polestar that guides analysis in Florida

2024Weekly S34 (Fla. Feb. 8, 2024) (“In Florida, the legislature has acted to provide very specific guidance concerning the general rules for determining when separate punishments are properly applied for separate offenses that are committed during one criminal transaction or episode.”); State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that “[s]ubsection 775.021(4)(b) is the specific, clear, and precise statement of legislative intent” that serves “as the controlling polestar” that guides double-jeopardy analysis); State v. Anderson, 695 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1997) (“Legislative intent

2015“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues, and there is no clearer signpost of legislative purpose than the official .language of Florida Statutes.” State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997) (footnote omitted).

2019Florida Wrongful Death Act Our "purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction." Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 185 (Fla. 2010); see also Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013) ("Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the construction and application of the statute." (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003))).

2017“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the construction and application of the statute.” Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013) (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)).

2019Florida Wrongful Death Act Our "purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction." Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 185 (Fla. 2010); see also Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013) ("Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the construction and application of the statute." (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003))).

2017“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the construction and application of the statute.” Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013) (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)).

2011The Legislature, however, has made plain its intent in amending section 443.101(l)(a)l., and “when construing a statutory provision, legislative intent is the polestar that guides our inquiry[.]” McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998).

2000This case requires us to determine whether the legislature intended that an insurance company's failure to comply with the 45-day notice requirement of section 627.613(2) prohibits the insurer from subsequently denying a claim on the basis that the benefits sought were expressly excluded from the insurance coverage. "[W]hen construing a statutory provision, legislative intent is the polestar that guides our inquiry and thus `when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpreta

2009As we recognized in Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17 (Fla.2001): The prevailing standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature “intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.” M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996); see State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997) (“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues....”).

2006As this Court has set forth: The prevailing standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature "intended to authorize separate *1172 punishments for the two crimes." M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996); see State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1997) ("Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues. . . .").

2017E.g., Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013); Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003); Patel v. State, 141 So. 3d 1239, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

2017E.g., Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013); Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003); Patel v. State, 141 So.3d 1239, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

2024Weekly S34 (Fla. Feb. 8, 2024) (“In Florida, the legislature has acted to provide very specific guidance concerning the general rules for determining when separate punishments are properly applied for separate offenses that are committed during one criminal transaction or episode.”); State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that “[s]ubsection 775.021(4)(b) is the specific, clear, and precise statement of legislative intent” that serves “as the controlling polestar” that guides double-jeopardy analysis); State v. Anderson, 695 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1997) (“Legislative intent

1998In State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla.1989), we recognized the legislative intent to impose multiple punishments for separate offenses even if the offenses are based on only one act.

2019Florida Wrongful Death Act Our "purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction." Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 41 So. 3d 180, 185 (Fla. 2010); see also Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So. 3d 362, 367 (Fla. 2013) ("Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis regarding the construction and application of the statute." (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003))).

2016See Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004).

2016See Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004).

2015“When the language of a statute is clear and. unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation to alter the plain meaning.” State v. Cohen, 696 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

2013In arguing that his convictions amount to double jeopardy violations, appellant relies principally on Melton v. State, 73 So.3d 296, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that “convictions and sentences for the sale, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver methamphetamine in violation of section 898.13, Florida Statutes, (Count 1) and [for] trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of section 893.135, Florida Statutes, (Count 2) violated [the] constitutional protection against double jeopardy”).

2009See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 2536 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (“Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are ‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent.”); Anderson, 695 So.2d at 311 (“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues.... ”); State v. Sousa, 903 So.2d 923, 928 (Fla.2005) (“The fundamental rule of construction in determining legislative intent is to first give effect to the plain and o

2009See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 2536 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (“Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are ‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent.”); Anderson, 695 So.2d at 311 (“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues.... ”); State v. Sousa, 903 So.2d 923, 928 (Fla.2005) (“The fundamental rule of construction in determining legislative intent is to first give effect to the plain and o

2009See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 2536 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (“Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are ‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent.”); Anderson, 695 So.2d at 311 (“Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues.... ”); State v. Sousa, 903 So.2d 923, 928 (Fla.2005) (“The fundamental rule of construction in determining legislative intent is to first give effect to the plain and o

2000Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141 , 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).

2000Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141 , 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)).

2000Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.1982).

1998Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R.