at 944 , for harmless error would be impossible to apply here where previous trials involving the same key witness had ended in mistrials. 2 Turning, therefore, to the second test for harmless error under Tabron II, 444 A.2d at 944 , it is clear that the restricted line of inquiry concerning Bryan’s adjudication for murder would have weakened the impact of his testimony.

2021The District argues that it could also prevail if it could show “that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness’s testimony.” Mason v. United States, 53 A.3d 1084, 1095 (D.C. 2012) (brackets omitted).

2018Cf., e.g., Longus, 52 A.3d at 841-42, 853-54 (error in limiting cross- examination of detective about allegations that detective had improperly coached witnesses was not harmless under Chapman standard; cross-examination could have aided defense efforts to impeach government‟s principal witness at trial); Coles v. United States, 36 A.3d 352, 359-60 (D.C. 2012) (error in curtailing cross- examination of key government witness at trial about alleged collusion reflecting corruption not harmless beyond reasonable doubt; court could not say “that the defendant would have been convicted without the

2018Cf., e.g. , Longus , 52 A.3d at 841-42, 853-54 (error in limiting cross-examination of detective about allegations that detective had improperly coached witnesses was not harmless under Chapman standard; cross-examination could have aided defense efforts to impeach government's principal witness at trial); Coles v. United States , 36 A.3d 352 , 359-60 (D.C. 2012) (error in curtailing cross-examination of key government witness at trial about alleged collusion reflecting corruption not harmless beyond reasonable doubt; court could not say "that the defendant would have been convicted without th

2018Cf., e.g., Longus, 52 A.3d at 841-42, 853-54 (error in limiting cross- examination of detective about allegations that detective had improperly coached witnesses was not harmless under Chapman standard; cross-examination could have aided defense efforts to impeach government‟s principal witness at trial); Coles v. United States, 36 A.3d 352, 359-60 (D.C. 2012) (error in curtailing cross- examination of key government witness at trial about alleged collusion reflecting corruption not harmless beyond reasonable doubt; court could not say “that the defendant would have been convicted without the

2018Cf., e.g. , Longus , 52 A.3d at 841-42, 853-54 (error in limiting cross-examination of detective about allegations that detective had improperly coached witnesses was not harmless under Chapman standard; cross-examination could have aided defense efforts to impeach government's principal witness at trial); Coles v. United States , 36 A.3d 352 , 359-60 (D.C. 2012) (error in curtailing cross-examination of key government witness at trial about alleged collusion reflecting corruption not harmless beyond reasonable doubt; court could not say "that the defendant would have been convicted without th

1986Curtailment of constitutionally-protected cross-examination constitutes harmless error where it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt ‘(1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witness’ testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness’ testimony.’ ” Springer, 388 A.2d at 856 (citation omitted); accord Goldman, 473 A.2d at 857 ; McNeil, 465 A.2d at 812 ; Tabron, 444 A.2d at 944 .

1984Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 451 A.2d 859, 865 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2105 , 77 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). 17 Eliciting bias testimony is an important function of cross-examination particularly “when, as here, the credibility of a key government witness is the central issue.” Benjamin v. United States, supra, 453 A.2d at 811 .

1984Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 451 A.2d 859, 865 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2105 , 77 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). 17 Eliciting bias testimony is an important function of cross-examination particularly “when, as here, the credibility of a key government witness is the central issue.” Benjamin v. United States, supra, 453 A.2d at 811 .

1984Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 451 A.2d 859, 865 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2105 , 77 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). 17 Eliciting bias testimony is an important function of cross-examination particularly “when, as here, the credibility of a key government witness is the central issue.” Benjamin v. United States, supra, 453 A.2d at 811 .

1984Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 451 A.2d 859, 865 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2105 , 77 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983). 17 Eliciting bias testimony is an important function of cross-examination particularly “when, as here, the credibility of a key government witness is the central issue.” Benjamin v. United States, supra, 453 A.2d at 811 .