act constituting violation in Pennsylvania

2021To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) the [PFA] Order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor had notice of the Order; (3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent. -4- J-S14028-21 Id. at 110 .

2021To establish indirect criminal contempt of a PFA Order, “the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the Order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the Order; (3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 110 .

2025“Where a PFA order is involved, an [ICC] charge is designed to seek punishment for violation of the protective order[.]” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). -4- J-S25023-25 To establish ICC, the Commonwealth must prove that: “1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 61

2025To establish ICC, the Commonwealth must prove that: “1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 619 (Pa. Super. 2012).

2025Commonwealth v. Ashton, 824 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2024Commonwealth v. Ashton, 824 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2003).

2022In order to establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: “1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. Felder, 176 A.3d 331, 333-334 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted, some formatting altered).

2019In order to establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent. -6– J-A25018-18 Commonwealth v. Felder, 176 A.3d 331 , 333–34 (Pa. Super. 2017) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted).

2022Petitions for Contempt In order for a party to be held in contempt, "the moving party must prove that: (1) the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree that he disobeyed; (2) the act constituting the violation was volitional; and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent." Gunther v. Bolus, 2004 PA Super 8 , 853 A.2d 1014, 1017 (citing Marian Shop, Inc. v. Baird, 448 Pa.Super. 52 , 670 A.2d 671,673 (1996)).

2022Petitions for Contempt In order for a party to be held in contempt, "the moving party must prove that: (1) the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree that he disobeyed; (2) the act constituting the violation was volitional; and (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent." Gunther v. Bolus, 2004 PA Super 8 , 853 A.2d 1014, 1017 (citing Marian Shop, Inc. v. Baird, 448 Pa.Super. 52 , 670 A.2d 671,673 (1996)).

2022In Commonwealth v. Lambert, 147 A.3d 1221 (Pa. Super 2016), this Court explained: To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.

2022In Commonwealth v. Lambert, 147 A.3d 1221 (Pa. Super 2016), this Court explained: To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.

2026The elements of civil and criminal contempt are similar and require proof that: “(1) the court’s order was definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor had notice of the order; (3) the act constituting the violation was volitional; and (4) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.” Fetzer, 336 A.3d at 1068 (internal citation omitted) (discussing criminal contempt); see also Gunther, 853 A.2d at 1017 (stating, “For a person to be found in civil contempt, the moving party - 18 - J-A08040-25 J-A08042-25 must prove that: (1) the c

2022“For a person to be found in civil contempt, the moving party must prove that: (1) the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree that he disobeyed; (2) the act constituting the violation was volitional; and[,] (3) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.” Gunther v. Bolus, 853 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Pa.Super. 2004).

2023The elements of indirect criminal contempt are: (1) “the court’s order was definite, clear, specific, and leaving no doubt in the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited,” (2) “the contemnor had notice of the order,” (3) “the act constituting the violation was volitional,” and (4) “the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.” McMullen, 961 A.2d at 849 ; see also Baker, 766 A.2d at 331 .

2019Specially, the Commonwealth must prove that: 1) The [PFA] order must be definite, clear, specific and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; 2) The contemnor must have had notice of the specific [PFA] order or decree; 3) The act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) The contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent. -4- J-S67018-19 Id. at 331 .

2026To prove indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must present evidence sufficient to establish that “the court’s order was definite, clear, specific, and leaving no doubt in the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; the contemnor had notice of the order; the act constituting the violation was volitional; and the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 849 (Pa. 2008).

2025McMullen, 961 A.2d at 849 ; see also Commonwealth v. Bartic, 303 A.3d 124, 132 (Pa.Super. 2023). -8- J-S24026-25 (2) the contemnor had notice of the order; (3) the act constituting the violation was volitional; and (4) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent.

2014A20015/14 (3) The act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) The contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. Zacher, 455 Pa.Super. 594 , 689 A.2d 267, 269 (1997) (quoting Fenstamaker v. Fenstamaker, 337 Pa.Super. 410 , 487 A.2d 11, 14 (1985)).

2014A20015/14 (3) The act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) The contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. Zacher, 455 Pa.Super. 594 , 689 A.2d 267, 269 (1997) (quoting Fenstamaker v. Fenstamaker, 337 Pa.Super. 410 , 487 A.2d 11, 14 (1985)).

2025Commonwealth v. Boyer, 282 A.3d 1161, 1172 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

2024To establish ICC, the Commonwealth must prove the following four elements: “1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. Boyer, 282 A.3d 1161, 1167 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

2022Id. at 721 .

2017The elements of indirect criminal contempt include: “1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 619 (Pa. Super. 2012).

2022Where there is no prior notice, the conviction cannot stand.14 for past acts of misbehavior rather than setting forth the conditions of compliance to which the contemnor was required to conform and conditioning punitive measures on failure to comply therewith.”). 12 Baker, 766 A.2d at 331 (cleaned up); see also Commonwealth v. Garrison, 386 A.2d 971, 977-78 (Pa. 1978); Diamond v. Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1196 (Pa. Super. 1998). 13 See Commonwealth v. Owens, 436 A.2d 129, 134 (Pa. 1981) (finding no due process violation where, “prior to summarily citing and punishing appellant for contempt, the

2016Diamond v. Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1196 (Pa. Super. 1998).

2025Rather, “the act constituting the violation must be deliberate, and the act of the alleged contemnor must have been done with improper intent.” Sutch v. Roxborough Memorial Hosp., 142 A.3d 38, 68 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

2025Rather, “the act constituting the violation must be deliberate, and the act of the alleged contemnor must have been done with improper intent.” Sutch v. Roxborough Mem'l Hosp., 142 A.3d 38, 68 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

2025“Where a PFA order is involved, an [ICC] charge is designed to seek punishment for violation of the protective order[.]” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 10 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). -4- J-S25023-25 To establish ICC, the Commonwealth must prove that: “1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613, 61

2017Aod the Court failed to show bow Appellant was found to be in contempt of the PFA Order." In regard to the finding of Indirect Criminal Contempt, the law is clear: Where a Protection from Abuse Act (PFA) order is involved, an indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek punishment for violation of the protective order, and to establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: I) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the v

2022Taylor, 137 A.3d at 615 (citation omitted).

2022This Court has stated: “Where a PFA order is involved, an indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek punishment for violation of the protective order.” To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent. - 17 - J-S02033-22 J-S02034-22 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 137 A.3d 611, 614-15

1980We have held that [cjontempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree, . . . the act constituting the violation was volitional, . . . and the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. . . . [T]his Court has adopted the standard of intent prevailing in the federal courts that the contemnor “knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 369 , 386 A.2d 971, 977-78 (1978).

1980We have held that [cjontempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree, . . . the act constituting the violation was volitional, . . . and the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. . . . [T]his Court has adopted the standard of intent prevailing in the federal courts that the contemnor “knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 369 , 386 A.2d 971, 977-78 (1978).

2023See Thomas, supra. Appellants’ claims regarding the orphans’ court’s finding them in contempt are directed toward the second and third elements set forth in Thomas, i.e., whether the act constituting their violation was volitional, and whether they acted with wrongful intent.

2023See Thomas, supra. Appellants’ claims regarding the orphans’ court’s finding them in contempt are directed toward the second and third elements set forth in Thomas, i.e., whether the act constituting their violation was volitional, and whether they acted with wrongful intent.

2022Petitioners' Petitions for Contempt are requesting that the Court hold Plaintiff in civil contempt for failing to comply with the Court's Orders of July 15, 2020 and July 30, 2020."The purpose of civil contempt is to compel performance of lawful orders, and in some instances, to compensate the complainant for the loss sustained, Gunther, 853 A.2d at 1018 (citing Cecil Township v. Klements, 821 A.2d 670, 675 (Pa.Commw.2003)).

2022Petitioners' Petitions for Contempt are requesting that the Court hold Plaintiff in civil contempt for failing to comply with the Court's Orders of July 15, 2020 and July 30, 2020."The purpose of civil contempt is to compel performance of lawful orders, and in some instances, to compensate the complainant for the loss sustained, Gunther, 853 A.2d at 1018 (citing Cecil Township v. Klements, 821 A.2d 670 , 675 (Pa.Commw.2003)).

2022See id. at 1235 .

2015Habjan, supra at 637 (citing Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 489 (Pa.Super. 2006)); Harcar, supra at 1235 (citation omitted).

2005Id. at 939 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 1008, 1013 (Pa.Super.1997)). ¶ 7 A finding of criminal contempt must be supported by the following four elements: (1) The [court’s] order or decree must be definite, clear, specific and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) The contemnor must have had notice of the specific order or decree, (3) The act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.

2005Id. at 939 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 1008, 1013 (Pa.Super.1997)). ¶ 7 A finding of criminal contempt must be supported by the following four elements: (1) The [court's] order or decree must be definite, clear, specific and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) The contemnor must have had notice of the specific order or decree, (3) The act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and (4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.

1978Contempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemner had notice of the specific order or decree, East Cain Township v. Carter, 440 Pa. 607 , 269 A.2d 703 (1970); Commonwealth v. Gaston, 460 Pa. 385 , 333 A.2d 779 (1975) (plurality opinion); accord, Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 , 213 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1967); see Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977), the act constituting the violation was volitional, Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977); accord, United States v. Seale, 461 F.2

1978Contempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemner had notice of the specific order or decree, East Cain Township v. Carter, 440 Pa. 607 , 269 A.2d 703 (1970); Commonwealth v. Gaston, 460 Pa. 385 , 333 A.2d 779 (1975) (plurality opinion); accord, Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 , 213 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1967); see Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977), the act constituting the violation was volitional, Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977); accord, United States v. Seale, 461 F.2

1978Contempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemner had notice of the specific order or decree, East Cain Township v. Carter, 440 Pa. 607 , 269 A.2d 703 (1970); Commonwealth v. Gaston, 460 Pa. 385 , 333 A.2d 779 (1975) (plurality opinion); accord, Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 , 213 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1967); see Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977), the act constituting the violation was volitional, Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977); accord, United States v. Seale, 461 F.2

1978Contempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemner had notice of the specific order or decree, East Cain Township v. Carter, 440 Pa. 607 , 269 A.2d 703 (1970); Commonwealth v. Gaston, 460 Pa. 385 , 333 A.2d 779 (1975) (plurality opinion); accord, Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 , 213 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1967); see Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977), the act constituting the violation was volitional, Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977); accord, United States v. Seale, 461 F.2

1978Contempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemner had notice of the specific order or decree, East Cain Township v. Carter, 440 Pa. 607 , 269 A.2d 703 (1970); Commonwealth v. Gaston, 460 Pa. 385 , 333 A.2d 779 (1975) (plurality opinion); accord, Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 , 213 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1967); see Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977), the act constituting the violation was volitional, Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977); accord, United States v. Seale, 461 F.2

1978Contempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemner had notice of the specific order or decree, East Cain Township v. Carter, 440 Pa. 607 , 269 A.2d 703 (1970); Commonwealth v. Gaston, 460 Pa. 385 , 333 A.2d 779 (1975) (plurality opinion); accord, Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 , 213 (8th Cir. 1974); In re Rubin, 378 F.2d 104 (3rd Cir. 1967); see Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977), the act constituting the violation was volitional, Commonwealth v. Washington, 470 Pa. 199 , 368 A.2d 263 (1977); accord, United States v. Seale, 461 F.2

2022Where there is no prior notice, the conviction cannot stand.14 for past acts of misbehavior rather than setting forth the conditions of compliance to which the contemnor was required to conform and conditioning punitive measures on failure to comply therewith.”). 12 Baker, 766 A.2d at 331 (cleaned up); see also Commonwealth v. Garrison, 386 A.2d 971, 977-78 (Pa. 1978); Diamond v. Diamond, 715 A.2d 1190, 1196 (Pa. Super. 1998). 13 See Commonwealth v. Owens, 436 A.2d 129, 134 (Pa. 1981) (finding no due process violation where, “prior to summarily citing and punishing appellant for contempt, the

2000Moreover, “unless the evidence establishes an intentional disobedience or an intentional neglect of the lawful process of the court, no contempt has been proven.” Ricci v. Geary, 670 A.2d at 192 . ¶ 11 After review, we cannot conclude that it was proven that Appellant’s failure to contact the Assistant District Attorney was a volitional act committed with a wrongful intent such that a contempt citation is appropriate.

2022See Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/21, at 2 (unpaginated) (citing Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2005)) In finding the Commonwealth had proven these elements here, the trial court initially observed the PFA order clearly prohibited Beahan from harassing, stalking or attempting to threaten Danielle, and that Beahan conceded he had notice of the PFA order.

2017Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174 , 1176–77 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2021Id.

2015Habjan, supra at 637 (citing Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478, 489 (Pa.Super. 2006)); Harcar, supra at 1235 (citation omitted).

2014Where a PFA order is involved, an [ICC] charge is designed to seek punishment for Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 8 We observe that the Commonwealth did not file a responsive brief, nor did the trial court file a complete Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, as Judge Peoples passed away shortly after trial. -5- J-A23036- 14 A.2d 108 , 110 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volition

2008Commonwealth v. Padilla, 885 A.2d 994 (Pa. Super. 2005).