26 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Royalgreen2 sentences2006See also State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 -310 ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981) (“[w]here a defendant raises an affirmative defense and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citations omitted). 2006See also State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 -310 ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981) (“[w]here a defendant raises an affirmative defense and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citations omitted). | 4 | 9 |
Andrews v. Stategreen2 sentences1999“When a defendant presents evidence that he was justified in using deadly force, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Andrews v. State, 267 Ga. 473, 474 (1) ( 480 SE2d 29 ) (1997). “[A] person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause . . . great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself.” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). 1999“When a defendant presents evidence that he was justified in using deadly force, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Andrews v. State, 267 Ga. 473, 474 (1) ( 480 SE2d 29 ) (1997). “[A] person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause . . . great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself.” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). | 3 | 5 |
Manning v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Hamilton v. State, 243 Ga. App. 10, 11 ( 532 SE2d 118 ) (2000); Manning v. State, 231 Ga. App. 584, 585 (3) ( 499 SE2d 650 ) (1998). 2001Hamilton v. State, 243 Ga. App. 10, 11 ( 532 SE2d 118 ) (2000); Manning v. State, 231 Ga. App. 584, 585 (3) ( 499 SE2d 650 ) (1998). | 2 | 2 |
Coleman v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. App. 193, 194 (2) ( 233 SE2d 42 ) (1977). *138 "[W]here the informer is a witness or participant [in the alleged crime], a request for disclosure requires the trial court to balance the benefits of disclosure to the defendant against the resulting harm to the government. 1989Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. App. 193, 194 (2) ( 233 SE2d 42 ) (1977). *138 "[W]here the informer is a witness or participant [in the alleged crime], a request for disclosure requires the trial court to balance the benefits of disclosure to the defendant against the resulting harm to the government. | 1 | 2 |
Burchett v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See generally Burchett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 271, 273 (2) ( 641 SE2d 262 ) (2007) (once evidence of an affirmative defense is presented, “it then [is] incumbent upon the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt”). 2011See generally Burchett v. State, 283 Ga. App. 271, 273 (2) ( 641 SE2d 262 ) (2007) (once evidence of an affirmative defense is presented, “it then [is] incumbent upon the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt”). | 1 | 1 |
Austin v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Austin v. State, 218 Ga. App. 90, 91 (2) ( 460 SE2d 310 ) (1995) (“where a defendant raises an affirmative defense of justification and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2002See Austin v. State, 218 Ga. App. 90, 91 (2) ( 460 SE2d 310 ) (1995) (“where a defendant raises an affirmative defense of justification and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Hamilton v. State, 243 Ga. App. 10, 11 ( 532 SE2d 118 ) (2000); Manning v. State, 231 Ga. App. 584, 585 (3) ( 499 SE2d 650 ) (1998). 2001Hamilton v. State, 243 Ga. App. 10, 11 ( 532 SE2d 118 ) (2000); Manning v. State, 231 Ga. App. 584, 585 (3) ( 499 SE2d 650 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences1999“Whether or not the circumstances of the case are such that they would excite the fears of a reasonable man to the point that he felt it necessary to use deadly force is a question for the jury.” Young v. State, 229 Ga. App. 497, 499 ( 494 SE2d 226 ) (1997). 1999“Whether or not the circumstances of the case are such that they would excite the fears of a reasonable man to the point that he felt it necessary to use deadly force is a question for the jury.” Young v. State, 229 Ga. App. 497, 499 ( 494 SE2d 226 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences1998If the defendant presents a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden shifts to the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt as one of the elements of the crime.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brooks v. State, 224 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 482 SE2d 725 ) (1997). 1998If the defendant presents a prima facie case of entrapment, the burden shifts to the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt as one of the elements of the crime.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brooks v. State, 224 Ga. App. 829, 830 (1) ( 482 SE2d 725 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Thus, although the evidence did not demand a finding of entrapment, a question of fact was presented for determination by the jury, see State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981); see also Marshall v. State, 143 Ga. App. 249, 251-253 (1) ( 237 SE2d 709 ) (1977), and the burden was on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 1989Thus, although the evidence did not demand a finding of entrapment, a question of fact was presented for determination by the jury, see State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 ( 275 SE2d 646 ) (1981); see also Marshall v. State, 143 Ga. App. 249, 251-253 (1) ( 237 SE2d 709 ) (1977), and the burden was on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
Herrmann v. Stategreen2 sentences1984That is not to say, however, that this principle (or any other principle of law) must in every case be given in charge under pain of reversal. "[I]t is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court." Herrmann v. State, 235 Ga. 400, 402 ( 220 SE2d 2 ) (1975). 1984That is not to say, however, that this principle (or any other principle of law) must in every case be given in charge under pain of reversal. "[I]t is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court." Herrmann v. State, 235 Ga. 400, 402 ( 220 SE2d 2 ) (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2017"Where a defendant raises an affirmative defense and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones v. State , 160 Ga.App. 209 , 209-210 (2), 286 S.E.2d 764 (1981) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2017"Where a defendant raises an affirmative defense and testifies to the same, the burden is on the State to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones v. State , 160 Ga.App. 209 , 209-210 (2), 286 S.E.2d 764 (1981) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 2 | 1984–2017 |
May v. State
green
1 sentence2007Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Diaz v. State
green
2 sentences2001Diaz v. State, 270 Ga. 421 -422 ( 510 SE2d 529 ) (1999). 2001Diaz v. State, 270 Ga. 421 -422 ( 510 SE2d 529 ) (1999). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Coleman v. State
green
2 sentences1997Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 7 (2) ( 413 SE2d 722 ) (1992), overruled on other grounds in Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994). 1997Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 7 (2) ( 413 SE2d 722 ) (1992), overruled on other grounds in Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Wagner v. State
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 72 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Anderson v. State
green
2 sentences1997Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 7 (2) ( 413 SE2d 722 ) (1992), overruled on other grounds in Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994). 1997Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 7 (2) ( 413 SE2d 722 ) (1992), overruled on other grounds in Coleman v. State, 264 Ga. 253 (3) ( 443 SE2d 626 ) (1994). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Walden v. State
green
2 sentences1986Walden v. State, 251 Ga. 505 (3) ( 307 SE2d 474 ) (1983). 1986Walden v. State, 251 Ga. 505 (3) ( 307 SE2d 474 ) (1983). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.