27 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2010–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Williams (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2020See, e.g., Harris at ¶ 16-18 (explicitly acknowledging that although Fischer was limited to postrelease control cases, the court would apply it to the failure to include a mandatory driver’s-license suspension and declare the sentence void in part); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus (failure to impose mandatory fine when no affidavit of indigency was filed rendered that part of the sentence void); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28 (imposition of separate sentences for allied offenses rendered the sentences 2020See, e.g., Harris at ¶ 16-18 (explicitly acknowledging that although Fischer was limited to postrelease control cases, the court would apply it to the failure to include a mandatory driver’s-license suspension and declare the sentence void in part); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus (failure to impose mandatory fine when no affidavit of indigency was filed rendered that part of the sentence void); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28 (imposition of separate sentences for allied offenses rendered the sentences | 4 | 4 |
State v. Steelegreen2 sentences2020Franklin No. 18AP-187, 2018-Ohio-3950, ¶ 11, fn. 1 ; accord State v. Davic, 10th Dist. 2020Franklin No. 18AP- 187, 2018-Ohio-3950, ¶ 11, fn. 1 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Harper (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2025But in State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913 , and State v. Hudson, 2020-Ohio-3849 , the Supreme Court revisited the void sentence doctrine, and held that “[w]hen a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction in imposing postrelease control renders the court’s judgment voidable. . . . [Such a sentence is] not void, and it is not subject to collateral attack.” Harper at ¶ 4-5. 2023See State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (overruling our void-sentence case law even though the parties did not raise a facial challenge to the void-sentence doctrine on appeal). | 2 | 6 |
State v. Fischergreen2 sentences2020I would adopt this proposition of law and, on that basis, reverse the portion of the Tenth District’s decision finding error and remanding the case to the trial court to correct the entry with a nunc pro tunc entry in compliance with Grimes. {¶ 51} The state correctly acknowledges that the void-sentence doctrine was premised on the notion that “a sentence that is not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms is void.” State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010- Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332 , ¶ 8. 2020I would adopt this proposition of law and, on that basis, reverse the portion of the Tenth District’s decision finding error and remanding the case to the trial court to correct the entry with a nunc pro tunc entry in compliance with Grimes. {¶ 51} The state correctly acknowledges that the void-sentence doctrine was premised on the notion that “a sentence that is not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms is void.” State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010- Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332 , ¶ 8. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Harris at ¶ 16-18 (explicitly acknowledging that although Fischer was limited to postrelease control cases, the court would apply it to the failure to include a mandatory driver’s-license suspension and declare the sentence void in part); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus (failure to impose mandatory fine when no affidavit of indigency was filed rendered that part of the sentence void); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28 (imposition of separate sentences for allied offenses rendered the sentences 2020See, e.g., Harris at ¶ 16-18 (explicitly acknowledging that although Fischer was limited to postrelease control cases, the court would apply it to the failure to include a mandatory driver’s-license suspension and declare the sentence void in part); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus (failure to impose mandatory fine when no affidavit of indigency was filed rendered that part of the sentence void); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28 (imposition of separate sentences for allied offenses rendered the sentences | 1 | 3 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2017Even though the void sentence doctrine has since been somewhat expanded by the Ohio Supreme Court, the primary expansions have involved a failure to include mandatory driver's license suspension in the offender's sentence (State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318 , 2012-Ohio-1908 , 972 N.E.2d 509 , paragraph one of the syllabus), and a failure to include certain mandatory fines in the sentence (State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus). {¶20} Accordingly, we find no merit in appellant’s attempt to extend the void sentence rule to the present matter, as the tri 2017Even though the void sentence doctrine has since been somewhat expanded by the Ohio Supreme Court, the primary expansions have involved a failure to include mandatory driver's license suspension in the offender's sentence (State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318 , 2012-Ohio-1908 , 972 N.E.2d 509 , paragraph one of the syllabus), and a failure to include certain mandatory fines in the sentence (State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus). {¶20} Accordingly, we find no merit in appellant’s attempt to extend the void sentence rule to the present matter, as the tri | 1 | 3 |
State v. Paynegreen2 sentences2020See State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502 , 2007-Ohio-4642 , 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 28 . {¶ 27} By outlining the history of our jurisprudence and the “modern expansion” of the void-sentence doctrine, the state demonstrates that our caselaw has not always limited the understanding of void judgments to those that are entered by a court lacking subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. 2020See State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502 , 2007-Ohio-4642 , 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 28 . {¶ 27} By outlining the history of our jurisprudence and the “modern expansion” of the void-sentence doctrine, the state demonstrates that our caselaw has not always limited the understanding of void judgments to those that are entered by a court lacking subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jones (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2021See State v. Jones, 162 Ohio St.3d 542 , 2020-Ohio-4031 , 166 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 3 (declining to resolve the proposition of law accepted for review and instead remanding to the court of appeals to address the predicate question of whether defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); see also State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 (overruling our void-sentence cases even though the parties did not raise a facial challenge to the void-sentence doctrine on appeal). {¶ 41} The question presently before the court presumes that R.C. 2935.04 appli 2021See State v. Jones, 162 Ohio St.3d 542 , 2020-Ohio-4031 , 166 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 3 (declining to resolve the proposition of law accepted for review and instead remanding to the court of appeals to address the predicate question of whether defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); see also State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 (overruling our void-sentence cases even though the parties did not raise a facial challenge to the void-sentence doctrine on appeal). {¶ 41} The question presently before the court presumes that R.C. 2935.04 appli | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Henderson, 155 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 2019-Ohio-1421 , 120 N.E.3d 867 ; State v. Hudson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2019-Ohio-2780 , 125 N.E.3d 947 . 2020See State v. Henderson, 155 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 2019-Ohio-1421 , 120 N.E.3d 867 ; State v. Hudson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2019-Ohio-2780 , 125 N.E.3d 947 . | 1 | 1 |
In re J.S.green2 sentences2020See, e.g., Harris at ¶ 16-18 (explicitly acknowledging that although Fischer was limited to postrelease control cases, the court would apply it to the failure to include a mandatory driver’s-license suspension and declare the sentence void in part); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus (failure to impose mandatory fine when no affidavit of indigency was filed rendered that part of the sentence void); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28 (imposition of separate sentences for allied offenses rendered the sentences 2020See, e.g., Harris at ¶ 16-18 (explicitly acknowledging that although Fischer was limited to postrelease control cases, the court would apply it to the failure to include a mandatory driver’s-license suspension and declare the sentence void in part); State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151 , 2012-Ohio-5479 , 985 N.E.2d 432 , syllabus (failure to impose mandatory fine when no affidavit of indigency was filed rendered that part of the sentence void); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28 (imposition of separate sentences for allied offenses rendered the sentences | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnson (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio- 2927, 85 N.E.3d 700 , ¶ 37 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only); Grimes at ¶ 27 (French, J., concurring in judgment only); Williams at ¶ 35-68 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting); see also State v. Johnson, 155 Ohio St.3d 441 , 2018-Ohio-4957 , 122 N.E.3d 126, ¶ 12 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only); Johnson at ¶ 17 (DeGenaro, J., concurring in judgment only). {¶ 47} This case is simply further evidence that it is long past time to end this court’s dalliance with perpetually modifiable sentences. . 2019See, e.g., State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio- 2927, 85 N.E.3d 700 , ¶ 37 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only); Grimes at ¶ 27 (French, J., concurring in judgment only); Williams at ¶ 35-68 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting); see also State v. Johnson, 155 Ohio St.3d 441 , 2018-Ohio-4957 , 122 N.E.3d 126, ¶ 12 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only); Johnson at ¶ 17 (DeGenaro, J., concurring in judgment only). {¶ 47} This case is simply further evidence that it is long past time to end this court’s dalliance with perpetually modifiable sentences. . | 1 | 1 |
Majoros v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Majoros v. Collins, 64 Ohio St.3d 442, 443 , 596 N.E.2d 1038 (1992). {¶ 37} As pointed out by Justice Lanzinger in a series of thoughtful dissents, this court’s extension of the void-sentence doctrine in the postrelease-control area—and its subsequent expansion of the doctrine to include other sentencing errors—is contrary to historical practice. 2017See, e.g., Majoros v. Collins, 64 Ohio St.3d 442, 443 , 596 N.E.2d 1038 (1992). {¶ 37} As pointed out by Justice Lanzinger in a series of thoughtful dissents, this court’s extension of the void-sentence doctrine in the postrelease-control area—and its subsequent expansion of the doctrine to include other sentencing errors—is contrary to historical practice. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Billitergreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Bezak at ¶ 30-31 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting); Fischer at ¶ 41-57 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting); State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103 , 2012-Ohio-5144 , 980 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 15-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 35-68 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 2017See, e.g., Bezak at ¶ 30-31 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting); Fischer at ¶ 41-57 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting); State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103 , 2012-Ohio-5144 , 980 N.E.2d 960, ¶ 15-26 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403 , 2016-Ohio-7658 , 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 35-68 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Josephgreen2 sentences2016Compare State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 27, 30 (holding that a sentence is void in part and subject to correction at any time irrespective of the principles of res judicata or law of the case doctrine, where an offender is not properly required to be subject to a period of post-release control) with State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2010-Ohio-954, ¶ 1, 19-21 (holding that the void sentence exception in Fischer does not apply to the improper imposition of costs). {¶ 13} The issues Breeze attempts to appeal have been fully litigated at the trial level and could have be 2016Compare State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶ 27, 30 (holding that a sentence is void in part and subject to correction at any time irrespective of the principles of res judicata or law of the case doctrine, where an offender is not properly required to be subject to a period of post-release control) with State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2010-Ohio-954, ¶ 1, 19-21 (holding that the void sentence exception in Fischer does not apply to the improper imposition of costs). {¶ 13} The issues Breeze attempts to appeal have been fully litigated at the trial level and could have be | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Henderson (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2021After years of expanding on the void sentence doctrine, in the cases of State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2020-Ohio-4784 , 162 N.E.3d 776 , the Ohio Supreme Court returned to the “traditional understanding” of void judgments. 2021After years of expanding on the void sentence doctrine, in the cases of State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2020-Ohio-4784 , 162 N.E.3d 776 , the Ohio Supreme Court returned to the “traditional understanding” of void judgments. | 6 | 2020–2021 |
State v. Beasley
green
2 sentences2020In other words, “ ‘[a]ny attempt by a court to disregard statutory requirements * * * renders the attempted sentence a nullity or void.’ ” (Ellipsis sic.) Id. at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75 , 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984). 2011Id. {¶10} The Supreme Court has never overruled Beasley and acknowledged the opinion in Fischer when discussing the evolution of the void sentence doctrine in Ohio. | 3 | 2010–2020 |
State v. Saxon
green
2 sentences2020Overlaying our void-sentence jurisprudence conflicted with this precedent, and I concluded that [b]y expanding the void-sentence doctrine beyond postrelease- control cases and cases in which the trial court abridges the sentencing commands of the General Assembly, this decision will spawn a new wave of void-sentence litigation and severely undermine res judicata, which “promotes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue 29 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO on which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” Id. at ¶ 95 (K 2016By expanding the void-sentence doctrine beyond postrelease-control cases and cases in which the trial court abridges the sentencing commands of the General Assembly, this decision will spawn a new wave of void-sentence litigation and severely undermine res judicata, which “promotes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176 , 2006-Ohio-1245 , 846 N.E.2d 824 , ¶ 18. “[C]ases of postconviction relief pose difficult problems for | 2 | 2016–2020 |
State v. Morrison
neutral
2 sentences2017Thus, under the circumstances of the case sub judice, we hold appellant's motion for resentencing based on claims of disproportionality and the overriding purposes of sentencing was properly rejected by the trial court as outside the void sentence exception and thus not under said court's jurisdiction. {¶14} State v. Morrison, 2016-Ohio-1271, ¶¶ 11-14 . {¶15} “Alleged errors in consecutive sentencing do not render a sentence void. 2017As in appellant’s earlier appeal in State v. Morrison, 2016-Ohio-1271 , this issue falls outside the void sentence exception. {¶33} The fourth assignment of error is overruled. | 2 | 2016–2017 |
State v. Hudson (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2025But in State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913 , and State v. Hudson, 2020-Ohio-3849 , the Supreme Court revisited the void sentence doctrine, and held that “[w]hen a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction in imposing postrelease control renders the court’s judgment voidable. . . . [Such a sentence is] not void, and it is not subject to collateral attack.” Harper at ¶ 4-5. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Perry
green
2 sentences2021(Emphasis added.) State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 , 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. {¶9} After years of expanding on the void sentence doctrine, in the cases of Harper and Henderson, the Supreme Court of Ohio returned to the “traditional understanding” of void and voidable judgments. 2021(Emphasis added.) State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 , 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. {¶9} After years of expanding on the void sentence doctrine, in the cases of Harper and Henderson, the Supreme Court of Ohio returned to the “traditional understanding” of void and voidable judgments. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Goldfuss v. Davidson
green
2 sentences2020“A first principle of appellate jurisdiction is that a party ordinarily may not present 18 January Term, 2020 an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5156 , ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). 2020“A first principle of appellate jurisdiction is that a party ordinarily may not present 18 January Term, 2020 an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5156 , ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Jordan
green
2 sentences2020Because there is no statutory requirement to include “consequences” language, there is no concern about the trial court imposing a sentence without statutory 20 January Term, 2020 authority when not including that language, and thus no concern about a trial court violating its “statutory duty” by imposing a sentence unauthorized by statute, see State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 , ¶ 23 (holding that a trial court’s failure to fulfill its statutory duty of providing notice of postrelease control at sentencing renders the sentence void). {¶ 53} This court has st 2020Because there is no statutory requirement to include “consequences” language, there is no concern about the trial court imposing a sentence without statutory 20 January Term, 2020 authority when not including that language, and thus no concern about a trial court violating its “statutory duty” by imposing a sentence unauthorized by statute, see State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2004-Ohio-6085 , 817 N.E.2d 864 , ¶ 23 (holding that a trial court’s failure to fulfill its statutory duty of providing notice of postrelease control at sentencing renders the sentence void). {¶ 53} This court has st | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Martinez-Castro
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Henderson, 155 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 2019-Ohio-1421 , 120 N.E.3d 867 ; State v. Hudson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2019-Ohio-2780 , 125 N.E.3d 947 . 2020See State v. Henderson, 155 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 2019-Ohio-1421 , 120 N.E.3d 867 ; State v. Hudson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2019-Ohio-2780 , 125 N.E.3d 947 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Hudson
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Henderson, 155 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 2019-Ohio-1421 , 120 N.E.3d 867 ; State v. Hudson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2019-Ohio-2780 , 125 N.E.3d 947 . 2020See State v. Henderson, 155 Ohio St.3d 1421 , 2019-Ohio-1421 , 120 N.E.3d 867 ; State v. Hudson, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452 , 2019-Ohio-2780 , 125 N.E.3d 947 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Grimes (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2020The absence of “consequences” language does not render a sentence void {¶ 50} With its second proposition of law, the state asks this court to hold that a trial court’s failure to include in a sentencing entry language about the consequences of violating the conditions of postrelease control, as required by State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio-2927 , 85 N.E.3d 700 , ¶ 1, does not render a sentence void. 2020The absence of “consequences” language does not render a sentence void {¶ 50} With its second proposition of law, the state asks this court to hold that a trial court’s failure to include in a sentencing entry language about the consequences of violating the conditions of postrelease control, as required by State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio-2927 , 85 N.E.3d 700 , ¶ 1, does not render a sentence void. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Wintermeyer (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2020“A first principle of appellate jurisdiction is that a party ordinarily may not present 18 January Term, 2020 an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5156 , ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). 2020“A first principle of appellate jurisdiction is that a party ordinarily may not present 18 January Term, 2020 an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State v. Wintermeyer, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-5156 , ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 10, citing Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Covington
green
1 sentence2020Clark No 2019- CA-50, 2020-Ohio-390 (reviewing the various applications of the doctrine before ultimately deciding that it did not apply to a collateral attack of an improper nonmandatory sentence); State v. Grant, 1st Dist. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re J.S.
neutral
1 sentence2020Cuyahoga No. 96637, 2011-Ohio-6280 (applying the void-sentence doctrine in the serious-youth-offender context); State v. Covington, 2d Dist. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Baker
green
2 sentences2017We disagree. {¶29} As best as we can ascertain, appellant maintains that he may continue to challenge his conviction under the theory that he has never been properly sentenced, relying upon the void sentence doctrine as it relates to the imposition of post-release control on his felony murder count.2 2 In his reply brief, appellant also attempts to develop an argument in this vein that his 2004 sentencing entry was incomplete pursuant to State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197 , 2008-Ohio-3330 , 893 N.E.2d 163 . 2017We disagree. {¶29} As best as we can ascertain, appellant maintains that he may continue to challenge his conviction under the theory that he has never been properly sentenced, relying upon the void sentence doctrine as it relates to the imposition of post-release control on his felony murder count.2 2 In his reply brief, appellant also attempts to develop an argument in this vein that his 2004 sentencing entry was incomplete pursuant to State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197 , 2008-Ohio-3330 , 893 N.E.2d 163 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence2016No. 12 MA 197, 2013-Ohio-4000, ¶ 17 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.