context of official immunity in Georgia

2024See, e.g., Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390, 392 (2) ( 467 SE2d 336 ) (1996) (construing the term “actual malice” in the context of official immunity under Art.

2024See, e.g., Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390, 392 (2) ( 467 SE2d 336 ) (1996) (construing the term “actual malice” in the context of official immunity under Art.

2015Kidd v. Coates, 271 Ga. 33 ( 518 SE2d 124 ) (1999). “[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do wrong” that is consistent with a “deliberate or premeditated design to inflict injury.” Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 414-415 ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2015Kidd v. Coates, 271 Ga. 33 ( 518 SE2d 124 ) (1999). “[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do wrong” that is consistent with a “deliberate or premeditated design to inflict injury.” Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 414-415 ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023“In short, the important question in the context of official immunity is . . . whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

2022Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199 (1) ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted); accord Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II); Harper, 270 Ga. App. at 440 (2). “[T]he important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether [the school administrators] owed a duty of care, but rather, whether [they] owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render [their] duty a ministerial one.” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019As our Supreme Court also noted in Barnett , " 'the important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.' " Barnett , 302 Ga. at 848 (II), 809 S.E.2d 813 , quoting Eshleman v. Key , 297 Ga. 364 , 367 (2), 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015).

2019As our Supreme Court also noted in Barnett , " 'the important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one.' " Barnett , 302 Ga. at 848 (II), 809 S.E.2d 813 , quoting Eshleman v. Key , 297 Ga. 364 , 367 (2), 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015).

2026See Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 581–82. 15 purposes.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 118 Ga. at 102 ).

2026See Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 581–82. 15 purposes.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 118 Ga. at 102 ).

2026See Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 581–82. 15 purposes.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 118 Ga. at 102 ).

2026See Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 581–82. 15 purposes.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 118 Ga. at 102 ).

2014It does not include wilful, wanton or reckless conduct or implied malice.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga. App. 235, 247 (2) (b) ( 638 SE2d 376 ) (2006).

2014It does not include wilful, wanton or reckless conduct or implied malice.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Daley v. Clark, 282 Ga. App. 235, 247 (2) (b) ( 638 SE2d 376 ) (2006).

2022Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199 (1) ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted); accord Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II); Harper, 270 Ga. App. at 440 (2). “[T]he important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether [the school administrators] owed a duty of care, but rather, whether [they] owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render [their] duty a ministerial one.” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199 (1) ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted); accord Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II); Harper, 270 Ga. App. at 440 (2). “[T]he important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether [the school administrators] owed a duty of care, but rather, whether [they] owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render [their] duty a ministerial one.” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 199 (1) ( 647 SE2d 54 ) (2007) (citations and punctuation omitted); accord Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II); Harper, 270 Ga. App. at 440 (2). “[T]he important question in the context of official immunity is not merely whether [the school administrators] owed a duty of care, but rather, whether [they] owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render [their] duty a ministerial one.” Barnett, 302 Ga. at 848 (II) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017“A deliberate intention to do wrong such as to constitute the actual malice necessary to overcome official immunity must be the intent to cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff[ ] (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Selvy v. Morrison, 292 Ga. App. 702, 704 ( 665 SE2d 401 ) (2008).

2017“A deliberate intention to do wrong such as to constitute the actual malice necessary to overcome official immunity must be the intent to cause the harm suffered by the plaintiff[ ] (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Selvy v. Morrison, 292 Ga. App. 702, 704 ( 665 SE2d 401 ) (2008).

2015McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593 ( 678 SE2d 922 ) (2009); see Crisp County School System v. Brown, 226 Ga. App. at 802 (2) (“The term ‘actual malice,’ as it is used in the context of official immunity, requires a deliberate intention to do wrong.”) (citation omitted).

2015McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593 ( 678 SE2d 922 ) (2009); see Crisp County School System v. Brown, 226 Ga. App. at 802 (2) (“The term ‘actual malice,’ as it is used in the context of official immunity, requires a deliberate intention to do wrong.”) (citation omitted).

2015Ill will alone is insufficient to establish actual malice; [Zimmerman] must show that [Stephens] acted with the deliberate intent to commit a wrongful act or with the deliberate intent to harm [him].” (Citation omitted.) Anderson, supra at 160 (2).

2015McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593 ( 678 SE2d 922 ) (2009); see Crisp County School System v. Brown, 226 Ga. App. at 802 (2) (“The term ‘actual malice,’ as it is used in the context of official immunity, requires a deliberate intention to do wrong.”) (citation omitted).

2015McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593 ( 678 SE2d 922 ) (2009); see Crisp County School System v. Brown, 226 Ga. App. at 802 (2) (“The term ‘actual malice,’ as it is used in the context of official immunity, requires a deliberate intention to do wrong.”) (citation omitted).

2014Compare State of Ga. v. Gober, 229 Ga. App. 700, 700-701 ( 494 SE2d 724 ) (1997). 6 malice is required, which is more than ill will: In the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do wrong, and denotes express malice or malice in fact.

2014Compare State of Ga. v. Gober, 229 Ga. App. 700, 700-701 ( 494 SE2d 724 ) (1997). 6 malice is required, which is more than ill will: In the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do wrong, and denotes express malice or malice in fact.

2014Unlike a ministerial act, a discretionary act “calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and 8 judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187, 191 (1) ( 581 SE2d 272 ) (2003). “[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do wrong, and denotes express malice or malice in fact.

2014Unlike a ministerial act, a discretionary act “calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and 8 judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Harvey v. Nichols, 260 Ga. App. 187, 191 (1) ( 581 SE2d 272 ) (2003). “[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do wrong, and denotes express malice or malice in fact.

2006See also Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Bd. of Ed., 232 Ga.App. 892 , 503 S.E.2d 43 (1998) (physical precedent only).

2006See also Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Bd. of Ed., 232 Ga.App. 892 , 503 S.E.2d 43 (1998) (physical precedent only).

2006Regarding the Bajjanis' allegations of actual malice, "`[i]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act [and] such act may be accomplished with or without ill will and whether or not injury was intended.' Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2), 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999)." Meagher v. Quick, 264 Ga.App. 639, 645 (3), 594 S.E.2d 182 (2003).

2006Regarding the Bajjanis' allegations of actual malice, "`[i]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act [and] such act may be accomplished with or without ill will and whether or not injury was intended.' Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2), 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999)." Meagher v. Quick, 264 Ga.App. 639, 645 (3), 594 S.E.2d 182 (2003).

2002Conference Center, 219 Ga. App. 104, 106 (1) ( 464 SE2d 398 ) (1995); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 297 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995); see also Dillard, supra at 383 (principal, school superintendent, and members of school board were immune from allegations that student was wrongfully suspended). 29 See Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (“[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act.”); Muller v. English, 221 Ga. App. 672, 676 (2) (c) ( 472 SE2d 448 ) (1996) (“ Wilful conduct is based o

2002Conference Center, 219 Ga. App. 104, 106 (1) ( 464 SE2d 398 ) (1995); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 297 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995); see also Dillard, supra at 383 (principal, school superintendent, and members of school board were immune from allegations that student was wrongfully suspended). 29 See Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (“[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act.”); Muller v. English, 221 Ga. App. 672, 676 (2) (c) ( 472 SE2d 448 ) (1996) (“ Wilful conduct is based o

2002Conference Center, 219 Ga. App. 104, 106 (1) ( 464 SE2d 398 ) (1995); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 297 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995); see also Dillard, supra at 383 (principal, school superintendent, and members of school board were immune from allegations that student was wrongfully suspended). 29 See Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (“[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act.”); Muller v. English, 221 Ga. App. 672, 676 (2) (c) ( 472 SE2d 448 ) (1996) (“ Wilful conduct is based o

2002Conference Center, 219 Ga. App. 104, 106 (1) ( 464 SE2d 398 ) (1995); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 297 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995); see also Dillard, supra at 383 (principal, school superintendent, and members of school board were immune from allegations that student was wrongfully suspended). 29 See Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (“[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act.”); Muller v. English, 221 Ga. App. 672, 676 (2) (c) ( 472 SE2d 448 ) (1996) (“ Wilful conduct is based o

2002Conference Center, 219 Ga. App. 104, 106 (1) ( 464 SE2d 398 ) (1995); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 297 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995); see also Dillard, supra at 383 (principal, school superintendent, and members of school board were immune from allegations that student was wrongfully suspended). 29 See Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (“[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act.”); Muller v. English, 221 Ga. App. 672, 676 (2) (c) ( 472 SE2d 448 ) (1996) (“ Wilful conduct is based o

2002Conference Center, 219 Ga. App. 104, 106 (1) ( 464 SE2d 398 ) (1995); Coffee County School Dist. v. Snipes, 216 Ga. App. 293, 297 ( 454 SE2d 149 ) (1995); see also Dillard, supra at 383 (principal, school superintendent, and members of school board were immune from allegations that student was wrongfully suspended). 29 See Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 415 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999) (“[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a wrongful act.”); Muller v. English, 221 Ga. App. 672, 676 (2) (c) ( 472 SE2d 448 ) (1996) (“ Wilful conduct is based o

2002A01A2202 and A01A2230 also lack merit. 32 See Gamble, supra. 33 See, e.g., Hill v. City of Fort Valley, 251 Ga. App. 615, 616 (1) (a) ( 554 SE2d 783 ) (2001) (to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must prove that (1) the conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal connection existed between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe); Gillis v. American Gen.

2002A01A2202 and A01A2230 also lack merit. 32 See Gamble, supra. 33 See, e.g., Hill v. City of Fort Valley, 251 Ga. App. 615, 616 (1) (a) ( 554 SE2d 783 ) (2001) (to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must prove that (1) the conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) a causal connection existed between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe); Gillis v. American Gen.

2000Rushing to the assistance of a fellow officer in response to an emergency call has been deemed a discretionary act for which a deputy sheriff may not be held personally liable unless he or she acted “with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury.” Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753 (6) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). “[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do [a wrongful act].” (Punctuation omitted.) Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999); Merrow v. Hawkins, supra at 391.

2000Rushing to the assistance of a fellow officer in response to an emergency call has been deemed a discretionary act for which a deputy sheriff may not be held personally liable unless he or she acted “with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury.” Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753 (6) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). “[I]n the context of official immunity, actual malice requires a deliberate intention to do [a wrongful act].” (Punctuation omitted.) Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414 (2) ( 520 SE2d 896 ) (1999); Merrow v. Hawkins, supra at 391.

1999In Merrow , we held that in the context of official immunity, “ ‘actual malice’ requires a deliberate intention to do wrong,” id. at 391 , and *415 denotes “ ‘express malice or malice in fact.’ [Cit.]” Id. at 392 . 1 This definition is consistent with express malice which, in criminal law, is similarly defined as a deliberate intention to do an unlawful act. 2 Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 259-260 ( 507 SE2d 744 ) (1998); see also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 3d ed. (1969) (express malice is a “deliberate or premeditated design to inflict injury or take life”).

1999In Merrow , we held that in the context of official immunity, “ ‘actual malice’ requires a deliberate intention to do wrong,” id. at 391 , and *415 denotes “ ‘express malice or malice in fact.’ [Cit.]” Id. at 392 . 1 This definition is consistent with express malice which, in criminal law, is similarly defined as a deliberate intention to do an unlawful act. 2 Parker v. State, 270 Ga. 256, 259-260 ( 507 SE2d 744 ) (1998); see also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 3d ed. (1969) (express malice is a “deliberate or premeditated design to inflict injury or take life”).