six-month discovery rule in Michigan

2026As explained, while the Miller Court classified the six-month discovery rule in MCL 600.5838a(2) as only an alternative statute of limitations, it classified MCL 600.5852 as “a saving statute, not a statute of limitations.” Miller, 466 Mich at 202 .

2026As explained, while the Miller Court classified the six-month discovery rule in MCL 600.5838a(2) as only an alternative statute of limitations, it classified MCL 600.5852 as “a saving statute, not a statute of limitations.” Miller, 466 Mich at 202 .

2017The Court concluded that “[b]ecause the plaintiff filed her claim well past two years from [the defendant’s] last day of service, the suit [was] barred under the two-year limitation provision,” and it further concluded that the plaintiff’s “action [was] also barred under -8- the six-month discovery rule.” Id. at 544 .

2017The Court concluded that “[b]ecause the plaintiff filed her claim well past two years from [the defendant’s] last day of service, the suit [was] barred under the two-year limitation provision,” and it further concluded that the plaintiff’s “action [was] also barred under -8- the six-month discovery rule.” Id. at 544 .

1998In Solowy , at 222, the Court, observing that the “possible cause of action” standard established in Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1 ; 506 NW2d 816 (1993) (a pharmaceutical products liability case), and Gebhardt v O’Rourke, 444 Mich 535 , 510 NW2d 900 (1994) (legal malpractice), was “not specific to those types of claims” and applied broadly to “other types of tort suits that are subject to the discovery rule,” held that the six-month discovery rule period begins to run in medical malpractice actions when the plaintiff, on the basis of objective facts, is aware of a possible cause of ac

1998In Solowy , at 222, the Court, observing that the “possible cause of action” standard established in Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1 ; 506 NW2d 816 (1993) (a pharmaceutical products liability case), and Gebhardt v O’Rourke, 444 Mich 535 , 510 NW2d 900 (1994) (legal malpractice), was “not specific to those types of claims” and applied broadly to “other types of tort suits that are subject to the discovery rule,” held that the six-month discovery rule period begins to run in medical malpractice actions when the plaintiff, on the basis of objective facts, is aware of a possible cause of ac

2023“This Court has also held that a client terminated his attorney’s representation by sending a letter stating that the attorney did not have authority to act on his behalf.” Id., citing Hooper v Hill Lewis, 191 Mich App 312, 315 ; 477 NW2d 114 (1991).

2023Indeed, “the retention of alternate counsel is sufficient proof of the client’s intent to terminate the attorney’s 4 There is also a six-month discovery exception, see MCL 600.5838(2), but no one has argued that this exception is applicable in this case. -6- representation.” Id.

2023“This Court has also held that a client terminated his attorney’s representation by sending a letter stating that the attorney did not have authority to act on his behalf.” Id., citing Hooper v Hill Lewis, 191 Mich App 312, 315 ; 477 NW2d 114 (1991).

2023“This Court has also held that a client terminated his attorney’s representation by sending a letter stating that the attorney did not have authority to act on his behalf.” Id., citing Hooper v Hill Lewis, 191 Mich App 312, 315 ; 477 NW2d 114 (1991).

2015“The period applicable to medical malpractice is two years from the accrual date.” Kincaid, 300 Mich App at 523 , citing MCL 600.5805(6).

2015“Under the six-month discovery rule, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that she did not discover or could not have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence the existence of a possible medical malpractice claim more than six months before she filed her complaint.” Turner v Mercy Hosps & Health Servs of Detroit, 210 Mich App 345, 353 ; 533 NW2d 365 (1995).

2015“Under the six-month discovery rule, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that she did not discover or could not have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence the existence of a possible medical malpractice claim more than six months before she filed her complaint.” Turner v Mercy Hosps & Health Servs of Detroit, 210 Mich App 345, 353 ; 533 NW2d 365 (1995).

2014In Driver , “the six-month discovery rule provide[d] the applicable limitations period.” Id. at 250 .

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2006Centers, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 527 (2005); Evans v. Hallal, 472 Mich. 929 , 697 N.W.2d 526 (2005); McMiddleton v. Bolling, 267 Mich.App. 667, 671 , 705 N.W.2d 720 (2005); Lentini v. Urbancic (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 579 , 582 n. 3, 705 N.W.2d 701 (2005). [3] Not only were the cases dismissed, but the grounds of dismissal call into question the adequacy of counsel's representation; a statute of limitations error on the part of trial counsel is the most rudimentary error. [4] Although plaintiff apparently is the successor personal representative, she relies on the date the initial persona

2002In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411 ; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). *202 Following these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the six-month discovery rule is a “period of limitation” within the meaning of the saving statute.

2002In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411 ; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). *202 Following these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the six-month discovery rule is a “period of limitation” within the meaning of the saving statute.

2002The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1 ; 568 NW2d 131 (1997), and held that the six-month discovery rule for medical malpractice actions was not incorporated by the wrongful death saving *198 statute. 1 We reverse the judgments of the trial court and Court of Appeals and overrule Poffenbarger to the extent that it held that MCL 600.5852 does not incorporate the six-month discovery rule. i We borrow the Court of Appeals statement of facts: Decedent went to see his internist, Dr. Attary, in 1993 because he had a chronic cough and had been spitting up bloo

2002The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1 ; 568 NW2d 131 (1997), and held that the six-month discovery rule for medical malpractice actions was not incorporated by the wrongful death saving *198 statute. 1 We reverse the judgments of the trial court and Court of Appeals and overrule Poffenbarger to the extent that it held that MCL 600.5852 does not incorporate the six-month discovery rule. i We borrow the Court of Appeals statement of facts: Decedent went to see his internist, Dr. Attary, in 1993 because he had a chronic cough and had been spitting up bloo

1995RJA, § 5838(2) provides the following six-month discovery rule for malpractice actions: RJA, § 5813 provides: All other personal actions shall be commenced within the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different period is stated in the statutes. [MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813.] RJA, § 5805(8) provides: The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property. [MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).] RJA, § 5807 provides in relevant part: No person m

1995RJA, § 5838(2) provides the following six-month discovery rule for malpractice actions: RJA, § 5813 provides: All other personal actions shall be commenced within the period of 6 years after the claims accrue and not afterwards unless a different period is stated in the statutes. [MCL 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813.] RJA, § 5805(8) provides: The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property. [MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).] RJA, § 5807 provides in relevant part: No person m

1995MCL 600.5838a(3); MSA 27A.5838(1)(3); Chase, supra at 198 ; Amrhein, supra. This Court has held that the discovery rule does not act to hold a matter in abeyance indefinitely while a plaintiff seeks professional assistance to determine the existence of a claim.

1995MCL 600.5838a(3); MSA 27A.5838(1)(3); Chase, supra at 198 ; Amrhein, supra. This Court has held that the discovery rule does not act to hold a matter in abeyance indefinitely while a plaintiff seeks professional assistance to determine the existence of a claim.

1994Recently, in Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1 ; 490 NW2d 305 (1993), we stated that the standard under the discovery rule is not that the plaintiff knows of a "likely” cause of action.

1989Finally, we note that, even in her appellate brief, plaintiff concedes that, all along, she had "a vague notion that she should not have received certain shots during her hospital stay.” In order for a medical malpractice claim to be deemed discovered under the six-month discovery rule, a plaintiff need only have reason to believe that his or her treatment was improper. 'This *350 does not require the advice of an attorney, but merely requires a subjective belief that a malpractice claim is possible.” Antal v Porretta, 165 Mich App 238, 242 ; 418 NW2d 395 (1987).

1989Finally, we note that, even in her appellate brief, plaintiff concedes that, all along, she had "a vague notion that she should not have received certain shots during her hospital stay.” In order for a medical malpractice claim to be deemed discovered under the six-month discovery rule, a plaintiff need only have reason to believe that his or her treatment was improper. 'This *350 does not require the advice of an attorney, but merely requires a subjective belief that a malpractice claim is possible.” Antal v Porretta, 165 Mich App 238, 242 ; 418 NW2d 395 (1987).

1989Kelly v Richmond, 156 Mich App 699 ; 402 NW2d 73 (1986); Juravle v Ozdagler, 149 Mich App 148 ; 385 NW2d 627 (1985).

1989Kelly v Richmond, 156 Mich App 699 ; 402 NW2d 73 (1986); Juravle v Ozdagler, 149 Mich App 148 ; 385 NW2d 627 (1985).

1989Kelly v Richmond, 156 Mich App 699 ; 402 NW2d 73 (1986); Juravle v Ozdagler, 149 Mich App 148 ; 385 NW2d 627 (1985).

1989Kelly v Richmond, 156 Mich App 699 ; 402 NW2d 73 (1986); Juravle v Ozdagler, 149 Mich App 148 ; 385 NW2d 627 (1985).

1988However, plaintiff argues that his lawsuit against the law firm was timely in accordance with the six-month discovery rule. *362 I am convinced that this case is governed by Luick, supra, the only published case in Michigan in which this Court addressed the issue whether an appeal tolls the legal malpractice statute of limitations.

1988I am convinced that this case is governed by Luick, supra, the only published case in Michigan in which this Court addressed the issue whether an appeal tolls the legal malpractice statute of limitations.