Venetian Salami analysis in Florida

2022The issue here, stripped down of the international intrigue, becomes a standard Venetian Salami analysis: does “the complaint allege[] sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the statute;” and if it does, does the record reveal “sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ . . . to satisfy due process requirements?” Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d at 502 (citations omitted).

2022The issue here, stripped down of the international intrigue, becomes a standard Venetian Salami analysis: does “the complaint allege[] sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the statute;” and if it does, does the record reveal “sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ . . . to satisfy due process requirements?” Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d at 502 (citations omitted).

2025Travel Agencies of Am., Inc., 656 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (internal quotations omitted))).

2024Travel Agencies of Am., Inc., 656 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995))).

2018See, e.g. , Golant v. German Shepherd Dog Club of Am., Inc. , 26 So.3d 60 , 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that even though a not-for-profit corporation did not maintain a physical office in the United States but operated almost exclusively from the homes of its board members, the complaint's allegation that the corporation had a "de facto office" in the home of one of its board members was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Venetian Salami inquiry and bring the plaintiff's action within ambit of section 48.193(1)(a)(1) ); Premier Hotel Corp. v. M Grp.

2018See, e.g. , Golant v. German Shepherd Dog Club of Am., Inc. , 26 So.3d 60 , 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that even though a not-for-profit corporation did not maintain a physical office in the United States but operated almost exclusively from the homes of its board members, the complaint's allegation that the corporation had a "de facto office" in the home of one of its board members was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Venetian Salami inquiry and bring the plaintiff's action within ambit of section 48.193(1)(a)(1) ); Premier Hotel Corp. v. M Grp.

2016Taskey v. Burtis, 785 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Factors that go into determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist include the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct will result in suit in the forum state and the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s privileges and protections.”); Labry v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 8 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391, 394-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

2016Taskey v. Burtis, 785 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Factors that go into determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist include the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct will result in suit in the forum state and the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s privileges and protections.”); Labry v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 8 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391, 394-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

2018Resorts, S.A. , 753 So.2d 647 , 647-48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that the basis for jurisdiction was sufficiently shown under section 48.193(1)(a) because (1) the nonresident corporation had an office in Florida as shown by the corporate president's letterhead and business cards and (2) the corporation conceded to performing some services in Florida on the contract at issue).

2018Resorts, S.A. , 753 So.2d 647 , 647-48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that the basis for jurisdiction was sufficiently shown under section 48.193(1)(a) because (1) the nonresident corporation had an office in Florida as shown by the corporate president's letterhead and business cards and (2) the corporation conceded to performing some services in Florida on the contract at issue).

2025Therefore, “[i]f Florida’s long-arm statute does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction under the initial statutory prong of this inquiry, the constitutional analysis is unnecessary.” Homeway Furniture Co. of Mount Airy, Inc. v. Horne, 822 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Rautenberg v. Falz, 193 So. 3d 924, 930 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“When the plaintiff fails to meet the first prong of the 5 Venetian Salami test, the court need not consider the minimum contacts aspect.” (quoting PK Computs., Inc. v. Indep.

2025Therefore, “[i]f Florida’s long-arm statute does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction under the initial statutory prong of this inquiry, the constitutional analysis is unnecessary.” Homeway Furniture Co. of Mount Airy, Inc. v. Horne, 822 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Rautenberg v. Falz, 193 So. 3d 924, 930 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (“When the plaintiff fails to meet the first prong of the 5 Venetian Salami test, the court need not consider the minimum contacts aspect.” (quoting PK Computs., Inc. v. Indep.

2025Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000).

2025Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000).

2025“The first step of the Venetian Salami analysis may involve a burden shift.” Kitroser v. Hurt, 85 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (Fla. 2012).

2025“The first step of the Venetian Salami analysis may involve a burden shift.” Kitroser v. Hurt, 85 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (Fla. 2012).

2024See Stonepeak, 231 So. 3d at 552 ("Specific jurisdiction also 'requires a causal connection between the defendant's activities in Florida and the plaintiff's cause of action, a requirement known as 'connexity.' " (quoting Canale, 20 So. 3d at 466 )).

2024See Stonepeak, 231 So. 3d at 552 ("Specific jurisdiction also 'requires a causal connection between the defendant's activities in Florida and the plaintiff's cause of action, a requirement known as 'connexity.' " (quoting Canale, 20 So. 3d at 466 )).

2024We note, however, that the United States Supreme Court “has limited [section 48.193(1)(a)(6)] jurisdiction over a manufacturer on due process grounds, concluding that merely placing goods in the stream of commerce does not create sufficient minimum contacts to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction.” S. Wall Prods., Inc. v. Bolin, 251 So. 3d 935, 939-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). 14

2024We note, however, that the United States Supreme Court “has limited [section 48.193(1)(a)(6)] jurisdiction over a manufacturer on due process grounds, concluding that merely placing goods in the stream of commerce does not create sufficient minimum contacts to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction.” S. Wall Prods., Inc. v. Bolin, 251 So. 3d 935, 939-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). 14

2022See Northwind, 273 So. 3d at 1088 .

2020See Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“It is sufficient for purposes of satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis that a complaint allege that a contract was made by a resident plaintiff with a non-resident defendant and that payment was agreed to have been made in Florida.” (emphasis added)); Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So. 2d 434 , 436–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“In this case, the complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional activity to bring this action within Florida’s long-arm statute. [Defendant] contracted with a Florida c

2020See Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“It is sufficient for purposes of satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis that a complaint allege that a contract was made by a resident plaintiff with a non-resident defendant and that payment was agreed to have been made in Florida.” (emphasis added)); Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So. 2d 434 , 436–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“In this case, the complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional activity to bring this action within Florida’s long-arm statute. [Defendant] contracted with a Florida c

2020See Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“It is sufficient for purposes of satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis that a complaint allege that a contract was made by a resident plaintiff with a non-resident defendant and that payment was agreed to have been made in Florida.” (emphasis added)); Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So. 2d 434 , 436–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“In this case, the complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional activity to bring this action within Florida’s long-arm statute. [Defendant] contracted with a Florida c

2020See Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“It is sufficient for purposes of satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis that a complaint allege that a contract was made by a resident plaintiff with a non-resident defendant and that payment was agreed to have been made in Florida.” (emphasis added)); Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So. 2d 434 , 436–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“In this case, the complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional activity to bring this action within Florida’s long-arm statute. [Defendant] contracted with a Florida c

2020See Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“It is sufficient for purposes of satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis that a complaint allege that a contract was made by a resident plaintiff with a non-resident defendant and that payment was agreed to have been made in Florida.” (emphasis added)); Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So. 2d 434 , 436–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“In this case, the complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional activity to bring this action within Florida’s long-arm statute. [Defendant] contracted with a Florida c

2020See Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761, 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“It is sufficient for purposes of satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis that a complaint allege that a contract was made by a resident plaintiff with a non-resident defendant and that payment was agreed to have been made in Florida.” (emphasis added)); Smith Architectural Group, Inc. v. Dehaan, 867 So. 2d 434 , 436–37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“In this case, the complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional activity to bring this action within Florida’s long-arm statute. [Defendant] contracted with a Florida c

2020Motivate, Inc., 386 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint alleges in part . . . [Defendant] has done acts enumerated in Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, . . . which acts are more particularly described as follows . . . breaches a contract in this state 6 Ford’s Affidavit states that Williamson breached the Agreement when he signed a contract with CAA to be his exclusive marketing agent.

2020Motivate, Inc., 386 So. 2d 60, 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint alleges in part . . . [Defendant] has done acts enumerated in Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, . . . which acts are more particularly described as follows . . . breaches a contract in this state 6 Ford’s Affidavit states that Williamson breached the Agreement when he signed a contract with CAA to be his exclusive marketing agent.

2018See Holland v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 643 So. 2d 621 , 623 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (recognizing that “under certain circumstances a trial court, on a motion to dismiss supported by affidavit, has the authority to decide ultimate issues of fact relating to jurisdiction over the person”).

2018See Holland v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 643 So. 2d 621 , 623 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (recognizing that “under certain circumstances a trial court, on a motion to dismiss supported by affidavit, has the authority to decide ultimate issues of fact relating to jurisdiction over the person”).

2018Appellants also rely on Renaissance Health, where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that “defamatory comments posted in an internet chat room ‘that were targeted to Florida residents’ . . . in Florida were electronic communications that fell within [the long-arm statute],” satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis. 982 So. 2d at 742 (quoting Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2018Appellants also rely on Renaissance Health, where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that “defamatory comments posted in an internet chat room ‘that were targeted to Florida residents’ . . . in Florida were electronic communications that fell within [the long-arm statute],” satisfying the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis. 982 So. 2d at 742 (quoting Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2016Taskey v. Burtis, 785 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Factors that go into determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist include the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct will result in suit in the forum state and the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s privileges and protections.”); Labry v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 8 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391, 394-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

2016Taskey v. Burtis, 785 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Factors that go into determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist include the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct will result in suit in the forum state and the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s privileges and protections.”); Labry v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 8 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391, 394-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

2016Taskey v. Burtis, 785 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Factors that go into determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist include the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct will result in suit in the forum state and the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s privileges and protections.”); Labry v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 8 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391, 394-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

2016Taskey v. Burtis, 785 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Factors that go into determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist include the foreseeability that the defendant’s conduct will result in suit in the forum state and the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum’s privileges and protections.”); Labry v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 8 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391, 394-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

2016When the plaintiff fails to meet the first prong of the Venetian Salami test, the court “need not consider the minimum- contacts aspect.” Id.; see also Casi-ta, 960 So.2d at 858 .

2016When the plaintiff fails to meet the first prong of the Venetian Salami test, the court “need not consider the minimum- contacts aspect.” Id.; see also Casi-ta, 960 So.2d at 858 .

2016The appellate court instructed that on remand the motion to dismiss be granted without prejudice so as to allow the plaintiffs to amend the conn plaint if they could “assert proper allegations to support personal jurisdiction.” PK Computers, 656 So.2d at 255 ; see also Russo v. Fink, 87 So.3d 815, 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

2016The appellate court instructed that on remand the motion to dismiss be granted without prejudice so as to allow the plaintiffs to amend the conn plaint if they could “assert proper allegations to support personal jurisdiction.” PK Computers, 656 So.2d at 255 ; see also Russo v. Fink, 87 So.3d 815, 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

2013Under section 48.193(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), long-arm jurisdiction may be exercised where the “cause of action aris[es] from ... [committing a tortious act within this state.” See Arch Aluminum & Glass Co. v. Haney, 964 So.2d 228, 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

2013Under section 48.193(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), long-arm jurisdiction may be exercised where the “cause of action aris[es] from ... [committing a tortious act within this state.” See Arch Aluminum & Glass Co. v. Haney, 964 So.2d 228, 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).