nine factors in Georgia

2023See id. (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). 12 a juvenile at the time of his interview, see OCGA § 15-11-2 (10) (B) (defining “[c]hild”), the trial court was required to consider each of the nine factors set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124 (226 SE2d 922) (1976), to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (196

2023See id. (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). 12 a juvenile at the time of his interview, see OCGA § 15-11-2 (10) (B) (defining “[c]hild”), the trial court was required to consider each of the nine factors set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124 (226 SE2d 922) (1976), to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (196

2002After conducting a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964), and after considering the nine factors set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 ( 226 SE2d 922 ) (1976) for determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s incriminating statement, the trial court admitted appellant’s custodial statement. 2 See also State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63-64 (2) (b) ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991).

2002After conducting a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964), and after considering the nine factors set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 ( 226 SE2d 922 ) (1976) for determining the voluntariness of a juvenile’s incriminating statement, the trial court admitted appellant’s custodial statement. 2 See also State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63-64 (2) (b) ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991).

2008Applying the nine factors found in Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115 (3) (b) ( 428 SE2d 333 ) (1993), the State also argues that Vergara’s statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

2008Applying the nine factors found in Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115 (3) (b) ( 428 SE2d 333 ) (1993), the State also argues that Vergara’s statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2020But where the record evidence is “sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that [a defendant] knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and that his statements were properly admitted at trial under the Riley test,” we have rejected the assertion that “the appellate record is incomplete” simply because the trial court’s order is “silent as to whether the Riley factors were considered.” Green v. State, 282 Ga. 672, 674 ( 653 SE2d 23 ) (2007).

1998“Moreover, [after the admission of such testimony], the court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing, which produced evidence which authorized the finding that, considering the nine factors enumerated in Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227 (3) ( 282 SE2d 301 ) (1981), the statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (Punctuation omitted.) Stowers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 518, 520 ( 422 SE2d 870 ) (1992).

1998“Moreover, [after the admission of such testimony], the court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing, which produced evidence which authorized the finding that, considering the nine factors enumerated in Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227 (3) ( 282 SE2d 301 ) (1981), the statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (Punctuation omitted.) Stowers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 518, 520 ( 422 SE2d 870 ) (1992).

2023See Riley, 237 Ga. at 128. 26 factor framework is required or exclusive. 16 Moreover, we make 16 See, e.g., Williams, 238 Ga. at 302-303 (explaining that Riley held that whether a juvenile knowing and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances (as noted above), but saying that “the totality of the circumstances is to be determined by consideration of the nine factors set out in West” and listing those factors); Crawford, 240 Ga. at 323-325 (explaining and applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test (as noted above), and stating that “[t]he court

1988The posture of the evidence at the hearing on the voluntariness of the juvenile’s statement did not fully address the nine factors of Riley, supra. Compare the factors known to exist in this case with the facts in Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321 ( 240 SE2d 824 ).

2023See id. (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). 12 a juvenile at the time of his interview, see OCGA § 15-11-2 (10) (B) (defining “[c]hild”), the trial court was required to consider each of the nine factors set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124 (226 SE2d 922) (1976), to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (196

2023See id. (“To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). 12 a juvenile at the time of his interview, see OCGA § 15-11-2 (10) (B) (defining “[c]hild”), the trial court was required to consider each of the nine factors set forth in Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124 (226 SE2d 922) (1976), to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (196

2023Noting that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving this question include” the nine factors later listed in Riley, the court held that whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights did not depend on “age alone,” but rather on “the totality of circumstances.” Id. at 469 . 16 Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 ( 99 SCt 2560 , 61 LE2d 197) (1979), examined whether a juvenile had invoked his rights pursuant to Miranda by requesting to speak with his probation officer.

2023Noting that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving this question include” the nine factors later listed in Riley, the court held that whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights did not depend on “age alone,” but rather on “the totality of circumstances.” Id. at 469 . 16 Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 ( 99 SCt 2560 , 61 LE2d 197) (1979), examined whether a juvenile had invoked his rights pursuant to Miranda by requesting to speak with his probation officer.

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023See Riley, 237 Ga. at 128. 26 factor framework is required or exclusive. 16 Moreover, we make 16 See, e.g., Williams, 238 Ga. at 302-303 (explaining that Riley held that whether a juvenile knowing and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances (as noted above), but saying that “the totality of the circumstances is to be determined by consideration of the nine factors set out in West” and listing those factors); Crawford, 240 Ga. at 323-325 (explaining and applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test (as noted above), and stating that “[t]he court

2023See Riley, 237 Ga. at 128. 26 factor framework is required or exclusive. 16 Moreover, we make 16 See, e.g., Williams, 238 Ga. at 302-303 (explaining that Riley held that whether a juvenile knowing and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances (as noted above), but saying that “the totality of the circumstances is to be determined by consideration of the nine factors set out in West” and listing those factors); Crawford, 240 Ga. at 323-325 (explaining and applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test (as noted above), and stating that “[t]he court

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023See Riley, 237 Ga. at 128. 26 factor framework is required or exclusive. 16 Moreover, we make 16 See, e.g., Williams, 238 Ga. at 302-303 (explaining that Riley held that whether a juvenile knowing and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances (as noted above), but saying that “the totality of the circumstances is to be determined by consideration of the nine factors set out in West” and listing those factors); Crawford, 240 Ga. at 323-325 (explaining and applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test (as noted above), and stating that “[t]he court

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023See id. at 492 . 15 friends or an attorney; (5) whether the accused was interrogated before or after formal charges had been filed; (6) methods used in interrogation; (7) length of interrogations; (8) whether vel non the accused refused to voluntarily give statements on prior occasions; and (9) whether the accused has repudiated an extra judicial statement at a later date.” Id. at 128 (quoting West v. United States, 399 F2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968)).12 The Riley Court then disapproved a Georgia Court of Appeals case, Freeman v. Wilcox, to the extent it could be read as requiring an automatic e

2023Noting that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving this question include” the nine factors later listed in Riley, the court held that whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights did not depend on “age alone,” but rather on “the totality of circumstances.” Id. at 469. 16 (disapproving Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325 (167 SE2d 163) (1969)).

2023See also, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 825 F3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining, in the context of determining whether there was sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, that “totality of the circumstances” “means that all material ‘circumstances should be considered’”) (citation omitted); United States v. Melton, 782 F3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting, in the context of determining whether a criminal defendant’s 14 We note that although Riley’s factors were derived from West, that case said that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving [

2023See also, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 825 F3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining, in the context of determining whether there was sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, that “totality of the circumstances” “means that all 14 We note that although Riley’s factors were derived from West, that case said that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving [the] question [of juvenile waiver] include” before listing the nine factors later enumerated in Riley.

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023They are . . .” and listing the Riley factors); Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 228-230 (282 SE2d 301) (1981) (noting that Riley held that “‘the question of a voluntary and knowing waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances,’ to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing and applying the Riley factors); Howe v. State, 250 Ga. 811, 812-813 (301 SE2d 280) (1983) (noting that “Riley . . . adopted a totality of the circumstances test,” but listing and applying the nine Riley factors and concluding that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, as reflected in

2023Noting that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving this question include” the nine factors later listed in Riley, the court held that whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights did not depend on “age alone,” but rather on “the totality of circumstances.” Id. at 469. 16 (disapproving Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325 (167 SE2d 163) (1969)).

2023Noting that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving this question include” the nine factors later listed in Riley, the court held that whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights did not depend on “age alone,” but rather on “the totality of circumstances.” Id. at 469. 16 (disapproving Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325 (167 SE2d 163) (1969)).

2023See also, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 825 F3d 59, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining, in the context of determining whether there was sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, that “totality of the circumstances” “means that all material ‘circumstances should be considered’”) (citation omitted); United States v. Melton, 782 F3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting, in the context of determining whether a criminal defendant’s 14 We note that although Riley’s factors were derived from West, that case said that “[f]actors considered by the courts in resolving [

2023In other words, the nine factors listed in West were not exclusive. 24 material ‘circumstances should be considered’”) (citation omitted); United States v. Melton, 782 F3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting, in the context of determining whether a criminal defendant’s admission during a revocation proceeding that he violated the conditions of his supervised release was knowing and voluntary, that “‘the totality of the circumstances means exactly that—all the circumstances should be considered,’” and “‘courts should beware of assigning talismanic significance to any single fact or circumstance’”