156 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Grewegreen2 sentences2024See State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 214 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991); RCW 9.94A.585(4) (“To reverse a sentence which is outside the standard sentence range, the reviewing court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence outside the standard 22 For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/. 2024See State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 214 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991); RCW 9.94A.585(4) (“To reverse a sentence which is outside the standard sentence range, the reviewing court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence outside the standard 22 For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/. | 4 | 9 |
State v. Hughesred2 sentences2018The State argues that Baldwin remains good law.8 At the time of Baldwin and before Blakely, the SRA provided judges with the authority to impose a sentence outside the standard range based on the judge’s own finding that there were “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) (2000); see State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001), overruled by State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 131 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005). 2007Whenever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law. ¶40 As explained by Hughes, former RCW 9.94A.535 “explicitly directed] the trial court to make the necessary factual findings” to support an exceptional sentence “and d[id] not include any provision allowing a jury to make those determinations during trial, during a separate sentencing phase, or on remand.” Hughes, 154 Wn.2d at 149 (emphasis added). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2001See also State v. Johnson, 124 Wn.2d 57, 65-66 , 873 P.2d 514 (1994). 2001See also State v. Johnson, 124 Wn.2d 57, 65-66 , 873 P.2d 514 (1994). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Nordbygreen2 sentences1991"A sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for that offense if it finds, considering the *905 purpose of the SRA, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exception." State v. Pryor, 115 Wn.2d 445, 450 , 799 P.2d 244 (1990) (citing State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 516 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986)); RCW 9.94A.120(2). 1991"A sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for that offense if it finds, considering the *905 purpose of the SRA, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exception." State v. Pryor, 115 Wn.2d 445, 450 , 799 P.2d 244 (1990) (citing State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 516 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986)); RCW 9.94A.120(2). | 2 | 16 |
State v. Hughesred2 sentences2018The State argues that Baldwin remains good law.8 At the time of Baldwin and before Blakely, the SRA provided judges with the authority to impose a sentence outside the standard range based on the judge’s own finding that there were “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) (2000); see State v. Gore, 143 Wn.2d 288, 315 , 21 P.3d 262 (2001), overruled by State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 131 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005). 2007Whenever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law. ¶ 40 As explained by Hughes, former RCW 9.94A.535 "explicitly direct[ed] the trial court to make the necessary factual findings" to support an exceptional sentence "and d[id] not include any provision allowing a jury to make those determinations during trial, during a separate sentencing phase, or on remand." Hughes, 154 Wash.2d at 149, 110 P.3d 192 (emphasis added). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Armstronggreen2 sentences1989RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986). 1989RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547 , 723 P.2d 1111 (1986). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Houston-Sconiersgreen2 sentences2020See 188 Wn.2d at 21 . 2019See id. 6 No. 51511-3-II Here, the superior court was well aware of its ability and discretion to impose an exceptional mitigated sentence based on Collins’s youth. | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Allertgreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Friedlundgreen2 sentences2026In turn, whenever “a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” RCW 9.94A.535 (emphasis added); State v. Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d 388, 390-91 , 341 P.3d 280 (2015). 2026In turn, whenever “a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” RCW 9.94A.535 (emphasis added); State v. Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d 388, 390-91 , 341 P.3d 280 (2015). | 1 | 7 |
State v. Kolesnikgreen2 sentences2020State v. Kolesnik, 146 Wn. 2010Rather, the Gordon court's discussion of the functional equivalent of substantive crime elements was solely for purposes of underscoring the necessity of defining for the jury the specific legally-required components of the aggravating circumstances, rather than leaving the jury to speculate based on the ordinary meaning of these terms. [10] RCW 9.94A.585(4): To reverse a sentence which is outside the standard sentence range, the reviewing court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reaso | 1 | 5 |
State v. Taualagreen2 sentences2018Tauala, 54 Wn. 2017In other words, "[t]he need for rehabilitation or treatment, the need to protect society from dangerous offenders, and the previous failure of noncustodial treatment or supervision are reasons that can support a sentence outside the standard range." State v. Tauala, 54 Wn. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2001A sentence outside the standard range shall be a determinate sentence."; State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wash.2d 847, 857 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997); State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d 834, 839-40 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997) (quoting RCW 9.94A. 120(2); State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388, 391 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). [64] RCW 9.94A.390. [65] RCW 9.94A.390(2)(a) which provides "(2) Aggravating Circumstances (a) The defendant's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim." [66] Clerk's Papers at 498-500; see Ferguson, 97 Wash.App. 1080 , 1999 WL 1004992 , at *8. [67] C 2001A sentence outside the standard range shall be a determinate sentence."; State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wash.2d 847, 857 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997); State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d 834, 839-40 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997) (quoting RCW 9.94A. 120(2); State v. Ritchie, 126 Wash.2d 388, 391 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). [64] RCW 9.94A.390. [65] RCW 9.94A.390(2)(a) which provides "(2) Aggravating Circumstances (a) The defendant's conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim." [66] Clerk's Papers at 498-500; see Ferguson, 97 Wash.App. 1080 , 1999 WL 1004992 , at *8. [67] C | 1 | 4 |
State v. Morogreen2 sentences2006Respondent has escaped while on [electronic home monitoring] and when placed on pass from detention to Lakeside Milam, Respondent left the inpatient program facility three times in three days, and remained on warrant status for a period approximately two months thereafter." Id. [18] Clerk's Papers at 22. [19] See State v. Moro, 117 Wash.App. 913, 918 , 73 P.3d 1029 (2003) ("the need for treatment or rehabilitation, . . . and the previous failure of noncustodial treatment or supervision are valid reasons that support a sentence outside the standard range"). [20] Clerk's Papers at 24. [21] RCW 1 2004A court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for a juvenile offender if it determines that a sentence within the standard range would "effectuate a manifest injustice." RCW 13.40.160(2); State v. Beaver, 148 Wash.2d 338, 345 , 60 P.3d 586 (2002). "`Manifest injustice' means a disposition that would either impose an excessive penalty on the juvenile or would impose a serious and clear danger to society in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977(JJA)." RCW 13.40.020(17); State v. Moro, 117 Wash.App. 913, 918 , 73 P.3d 1029 (2003). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Morogreen2 sentences2006Respondent has escaped while on [electronic home monitoring] and when placed on pass from detention to Lakeside Milam, Respondent left the inpatient program facility three times in three days, and remained on warrant status for a period approximately two months thereafter." Id. [18] Clerk's Papers at 22. [19] See State v. Moro, 117 Wash.App. 913, 918 , 73 P.3d 1029 (2003) ("the need for treatment or rehabilitation, . . . and the previous failure of noncustodial treatment or supervision are valid reasons that support a sentence outside the standard range"). [20] Clerk's Papers at 24. [21] RCW 1 2004A court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for a juvenile offender if it determines that a sentence within the standard range would “effectuate a manifest injustice.” RCW 13.40.160(2); State v. Beaver, 148 Wn.2d 338, 345 , 60 P.3d 586 (2002). “ ‘Manifest injustice’ means a disposition that would either impose an excessive penalty on the juvenile or would impose a serious and clear danger to society in light of the purposes of [the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA)].” RCW 13.40.020(17); State v. Moro, 117 Wn. | 1 | 3 |
| State v. SHgreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. McAlpingreen | 1 | 2 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Mulhollandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Gorered | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gorered | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stubbs
green
2 sentences2014State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117, 123 , 240 P. 3d 143 ( 2010); see also RCW 9. 94A. 585( 4) ( stating that we may reverse a sentence outside of the standard range if " the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record. "). 2012To reverse an exceptional sentence, we must find either that “the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record which was before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence outside the standard sentence range for that offense” or that “the sentence imposed was clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.” RCW 9.94A.585(4); Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d at 123 . | 9 | 2011–2019 |
State v. Law
green
2 sentences2008State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶ 7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. 2008State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. | 7 | 2008–2018 |
State v. Stubbs
green
2 sentences2014State v. Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d 117, 123 , 240 P. 3d 143 ( 2010); see also RCW 9. 94A. 585( 4) ( stating that we may reverse a sentence outside of the standard range if " the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record. "). 2011State v. Stubbs, 170 Wash.2d 117, 123 , 240 P.3d 143 (2010); see also RCW 9.94A.585(4) (stating that this court may reverse a sentence outside of the standard range if "the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the record."). | 6 | 2011–2015 |
State v. Pryor
green
2 sentences1991"A sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for that offense if it finds, considering the *905 purpose of the SRA, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exception." State v. Pryor, 115 Wn.2d 445, 450 , 799 P.2d 244 (1990) (citing State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 516 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986)); RCW 9.94A.120(2). 1991"A sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the standard range for that offense if it finds, considering the *905 purpose of the SRA, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exception." State v. Pryor, 115 Wn.2d 445, 450 , 799 P.2d 244 (1990) (citing State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 516 , 723 P.2d 1117 (1986)); RCW 9.94A.120(2). | 6 | 1991–2001 |
State v. Law
green
2 sentences2008State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶ 7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. 2008State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. | 5 | 2008–2018 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2005RCW 9.94A.535 allows the court to “impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. 2005RCW 9.94A.535 allows the court to “impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S. Ct. 2531 , 159 L. | 4 | 2005–2021 |
State v. Hale
green
2 sentences2013Mejia is correct that RCW 9. 535 states that "[ 94A. w]henever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law." State v. Hale, 146 Wn. 2011This statute provides in relevant part, ‘Whenever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 146 Wn. | 4 | 2011–2013 |
State v. Ha'Mim
red
2 sentences2008State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶ 7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. 2008State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. | 4 | 2001–2008 |
State v. Ha'mim
red
2 sentences2008State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wash.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶ 7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. 2008State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005) (quoting State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997)); RCW 9.94A.585(4). ¶7 RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part: The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. | 4 | 2001–2008 |
State v. Fisher
green
2 sentences1994In Fisher , the Supreme Court expressed two reasons for prohibiting the sentencing judge from considering earned early release in imposing an exceptional sentence: (1) the fact that the framework of the SRA indicates that earned early release time is to be considered only after the offender has begun serving the sentence, and (2) because it would be unfair to impose a sentence outside the standard range based on speculative predictions about the likely behavior of the offender while in confinement. 108 Wn.2d at 429 n.6; 58 Wn. 1994Fisher, 108 Wn.2d at 429 . | 4 | 1989–1994 |
State v. Garcia-Martinez
green
2 sentences2023When a defendant appeals a discretionary sentence within the standard range, our review is limited to those “circumstances where the court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.” State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47 , 56, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017) (adopting the language of State v. Garcia- Martinez, 88 Wn. 2016"So long as the trial court has considered whether there is a basis to impose a sentence outside the standard range, decided that it is either factually or legally insupportable and imposed a standard range sentence, it has not violated the defendant's right to equal protection." Garcia-Martinez. 88 Wn. | 3 | 2016–2023 |
State v. Fowler
green
2 sentences2017It is a requirement of all exceptional reduced sentencing that "any reasons relied on for deviating from the standard range must 'distinguish the defendant's crime from others in the same category."' State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 405 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002) (quoting State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 509 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993)). 4 r i I No. 33642-5-111 I I State v. Graham I I I "To reverse a sentence which is outside the standard sentence range, the reviewing I court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not II supported by the record which was before the judge 2008State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 405 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002). | 3 | 2008–2017 |
State v. Fowler
green
2 sentences2017It is a requirement of all exceptional reduced sentencing that "any reasons relied on for deviating from the standard range must 'distinguish the defendant's crime from others in the same category."' State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 405 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002) (quoting State v. Gaines, 122 Wn.2d 502, 509 , 859 P.2d 36 (1993)). 4 r i I No. 33642-5-111 I I State v. Graham I I I "To reverse a sentence which is outside the standard sentence range, the reviewing I court must find: (a) Either that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not II supported by the record which was before the judge 2008State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 405 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002). | 3 | 2008–2017 |
State v. Pascal
green
2 sentences2005Former RCW 9.94A. 120(2) (emphasis added). 34 ¶66 Former RCW 9.94A.390 contained a list of “illustrative factors,” but cautioned that the factors “are illustrative only and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences.” Id. 2005Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) (emphasis added). [13] ¶ 65 Former RCW 9.94A.390 contained a list of "illustrative factors," but cautions that the factors "are illustrative only and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences." Id. | 3 | 1991–2005 |
State v. Ritchie
green
2 sentences2001A sentence outside the standard range shall be a determinate sentence.”; State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 857 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997); State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 839-40 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997) (quoting RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Ritchie, 126 Wn.2d 388, 391 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). 2001A sentence outside the standard range shall be a determinate sentence.”; State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 857 , 947 P.2d 1192 (1997); State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 839-40 , 940 P.2d 633 (1997) (quoting RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Ritchie, 126 Wn.2d 388, 391 , 894 P.2d 1308 (1995)). | 3 | 1996–2001 |
State v. Batista
green
2 sentences1994In McClure , the court indicated that a sentencing judge must choose between the two types of exceptional sentences — a sentence outside the standard range and consecutive sentencing — based on the following statement in State v. Batista, 116 Wn.2d 777, 785-86 , 808 P.2d 1141 (1991): " 'If a presumptive sentence is clearly too lenient, this problem could be remedied either by lengthening concurrent sentences, or by imposing consecutive sentences.’ ” McClure, 64 Wn. 1994In McClure , the court indicated that a sentencing judge must choose between the two types of exceptional sentences — a sentence outside the standard range and consecutive sentencing — based on the following statement in State v. Batista, 116 Wn.2d 777, 785-86 , 808 P.2d 1141 (1991): " 'If a presumptive sentence is clearly too lenient, this problem could be remedied either by lengthening concurrent sentences, or by imposing consecutive sentences.’ ” McClure, 64 Wn. | 3 | 1992–1994 |
State v. Solberg
green
2 sentences2019Under RCW 9.94A.535(3)(e), an offense is a major violation of the VUSCA when the offense is “more onerous than the typical offense of its statutory definition.” The fact the offenses for which Abarca was convicted were by definition “more onerous than the typical offense,” provides an ample basis for the trial court to conclude that there was a substantial and compelling reason to distinguish this 11 See State v. Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d 388, 390-92 , 341 P.3d 280 (2015); State v. Pappas, 176 Wn.2d 188, 190-91 , 289 P.3d 634 (2012); Stubbs, 170 Wn.2d at 122 ; Solberg, 122 Wn.2d at 702 - 05; State 2004State v. Rotko, 116 Wash.App. 230, 242 , 67 P.3d 1098 (2003) (citing RCW 9.94A.585(4); State v. Solberg, 122 Wash.2d 688, 705 , 861 P.2d 460 (1993)). | 2 | 2004–2019 |
| State v. France green | 2 | 2015–2019 |
| State v. Davis green | 2 | 2016–2017 |
| State v. Alvarado green | 2 | 2012–2014 |
| State v. Alvarado green | 2 | 2012–2014 |
| State v. McClure green | 2 | 1994–2013 |
| State v. Rohrich green | 2 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Hale green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Stevens green | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Mail green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Beaver green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Beaver green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Breedlove green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Rotko neutral | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Jeannotte green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Jeannotte green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Freitag green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. George green | 2 | 1993–1994 |
| State v. Oxborrow green | 2 | 1993–1994 |
| In Re the Welfare of Luft green | 2 | 1984–1992 |
| State v. Wall green | 2 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Griffin green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Griffin neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.