Pennsylvania Constitution bar in Pennsylvania

2025Leister, 712 A.2d at 335 (citing Commonwealth ex rel.

2025Kelly, supra. Where, as here, the record supports the court’s finding of manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, “neither the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor Article I, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution will bar retrial.” Leister, supra at 335 (citing Commonwealth ex rel.

2022In Commonwealth v. Diehl, 532 Pa. 214 , [216–17], 615 A.2d 690 [, 691 (1992)], our Supreme Court, when considering whether manifest necessity for the trial court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial existed, stated: Since Justice Story’s 1824 opinion in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 , it has been well settled that the question whether under the Double Jeopardy Clause there can be a new trial after a mistrial has been declared without the defendant’s request or consent depends on [whether] there is a manifest necessity for the mistrial, or the ends of publi

2022In Commonwealth v. Diehl, 532 Pa. 214 , [216–17], 615 A.2d 690 [, 691 (1992)], our Supreme Court, when considering whether manifest necessity for the trial court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial existed, stated: Since Justice Story’s 1824 opinion in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 , it has been well settled that the question whether under the Double Jeopardy Clause there can be a new trial after a mistrial has been declared without the defendant’s request or consent depends on [whether] there is a manifest necessity for the mistrial, or the ends of publi

2019“Where there exists manifest necessity for a trial judge to declare a mistrial sua sponte, neither the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor Article I, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution will bar retrial.” Walker, 954 A.2d at 1254 (quoting Kelly, 797 A.2d at 936 ).

2019“Where there exists manifest necessity for a trial judge to declare a mistrial sua sponte, neither the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor Article I, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution will bar retrial.” Walker, 954 A.2d at 1254 (quoting Kelly, 797 A.2d at 936 ).

2023In support, Appellant contends that the Alexander Court “merely reaffirmed the existing Pennsylvania Constitution standard” that was in place prior to the Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality).

2015Alternatively, [Appellant] sought leave to file a second amended petition so that he could raise state habeas corpus claims pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and claim that his mandatory sentence of life without parole “violates the ban on cruel punishments pursuant to Art. 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id. at 3 .

2014Commonwealth v. Hoovler, 880 A.2d 1258, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kelly, 797 A.2d 925, 936 (Pa. Super. 2002)), appeal denied, 890 A.2d 1057 (Pa. 2005)).

2011If so, the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution would bar retrial of any charges prosecuted at the second trial. [Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177 , 615 A.2d 321 (1992) ].

2011If so, the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution would bar retrial of any charges prosecuted at the second trial. [Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177 , 615 A.2d 321 (1992) ].

2008Leister, 712 A.2d at 335 (citing Commonwealth ex rel.

2006The City requested the trial court to certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) "on the specific question of whether the city can be liable under the Pennsylvania Constitution for a claim of excessive force." Jones, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 54 .

2006The City requested the trial court to certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal by permission pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) “on the specific question of whether the city can be liable under the Pennsylvania Constitution for a claim of excessive force.” Jones, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th at 54 .

1995Our Supreme Court adjudicated the issue of Representative Sweeney’s federal constitutional right of due process after having been convicted in a federal court of three counts of mail fraud, and, citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), followed the principle that ordinarily, the exercise of the judiciary’s power to review the constitutionality of legislative action does not offend the principle of the separation of powers.

1995Similarly, in Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493 , 375 A.2d 698 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not bar judicial review of legislative action expelling a member from Pennsylvania’s General Assembly.

1995Similarly, in Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493 , 375 A.2d 698 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution does not bar judicial review of legislative action expelling a member from Pennsylvania’s General Assembly.

1993In County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 517 Pa. 65 , 534 A.2d 760 (1987), our Supreme Court found that the system of *518 county funding of the judicial system violated Article 5, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the requirement that there be a unified judicial system mandates that the funding for all judicial districts be uniform and not dependent on adequate appropriations for 67 different Boards of County Commissioners.

1993In County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 517 Pa. 65 , 534 A.2d 760 (1987), our Supreme Court found that the system of *518 county funding of the judicial system violated Article 5, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the requirement that there be a unified judicial system mandates that the funding for all judicial districts be uniform and not dependent on adequate appropriations for 67 different Boards of County Commissioners.

1984In Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46 , 470 A.2d 457 (1983), our Supreme Court held that a defendant accused of a possessory crime will continue to have “automatic standing” under Article I, section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution to challenge the admissibility of evidence alleged to be the fruit of an illegal search.

1984In Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46 , 470 A.2d 457 (1983), our Supreme Court held that a defendant accused of a possessory crime will continue to have “automatic standing” under Article I, section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution to challenge the admissibility of evidence alleged to be the fruit of an illegal search.

1977IV — Due Process In order to determine the requirements of procedural due process, we must first determine if the interest as serted by Sweeney is protected by the due process clause, U.S.Const. amendment XIV. 30 Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association v. Insurance Department, 471 Pa. 437 , 370 A.2d 685 (1977).

1977IV — Due Process In order to determine the requirements of procedural due process, we must first determine if the interest as serted by Sweeney is protected by the due process clause, U.S.Const. amendment XIV. 30 Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association v. Insurance Department, 471 Pa. 437 , 370 A.2d 685 (1977).