evidence at a suppression hearing in Georgia

2023When “the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.” Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36-37 (1) ( 727 SE2d 456 ) (2012).

2023When “the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.” Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36-37 (1) ( 727 SE2d 456 ) (2012).

2025Given the record before us, and in light of the reasonableness of time frames at issue, the trial court did not err by finding that the 9 Leopard does not challenge the particularity of the warrant’s description of the items to be seized. 10 See Miller, 288 Ga. at 286 (1) (appellate courts must view the evidence at a suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment). 8 search of Leopard’s cell phone occurred during the course of the execution of the warrant.11 2.

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the State or the defendant.1 To the extent that “the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.”2 The evidence from the suppression hearing was uncontraverted and shows that after arresting a suspect in a narcotics sting operation, a drug enforcement officer observed the suspect’s cell phone receive a text message from a person identified as 1 (Citations and punctua

2015These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the State or the defendant.1 To the extent that “the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.”2 The evidence from the suppression hearing was uncontraverted and shows that after arresting a suspect in a narcotics sting operation, a drug enforcement officer observed the suspect’s cell phone receive a text message from a person identified as 1 (Citations and punctua

2015These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the State or the defendant.1 To the extent that “the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.”2 The evidence from the suppression hearing was uncontraverted and shows that after arresting a suspect in a narcotics sting operation, a drug enforcement officer observed the suspect’s cell phone receive a text message from a person identified as 1 (Citations and punctua

2015These principles apply equally whether the trial court ruled in favor of the State or the defendant.1 To the extent that “the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.”2 The evidence from the suppression hearing was uncontraverted and shows that after arresting a suspect in a narcotics sting operation, a drug enforcement officer observed the suspect’s cell phone receive a text message from a person identified as 1 (Citations and punctua

2013See Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36-37 (1) ( 727 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (“When the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of law to the undisputed facts.”) (citation omitted); Corey v. State, 320 Ga. App. 350, 350-351 ( 739 SE2d 790 ) (2013) (applying de novo standard of review where only evidence is officer’s undisputed testimony and officer’s credibility has not been challenged).

2013See Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36-37 (1) ( 727 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (“When the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application of law to the undisputed facts.”) (citation omitted); Corey v. State, 320 Ga. App. 350, 350-351 ( 739 SE2d 790 ) (2013) (applying de novo standard of review where only evidence is officer’s undisputed testimony and officer’s credibility has not been challenged).

2020Significantly, “where controlling facts are not in dispute, such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de novo.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Benton v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 572 (2) ( 807 SE2d 450 ) (2017).

2020Significantly, “where controlling facts are not in dispute, such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de novo.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Benton v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 572 (2) ( 807 SE2d 450 ) (2017).

2017See Mitchell v. State , --- Ga. ----, ----, 802 S.E.2d 217 , 220 (2017) ("When the evidence at a suppression hearing is uncontroverted and the credibility of witnesses is not in question, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015Ellington, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ( 88 SCt 1868 , 20 LE2d 889) (1968). 2 Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 SE2d 503 ) (2001) (punctuation and footnotes omitted); see Ga. L. 2000, p. 523, § 1; see also Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 636 (2) ( 563 SE2d 527 ) (2002) (noting change to Georgia law). 3 Supra. 4 Chiasson, supra at 63-64 (1). 5 State v. Massa, 273 Ga. App. 596, 597 ( 615 SE2d 652 ) (2005), citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 6 Supra. 7 Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286 -287 (1) ( 702 SE2d 888 ) (2010), quoting Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1

2015See also Barrett v. State, 289 Ga. 197, 200 (1) ( 709 SE2d 816 ) (2011) (“[T]he trial court’s findings on disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and its application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.”). 2 “Skeet.” Skeet initiated a text message dialogue that the officer interpreted as inquiring about purchasing $325 worth of marijuana from the suspect.

2015See also Barrett v. State, 289 Ga. 197, 200 (1) ( 709 SE2d 816 ) (2011) (“[T]he trial court’s findings on disputed facts will be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and its application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo review.”). 2 “Skeet.” Skeet initiated a text message dialogue that the officer interpreted as inquiring about purchasing $325 worth of marijuana from the suspect.

2015To the extent an issue concerns a mixed question of fact and law, we accept the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and witness credibility unless they are clearly erroneous, hut independently apply the law to the facts.”) (citations omitted). 8 Tate, supra at 56 (3) (citation and footnote omitted); see State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 505 ( 602 SE2d 271 ) (2004) (“The trial judge, like the jury, is the primary guardian of the rights of a citizen.

2015To the extent an issue concerns a mixed question of fact and law, we accept the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and witness credibility unless they are clearly erroneous, hut independently apply the law to the facts.”) (citations omitted). 8 Tate, supra at 56 (3) (citation and footnote omitted); see State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 505 ( 602 SE2d 271 ) (2004) (“The trial judge, like the jury, is the primary guardian of the rights of a citizen.