168 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1960–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapski v. Copley Pressgreen2 sentences2021Second, Allstate contends the statements are capable of an innocent construction because the allegedly defamatory statements, made months after plaintiffs were fired from Allstate, could reasonably be understood to be about other former employees in the Equity -9- Division and the statements can be reasonably construed in a way that does not assert illegal or unethical behavior by former employees. ¶ 32 Both of Allstate’s arguments are rooted in the innocent construction rule, which our supreme court clarified in Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344 (1982). 2014In applying the innocent construction rule, we must consider the alleged defamatory words " 'in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning.' " Id. at 503 (quoting Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982)). ¶ 43 Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant's articles constituted defamation per se because they implied that she either violated state law in order to obtain a homeowner's exemption or committed perjury in her board of election filings. | 16 | 61 |
John v. Tribune Companygreen2 sentences2021“Thus, the innocent construction rule requires a writing ‘to be read as a whole.’ ” Id. (quoting John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442 (1962)). 2015Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 512 (the innocent construction rule requires that a writing be read “ ‘as a whole’ ” (quoting John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442 (1962)). | 7 | 58 |
Tuite v. Corbittgreen2 sentences2024For example, the supreme court refused a request to abandon the innocent construction rule in defamation per se cases, alluding to the advancement of “free speech and free press and *** the robust discussion of daily affairs.” Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 511 . 2021Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 510, 512 . ¶ 19 Instead, when “construing the statement under the innocent construction rule, [we] must ‘give the allegedly defamatory words their natural and obvious meaning’ and interpret them ‘as they appeared to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader.’ ” Id. at 510 (quoting Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93 ). “[T]he context of [the] statement is critical in determining its meaning.” Id. at 512. | 7 | 18 |
Valentine v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurancegreen2 sentences1990In Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill. 2d 168, 171 , this court stated that the innocent construction rule had been “consistently applied by the appellate courts in this State.” Three justices dissented in Valentine, disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion that the statement at issue was subject to an innocent construction. 1986(Valentine v. North American Co. (1974), 60 Ill. 2d 168, 172 (Ward, J., Underwood, C.J., and Schaefer, J., dissenting).) In John it was said: “We further believe the language in defendant’s articles is not libelous of plaintiff when the innocent construction rule is consulted. | 5 | 13 |
Green v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2026App. 3d 443, 452 (2000). ¶ 23 Another defense is the innocent construction rule, under which “even if an alleged statement falls into one of the categories of words that are defamatory per se, it will not be actionable per se if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction.” Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 499 (2009). 2025Because damages are presumed, “a defamation per se claim must be pled with a heightened level of precision and particularity.” Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 495 . ¶ 40 Additionally, under the innocent construction rule, a statement that falls into a category of words that are defamatory per se is not actionable if it is reasonably capable of an innocent -14- Nos. 1-23-1077 and 1-23-2376, cons. construction. | 4 | 11 |
Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp.green2 sentences2025There are five categories of statements considered to be defamatory per se, including, as relevant here, words that impute that a person: “is unable to perform or lacks integrity in performing her or his employment duties”; “lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person in her or his profession”; and “has committed a crime.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579-80 (2006). ¶ 128 Under the innocent construction rule, even if a statement fits into one of the defamatory per se categories, it will not be actionable “if it is reasonably capable of an innocent 2023Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11 ; see also Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 413 (1996). ¶ 19 Plaintiffs allege the innocent construction rule does not defeat their claim because the quoted language in Steinberg’s article encompasses a sufficiently small group of Polish emigrants in the Chicago area who grew up in Poland during World War II. | 4 | 8 |
Tuite v. Corbittgreen2 sentences2008Tuite v. Corbitt, 358 Ill. 2008Tuite v. Corbitt, 358 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc.green2 sentences2021Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 510, 512 . ¶ 19 Instead, when “construing the statement under the innocent construction rule, [we] must ‘give the allegedly defamatory words their natural and obvious meaning’ and interpret them ‘as they appeared to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader.’ ” Id. at 510 (quoting Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93 ). “[T]he context of [the] statement is critical in determining its meaning.” Id. at 512. 2015“Whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to an innocent interpretation is a question of law for the court to decide.” Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 90 (1996).8 8 We note that in Bryson, our supreme court ruled the innocent construction rule could not be the subject of a section of a section 2-615 motion and treated it as affirmative matter raised under section 2-619 of the Code, where the plaintiff did not attach a copy of the article to her complaint as an exhibit or recite the article within the complaint. | 3 | 32 |
Mittelman v. Witousred2 sentences2022App. 3d 966, 969 (1991)), if shielded under the innocent construction rule (Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992)), if safeguarded as an expression of opinion (Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 239 (1989)), or if protected by a qualified privilege (Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing and Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16 (1993)). 2006This court addressed the innocent construction rule again in Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 232 (1989), observing that “the law of defamation in general — and the innocent construction rule in particular — has spawned a morass of case law in which consistency and harmony have long ago disappeared.” Nevertheless, we did not abandon the innocent construction rule. | 3 | 16 |
Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co.green2 sentences2025There are five categories of statements considered to be defamatory per se, including, as relevant here, words that impute that a person: “is unable to perform or lacks integrity in performing her or his employment duties”; “lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person in her or his profession”; and “has committed a crime.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2d 558, 579-80 (2006). ¶ 128 Under the innocent construction rule, even if a statement fits into one of the defamatory per se categories, it will not be actionable “if it is reasonably capable of an innocent 2009Therefore, we adhere to the rule stated in Chapski and recently reaffirmed in Solaia Technology, 221 Ill. 2d at 580-81 , to analyze whether the innocent construction rule applies to bar plaintiffs claim for defamation per se. | 3 | 5 |
American Int'l Hosp. v. Chicago Tribune Co.green2 sentences1987App. 3d 1019 , 483 N.E.2d 965 , this court held: “Plaintiff maintains that the circuit court erroneously applied the innocent construction rule to dismiss its complaint, which set forth a cause of action in libel per quod. 1987We disagree. * * * Illinois law is unsettled as to whether the innocent construction rule applies to actions in libel per quod, in addition to libel per se. [Citation.] Nonetheless, decisions considering allegedly defamatory language in libel per quod actions have evaluated such language in light of ‘related principles,’ suggesting that the words be read in context and given their natural and obvious meanings, and the complaint dismissed if the challenged words are not reasonably or fairly capable of the meaning assigned to them by the plaintiff. [Citations.]” 136 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
| Seith v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Maxit, Inc. v. Van Clevegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Salamone v. HOLLINGER INTERN., INC.green | 2 | 2 |
| Harrison v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Parker v. House O'Lite Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Taradash v. Adelet/Scott-Fetzer Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.green | 2 | 2 |
Owen v. Carrgreen2 sentences1991Examining the statements in context, as required by the innocent construction rule, revealed them to be “ ‘an attorney’s biased presentation of his client’s view.’ ” (Owen, 113 Ill. 2d at 280 , 497 N.E.2d at 1148 .) As such, they were not actionable per se. 1991Examining the statements in context, as required by the innocent construction rule, revealed them to be “ ‘an attorney’s biased presentation of his client’s view.’ ” (Owen, 113 Ill. 2d at 280 , 497 N.E.2d at 1148 .) As such, they were not actionable per se. | 1 | 8 |
Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2006Recognizing that the rule *131 had been applied in wildly divergent ways by our appellate court, the strongest argument this court could muster in defense of the innocent construction rule was "that it comports with the constitutional interests of free speech and free press and encourages the robust discussion of daily affairs." Chapski, 92 Ill.2d at 350 , 65 Ill.Dec. 884 , 442 N.E.2d 195 , citing Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill.App.3d 67, 71 , 33 Ill.Dec. 708 , 397 N.E.2d 41 (1979). 2006Recognizing that the rule had been applied in wildly divergent ways by our appellate court, the strongest argument this court could muster in defense of the innocent construction rule was “that it comports with the constitutional interests of free speech and free press and encourages the robust discussion of daily affairs.” Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 350 , citing Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. | 1 | 5 |
Cartwright v. Garrisongreen2 sentences1996Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League, 140 Ill.App.3d 127, 134 , 94 Ill.Dec. 624 , 488 N.E.2d 623 (1986) (where plaintiff failed to attach league bylaws as an exhibit to his complaint, defendants properly submitted the documents in support of a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss); Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill.App.3d 536, 540 , 69 Ill.Dec. 229 , 447 N.E.2d 446 (1983) (in a defamation action, the question of whether the allegedly defamatory language is rendered nonactionable per se by reason of the innocent construction rule may properly be considered in a section 2-619 m 1996Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League, 140 Ill.App.3d 127, 134 , 94 Ill.Dec. 624 , 488 N.E.2d 623 (1986) (where plaintiff failed to attach league bylaws as an exhibit to his complaint, defendants properly submitted the documents in support of a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss); Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill.App.3d 536, 540 , 69 Ill.Dec. 229 , 447 N.E.2d 446 (1983) (in a defamation action, the question of whether the allegedly defamatory language is rendered nonactionable per se by reason of the innocent construction rule may properly be considered in a section 2-619 m | 1 | 5 |
Hambric v. Field Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences1967This innocent construction rule has been approved and underscored in other Illinois cases (Hambric v. Field Enterprises, 46 Ill. 1967This innocent construction rule has been approved and underscored in other Illinois cases (Hambric v. Field Enterprises, 46 Ill App2d 355, 358, 196 NE 2d 489 ; and cases cited). | 1 | 4 |
Anderson v. Vanden Dorpelgreen2 sentences2023Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11 ; see also Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 413 (1996). ¶ 19 Plaintiffs allege the innocent construction rule does not defeat their claim because the quoted language in Steinberg’s article encompasses a sufficiently small group of Polish emigrants in the Chicago area who grew up in Poland during World War II. 1997The defendant cites to Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel , 172 Ill. 2d 399 (1996), to support his argument. | 1 | 3 |
Heerey v. Berkegreen2 sentences2021See Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 509 (2006); Heerey v. Berke, 188 Ill. 1993App. 3d 527 , 544 N.E.2d 1037 .) Here, we find that the trial court properly applied the innocent construction rule to the per se action and that plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to recover under the per quod theory of defamation. | 1 | 3 |
Kirchner v. Greenegreen2 sentences2010However, even if we were to find that Opresnik’s statements imputed a criminal offense, “the innocent construction rule applies in determining whether a statement alleged to be defamatory per se imputes a criminal offense.” Kirchner, 294 Ill. 2010However, even if we were to find that Opresnik’s statements imputed a criminal offense, “the innocent construction rule applies in determining whether a statement alleged to be defamatory per se imputes a criminal offense.” Kirchner, 294 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Moriarty v. Greenegreen2 sentences2020Moriarty, 315 Ill. 2020Moriarty, 315 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Owens v. CBS, INC.green2 sentences1990See also Owens v. CBS, Inc. (1988), 173 Ill.App.3d 977 , 123 Ill.Dec. 521 , 527 N.E.2d 1296 . *153 When a newspaper publication is involved, the headline and news report to which it refers generally must be considered in its entirety, including the place and position of the item, to determine whether such publication is libelous under the innocent construction rule. 1990See also Owens v. CBS, Inc. (1988), 173 Ill.App.3d 977 , 123 Ill.Dec. 521 , 527 N.E.2d 1296 . *153 When a newspaper publication is involved, the headline and news report to which it refers generally must be considered in its entirety, including the place and position of the item, to determine whether such publication is libelous under the innocent construction rule. | 1 | 3 |
Kakuris v. Kleingreen2 sentences1993App. 3d 597 , 410 N.E.2d 984 , the court found that words "lack of achievement” were subject to the innocent construction rule where a communication had been published that the bank employee did not perform up to the high standards expected of officers of the bank and therefore dismissed plaintiffs action. 1982App. 3d 338, 343 ) (“attempts to eliminate the innocent-construction rule have been consistently rejected by the courts of Illinois for many years in the past”); Kakuris v. Klein (1980), 88 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
| Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc.green | 1 | 3 |
| Makis v. Area Publications Corp.green | 1 | 3 |
| Harte v. Chicago Council of Lawyersgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Vitro v. Mihelcicgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Kumaran v. Brotmangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Chavez v. ELGIN, JOLIET & EASTERN RAILWAY CO.green | 1 | 2 |
| Catalano v. Pechousgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Vee See Construction Co. v. Jensen & Halstead, Ltd.green | 1 | 2 |
| Missner v. Cliffordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| J. Maki Construction Co. v. Chicago Regional Council of Carpentersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kaltreider Construction, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences1988The innocent construction rule was first adopted obiter dictum in John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 437 , 181 N.E.2d 105 , cert, denied (1962), 371 U.S. 877 , 9 L. 1988The innocent construction rule was first adopted obiter dictum in John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 437 , 181 N.E.2d 105 , cert, denied (1962), 371 U.S. 877 , 9 L. | 16 | 1975–1988 |
John v. Tribune Co.
green
2 sentences1982Ed. 2d 114 , 83 S. Ct. 148 .) Plaintiffs contend on appeal that Cosnow’s statement is not susceptible of an innocent construction and, alternatively, if the innocent construction rule does apply, it only renders the statement nonactionable as libel 1 per se. 1982Ed. 2d 114 , 83 S. Ct. 148 .) The rule says “nonactionable as a matter of law,” not “nonactionable without proof of special damages.” We also note that some Illinois opinions discuss the innocent construction rule as if it applies to libel per quod. | 13 | 1978–1988 |
Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022App. 3d 966, 969 (1991)), if shielded under the innocent construction rule (Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992)), if safeguarded as an expression of opinion (Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 239 (1989)), or if protected by a qualified privilege (Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing and Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16 (1993)). 1995App. 3d 966, 969 , 569 N.E.2d 1104 ), if shielded under the innocent construction rule (Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11 ; Mittelman v. Witous (1989), 135 Ill. 2d 220, 232 , 552 N.E.2d 973 ; Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344 , 442 N.E.2d 195 ), if safeguarded as an expression of opinion (Mittelman, 135 Ill. 2d at 239 ), or if protected by qualified privilege (Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc. (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 16 , 619 N.E.2d 129 ). | 4 | 1995–2022 |
MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences2006Some jurisdictions, such as New York, appear always to have followed the reasonable construction rule (see, e.g., James, 40 N.Y.2d at 419 , 353 N.E.2d at 837-38 , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 874 ), while others, such as California, once followed the innocent construction rule but abandoned it in favor of the reasonable construction rule (MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536 , 343 P. 2d 36 (1959)). 2006Some jurisdictions, such as New York, appear always to have followed the reasonable construction rule (see, e.g., James, 40 N.Y.2d at 419 , 353 N.E.2d at 837-38 , 386 N.Y.S.2d at 874 ), while others, such as California, once followed the innocent construction rule but abandoned it in favor of the reasonable construction rule (MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536 , 343 P. 2d 36 (1959)). | 4 | 1976–2006 |
Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences1979According to the court, the innocent construction rule holds: “® ° that the article is to be read as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words ahegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.” ( 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442 , 181 N.E.2d 105, 108 .) The words are to be read stripped of innuendo (Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 345, 347-48 , 243 N.E.2d 217, 220 ; Van Tuil v. Carroll (1972), 3 Ill. 1979According to the court, the innocent construction rule holds: “® ° that the article is to be read as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words ahegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.” ( 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442 , 181 N.E.2d 105, 108 .) The words are to be read stripped of innuendo (Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 345, 347-48 , 243 N.E.2d 217, 220 ; Van Tuil v. Carroll (1972), 3 Ill. | 4 | 1972–1979 |
Kilbane v. Sabonjian
green
2 sentences1996App. 3d 536, 540 (1983) (in a defamation action, the question of whether the allegedly defamatory language is rendered nonactionable per se by reason of the innocent construction rule may properly be considered in a section 2 — 619 motion to dismiss); Kilbane v. Sabonjian, 38 Ill. 1996Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League, 140 Ill.App.3d 127, 134 , 94 Ill.Dec. 624 , 488 N.E.2d 623 (1986) (where plaintiff failed to attach league bylaws as an exhibit to his complaint, defendants properly submitted the documents in support of a section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss); Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill.App.3d 536, 540 , 69 Ill.Dec. 229 , 447 N.E.2d 446 (1983) (in a defamation action, the question of whether the allegedly defamatory language is rendered nonactionable per se by reason of the innocent construction rule may properly be considered in a section 2-619 m | 3 | 1996–1997 |
Jacobs v. Gasoline Retailers' Ass'n
green
2 sentences1989App. 3d 7, 10 , 328 N.E.2d 187 , appeal denied (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 597 .) Plaintiff’s assertion that the Illinois Supreme Court repudiated the innocent construction rule is misplaced. 1979The aldermen could be viewed as having generally betrayed their public trust, as Judas betrayed Christ's trust * * *." Thus, the defendant relies on the innocent construction rule which holds that words allegedly libelous must be read as a whole and in their best possible sense, and if they are capable of an innocent construction, they must be declared nonactionable at law. ( Jacobs v. Gasoline Retailers' Association (1st Dist. 1975), 28 Ill. | 3 | 1979–1989 |
Fried v. Jacobson
green
2 sentences1987This preliminary determination is properly a question of law to be resolved by the court in the first instance; whether the publication was in fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff is a question for the jury should the initial determination be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” The innocent-construction rule has since been followed by the supreme court in Fried v. Jacobson (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 24 , 457 N.E.2d 392 , and Owen v. Carr (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 273 , 497 N.E.2d 1145 . 1987This preliminary determination is properly a question of law to be resolved by the court in the first instance; whether the publication was in fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff is a question for the jury should the initial determination be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” The innocent-construction rule has since been followed by the supreme court in Fried v. Jacobson (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 24 , 457 N.E.2d 392 , and Owen v. Carr (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 273 , 497 N.E.2d 1145 . | 3 | 1985–1987 |
Garber-Pierre Food Products, Inc. v. Crooks
green
2 sentences1985App. 3d 356, 360 , 397 N.E.2d 211 .) In Chap-ski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 , 442 N.E.2d 195 , the supreme court defined the parameters of the innocent construction rule as it is currently applicable: “[A] written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se. 1985App.3d 356, 360 , 397 N.E.2d 211 .) In Chapski *1025 v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill.2d 344, 352 , 442 N.E.2d 195 , the supreme court defined the parameters of the innocent construction rule as it is currently applicable: "[A] written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se. | 3 | 1979–1985 |
| Valentine v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance green | 3 | 1975–1984 |
| People v. Walston green | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Hadley v. Subscriber Doe green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Hadley v. Doe green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Walker v. Kansas City Star Company green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Monnin v. Wood green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Steffes v. Crawford neutral | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. green | 2 | 1987–2006 |
| James v. Gannett Co. green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Kight green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co. green | 2 | 1989–2005 |
| Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. green | 2 | 1987–1998 |
| Welch v. Chicago Tribune Co. green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Belmonte v. Rubin green | 2 | 1980–1994 |
| Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Phillips green | 2 | 1989–1992 |
| American International Hospital v. Chicago Tribune Co. green | 2 | 1985–1985 |
| Audition Division, Ltd. v. Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Chicago, Inc. green | 2 | 1985–1985 |
| American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Ass'n green | 2 | 1985–1985 |
| Nagib v. News-Sun green | 2 | 1983–1983 |
| Byars v. Kolodziej green | 2 | 1978–1980 |
| Troman v. Wood green | 2 | 1979–1980 |
| Van Tuil v. Carroll neutral | 2 | 1979–1979 |
| Moricoli v. Schwartz green | 2 | 1978–1978 |
| Conrad v. Logan neutral | 2 | 1972–1975 |
| Archibald v. Belleville News Democrat green | 2 | 1968–1972 |
| Dilling v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co. green | 2 | 1969–1969 |
| Benton v. Little League Baseball, Inc. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Coghlan v. Beck green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Dupree green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Moore v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.