first level analysis in Oregon

2018See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (“at the first level of analysis, the court considers the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes”) rev’d on other grounds. /// 7 Identical language appears in other exemption statutes concerning the property of charitable and religious organizations.

2018See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (“at the first level of analysis, the court considers the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes”) rev’d on other grounds. /// 7 Identical language appears in other exemption statutes concerning the property of charitable and religious organizations.

2019Corp., Inc. v. Watkins, 347 Or 687, 692 , 227 P3d 1134 (2010) (“As part of that first level of analysis, this court considers its prior interpretations of the statute.”); State v. Murray, 343 Or 48, 52 , 162 P3d 255 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis of a stat- ute, this court also considers case law interpreting that statute.”).

2019Corp., Inc. v. Watkins, 347 Or 687, 692 , 227 P3d 1134 (2010) (“As part of that first level of analysis, this court considers its prior interpretations of the statute.”); State v. Murray, 343 Or 48, 52 , 162 P3d 255 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis of a stat- ute, this court also considers case law interpreting that statute.”).

2009Weber and Weber, 337 Or. 55, 67 , 91 *841 P.3d 706 (2004) ("[T]his court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing upon those statutes."); Denton and Denton, 326 Or. 236, 241 , 951 P.2d 693 (1998) ("[W]e also consider, at this first level of analysis, the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes * * * the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted.").

2009Weber and Weber, 337 Or. 55, 67 , 91 *841 P.3d 706 (2004) ("[T]his court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing upon those statutes."); Denton and Denton, 326 Or. 236, 241 , 951 P.2d 693 (1998) ("[W]e also consider, at this first level of analysis, the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes * * * the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted.").

2006See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 415 , 908 P2d 300 (1995) (examining “historical context” of a statute at the first level of analysis).

2006See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 415 , 908 P2d 300 (1995) (examining “historical context” of a statute at the first level of analysis).

2007As a term of common usage, we give the word its common meaning, Smurfit Newsprint Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or 591, 597 , 997 P2d 185 (2000) (“At the first level of analysis we examine the text and context, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.”), unless there is clear evidence that the legislature intended some other meaning, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Body Imaging, P.C., 163 Or App 526, 533 , 989 P2d 36 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 252 (2000) (“[W]e begin with [statutory text], giving the textual terms their ordinary meanings, unless the statutes or their contexts ma

2007As a term of common usage, we give the word its common meaning, Smurfit Newsprint Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or 591, 597 , 997 P2d 185 (2000) (“At the first level of analysis we examine the text and context, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.”), unless there is clear evidence that the legislature intended some other meaning, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Body Imaging, P.C., 163 Or App 526, 533 , 989 P2d 36 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 252 (2000) (“[W]e begin with [statutory text], giving the textual terms their ordinary meanings, unless the statutes or their contexts ma

1999See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 415 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), on recons 325 Or 46 (1997) (addressing the historical context of a statute in the first level of analysis).

1998Although the text of the statutory provision itself is the best evidence of the legislature’s intent, we also consider, at this first level of analysis, the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes, ibid., as well as the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 415-17 , 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons 325 Or 46 , 932 P2d 1141 (1997).

2008Bridgeview Vineyards, Inc. v. State Land Board, 211 Or App 251, 262 , 154 P3d 734 , rev den, 343 Or 690 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis, we do not consider the text in isolation; rather we employ rules of textual construction that bear directly on how to read the text, and we are careful to consider the text in context.”).

2008Bridgeview Vineyards, Inc. v. State Land Board, 211 Or App 251, 262 , 154 P3d 734 , rev den, 343 Or 690 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis, we do not consider the text in isolation; rather we employ rules of textual construction that bear directly on how to read the text, and we are careful to consider the text in context.”).

2008Bridgeview Vineyards, Inc. v. State Land Board, 211 Or App 251, 262 , 154 P3d 734 , rev den, 343 Or 690 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis, we do not consider the text in isolation; rather we employ rules of textual construction that bear directly on how to read the text, and we are careful to consider the text in context.”).

2008See Bridgeview Vineyards, Inc. v. State Land Board, 211 Or App 251, 262 , 154 P3d 734 , rev den, 343 Or 690 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis, we do not consider the text in isolation; rather, we employ rules of textual construction that bear directly on how to read the text, and we are careful to consider the text in context.”).

2011State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009); Ram Technical Services, Inc. v. Koresko, 346 Or 215, 232 , 208 P3d 950 (2009); State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532 , 964 P2d 1007 (1998). *646 ORS 81.010 has not been amended since it was enacted in 1862.

2011State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009); Ram Technical Services, Inc. v. Koresko, 346 Or 215, 232 , 208 P3d 950 (2009); State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532 , 964 P2d 1007 (1998). *646 ORS 81.010 has not been amended since it was enacted in 1862.

1999The context of a statute relevant at the first level of analysis may include other provisions of the same statute and related statutes, id. at 610-11 , prior enactments and prior judicial interpretations of those and related statutes, Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 435 , 918 P2d 808 (1996), and the historical context of the relevant enactments.

1999The context of a statute relevant at the first level of analysis may include other provisions of the same statute and related statutes, id. at 610-11 , prior enactments and prior judicial interpretations of those and related statutes, Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 435 , 918 P2d 808 (1996), and the historical context of the relevant enactments.

2017Madson, 209 Or App at 383 (“If, based on that examination [of the text and context] and a review of the circumstances of the contract’s formation, the meaning of the provisions is clear, we construe the terms as a matter of law.”); Yogman, 325 Or at 361 (After the court examines the text and context, “ [i]f the provision is clear, the analysis ends.”).

2009Yogman, 325 Or. at 361 , 937 P.2d 1019 . [7] Central to the parties' dispute is the meaning of the clause added to the contract by paragraph 2 of Addendum B.

2016See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (“[T]here is no more persuasive evidence of the intent of the legislature than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (text and context are considered in the first level of analysis).

2016See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72 , 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (“[T]here is no more persuasive evidence of the intent of the legislature than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11 , 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (text and context are considered in the first level of analysis).

2007As a term of common usage, we give the word its common meaning, Smurfit Newsprint Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or 591, 597 , 997 P2d 185 (2000) (“At the first level of analysis we examine the text and context, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.”), unless there is clear evidence that the legislature intended some other meaning, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Body Imaging, P.C., 163 Or App 526, 533 , 989 P2d 36 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 252 (2000) (“[W]e begin with [statutory text], giving the textual terms their ordinary meanings, unless the statutes or their contexts ma

2007As a term of common usage, we give the word its common meaning, Smurfit Newsprint Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or 591, 597 , 997 P2d 185 (2000) (“At the first level of analysis we examine the text and context, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.”), unless there is clear evidence that the legislature intended some other meaning, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Body Imaging, P.C., 163 Or App 526, 533 , 989 P2d 36 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 252 (2000) (“[W]e begin with [statutory text], giving the textual terms their ordinary meanings, unless the statutes or their contexts ma

2019Corp., Inc. v. Watkins, 347 Or 687, 692 , 227 P3d 1134 (2010) (“As part of that first level of analysis, this court considers its prior interpretations of the statute.”); State v. Murray, 343 Or 48, 52 , 162 P3d 255 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis of a stat- ute, this court also considers case law interpreting that statute.”).

2019Corp., Inc. v. Watkins, 347 Or 687, 692 , 227 P3d 1134 (2010) (“As part of that first level of analysis, this court considers its prior interpretations of the statute.”); State v. Murray, 343 Or 48, 52 , 162 P3d 255 (2007) (“At the first level of analysis of a stat- ute, this court also considers case law interpreting that statute.”).

2017Madson, 209 Or App at 383 (“If, based on that examination [of the text and context] and a review of the circumstances of the contract’s formation, the meaning of the provisions is clear, we construe the terms as a matter of law.”); Yogman, 325 Or at 361 (After the court examines the text and context, “ [i]f the provision is clear, the analysis ends.”).

2012Gaines, 346 Or at 171 ; see also State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (explaining that courts consider prior cases construing a statute at the first level of analysis). “[OJnce the meaning and application of a statute have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.” Wilson v. Tri-Met, 234 Or App 615, 624 , 228 P3d 1225 , rev den, 348 Or 669 (2010); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by th

2012Gaines, 346 Or at 171 ; see also State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (explaining that courts consider prior cases construing a statute at the first level of analysis). “[OJnce the meaning and application of a statute have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.” Wilson v. Tri-Met, 234 Or App 615, 624 , 228 P3d 1225 , rev den, 348 Or 669 (2010); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by th

2012Gaines, 346 Or at 171 ; see also State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (explaining that courts consider prior cases construing a statute at the first level of analysis). “[OJnce the meaning and application of a statute have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.” Wilson v. Tri-Met, 234 Or App 615, 624 , 228 P3d 1225 , rev den, 348 Or 669 (2010); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by th

2012Gaines, 346 Or at 171 ; see also State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (explaining that courts consider prior cases construing a statute at the first level of analysis). “[OJnce the meaning and application of a statute have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.” Wilson v. Tri-Met, 234 Or App 615, 624 , 228 P3d 1225 , rev den, 348 Or 669 (2010); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by th

2012Gaines, 346 Or at 171 ; see also State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (explaining that courts consider prior cases construing a statute at the first level of analysis). “[OJnce the meaning and application of a statute have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.” Wilson v. Tri-Met, 234 Or App 615, 624 , 228 P3d 1225 , rev den, 348 Or 669 (2010); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by th

2012Gaines, 346 Or at 171 ; see also State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (explaining that courts consider prior cases construing a statute at the first level of analysis). “[OJnce the meaning and application of a statute have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.” Wilson v. Tri-Met, 234 Or App 615, 624 , 228 P3d 1225 , rev den, 348 Or 669 (2010); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by th

2012Gaines, 346 Or at 171 ; see also State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 100 , 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (explaining that courts consider prior cases construing a statute at the first level of analysis). “[OJnce the meaning and application of a statute have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.” Wilson v. Tri-Met, 234 Or App 615, 624 , 228 P3d 1225 , rev den, 348 Or 669 (2010); see also Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 77 , 948 P2d 722 (1997) (“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted by th

2010Marshall’s Towing v. Department of State Police, 339 Or 54, 62 , 116 P3d 873 *110 (2005).

2010Marshall’s Towing v. Department of State Police, 339 Or 54, 62 , 116 P3d 873 *110 (2005).

2009See Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 401 , 84 P3d 140 (2004) (considering text and context at the first level of analysis).

2009See Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or 392, 401 , 84 P3d 140 (2004) (considering text and context at the first level of analysis).

2009Weber and Weber, 337 Or 55, 67 , 91 P3d 706 (2004) (“[T]his court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing upon those statutes.”); Denton and Denton, 326 Or 236, 241 , 951 P2d 693 (1998) (“[W]e also consider, at this first level of analysis, the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes * * * the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted.”).

2009Weber and Weber, 337 Or. 55, 67 , 91 *841 P.3d 706 (2004) ("[T]his court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing upon those statutes."); Denton and Denton, 326 Or. 236, 241 , 951 P.2d 693 (1998) ("[W]e also consider, at this first level of analysis, the context of the statutory provision at issue, which includes * * * the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted.").