elemental principle in Florida

2006See S & T, 909 So.2d at 377 . [2] *304 ANALYSIS We have previously stated that "[i]t is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property." Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1967).

2004Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Fla.1985) (recognizing that this Court has adopted "the `American Rule' that attorney fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties"); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1967) ("It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party ... (1) where authorized by contract; [and] (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment;....").

1986Cf., AGO 68-76 in which this office concluded that, in the case of a special act levying a recreational tax, effective only after approval by the voters in a county-wide referendum, that "expenditure of the moneys realized from the tax imposition is limited to those purposes expressly enumerated in the act, of which the voters were expressly aware at the time of their approval vote in the referendum election." As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Oven v. Ausley, 143 So. 588 , 589 (Fla. 1932), "it is a violation of an elemental principle in the administration of public funds for those who are

1983See also, Oven v. Ausley, 143 So. 588 at 589 (Fla. 1932) (it is a violation of an elemental principle in the administration of public funds for those who are charged with the trust of their proper expenditure not to apply such funds to the purposes for which they were raised; when funds are raised by taxation, for one purpose they cannot be diverted to some other purpose without legislative authority).

2026Levin merely recognizes and properly applies the terms of the rule. 2 See, e.g., State v. Town of Sweetwater, 112 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1959) (“It is an elemental principle of appellate procedure that every judgment, order or decree of a trial court brought up for review is clothed with the presumption of correctness and that the burden is upon the appellant in all of such proceedings to make error clearly appear.”). 9 If postconviction appellants wish to present whatever part of the trial record they believe supports relief, regardless of whether it is an authorized part of the record as set

2022See State v. Town of Sweetwater, 112 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1959) (“It is an elemental principle of appellate procedure that every judgment, order or decree of a trial court brought up for review is clothed with the presumption of correctness and that the burden is upon the appellant in all of such proceedings to make error clearly appear.”); Lynn v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955) (“It is elementary that when a decree of the trial court is brought here on appeal the duty rests upon the appealing party to make error clearly appear.

2010VII , s. 9 , Fla. Const.). 13 See Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle v. Hobe Sound Company , 138 Fla. 141 , 189 So. 249 (1939); Dickinson v. Stone , 251 So. 2d 268 , 273-274 (Fla. 1971) (it is a violation of an elemental principle in the administration of public funds for one who is charged with the trust of their proper expenditure not to apply those funds to the purposes for which they are raised).

1977Dickinson v. Stone, 251 So.2d 268 , 273 (Fla. 1971); Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle v. Hobe Sound Co., 189 So. 249 , 250 (Fla. 1939); Oven v. Ausley, supra , at p. 589; Taylor v. Williams, 196 So. 214 , 217 (Fla. 1940).

2010And see Oven v. Ausley , 106 Fla. 455 , 143 So. 588 (1932); Taylor v. Williams , 142 Fla. 756 , 196 So. 214 (Fla. 1940). 14 See Op. Att'y Gen.

1971See Oven v. Ausley, 106 Fla. 455 , 143 So. 588 (1932); Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle v. Hobe Sound Company, 138 Fla. 141 , 189 So. 249 (1939); *274 Taylor v. Williams, 142 Fla. 756 , 196 So. 214 (1940).

2022See State v. Town of Sweetwater, 112 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1959) (“It is an elemental principle of appellate procedure that every judgment, order or decree of a trial court brought up for review is clothed with the presumption of correctness and that the burden is upon the appellant in all of such proceedings to make error clearly appear.”); Lynn v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955) (“It is elementary that when a decree of the trial court is brought here on appeal the duty rests upon the appealing party to make error clearly appear.

2022An appellant does not discharge this duty by merely posing a question with an accompanying assertion that it was improperly answered in the court below and then dumping the matter into the lap of the appellate court for decision.” (citation 12 omitted)); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distribs., Inc., 442 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (“When points, positions, facts and supporting authorities are omitted from the brief, a court is entitled to believe that such are waived, abandoned, or deemed by counsel to be unworthy.

2006See S & T, 909 So.2d at 377 . [2] *304 ANALYSIS We have previously stated that "[i]t is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property." Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1967).

2004Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Fla.1985) (recognizing that this Court has adopted "the `American Rule' that attorney fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties"); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1967) ("It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party ... (1) where authorized by contract; [and] (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment;....").

1982Second, it violates an elemental rule governing summary judgments. "[T]o obtain a summary judgment when the defendant asserts affirmative defenses, the plaintiff must either disprove those defenses by evidence or establish the legal insufficiency of the defenses." Bunner v. Florida Coast Bank, 390 So.2d 126, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see also Esteban v. Cordoba, 398 So.2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).

1982Second, it violates an elemental rule governing summary judgments. "[T]o obtain a summary judgment when the defendant asserts affirmative defenses, the plaintiff must either disprove those defenses by evidence or establish the legal insufficiency of the defenses." Bunner v. Florida Coast Bank, 390 So.2d 126, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); see also Esteban v. Cordoba, 398 So.2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).

1981The Florida Supreme Court states the applicable law here in Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 341 So.2d 759, 761 (Fla.1976), wherein it quoted with approval from Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1967), as follows: “It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney’s fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other pr

1972It is an elemental rule of statutory construction that “when the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous the courts must give them their plain meaning.” Vocelle v. Knight Brothers Paper Co., supra at 667.

1934See Milligan v. Keyser, 52 Fla. 331 , 42 South.